

**COMPETING AND
COMPLEMENTARY PERSPECTIVES
ON THE EU AS A CRISIS
MANAGEMENT ACTOR:
An Examination of the Common
Security and Defence Policy through the
Lenses of Idealism and Realism**

DISSERTATION

to obtain the degree of Doctor
at the Maastricht University,
on the authority of the Rector Magnificus
Prof.dr. G.P.M.F. Mols
in accordance with decision of the Board of Deans,
to be defended in public
on Thursday 25 November 2010, at 14:00 hrs

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Financial Contributor:

the Swedish Armed Forces.

Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.

Albert Einstein (1879-1955)

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Cover image by Caroline Gyllensporre:

The EU flag with the globe embedded on it depicts the global reach of the CSDP. In the margins a 'war hawk' and a 'peace dove' are shown, representing the influences of Realism and Idealism, respectively.

ISBN 978 90 8666 172 5

Published by Boekenplan, Maastricht.

Abstract

This thesis applies policy analysis to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in order to explain the actions of the European Union (EU) as an international crisis management actor. The ability to intervene in conflicts, including the use of force, distinguishes the CSDP from other policy areas of the EU. There are several key challenges associated with the study of the EU as an international actor. As a foreign policy actor, the EU is a *sui generis*, one of a kind, being neither a state nor an international organisation. It therefore lacks strict conformity with most of the models and theories within the realm of international relations (IR) theory, which, in general, takes a state-centric view of the interaction between international actors, and its applicability to the EU is questionable. Within this policy field, the EU portrays itself as an altruistic and unselfish ‘force for good’. This self-image is shared by other Western states and organisations. Its uniqueness is defined by the strong correlation that exists between the self-image and the representation of the CSDP by the research community, where the EU has captivated the majority of CSDP scholars.

This idealistic description of the EU raises some questions. When the EU describes itself as a beacon to the rest of mankind, it implicitly elevates European values and norms to a cosmopolitan level, thus claiming moral primacy. It could be argued that the global proliferation of values and norms is an act of a hegemonic power that aspires to shape the world in its favour, surely neither a noble nor an altruistic act. The notion of unselfishness also raises other questions from a domestic perspective. Is it not reasonable to expect that the CSDP first and foremost safeguards the interests of the EU citizens? Moreover, portraying the EU as a civil and soft power does not adequately explain the rapid development and frequent use of intrusive crisis management instruments outside the EU, and in particular, its military deployments. A few scholars have taken another approach by regarding the EU as a power-maximizing actor. This can neither explain the EU as an ardent advocate of international law and multilateralism, nor constitute a perspective that explains its relative weakness in the military arena, despite being a global economic power that has aspired towards defence cooperation since the 1950s. Moreover, it does not provide a compelling argument for the rapid expansion of civilian assistance missions that do not seek to enforce the will of the EU.

This research project is framed by the overarching question as to how the Council's decision to engage in crisis management missions be explained and is divided into two phases. Its primary objective is to contribute to a more detailed perception of the motivations behind EU crisis management missions. It subjects the explanatory power of Realism and Idealism, respectively, to critical examination by means of empirical analysis. Accordingly, the research revolves around two seminal questions:

1. How effective are Realism and Idealism, respectively, in assessing the motivation of the EU as a crisis management actor?
2. What is the explanatory power of various schools within Realism in assessing the motivation of the EU as a crisis management actor?

Based on official EU documents, the first phase investigates how effective Realism and Idealism are, respectively, in assessing the motivation of the EU as a crisis management actor by examining the decision-making for the twenty-three CSDP missions decided on from 2002 to 2009. Scientifically the work is positioned within the realm of International Relations, and more specifically, it relates to the sub-field of Security Studies. It is therefore important to identify relevant independent variables for the research that are rooted in the scientific discipline of Security Studies. When reviewing the body of literature in this discipline, six pertinent questions emerge that relate to distinct interrogatives. In order to operationalise the aforementioned six independent variables, they need to be tailored to reflect the CSDP context:

- *Why* is CSDP action justified?
- *What* is the nature of the threat?
- *How* should a CSDP response be tailored?
- *Where* is the conflict taking place?
- *When* is CSDP action needed?
- *Who* is engaged in resolving the conflict?

The investigation produced indecisive results in that neither Realism nor Idealism generated a dominant explanatory power for the CSDP. Contrary to the prevailing perception of the EU as a soft power, only some 55% of the empirical output collected indicated idealist preferences. This finding is even more striking when one considers that the empirical work was limited to official EU documents and statements. Consequently, the commonly held view that the EU is an altruistic foreign policy actor must be rejected, as it is too simplistic. Since neither Idealism nor Realism possess sufficient explanatory

power to explain decisions to launch CSDP missions, branches of the latter in these meta-theories should be further explored.

The second phase of the research investigates the explanatory power of various schools within Realism by drawing on four CSDP missions that revealed the pre-dominance of realist traits in the initial research, as well as on secondary empirical data. The realist schools considered include Classical Realism, Neorealism and Neoclassical Realism. Several key aspects of the research design are configured differently in comparison with the first part of the research. While the first phase of the research employs CSDP missions as the unit of analysis and produces an investigation of all CSDP missions, this phase takes a qualitative approach with selected realist theories as the analytical object, or unit of analysis. This allows an investigation of the explanatory power of these realist theories in the context of the CSDP. Hence, in order to test these realist theories, the selected CSDP missions become the independent variables that allow the theories to be populated with empirical data. Two of the most commonly utilised levels of analysis models for IR theory are used as a point of departure. The first model has been designed by Kenneth Waltz, who seeks to explain war as a product of a political process, at three levels, or by using three images. The second model has been developed by Graham Allison, who examines the USA's decision-making process during the Cuban Missile Crisis by applying a three-level analysis. Based on these models and the work of two influential CSDP scholars who represent the realist tradition, Barry Posen and Adrian Hyde-Price, an analytical framework has been developed, as shown in the table below.

Level of Analysis	Criteria	Mission 1	Mission 2	Mission 3	Mission 4
External Level	D1: Competition with the USA				
	D2: Reducing security dependence on the USA				
Internal MS Level	D3: National interests of the EU3				
	D4: Security in the neighbourhood				
Internal EU Level	D5: Ability to act				
	D6: Prestige and Promotion of the CSDP				

TABLE 1: Analytical Scheme Part II

This empirical investigation generated a somewhat indecisive result in that none of the six criteria produced a compelling explanatory power. Only when the realist schools are regarded as complementary and their results are combined, do they provide an explanatory power for Realism, and some 58% of the output generated was positive. If competition with the USA is eliminated as a criterion, the result improves, with an

overall output ratio of 65%. Significantly, this criterion is one of the most common arguments advanced by scholars in arguing for a realist perspective of the CSDP. This inconclusive result must also take into account that the four most 'realist-prone' missions were subjects of the study.

A synthesis of the findings suggests that the EU pursues crisis management based on an evenly balanced mix of realist and idealist influences. CSDP missions are as much about satisfying vital self-interests as advancing universal value interests. Responses are based on realist perceptions of the security environment and tailored to address state-centric threats in the neighbourhood of the EU or in former colonies of Member States. These actions are guided by idealist principles, often involving non-coercive measures. Responses tend to provide assistance through civilian instruments rather than military force. Employment deliberations also involve considerations of the enhancement of the political weight of the EU, including the Council, along with the aspiration to ensure effective multilateralism. Furthermore, the EU prefers intervening in post-conflict situations or preventive engagements without applying deterrence. It is hard to contend that the EU is a soft power, while, on the other hand, the explanatory power of Realism is weak. The EU is not advancing the CSDP to challenge American dominance in international security. On the contrary, it prefers complementary efforts. Nonetheless, the EU is influenced by a desire to reduce its security dependence on the USA. Realist drivers for the EU are generated primarily by Member States. The motivation for deployment of CSDP missions is affected by national interests, in particular, those of France, as well as a desire to secure EU borders, while the EU bureaucracy also contributes to the shaping of EU behaviour based on Realism. It does so for prestige, a desire to promote the CSDP, and to demonstrate the EU's ability to act. None of these aspirations by the EU bureaucracy have a strong influence on EU behaviour, but combined they constitute a driver for Realism. Since empirical investigation reveals a lack of convincing correlation with the analytical framework and the realist criteria examined, it is inferred that the explanatory power for explaining drivers for Realism is, to borrow an adjective often used for the CSDP, soft. To summarise, the EU thinks like a realist but acts as an idealist. It is a soft power with a hard core. The Council is predisposed to operate on the basis of idealistic principles in tailoring the mission mandate and timing the intervention, but its considerations are still underpinned by a realist calculus. It responds to state-centric threats and makes geopolitical priorities in the neighbourhood.

Acknowledgements

This project has been an intellectual journey involving a multitude of crossroads and roadblocks, and I wish to thank all those who helped me to move forward, without whom, I could not have completed this project. Their friendship and professional collaboration have meant a great deal to me. In this regard, I am deeply indebted to my supervisor, Professor Dr. Chris de Neubourg, whose encouragement, guidance and support from initial ideas to the final manuscript, enabled me to develop a scientific mindset. With each of his reviews, the manuscript took a quantum leap forwards in terms of quality and clarity.

I am indebted to my co-supervisor, Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Håkan Edström, for his persistence and constructive contributions. Throughout the project he has acted as my intellectual sherpa, guiding me to new heights of scientific understanding. With his support I have safely avoided numerous detours that I was all too ready to follow. He has a remarkable ability to find structure and make complex matters appear simple and understandable. I have been exceptionally privileged to have such a talented and dedicated mentor and a PhD fellow could not ask for more.

My gratitude also goes to the Assessment Committee. Professor Dr. Sophie Vanhoonacker (chairperson) together with Dr. Walter Hendriks, Dr. Jaap Hoogenboezem, Professor Dr. Knud Erik Jørgensen, and Professor Dr. Ramses Wessel provided careful and constructive assessments of my work. They helped me to significantly improve the manuscript in several critical areas, in particular, its legal and historical aspects.

The Maastricht Graduate School of Governance is an outstanding institution where one can conduct research while maintaining a full-time job. I admire the flexibility and pragmatism of the staff, in both the faculty and the administration, and I cannot imagine a better place to complete my dissertation. Special thanks go to Dr. Mindel van de Laar, who has been instrumental in making sure that the research project maintained momentum and progressed in compliance with the academic standards of the school. I would also like to thank my fellow students at the Dual Career PhD programme in Governance and Policy Analysis, in particular Manos Sfakianakis (Greece) and Laura Torvinen (Finland), who have been a tremendous support and inspiration.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. Magnus Petersson, for his inspiration and excellent guidance on scientific methods. His comments have all been very valuable. I am indebted to Professor Dr. Janne Haaland-Matlary for sharing her wealth of knowledge on the research subject. Her initial guidance allowed the project to take off in a direction that I was not able to fully appreciate until much later. I would like to express

my deepest gratitude to Professor Dr. Barry Posen, who patiently shared his insights into Realism and the EU. His academic work is not only central to the dissertation, but his personal involvement also took my conclusions on Neorealism to a higher level.

Each aforementioned individual provided insights that guided and challenged my thinking, substantially improving the finished product.

In addition to the technical and instrumental assistance listed above, I received equally important assistance and inspiration from family and friends. In particular my wife, Helena, who unselfishly ensured the conditions necessary for me to pursue this long-time personal goal. Thank you!

Finally, I thank my supportive work colleagues and superiors, who made it possible for me to combine my professional work with scientific research. During the research project I have had six consecutive superiors who have been equally patient. Their support has been a precondition for this research project. In chronological order they are Brigadier Ian Abbott (British Army), Brigadier General Reinhard Trischak (Austrian Army), Brigadier General Dieter Dammjacob (German Air Force), Brigadier General Jürgen Weigt (German Army), Lieutenant General Sverker Göranson (Swedish Army), and Lieutenant General Jan Salestrand (Swedish Air Force).

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Abbreviations

A

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
ANP	Afghan National Police
APF	African Peace Facility
Artemis	EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
AU	African Union

B

BOMMOLUK	Improvement of Border Controls at the Moldova-Ukraine Border
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C

CARDS	Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
Concordia	EU Military Operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy (previously ESDP)

CSP	Country Strategy Paper
D	
DG E	Directorate-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs
DR Congo	Democratic Republic of Congo
E	
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECHO	The Humanitarian Aid department of the European Commission
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDF	European Development Fund
EEC	European Economic Community
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EU AMIS	EU to support the African Union Mission in Darfur
EU3	The three most influential Member States; France, Germany and the UK
EUBAM Moldova	EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine
EUBAM Rafah	EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories
EUFOR Althea	EU Military Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina
EUFOR Tchad/RCA	EU Military Operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic
EUFOR RD Congo	EU Military Operation in support of the UN Mission in DR Congo
EUJUST Themis	EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia
EUJUST Lex	EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq
EULEX Kosovo	EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUMC	Military Committee of the European Union

EUMS	Military Staff of the European Union
EUMM Georgia	EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia
EUNAVFOR Somalia	EU Counter-Piracy Naval Operation off the Coast of Somalia
EUPAT	EU Police Advisory Team in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
EUPOL Afghanistan	EU Police Mission in Afghanistan
EUPOL COPPS	EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories
EUPOL Kinshasa	EU Police Mission in Kinshasa in DR Congo
EUPOL Proxima	European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
EUPOL RD Congo	EU Police Mission in DR Congo
EUPM	EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina
EUSEC RD Congo	EU security sector reform mission in the DR Congo
EUSSR Guinea-Bissau	EU mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau
EU NAVCO	EU military coordination of action against piracy in Somalia
F	
FOMUC	Multinational African Force in Central Africa
G	
G8	Group of Eight
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
GAM	Free Aceh Movement
GTEP	Georgia Train and Equip Program
I	
ICC	International Criminal Court
IFS	Instrument for Stability
IR	International Relations
IFOR	Implementation Force

ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
K	
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KFOR	Kosovo Force
M	
MINURCAT	UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in DR Congo
N	
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NSS	National Security Strategy
O	
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHR	Office of the High Representative
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OMiK	OSCE Mission in Kosovo
P	
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PNC	National Congolese Police
R	
RSC	Regional Security Complex
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
S	
SAP	Stabilisation and Association Process
SFOR	Stabilisation Force

SG/HR	Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for the CFSP
SITCEN	Joint Situation Centre
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SPLA/M	Sudanese People's Liberation Army/Movement
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SSDAT	Security Sector Advisory Team
T	
TACIS	Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TEC	Treaty on European Community
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TFPR	Task Force on Palestinian Reform
U	
UÇK	National Liberation Army
UN	United Nations
UPC	Union of Congolese Patriots
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UPDF	Ugandan People's Defence Force
W	
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization
WFP	World Food Programme

Part I

Introduction

Chapter 1

How can EU Crisis Management Missions be Explained?

[O]ur very name is rooted in mythology - Europa being a beautiful maiden carried off by the God Zeus in the guise of a bull. But today's Europe, beautiful though she may be, is no longer that kind of girl.

Benita Ferrero-Waldner¹

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is popular, important, and opaque and has been subject to almost no empirical research. This study empirically documents and analyses twenty-three interventions conducted by the European Union (EU). In it, I seek to understand the extent to which European actions in the CSDP context can be explained by altruistic motives, i.e., 'an unselfish force for good' driven by the desire to 'make the world a better place', or by the dictates of realpolitik, driven by self-interest and power maximization. The study investigates whether the 'beautiful maiden' mentioned in the quotation at the beginning of this chapter has grown into a benevolent granny or a selfish Amazon.

The CSDP is popular among European citizens and is in line with the ambitions of the political leadership, which aims to play a major role in world politics. The CSDP is relevant because it is seen as an important, if not the most important, instrument with which the EU establishes and confirms its role as a protagonist on the world stage. However, there are almost no fully developed theoretical treatments of the CSDP, nor has it been thoroughly interpreted in light of Idealism or Realism. Few if any scholars

¹ Quoted in Ferrero-Waldner (2007, p.1). The quote starts with 'our'. At the time of the statement Benita Ferrero-Waldner was the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy.

have studied the wealth of documents related to EU interventions, documents that could shed light on the nature of the CSDP and the motives underlying it.

Using the outcomes of a detailed analysis of key official documents concerning these twenty-three interventions, this study concludes that both the idealist and realist perspectives apply and coexist, though neither possesses overwhelming explanatory power with regard to the CSDP. The ‘beautiful maiden’ may be slightly schizophrenic or at least confused; she is ‘neither soft nor hard’ (Chapter 7), but rather ‘a soft power with a hard core’ (Chapter 12).

The empirical study itself was hampered by three specific circumstances. Firstly, the EU is a peculiar actor on the international scene, being neither a country nor an international organization. Secondly, decision-making in the EU is complex because it involves several layers and multiple power centres, for which reason the documents to be studied must encompass, *inter alia* CFSP Statements, Council Conclusions, European Council Conclusions, Common Positions, and Joint Actions. Most importantly, however, the documents themselves are sometimes inconsistent and incomplete. All the above arguments and the resulting conclusions are elaborated in the remainder of this chapter and the rest of the thesis.

1.1 The Research Problem

1.1.1 Framing the Research

This thesis applies policy analysis to the CSDP to explain the actions of the EU as an international actor. The CSDP is a unique and a nascent policy area, which, since its inception in 1999, has shown remarkable development. Its progress has been described as ‘revolutionary’ and it has been assessed as the fastest developing policy area of the EU (Solana, 2007e). The CSDP is also one of the most popular policy fields pursued by the EU. More than three-quarters of Europeans are in favour of defence and security cooperation (Foucault et al., 2009). It also has an important external function, as the CSDP is instrumental in the Union’s bolstering its role as a credible and capable global actor on the world stage (General Secretariat of the Council, 2009). The ability to intervene in conflicts, including the use of force, distinguishes the CSDP from other EU policy areas. The external dimension of the CSDP employs military forces and civilian capabilities pledged by Member States to improve security conditions during all phases of a conflict. These engagements are labelled CSDP missions. There is also an internal and integrating dimension to the CSDP that seeks to enhance the effectiveness and utility of the military forces of the Member States. This internal dimension is not

as developed as the external one, which is entirely logical, as defence and security are closely linked to the *raison d'État* and the fundamental rationale for the state construct. Surrendering the authority of national armed forces to the European integration process in areas that ultimately affect national survival interests is a sensitive issue, and this relationship gives the CSDP distinct features.

There are several key challenges associated with the study of the EU as an international actor. As a foreign policy actor, the EU is a *sui generis*, one of a kind, (Tonra and Christiansen, 2004, p.26) being neither a state nor an international organisation. It therefore lacks strict conformity with most of the models and theories within the realm of international relations (IR) theory (Farrell, 2005, p.453), which, in general, takes a state-centric view of the interaction between international actors, and its applicability to the EU is questionable. It is only recently that research has started to recognise the importance of non-state actors, yet, the EU does not fully conform to this alternative representation either. The wide range of EU policy areas includes internal as well as external policies. It has treaties that take primacy over national law in selected policy areas. While the EU is supranational in some areas of foreign policy, for instance, in external trade and development aid, it subscribes to intergovernmental principles in others, such as the CSDP.² The picture is further complicated by the fragmented institutional regime by which the EU is governed (Rosamond, 2005, p.465). In external relations, spokespersons acting on behalf of the European Council, the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the General Secretary of the Council, and the rotating Presidency represent the EU in their overlapping areas of competence, and the EU cannot be regarded as a homogenous actor.³ In order to draw attention to the nuances needed to explain the complexities within the Union, an elaboration of these EU entities is provided in Chapter 2. This dissertation makes references to selected EU bodies rather than the EU as a whole. To further blur the picture, Member States pursue their own security policy in tandem with the EU. The EU is represented in various formal and informal international institutions. In some settings, such as the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, the Group of Eight (G8), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), the EU has a seat at the table together with some of its Member States. The influence that the EU wields, as well its ability to 'speak with one voice', varies significantly (Gstöhl, 2009, p.385). There is little research that takes the uniqueness of EU into account (Carlsnaes et al., 2004). Indeed, the exclusive characteristics

² This supra-nationality is even more complicated considering that the EU has exclusive competence in some areas, such as external trade (i.e. Common Commercial Policy) while it shares competencies with Member States in other areas, including Development Aid. In this latter case, national policies are pursued in parallel with EU ones.

³ It is recognised that the implementation of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) makes the representation of the EU more streamlined.

of the EU as an international actor limit the ability to explain its behaviour based on existing theories. Nevertheless, this uniqueness has application beyond the European continent. Other regional security institutions, including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) also mix supranational governance with intergovernmental principles. The EU is spearheading the development of regional governance and integration, and inspiring others to copy it (Anderson, 1999, p.vii). The relevance of the research problem transcends the EU and calls for a wider application.

Another characteristic of the EU is its self-image. In the policy field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the parent policy area of the CSDP, the EU portrays itself as an altruistic and unselfish 'force for good' (Solana, 2006) and a normative power with a high degree of legitimacy (Farrell, 2005, p.452). Moreover, it claims to be both an ethical (European Council, 2001b) and a civil power (Prodi, 2000), driven by the desire to make the world a better place (European Council, 2003a). To a large extent, other states and organisations based on Western values also share this self-image, but the EU is unique in that the academic representation of the EU resonates with its self-image. Many scholars examine the EU through a liberal-idealist lens (Sjursen, 2006a). These observers assert that the EU acts primarily in support of universal values as opposed to advancing its own interests. The academic community applies similar descriptors to the EU, such as 'civil' (Duchêne, 1972), 'ethical' (Aggestam, 2008), 'civilising' or 'normative' (Manners, 2002), and 'soft' power (Michalski, 2005) to denote its *modus operandi*. Whilst describing the EU in this way is appealing, it makes implicit assumptions that may not be universally accepted. For instance, it suggests that what is good for Europe is, by definition, good for the rest of the world. Indeed, when the EU describes itself as a beacon to the rest of mankind, it implicitly elevates European values and norms to a cosmopolitan level, thus claiming moral primacy. It could be argued that the global proliferation of values and norms is an act of a hegemonic power that aspires to shape the world in its favour, surely neither a noble nor an altruistic act. The notion of unselfishness also raises other questions from a domestic perspective. The mandate given to the EU, codified in its treaties, is not confined to acting as a global force for good, but is primarily intended to promote the interests of European citizens. From this perspective, labelling the EU an unselfish force for good does not hold, and it can be argued that the CSDP was born out of self-interest (Bailes, 2008). The Balkan Crisis, and specifically the inability of Europe to intervene and de-escalate this major conflict at its borders, served as a catalyst for the introduction of the CSDP. As a part of the CFSP, and a key component of EU foreign policy, is it not reasonable to assume that CSDP first and foremost safeguards the interests of EU citizens? Moreover, portraying the EU as a civil and soft power does not adequately explain the rapid development and frequent

use of intrusive crisis management instruments outside the EU, and, in particular, its military deployments. Since 2003, the EU has had military forces continuously deployed in overseas missions, often with a mandate to use lethal force, if need be, to ensure peace and stability.

For all its good intentions, any account that portrays the CSDP solely as a universal peace project limits the ability to explain actions and progress within the CSDP. On the other hand, viewing the EU as a power-maximising and self-serving actor, as a few scholars do (Giegerich and Wallace, 2004; Hyde-Price, 2006; Posen, 2006), also has its shortfalls. Neither can it explain the EU as an ardent advocate of international law and multilateralism, nor does it constitute a perspective that explains the EU's relative weakness in the military arena, despite its being a global economic power that has aspired towards defence cooperation since the 1950s. Moreover, it does not provide a compelling argument for the rapid expansion of civilian assistance missions that do not seek to enforce the will of the EU.

The conception of the kind of actor that the EU is within the realm of the CSDP is under-theorised (Forsberg, 2006; Sjørnsen, 2006b), and several factors coalesce to restrict theoretical framing. As with other areas of European integration, the CSDP is conceived as an open-ended and amorphous process, without a clearly defined end-state. The research undertaken in this area is both polarised and skewed. Most of it is normative in that it is sympathetic to the EU self-image and does not challenge how the EU portrays itself (Sjørnsen, 2006a). Many scholars reinforce this notion by adding new utopian descriptors. A minority of scholars denounce the altruistic perspective of the CSDP and posit self-interest, in particular, on the part of key Member States, as the underlying motivation. Most of these assertions make little effort to anchor such claims in IR theory. However, a few have produced explanations of the CSDP based on Neorealism (Hyde-Price, 2006; Posen, 2006), but they fall short of being regarded as theories. Another common denominator for research in this field is the lack of empirical grounding. Since the first deployment in 2003, twenty-four crisis management (CSDP) missions have been deployed on three continents.⁴ The sea of empirical data that they have produced has to a large extent not been charted by the research community.

Among the schools that seek to explain how actors behave in order to enhance security, Realism and Liberalism are the two dominant ones (Collins, 2007). Within the latter tradition, internationalists are labelled as idealists (Burchill et al., 2005). Arguably, Idealism offers the most distinctly liberal school in contrast with Realism. The projection of the EU as an altruistic actor, by the Union itself, as well as by a significant part of

⁴ The study examines twenty-three CSDP missions. At the time of finalising the dissertation the Council has decided to launch another mission, the EU Training Mission for Somalia.

the research community, makes Idealism a logical point of departure in explaining its behaviour as an international actor. Consequently, the counter claim, asserting the EU as a self-centred powerhouse, also deserves attention, since it takes the analysis to the roots of IR studies encapsulated by the dichotomy between Idealism and Realism. The approach chosen does not argue that the EU is a realist or an idealist actor *per se*. Instead, these bodies of theories are employed as lenses through which its behaviour is examined and assessed.

The aforementioned challenges cloud the picture, making it more difficult to understand the kind of crisis management actor that the EU is, while simultaneously posing some pertinent questions. Is the self-proclaimed and commonly held view amongst scholars of the EU as an altruistic actor a representative one? Is it relevant to portray the EU as an altruistic actor? Does the idealistic notion of the EU provide a compelling explanatory power for understanding the EU as a crisis management actor? If not, should the EU be perceived as a power-maximising actor that seeks to leverage its role and influence in international relations through its crisis management engagements? Several audiences benefit from an improved knowledge of the limitations and strengths inherent in the explanatory power of the dominant theories that Realism and Idealism represent. The CSDP is a capstone policy field for the EU, and it is important for Europeans to understand and influence it, in particular, against the backdrop of concerns over the democratic deficit and lack of transparency within the EU (Bono, 2005; Wagner, 2006). Moreover, the recent amendments to the Treaties pave the way for further development of the CSDP. This merits a vibrant debate amongst practitioners as to how the EU should serve its citizens in the field of defence and security in the future.

In order to better understand the EU, it is necessary to develop and improve the explanatory power of theories. The representation of the EU, either as an altruistic or as a power-maximising actor, introduces an exclusivity that prevents these perspectives from co-existing. Competition among perspectives necessitates the strong dominance of either school in order to produce compelling arguments. Either Idealism or Realism dominates and produces overwhelming evidence, or neither accumulates compelling arguments. Their combined contributions cannot be assessed. Arguably, it is myopic to conceptualise the EU as a crisis management actor based on a single political tradition. Is it possible to move beyond this competing approach and find ways to treat Idealism and Realism as complementary explanations? Another possible shortfall is the treatment of Idealism and Realism, respectively, as homogenous schools. Is it sufficient to view these schools at a macro-level, rather than investigating their various branches and successors? In order to probe this area, it would be prudent, first and foremost, to address Realism. On the one hand, an examination based on Idealism can draw extensively on other research and on statements by EU officials, but will generate limited

additional value, since Idealism conforms with the self-image and notions provided by the research community. Realism, on the other hand, is inherently not associated with the EU. It is state-centric and pays little attention to non-state actors. Consequently, the EU has attracted limited research interest among realist scholars. Hence, an in-depth study of Realism within the context of the EU is likely to produce new findings and provide contributions for the research community. What incentives are there for Realism in the context of the CSDP? How can contemporary realist theories account for EU crisis management missions? Significantly, the dialectic discussion, involving Realism and Idealism, also necessitates attention to some relevant secondary questions. What cannot be explained by Idealism and Realism? How can this theoretical void be addressed by alternative explanations?

1.1.2 The Scope of the Research

To address the aforementioned problems of representing of the EU either as an altruistic or as a power maximizing actor, the research is framed by the overarching question of how to explain the Council's decision to engage in crisis management missions. This thesis is limited to explaining such behaviour in retrospect and does not aim to predict the future behaviour of the EU. Its primary objective is to contribute to a more detailed perception of the motivations behind EU crisis management missions, and it subjects the explanatory power of Realism and Idealism, respectively, to critical examination by means of empirical analysis. Accordingly, this research revolves around two seminal questions:

1. How effective are Realism and Idealism, respectively, in assessing the motivation of the EU as a crisis management actor?
2. What is the explanatory power of various schools within Realism in assessing the motivation of the EU as a crisis management actor?

The focus is on explaining the behaviour of the EU as well as contributing to the empirical work in this area, and the aim of this thesis is two-fold. It is designed to serve a broad audience, including both practitioners who work within the EU and EU citizens, helping them to appreciate the motivation that drives the EU to launch crisis management missions. Addressing this aim will implicitly shed light on the EU as an actor in the international arena. This aim is primarily accomplished by addressing the first question posed above. It is hoped that this thesis will stimulate a critical evaluation of the EU self-image and facilitate an informed discourse on the interaction between the EU and its citizens. Nevertheless, scholars remain the primary target audience. With regard to this group, the thesis intends to contribute to the research community's quest to provide

an enhanced explanatory power in the IR theories relating to the EU as a foreign policy actor. The scope of this applied research project is not to test these theories, but to investigate their explanatory power. Another supportive aim of this paper is to enrich the research community through a significant and unique empirical contribution that can lend support to other projects.

1.1.3 Research Design

In order to address the aforementioned questions, research is divided into two phases, of which the first seeks to clarify the first question. The point of theoretical departure is, on the one hand, the realm of security studies and, on the other hand, the idealist perception of the EU and its competing and contrasting theoretical school, i.e., Realism. The explanatory power of each school is investigated, based on a set of common questions that will force the adoption of a stance in favour of either Idealism or Realism. In a competitive research context common questions necessitate different explanations. To be of value in explaining the behaviour of the EU, one of them must have a clear dominance. This setup allows individual evaluations of Idealism and Realism, but it rejects a combined assessment. Empirical data are drawn from an investigation of official EU information about twenty-three crisis management missions. While this research applies a high level of abstraction by treating Idealism and Realism as homogenous and monolithic constructs, the second phase of the research examines the explanatory power of Realism in more detail by examining various trends and perspectives within that school. This phase explores three complementary Realist explanations for EU actions. Since scholars and practitioners have tended to subscribe to the Idealist narrative, a further elaboration of Idealism is likely to add little that is new. By contrast, an in-depth examination of incentives based on Realism has a significant potential for adding value to the research community. This second phase also builds on the initial findings in that it applies a limited subset of missions for further study, namely those that result in the dominance of realist outcomes in the initial analysis. The empirical data are expanded so as to include secondary sources. Mindful of the general perception of Idealism as the ideological repository for the CSDP, the in-depth elaboration of the explanatory power of Realism seeks to invigorate research through alternative perspectives.

The author has experience of some twenty-seven years of service in the Swedish Army, including assignments at the Ministry of Defence and secondment to the EU Military Staff, as well as operational experience from some of the conflict areas studied, although the analytical approach chosen is that of an outsider.

1.2 Thesis Structure

The thesis is subdivided into four parts. Part I serves as an introduction to the research, which is framed in Chapter 1. It identifies a problem statement with two associated research questions and outlines the general thrust of the work. Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the EU and, more specifically, to the CSDP as a policy field. It gives a brief account of the history of the CSDP as well as its legal and political foundation. Chapter 3 reflects on the images and roles that the EU assumes in the context of the CSDP, as scholars and the EU portray them. Part II addresses the usefulness of Idealism and Realism, respectively, in explaining the EU as a crisis management actor. Chapter 4 outlines methodological considerations for this part of the research by deducing pertinent independent variables from the body of research within the scientific discipline of Security Studies. Chapter 5 elaborates relevant theories in order to develop an analytical framework. EU policies are examined to define a set of plausible outcomes, i.e., EU responses. To further complete the analytical framework, the set of plausible outcomes is partitioned into subsets relating to Realism and Idealism, respectively. Subsequently, a unique and comprehensive empirical investigation of all CSDP missions is conducted. Given the extensive body of analysis, a full account of the empirical work is documented in a supporting appendix (Appendix A). For the purpose of readability and overview, these findings are condensed in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, conclusions are drawn corresponding to the first research question. Part III tests the explanatory power of Realism, at three distinct conceptual levels, and the focus is to identify drivers for Realism. To this end, the subset of realist-dominated missions, based on the findings in Part II, is further examined by drawing on realist claims by two scholars, Adrian Hyde-Price and Barry Posen. Chapter 8 provides a methodological approach for the research. The independent variables are operationalised by developing an analytical framework comprising three levels of analysis. In Chapter 9, theories relating to the CSDP and Realism are examined to further refine the analytical framework by identifying criteria for assessment or realist drivers. Chapter 10 involves the empirical treatment based on the analytical framework. The work sheds light on the driving forces for realist influences on the CSDP missions. In the following Chapter 11, conclusions are drawn that relate to the second research question. Part IV comprises only the concluding Chapter 12. This chapter revisits the research problem as defined in Chapter 1 and summarises the findings. Finally, areas for further research are proposed.

Chapter 2

An Introduction to CSDP

Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan

Robert Schuman¹

2.1 Introduction

Any student of national policy machineries is likely to struggle with ambiguities and convoluted processes, and in this regard the EU does not seem any different. It is an amorphous institution comprising several actors with overlapping responsibilities, whose roles have evolved over time. Scholars interested in exploring EU policy framework will find it a challenge to obtain a comprehensive and coherent picture of the actors, processes and the products, including their internal relationships, which are involved in EU policy-making. Against this background, the ambition of this chapter is a modest one. It introduces aspects of the political, legal, and institutional foundations upon which the CSDP rests, which are relevant to the empirical analysis. A study of the EU as an international actor necessitates a knowledge of its unique developmental path as an institution and the context in which it was shaped (Casier and Vanhoonacker, 2007). A considerable portion of this chapter is devoted to the history and the evolution of the common security and defence policy. Further details of some areas are provided in Chapter 5, as the independent variables are operationalised. The reader is advised to bear in mind that the empirical investigation covers CSDP missions during the period

¹ Declaration of 9 May 1950 by the French foreign minister which led to the creation of what is now the European Union, see http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm. The website was accessed on 25 October 2008.

from 2002 to 2009, and that the later part of the development discussed below is undertaken in parallel with these missions, which themselves constitute a key dimension of the CSDP development.

2.2 The Trinity of the evolving Common Security and Defence Policy

In physics it is known fact that a pendulum in motion that is influenced in its movements by three equally strong magnets never repeats its trajectory. This suggests that any system of three interacting forces can generate very complex dynamics to a point beyond predictability, and Karl von Clausewitz used a trinity of three sets of forces to explain the phenomena of war (Alberts and Czerwinski, 1997, p.72).² Each of these forces is underpinned by its own laws and rationale, and this metaphor is also instructive in explaining the roots and development of the CSDP. In this version of the trinity, the forces are embodied by France, the UK and (West) Germany. France, the engine for European integration, leverages national interests by elevating them to the European level and by creating institutions capable of addressing them at that superior level. Britain's way to leverage its interests does not go via Brussels but across the Atlantic, to Washington and its 'special relationship' with the USA. It is a hesitant power in European integration, as the utility of surrendering authority to European institutions lacks appeal. Initially (West) Germany was the fettered and passive force, whose actual power lay in its potential as a security threat, but it subsequently became an integrating force, often in close cooperation with France. Its reluctance to employ military force to accomplish policy objectives abroad distinguishes Germany from France.

2.2.1 Security Considerations in the Aftermath of World War II

European multilateral security and defence management has a long history that predates World War II. In 1814, key states in Europe met at an international conference to plan how to respond to crises that threatened the security of the region, which became known as the Concert of Europe. This conference pioneered peacetime multilateral crisis management and its security regime served as an inspiration for the League of Nations (Lindley, 2003, p.225), an institution closely associated with Idealism. After the end of the Cold War, the Concert of Europe also facilitated discussion of the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Lindley, 2003, p.225), the chief international institution associated with deterrence, military power and Realism.

² Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) was a Prussian general who produced theories on strategy that remain influential. For a comprehensive discussion on Clausewitz and the trinity, see Beyerchen (1992).

In the aftermath of the Second World War, several initiatives were pursued to unite Europe and improve its security, many of which originated in France. After World War II, the French elite was united in a strategy for Europe aimed at restoring French strength while keeping Germany weak (Parsons, 2003, p.56). In 1950, the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, proposed the pooling of coal and steel production and the creation of a supranational body to control a common market for these commodities (Dedman, 1996, p.57). The ultimate goal of the Schuman Plan was to provide security (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p.189), and Schuman argued that its aim was to make war between France and West Germany “not only unthinkable, but materially impossible” (Lucarelli, 1999, p.183). In 1951 the Treaty of Paris was signed, founding the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (European Coal and Steel Community, 1951).

Earlier, two other important security initiatives had been launched. As the Cold War escalated, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the UK signed the Treaty of Brussels, which established the Western Union in 1948. An institution, the Western Union Defence Organisation, was set up under the patronage of Field Marshal Montgomery to implement its defence provisions (Duke, 2000, p.13). The Treaty included, *inter alia*, provisions for mutual defence assistance. During the negotiations the British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, as well as his French colleague, Georges Bidault, tried to lure the USA into joining (Kaplan, 2004, p.2), as only its involvement would make this security alliance credible. However, it was reluctant to commit itself and it took another year of negotiations before the signatories to the Western Union joined the USA in signing the North Atlantic Treaty, in effect establishing NATO.³ Their calculations involved the survival interests of the European countries as well as ideological and economical interests with regard to Germany (Cogan, 2001, p.340).

In 1950, yet another security initiative was taking shape. At the European Assembly, Winston Churchill put forward a proposal for a unified European Army to provide effective European security (Mauter, 1998, p.79). While his idea did not express supranational aspirations a contemporary proposal did. René Pleven, the French Prime Minister, proposed a plan for an European Defence Community (Fursdon, 1980, pp.86-90). This proposal was, *inter alia*, a response to the USA’s insistence on rearming West Germany and the admission of that country into NATO, as American forces stationed in Europe were needed for the unfolding Korean War (Menon et al., 1992, p.100). The USA’s position was preceded by a proposal from Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, that West Germany should take part in the defence of Europe. From a French perspective it was believed that a supranational European Army would ensure the strictest control over German forces (Parsons, 2003, p.62). Pleven envisaged a pan-European defence force of some

³ In addition, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal signed the North Atlantic Treaty.

100,000 men as an alternative to the proposed NATO enlargement. It was foreseen that the European Defence Community would become an ostensible supranational construct under the political auspices of a European Political Community and a European Ministry of Defence (Dedman, 1996, pp.70-92). However, the force would be placed under the military command of NATO. Negotiations began within the ECSC in 1951 and Jean Monnet convinced Eisenhower of the benefits of an European Army, and the USA gave its support to the proposal (Winand, 1996, p.28).⁴ The NATO Council also endorsed the plan (Cook, 2001, p.348). The UK showed the same reluctance to join this supranational institution as it did in the case of the ECSC. A year later, the European Defence Community Treaty was signed by the signatories to the ECSC, and thus the UK opted out. However, the plan was never realised. In 1954 the French Parliament rejected it for fear that the treaty would threaten French national sovereignty (Judt, 2005, p.245). France also had difficulties in accepting its being subjected to supranational authorities while the UK could operate independently (Vanhoonacker, 2001, p.61).⁵ As a compensation for the French 'Non', the Treaty of Brussels was amended by the Paris Agreements in 1954 to demonstrate European unity in security matters *vis-a-vis* the USA and to cater for the defence integration of West Germany (Duke, 1996, p.168).⁶ These changes were initiated by the French prime minister, Pierre Mendès-France, in order to "frame German rearmament within a Franco-British-led intergovernmental organization" (Parsons, 2003, p.66). The Paris Agreements established the Western European Union (WEU) and brought in West Germany as well as Italy.⁷ From the outset, the WEU was made dependent on NATO in defence matters. Article IV of the Paris Agreements states that "the Council and its Agency will rely upon the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters" (Bloed and Wessel, 1994, p.3). The WEU mandate was not confined to security and defence cooperation and it addressed most aspects of European integration. However most other areas became irrelevant due to other cooperation arrangements; in particular, the European Economic Community (EEC) was entrusted with more powers and a broader mandate (Bloed and Wessel, 1994, p.xv).

Despite the significant development of security cooperation after World War II, including the establishment of NATO and the WEU, Europe still lacked security policy coordination, let alone a common security policy.

⁴ Jean Monnet was the chief architect of the Schuman Plan. He was the first president of the High Authority of the ECSC.

⁵ For a multi-faceted discussion on the rationale behind the rejection see Parsons (2003, pp.61-5).

⁶ Key official documents of the WEU are available in Bloed and Wessel (1994).

⁷ The change of name of the organisation and the inclusion of West Germany and Italy are attributed to the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden (Cook, 2001, 348).

2.2.2 The Bumpy Road Towards a Common Security Policy

The failures to create supranational entities to coordinate foreign policy and to establish a joint military force did not stop the progress of European integration and the aspiration towards closer security cooperation, and, once again Jean Monnet was instrumental in these efforts. He galvanised the support of various interest groups and politicians in the countries concerned (Phinnemore and McGowan, 2002, p.4). In 1957, two treaties were signed in Rome, founding the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)(European Atomic Energy Community, 1957; European Economic Community, 1957).⁸ The EEC provided a supranational authority for a common external economic policy, but the community was not endowed with any powers relating to other aspects of foreign and security policy, such as diplomacy and defence. While neither of these Treaties specifically addresses security issues, they are important building blocks of EU architecture.⁹ The founding treaties have been supplemented by accession treaties for the enlargements and other treaties and protocols.¹⁰ In addition, consolidated versions of the founding treaties serve the purpose of improving access to the legal framework by incorporating amendments. Several evolutionary steps in the context of other treaties and protocols are elaborated below.

During the Suez Crisis in 1956, the limitations of the transatlantic agreement became apparent to the Europeans, and the UK and France were unable to act as a global power without the consent of the USA. Although the former arrived at different conclusions with regard to this failure, it demonstrated the limitations of what could be expected from European integration without the inclusion of a foreign policy and security dimension (Hoffmann, 2000). Following this humiliating event, the UK closed ranks with the USA by signing the USA-UK Mutual Defence Agreement in 1958. France, on the other hand, saw the need for greater independence from the USA through further European integration. This conclusion was reinforced by the French setbacks in consultations with the USA and UK over NATO reform and nuclear weapons cooperation (Bozo, 2001, pp.46-8). As a consequence, President de Gaulle started to nurture the idea of a European defence organisation (Bozo, 2001, p.49). In 1960 he convinced the German Chancellor, Adenauer, that a political union to address these issues was needed based on intergovernmental principles (Smith, 2004a, p.46). In 1961 the six signatories to the EEC agreed to developed political cooperation for a defence organisation and

⁸ As the EU celebrated its fiftieth anniversary in 2007, the treaties of Rome are generally perceived as marking the birth of the EU.

⁹ They constitute two of the four founding treaties upon which the EU rests; together with the ECSC treaty three communities were in place. In addition the treaty launching the EU in 1991 is a founding treaty.

¹⁰ The categorisation follows that of the EUR-Lex available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm>. The website was last accessed on 24 August 2009.

mandated Christian Fouchet, a French diplomat, to prepare recommendations, which were presented in the form of a draft Treaty in 1961 (Fouchet Plan I), and modified in 1962 (Fouchet Plan II). The idea was to establish a Council composed of the Heads of states or governments supported by a Council of Foreign Ministers. To assist them a European Political Commission would be established separately from the European Communities. The smaller states denounced the plan for fear of being dominated by France and de Gaulle's idea of a 'Europe of States' was rejected. Shortly thereafter, he vetoed British EEC membership. This was partly a response to USA-UK dominance in defence matters through the agency of NATO (Smith, 2004a, p.68).

The Merger Treaty, signed in 1965, contributed to enhanced policy coherence by establishing a common Commission, the Commission of the European Communities, henceforth called the Commission, as well as a single Council of Ministers for all three communities (European Communities, 1965).¹¹ Another initiative for implementing an external dimension for this cooperation was launched in 1969. The proposal to organise European Political Cooperation (EPC) served several purposes. It gave fresh impetus to European integration as France withdrew from NATO's integrated military structure. The initiative also made use of the planned EEC enlargement in 1973 to include the UK. The practical aspects of the European Political Cooperation started on a modest scale and gradually expanded, based on three reports: Luxembourg/Davignon (1970), Copenhagen (1973), and London (1981). The negotiations on the Davignon report, designed to set out the scope and modalities for the European Political Cooperation (EPC), were influenced by the failure to establish the European Defence Community and the Fouchet Plan (Smith, 2004a, p.69). It called for the EPC to "allow member states of the European Community to discuss and co-ordinate their positions on foreign affairs and, where appropriate, act in concert" (White, 2001, p.71). The Copenhagen Report reflected enhanced information exchange, through more frequent meetings and the introduction of a telex-system, the COREU-network (Wessel, 1999, p.6). As the EPC matured, it started to achieve synergies with the Commission (Cameron, 2007, p.24). In 1980, Community instruments were used to implement the policies as sanctions were utilised to implement foreign policy decisions (Casier and Vanhoonacker, 2007, p.110). The cooperation with the Commission was codified and further strengthened in the London Report (Wessel, 1999, p.6). The Single European Act, signed in 1986, provided another important step for the EPC. A legal framework for cooperation was introduced in order to jointly 'formulate and implement a European foreign policy' (European Communities, 1986, Art.30). The Presidency of the Council was appointed to chair the EPC, with the Commission 'fully associated'. However, the powers granted to the institutions

¹¹ The Merger Treaty is sometimes referred to as the Brussels Treaty. The formal name is Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities.

were limited. Considerable measures were taken to confine and to curtail the new policy area and to ensure the primacy of the Member States.¹² Scholars are divided over the utility of the EPC. It proved to be successful in adopting common positions on some international developments while others were left unattended (Casier and Vanhoonacker, 2007, p.110). A comprehensive assessment of the EPC must consider that throughout its period of existence, and later, Member States stressed the intergovernmental nature of foreign policy cooperation when addressing their domestic audiences. As a consequence, procedures were as important as substance (Koutrakos, 2006, p.384). With this inward-looking perspective, the effectiveness of the policies is only one factor by which this cooperation should be assessed. Another important factor is the socialisation of foreign policy on the European level. In this regard it was successful as it paved the way for a common foreign and security policy (CFSP).

2.2.3 Introducing the Common Foreign and Security Policy

The Treaty on European Union (TEU), often referred to as the Treaty of Maastricht, came about in a very turbulent security environment (European Council, 1992b).¹³ This encouraged Member States to take part in a foreign and security policy. The intergovernmental conference to prepare the TEU was prompted by German reunification in 1990. This period was also shaped by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. In addition, the American-led liberation of Kuwait, the Gulf War, defined a new kind of high-technology conflict resolution under the auspices of the UN. In the negotiations, the President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, argued that the lessons learnt from the Gulf War demonstrated the limitations of the European Communities, and he concluded that “the only option compatible with the complete vision of European union was to insert a common security policy into this framework” (Holmes, 1997, p.70). On top of these seminal events a civil war unfolded in Europe, in Yugoslavia.¹⁴ To demonstrate EU cohesion and its ability to resolve the situation, Jacques Poos, then Luxembourg’s foreign minister and a representative of the EU Presidency, loftily proclaimed that “the hour of Europe has come” (Guicherd, 1993, p.159). In fact, it turned out to be an awkward moment for Europe and the EU, whose lack of political unity prolonged the crisis. As the war tore Yugoslavia apart and genocide took place,

¹² According to the Single European Act the final decisions were in effect taken by Members States: “The determination of common positions shall constitute a point of reference for the policies of the High Contracting Parties” (European Communities, 1986, Art.30 para 2(c)). In addition, cooperation was excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (European Communities, 1986, Art.31). Although it was integrated within the legal framework foreign policy cooperation retained many unique features (Koutrakos, 2006, p.386).

¹³ The Treaty was finalised at the European Council meeting in Maastricht on 9-10 December 1991 and finally signed on 7 February 1992 (Menon et al., 1992, p.98).

¹⁴ This was, however, not the first major conflict in Europe after World War II. Conflicts also include, but are not limited to, the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) and the Cyprus conflict (1974).

Europeans were unable to respond with coherent and adequate measures, including the use of military force (Dover, 2005).¹⁵ The TEU came into force in November 1993. The first important CFSP initiative and arguably the most important EU contribution to resolving the Balkan Crisis was already in the making. At the European Council Copenhagen Summit in 1993, a French proposal on a stability pact, sometimes referred to as the Balladur Pact, was deliberated favourably, whereby the use of CFSP instruments was foreseen (European Council, 1993, p.16). This initiative later evolved into a Stability Pact involving all key players in the international community.¹⁶

The TEU established the European Union based on a three-pillar structure, where the first pillar was based on the *acquis*¹⁷ of the European Communities. The EEC Treaty was renamed the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) to streamline the first pillar and to signal that it operated with a broader mandate outside the economic domain (European Council, 1992a). The TEU introduced an intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the second pillar, thereby replacing the EPC. What started as aspirations of political ‘cooperation’ in 1950 had evolved into common policy, albeit at an intergovernmental level. The vague language of the Single European Act, as reflected above, was significantly changed, whereby Member States were required to “support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity” (European Council, 1992b, art. J.1,J.4). However the cohesive power of these provisions did not meet expectations as the TEU was put in practice as “the obligation is to consult, not to unite” (Wessel, 2003, p.287). If negotiations fail to reach a consensus, Member States are free to pursue their own agenda. The Treaty also established objectives for this policy area, which are analysed in Chapter 5.4.1. Notwithstanding this progress, decisions within the CFSP are generally taken unanimously. For France and the UK it was still too sensitive to relinquish the power to veto, which is an integral part of consensus decision-making with regard to foreign policy. Germany, on the other hand, applied a more pragmatic approach (Vanhoonacker, 1997, p.6). Significantly, EU foreign policy had a wider scope than the second pillar and it also included community measures in the field of trade, development aid, co-operation agreements with third countries and organisations, and enlargement policies, which are possibly the most powerful foreign policy tool (Pollack, 2000). A third pillar, addressing cooperation in the spheres of Justice and Home Affairs was also established.

¹⁵ Nonetheless, there was some evidence of an ability to act, including the European Community Monitor Mission; the European administration, reconstruction, and police forces in Mostar; and diplomatic efforts by European mediators (Debié, 1997).

¹⁶ The Stability Pact is further discussed in Chapter 5.7.1.

¹⁷ *Acquis communautaire* refers to the body of law accumulated thus far (Phinnemore and McGowan, 2002, pp.3-4).

Although the TEU streamlined policy fields and the policy actors, it introduced new dividing lines. For once, the pillars were distinct in that they had different legal frameworks and fundamentally different decision-making procedures. To ensure coordination both the Commission and the Council were made responsible for ensuring consistency in policy development. In addition, the Commission became fully associated with the CFSP. As the EU uses a combination of supranational and intergovernmental principles concurrently in applying its foreign policy, this became a growing concern that provided the impetus for further amendments to the TEU. Despite the founding nature of the TEU, there was no sense of completeness. The urge to refine it, on the part of those Member States who wanted further European integration, was present from the outset (Nugent, 2006, p.93). One of the most significant achievements of the subsequent Treaty of Amsterdam (European Council, 1997), signed in 1997, was the improved effectiveness and coherence of external policies (Nugent, 2006, p.96). A High Representative for the CFSP was established to assist the Council of Ministers (henceforth the Council) and the Presidency. A policy planning and early warning unit was organised in the Secretariat to assist the Council in becoming more proactive. The Treaty also provided more clarity on measures for attaining policy objectives, including Common Strategies, Joint Actions and Common Positions.¹⁸ The Treaty of Amsterdam outlined a mandate for possible crisis management operations, including humanitarian and rescue and peace-keeping tasks and the tasks of combat forces in crisis management.¹⁹ However, the EU did not aspire to develop its own capabilities for such undertakings. Instead, the Treaty of Amsterdam envisaged the EU requesting support from the WEU. The underlying reason for this indecisive arrangement was a compromise. On the one hand, the UK did not want to undermine the role of NATO as the premier security organisation in Europe, on the other hand, France and Germany wanted the WEU to be integrated into the EU (Vanhoonaeker, 1997, p.7).

In parallel with the development of a more assertive role for the EU, a new transatlantic balance needed to be established. A more independent political role for Europe had to be reconciled with the continued reliance on American military capabilities. Following the adoption of the TEU, a proposal for a European Security and Defence Identity was put forward in order to establish a stronger and more European pillar of NATO. This was a response to the mandate given to the CFSP (Cornish, 1996, p.753), which included; “all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence” (European

¹⁸ Common Positions and Joint Actions were introduced in the Treaty of Maastricht but clarified in the amendments to the TEU based on the Treaty of Amsterdam. Common Strategies were introduced in the TEU following the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam and further clarified in the TEU based on the Treaty of Nice.

¹⁹ These so-called ‘Petersberg Tasks’ are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. For a detailed discussion on the integration of these tasks within the CFSP, see Pagani (1998).

Council, 1992b, art.J.4). At a NATO ministerial meeting in 1996, the European Security and Defence Identity proposal was implemented within NATO, possibly in order to ensure that the development of crisis management capabilities remained within the realm of the transatlantic cooperation (North Atlantic Council, 1996).

The enhanced CFSP was put to the test during the ratification process of the Treaty of Amsterdam, as the Kosovo War erupted in 1999. The EU was once more faced with a conflict in its backyard without the ability to respond adequately. The Council had not yet developed the capabilities necessary to manage crises of this nature. In the end, NATO, driven by overwhelming American airpower, stepped in and intervened. It did so without a UN Security Council resolution, a key requirement for EU endorsement, as this was enshrined in the TEU. However, the EU was still able to muster political support for the NATO air campaign. The European Council Declaration that offered support for the intervention did so from a self-defence, humanitarian and historical perspective (European Council, 1999a).²⁰ Domestic criticism of the EU grew in several Member States as the air campaign failed to have the decisive effect that was expected, and EU security and credibility were at stake (Türkcs and Gökğöz, 2006, p.676). At this critical juncture, the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, and then the EU Presidency argued for EU leadership; “it is unacceptable for the European Union to do nothing when human rights are being trampled upon only an hour’s jet flight away” (Friis and Murphy, 2000, p.769). This marked the starting point for a more ambitious policy for the region. It also provided an important incentive for the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which was taking shape in parallel during the German Presidency (Clarke, 2000; Keukeleire, 2001).

2.2.4 Adding the European Security and Defence Policy

Given the aforementioned blocked positions in the negotiations on the Treaty of Amsterdam regarding integral EU defence capabilities, the breakthrough in defence cooperation in 1998 came as a surprise for many commentators. New Labour and Tony Blair had been in office since 1997 and had sought a fresh start from the outset. Some argue

²⁰ This passage in the Declaration captures the gravity with which this crisis was regarded:

On the threshold of the 21st century, Europe cannot tolerate a humanitarian catastrophe in its midst. It cannot be permitted that, in the middle of Europe, the predominant population of Kosovo is collectively deprived of its rights and subjected to grave human rights abuses. We, the countries of the European Union, are under a moral obligation to ensure that indiscriminate behaviour and violence, which became tangible in the massacre at Racak in January 1999, are not repeated. We have a duty to ensure the return to their homes of the hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons. Aggression must not be rewarded. An aggressor must know that he will have to pay a high price. That is the lesson to be learnt from the 20th century. (European Council, 1999a, Part III).

that Prime Minister Blair abandoned the traditionally sceptical British position due to a realisation that he could maximize British influence in international politics by combining the special relationship with the USA with a constructive European dimension (Hoffmann, 2000, p.193). It was also seen as an attempt to gain relevance and adjust the balance of power in European affairs. The close cooperation between Germany and France had been driving EU development and by bolstering Franco-British relations, the dynamics would change (Hoffmann, 2000, p.193). However, the conventional view is that it was Blair's frustration at the inability of the EU to deal with the Balkan Crisis that constituted the key justification (Howorth, 2000; Stadelmaier, 2009). The first indication of a policy change came at the informal EU summit at Pörschach in October 1998 when Blair stated that "there is a strong willingness, which the UK obviously shares, for Europe to take a stronger foreign policy and security role" (Shepherd, 2000, p.14). This signalled a significant shift in British attitudes to European defence issues. The change materialised in December 1998 when the Franco-British Saint-Malo initiative was agreed. The Saint-Malo meeting produced a Letter of Intent on closer defence cooperation between the two countries and a joint declaration on European defence. The common view on European defence that emerged from the initiative terminated almost fifty years of British obstruction of European security cooperation. The Declaration included an acknowledgement that the Union needed capacity for autonomous action in response to international crises with 'credible military forces'. At the same time it legitimised the EU's becoming a credible and capable international actor in the realm of international peace and security (Howorth, 2001, p.769). In effect, this initiative paved the way for the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and later the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), as a subset of the CFSP. The Franco-German Summit in May 1999 confirmed that Germany was also in agreement with the St Malo initiative (Shepherd, 2000, p.15). It came therefore as no surprise when the European Council Summit in 1999 in Cologne adopted a key passage in the Saint-Malo Declaration:

[T]he Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. (European Council, 1999b, Annex III).²¹

This aspiration also articulated a need to establish an integral decision-making structure within the Council to replace the support provided by the WEU (European Council, 1999b, Annex III). Concurrently with this development, the Treaty of Amsterdam came

²¹ See also para 2 of the St Malo Declaration at <http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html>. The St Malo Declaration does not make any reference to NATO in this context. Website last accessed on 28 January 2010.

into force in May 1999, thus introducing a mandate for crisis management tasks. Javier Solana, the former Secretary General of NATO, was appointed as the High Representative for the CFSP and given a significant mandate to implement the ESDP.

The first stage of the development focused on agreeing ambitions for the policy area. The European Council Summit in Cologne provided guidance on the military development that was further detailed in the Helsinki Summit, and what was termed the Helsinki Headline Goal defined the military aspirations. These made it clear that there was no intention of organising a standing European army, and instead they emphasised voluntary contributions on a case-by-case basis:

Co-operating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks. (European Council, 1999c, AnnexIV).

The declaration also addressed the delicate issue of NATO relations, reflecting a compromise to avoid the role of NATO being challenged. It articulated a commitment to “develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises” (European Council, 1999c, Annex IV). There were reactions in Washington to the Cologne declaration, and the USA had mixed feelings about the European ambition to build up capabilities for autonomous military operations, as summarised by the NATO Secretary-General, Lord Robertson:

[T]here has always been a bit of schizophrenia about America, on the one hand saying “You Europeans have got to carry more of the burden” and then when the Europeans say “OK, we’ll carry more of the burden”, they say “Well wait a minute, are you trying to tell us to go home?” Quoted in Hyde-Price (2000, p.35).

American doubts were due at least in part to competing national interests in Europe, where different national arguments presented a confusing picture for the Americans to interpret. Peters summarises the ambivalent transatlantic logic that was conveyed:

[T]he “transatlantic logic,” making the [EU] stronger in the security and defence realm *either* to please *or* to challenge the United States, *either* to become an equal partner *or* a competitor to the United States, *or either* to strengthen the European contribution to the Western Alliance *or* to gain autonomy from US influence. (Peters, 2004, p.395).

From an American perspective, increased European crisis management capabilities to allow increased sharing of the security burden was welcomed. However, support for the ESDP was conditional. It should neither curtail American flexibility in choosing policy options nor challenge NATO as its main vehicle for exerting influence in Europe (Peters, 2004).²²

In 2000, the European Council at Feira outlined civilian instruments for crisis management in four priority areas: police, the rule of law, civilian administration, and civil protection (European Council, 2000a). The civilian domain in the ESDP was given more substance at the Gothenburg Summit (European Council, 2001c, Art. 4). In Nice in December 2000, the European Council took stock of the progress made and completed measures for implementing the ESDP, with particular regard to its structures and procedures. It adopted an extensive Presidency report on the establishment of the ESDP, which *inter alia*, provided for the creation of permanent political and military structures within the Council and the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union (henceforth the Secretariat), and the incorporation into the Union of the crisis management functions provided by the WEU. The Treaty of Nice, signed in 2001, amended the TEU accordingly (European Council, 2000d). The Political and Security Committee (PSC) was organised within the Council and was composed of national representatives at ambassadorial level, to run the day-to-day business of all aspects of the CFSP, including the ESDP. It was the equivalent of the North Atlantic Council, albeit with a much broader agenda. To support the PSC in military matters, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) was organised within the Council, composed of the chiefs of defence, represented by their permanent military delegates. In addition to giving military advice to the PSC, the EUMC was mandated to provide military direction to the EU Military Staff (EUMS), a new entity organised within the Secretariat. In a separate decision in 2000, the Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) was organised within the Council under the PSC to provide advice within its area of expertise. Until 2002, much of its work involved setting up new structures and establishing procedures. This was made possible in part by the support of the WEU, from which military personnel came in order to set up the EU Military Staff within the Secretariat. Furthermore a corpus of WEU politico-military concepts, which reflected the legacy of a decade of experience, was inherited (Gyllensporre, 2008, pp.76-9).

Beginning in late 2002, a second phase commenced as the ESDP became focused on preparing specific crisis management missions. In January 2003 the first one was launched, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The intention to deploy a military force

²² In 1998, at the 50th anniversary NATO summit, the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, coined the “three Ds” of NATO in reaction to the EU ambitions to step up efforts in crisis management. There must be no *Decoupling* from NATO, no *Duplication* of effort or resources, or *Discrimination* against NATO allies, see for instance Ilana (2004, p.30).

in Macedonia was more complicated, as it required support by NATO. This reliance on NATO was not for this mission alone, as the lack of European capabilities for 'high end' operations made a permanent arrangement with NATO crucial (Missiroli, 2003a, p.9). Following the European Council declaration on autonomous operations at the Cologne Summit in 1999, negotiations began with NATO to obtain a cooperation agreement to give the EU assured access to NATO military assets, in particular in the area of command and control and logistics, and operational planning capabilities where the Alliance, as such, was not engaged. The agreement, referred to as Berlin Plus²³ was a prerequisite not only for Concordia but also for forthcoming EU missions, and was finalised after three years of negotiations, during which political obstacles remained unresolved until the final agreement. The agreement was finalised in December 2002, after resolution of the deadlock between Greece and Cyprus (who blocked the agreement on the EU side) and Turkey (who blocked it in NATO). Doctrinally, it opened up a new command option by drawing on NATO Headquarters for the planning and conduct of missions. Such an option envisaged that NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe would also become the EU Operation Commander and that his or her Headquarters (SHAPE), would also be utilised as the EU Operation Headquarters. Significantly, the agreement was made at the height of the transatlantic discord over Iraq.²⁴

The academic contributions relating to EU crisis management have to a major extent addressed the 'high politics' surrounding the military component in two different areas. One of them relates to the delicate balance with NATO and the USA (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008; Hofmann, 2009; Keohane, 2003; Larrabee, 2009; Missiroli, 2002; Peters, 2004). The other involves the ability to muster the capabilities needed and the surrender of national authority in some areas in order to integrate them into the European context (Cornish and Edwards, 2005; Missiroli, 2003a; Shepherd, 2006).

The political turmoil over the invasion of Iraq did not spill over into the ESDP. On the contrary, it appears that failures in achieving consensus over Iraq were compensated for by unity within the CFSP (Menon, 2004). In 2003, the ESDP was given further political impetus by the European Security Strategy, which is discussed in detail below. The focus shifted towards establishing structured approaches to achieve the political goals set, to integrate the ten new Member States that joined in May 2004 and to establish

²³ The name refers to a previous, similar arrangement between NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) on 'separable but not separate' military assets and capabilities for WEU operations that was agreed in Berlin in 1996. A brief explanation of the agreement is available at the NATO website, http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm. The website was accessed on 9 July 2009. For a discussion on the history and scope of the Berlin Plus arrangements see, for instance, Reichard (2004) and Missiroli (2002).

²⁴ The agreement was signed in December 2002. What is termed the exchange of letters between the Secretary Generals was completed on 17 March 2003, only days before Concordia was launched, see, for instance, <http://www.wsibrussels.org/showarticle.cfm?id=191>. The website was accessed on 25 November 2009.

working relations with the newly established European Defence Agency.²⁵ This strategy galvanised capability development through the adoption of a Civilian Headline Goal 2008 and a new military Headline Goal 2010 for enhanced rapid response and interoperability, deployability and sustainability (Council of the EU, 2004o). In 2003, the EU also launched its first autonomous military operation, Artemis, in DR Congo, to act as a bridging force for the UN. With France as the Framework Nation, the operation involved rapid deployment and the use of lethal force. This spurred the development of EU Battlegroups (Council of the EU, 2007n), a showcase for demonstrating the operationalisation of the security strategy.²⁶ Operation Artemis also created conditions for a structured bilateral relationship with the UN in crisis management. Notwithstanding the cohesion underpinning the ESDP following the rift over Iraq, there was one initiative that generated roughly the same divide. In 2003, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg proposed strengthening capabilities to conduct operations by organising a permanent EU Operation Headquarters in Tervuren, on the outskirts of Brussels. The UK, Italy and Spain argued that it would be an unnecessary duplication as NATO Headquarters had been made available to the EU through the Berlin Plus arrangement. In addition, the USA articulated its dissatisfaction with the proposal, and what was at stake was NATO's role as the chief institution for European security. In response, the UK presented a proposal for EU planners to be integrated within NATO Headquarters in Mons (SHAPE). The compromise that emerged resulted in a unique capability, not to be found in Member States or NATO (Quille et al., 2006). The mission of the Civil-Military Cell included a capacity to "plan and run an autonomous EU military operation, once a decision on such an operation has been taken, as well as vehicle for greater coherence of the civilian and military structures under the SG/HR" (Council of the EU, 2007q, p.4). In 2005, the conceptual focus shifted from military crisis management aspects to civilian and civil-military relations. A conceptual framework for civil-military coordination (CMCO) was agreed in 2003 (General Secretariat of the Council, 2003a), the European Security Strategy, and a Tri-Presidency initiative (UK, Austria and Finland) ensured continued momentum. The establishment of the Civ-Mil Cell within the EUMS became a crucial vehicle for making progress with civilian missions. From late 2004 to mid 2006, twelve missions were launched, ten civilian, one civil-military and one military. With another five missions by the end of 2008, 2009 was the only year since 2001 when not a single decision to launch a crisis management operation was taken.

²⁵ For a discussion of the European Defence Agency and its institutional integration, see Batora (2009).

²⁶ A comprehensive discussion of the Battlegroup concept is provided in Lindström (2007).

2.2.5 The Creation of the CSDP

Notwithstanding the progress made, the scope of the Treaty of Nice was narrow, as it was devoted to institutional issues (Nugent, 2006, p.115). The Constitution Treaty, signed in 2004, intended, *inter alia*, to replace all previous founding treaties and establish a coherent constitution for the EU (European Council, 2004c). However, it was not a success as referenda in France and the Netherlands rejected the proposed treaty. To overcome this impasse a less ambitious integration plan, the Treaty of Lisbon, was introduced and was signed in December 2007 (European Council, 2007b). Once again, European integration was challenged following the Irish ‘No’ in the 2008 referendum. After a second Irish referendum in 2009, which had a positive outcome, the treaty came into effect in December 2009. Significantly, the Treaty of Lisbon is not constructed as a stand-alone document, but, instead, it makes changes to the TEU as well as the TEC. The latter has been renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). A significant change made to the Treaty of Lisbon was the dismantling of the pillar structure. However, the distinctive features of the CFSP have been preserved and it has, in effect, been maintained as a separate policy area. This provision emphasises its intergovernmental character, including unanimous decision-making in most cases, and it ensures that the Commission and the European Parliament continue to have limited influence. In the Treaty of Lisbon, the ESDP was re-branded as the CSDP.²⁷ It has been argued that the change of name reflects a renewed interest in this policy area (Koutrakos, 2006, p.497), for which, indeed, the treaty establishes more ambitious aspirations. It defines a Solidarity Clause, where Member States pledge to respond in concert, including the use of force, in the event of threatened terrorist attacks and natural or man-made disasters. Through this change the CSDP is no longer restricted to operating outside the borders of the EU. Moreover, a Protocol attached to the treaty lays down modalities for Permanent Structured Cooperation, calling for a “more assertive Union role in security and defence matters” (European Council, 2007b, Protocol A4). However, key decisions are needed to make this cooperative structure operational (Biscop, 2008a, p.433).

2.3 Policy Processes and Products

Following the widely accepted categorisation of policies into regulatory, distributive, and redistributive (Lowi, 1964), this study is concerned with the first category only, that is, those that lay down rules governing the behaviour of EU actors. Policy products are developed at different levels and compartmentalised into different organisational units with different processes. Consequently, their authority and level of influence differ

²⁷ This change was initially introduced in the Constitution Treaty.

widely. EU policy machinery is dominated by the Commission as it has, in relative terms, a predominantly large policy apparatus and exclusive competencies in several key areas. In addition, the most detailed and methodological policy process can be found within its area of responsibility. Under the pre-Lisbon TEU, the legislative process that turned proposals into EU law included two different Community methods, the Consultation Method and the Ordinary Legislative Procedure. They were both initiated by Commission proposals, and passed into law by the Council. However, the latter method also required the agreement of the European Parliament. The Commission was very influential in this process as it was, and still is, the body that generates almost all proposals which frame further considerations (Thomson et al., 2006). It is reasonable to assert that policy papers, including what are termed ‘Communications’ emanating from the Commission have relevance to, and an impact on, the EU as a whole, even though they may not aspire to become law or they may be undergoing a prolonged legislative process. Consequently, this thesis also draws on policy products that fall short of being legislative acts.

Various means are used to articulate policies. Under the pre-Lisbon TEU, the EU promulgated CFSP Statements several times a week, reflecting the continuous foreign and security deliberations that took place in Brussels at various levels. In addition, the Council, in the form of GAERC or other constellations, met on a monthly basis. Three legal instruments were available for implementing the CFSP, i.e., Common Strategies, Common Positions and Joint Actions.²⁸ Common Strategies were adopted by the European Council to provide a framework for coherence among EU institutions and Member States. As such they were not prepared in order to address specific crises. The Council decided on Common Positions and Joint Actions. Joint Actions addressed “specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union ...” (European Council, 2002d, art. 14.1). The application of Joint Actions included, but was not limited to, the initiation of crisis management missions. Common Positions represented a softer response by defining “the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the Common Positions” (European Council, 2002d, art. 15). For instance, economic sanctions and arms embargoes against third countries were pursued by adoption of Common Positions (Koutrakos, 2006). In an effort to ensure clarity and focus, a model for Council decisions on crisis management missions has been adopted based on the Levels of Agenda Model (Birkland, 2005, pp.108-12), but the crisis in question must

²⁸ A Common Strategy is now called “Decisions of the European Council on the strategic interests and objectives of the Union”. Common Positions are now decisions “defining a Union position”. In a similar vein Joint Actions have been replaced by decisions “defining a Union action” to initiate crisis management missions. The changes are codified in the TEU (European Council, 2010).

first come to the attention of the EU at the proper level. In the model, the highest level includes all possible conflicts that could be brought up for discussion in the EU, the ‘Agenda Universe’. Only a subset of these conflicts possesses the political acceptance and interest of the EU and the Member States for it to be discussed within institutions and thus raise institutional awareness. The systemic agenda forms a subset that will be considered carefully within the framework of EU foreign policy. This level will exclude any tensions or conflicts between Member States. A wide range of community instruments under the auspices of the Commission exists to formulate an initial reaction, for instance, dialogues within the framework of the implementation of development aid and neighbourhood programmes. The crisis may also cause widespread concern among Member States, thus establishing conditions for its being addressed within the realm of the CFSP. Under the pre-Lisbon TEU, the Presidency had a ‘privileged control’ over setting the agenda within the CFSP (Tallberg, 2003). Consensus within the Council could be obtained by agreeing on a CFSP statement, a Council conclusion or a Common Position, reflecting a sliding scale of political agreement and commitment. In some situations concrete, and possibly coercive, measures may be appropriate and the Council then agrees on a Joint Action to employ appropriate crisis management instrument(s).

Member States do not wish to commit in advance to prescriptive EU policies and guidelines,²⁹ and such arrangements would, *inter alia*, challenge the prerogatives of Member States with respect to defence matters. Nevertheless, when CSDP missions are examined in Chapters 6, 10 and Appendix A, it will become evident that the EU policies represent common values, principles and aspirations that guide crisis response decisions. Hence, the extant body of EU policies provides a vantage point for understanding how the decisions to launch CSDP missions are hammered out.

Within the CFSP there are six key entities involved in policy-making. The European Council, which includes the heads of state and government, sets priorities and provides broad guidelines, on the basis of which, the Council of the European Union (henceforth the Council) advances and implements the CFSP. This is done primarily through the Foreign Affairs Council that brings together EU Foreign Ministers and its subcommittees, in particular the Political and Security Committee (PSC). In the pre-Lisbon TEU, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) assumed this responsibility. Accordingly, for the purpose of this thesis, the GAERC is regarded as the key decision-making body for the CFSP. The Commission is fully associated with the work carried out in the CFSP, and, in particular, it manages the CFSP budget. The Presidency of the Council rotates among Member States every six months. Under

²⁹ Notwithstanding this proposition it is recognised that the decision-making process with regard to steps and procedures is laid out in an official document (General Secretariat of the Council, 2003c).

the pre-Lisbon TEU, it played an influential role in setting agendas, initiating and advancing the decision-making processes and managing the Council Committees as well as guiding the work of the Council Secretariat. The pre-Lisbon TEU also maintained the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, who also was the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union (SG/HR).³⁰ The SG/HR contributed to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and engaged in diplomatic dialogues with third countries.

An illuminating comparison of these principally different decision-making methods concluded that the Community method provided a robust audit trail and transparency, whereas the intergovernmental process was more attuned to national decision-making and to the fluid security environment, and caters for a rapid decision-making (Lundin and Revelas, 2006). Clearly, these institutionally separate methods suggest different scopes. The Commission adopted a longer-term perspective in issues pertaining to the Communities, and in the realm of external security it employed a conflict-preventing approach. The CFSP is not built on the external relations *acquis* of the Commission, instead it has a short-term and reactive crisis management perspective that reflects combined national agendas (Gourlay, 2004).

In addition to providing the legal basis for the EU polices, the treaties also define the scope in which the policy domain may operate.³¹ The treaties can be regarded as the top level of the policy pyramid. The residual family of policy products can be subdivided into those that are legally binding on EU institutions and, to a certain degree, on Member States, and those that encapsulate the political will, be it for the EU as a whole or its institutional entities. In the case of the latter there is no mechanism or formal authority to enforce implementation.

External polices are categorised in different ways depending on the context. An academic approach distinguishes four topical groups: external trade policies; foreign, security and defence policies; development policies; and the external dimension of other policies (Nugent, 2006, p.383). Practitioners in the Commission find it useful to subdivide Community external actions into seven areas; trade, development, technical and financial assistance, contractual relations with third countries in various forms, humanitarian aid and emergency interventions as well as the external aspects of internal policies, such as

³⁰ The High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy is replaced by the High Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This position is held ex officio by a Vice-President of the Commission. A new European External Action Service is to provide support for the new function of the High Representative. Moreover, the position as the Secretary-General of the Council is separated from the High Representative. The changes have been codified in the TEU (European Council, 2010).

³¹ In addition the body of EU law includes bilateral and multilateral agreements covering most countries and regions of the world.

the environment, energy, and transport (Lundin and Revelas, 2006). The EU website provides two additional and parallel policy structures, see Table 2.1:³²

- | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Defence – Conflict Prevention – Civilian Crisis Management • Non-proliferation disarmament • Development and Developing countries • Enlargement • European Union in the World • External Cooperation Programmes • Foreign policies (Relations with third countries and international organisations) • Humanitarian aid (Humanitarian Aid department - Echo) • Human rights in the world • International trade and trade agreements (External trade) • Neighbourhood policy | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civilian Crisis Management • Common Foreign & Security Policy (CFSP) • Instrument for Stability (IfS) • Conflict Diamonds (Blood Diamonds - The EU & the Kimberley Process) • Drugs • Environment - Green Diplomacy • EU Election Assistance & Observation • Euro-Mediterranean Partnership • European Neighbourhood Policy • Black Sea Synergy • External Energy Policy • Human rights & Democratisation • Information on grants • Landmine Actions • Middle East Peace Process • Migration • Northern Dimension • Public Consultations • Uprooted People • EU Centres |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

TABLE 2.1: Two different official EU lists of external policies

The aforementioned body of generic policies guides EU responses to external events and it is therefore of interest when examining crisis management missions. However, it must be emphasised that the CFSP is a semi-independent policy area with its own logic and legal framework. Even if the deductions from these policies clearly suggest that the employment of CSDP missions should be considered, a strong political will to engage is a prerequisite for the EU to initiate the decision-making process for an intervention. Consequently, synergy and influences from other policy areas are marginal as long as that

³² See http://ec.europa.eu/policies/index_en.htm and http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/policies/index_en.htm Both websites were accessed on 23 October 2008. By briefly examining these policy areas it can immediately be concluded that two of them do not qualify for further consideration for the purposes of this research. 'Europe in the World' is not a policy area in its own right but a condensation of selected sectorial and geographical policies. A study of the Commission website relating to the policy area supports this conclusion, see http://ec.europa.eu/world/index_en.htm. Accessed on 25 October 2008. The policy area relating to EU centres aims at promoting greater understanding of the EU by establishing a network of EU centres and has thus no relevance to this study.

political will is absent. Moreover, the above lists reflect neither the internal dependencies nor the relative weight and importance of these sectors. The empirical examination in Chapter 6 reveals that only a few of them have any significant impact on considerations for the launching of CSDP missions. The set of strategies as defined by the EU includes the documents in Table 2.2.³³

- European Security Strategy - A secure Europe in a better world (adopted by the European Council on 12/13 December 2003)
- EU Strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (adopted by the European Council on 12/13 December 2003 - doc.15708/03)
- EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons and their ammunition (adopted by the European Council on 15/16 December 2005)
- EU Strategy: “The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership” (adopted by the European Council on 15/16 December 2005)
- EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy (adopted by the European Council on 15/16 December 2005)
- EU Strategy for the Pacific (adopted by the Council on 17 July 2006)
- EU Strategy: “The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership” (adopted by the European Council on 21/22 June 2007)
- East Asia Policy Guidelines (adopted by the Council on 20 December 2007)

TABLE 2.2: Official list of EU strategies

There are several factors that contribute to the lack of coherence. The web of policies does not paint a consistent picture of the policies and their linkages. An examination of the spectrum of policy sectors shows that they have different styles and traditions that vary in time as European integration evolves (Richardson, 2001, pp.6-8). Arguably, the EU lacks a policy framework, as there is no single EU authority that is responsible for providing this context and coherence. The current patchwork and lack of overview are also a reflection of the fact that policies come to fruition not only because of what is desirable, but also because of what is possible (Nugent, 2006, p.390). Functional policy clusters evolve in a way that reflects the functional competencies in the Commission and the Council Secretariat, respectively. Moreover, the term ‘policy’ is not consistently applied. Some policies undergo rigorous scrutiny by a wide range of external and internal EU actors and become legally binding, while others have a declaratory status that merely encapsulates the political consensus at a particular point in time. Regardless of its shape and form, it is assumed that this web of policies creates a fabric of knowledge and values based on how the EU understands and approaches conflicts. Moreover, the involvement

³³ The Common Strategies of the EU on Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean region, respectively, all expired in 2004 (Council Secretariat, 2008, p.99). In addition to these strategies, the Commission also issues Strategy papers for Development Programmes etc.

and influence of EU bodies in the policy process vary. On a sliding scale ranging from policy areas with an extensive EU policy involvement to those with virtually no such involvement, trade policies tend to have a dominant EU role, whereas policies relating to defence matters are found at the opposite end, thus limiting the EU's ability to harmonise sectorial approaches (Nugent, 2006, pp.387-9). The variable degree of involvement of Member States and EU institutions has also given rise to principally different staffing procedures.

Whilst the EU has identified its broad panoply of instruments for international security as a strategic advantage, it is also acutely aware of the challenges associated with achieving coherent responses through military and civilian means (European Council, 2003a; Ferrero-Waldner, 2006b; Gourlay, 2004). Accordingly, the EU policies, internal and external, tend to stress the need to improve coherence across and within pillars (European Commission, 2006e; European Council, 2003a).

The European Security Strategy (ESS) "A Secure Europe in a Better World" (European Council, 2003a) is by far the most influential policy document on CFSP issues after the TEU, and it provides a historical narrative in which it is concluded that Europe should take on responsibilities for global security.³⁴ It subsequently studies the global security environment and identifies global challenges. Terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, failed states and organised crime are regarded as key threats. Moreover, the document concludes that the strategic objectives necessary to address these threats include extending the zone of security around Europe, strengthening the international order, and paying particular attention to new threats. The strategy also asserts that "With the new threats the first line of defence will often be abroad" (European Council, 2003a, p.7). Based on this argumentation a list of policy implications is outlined. The EU must be more active, coherent and capable and work with its partners. The elaboration on multilateralism places the emphasis on the transatlantic relationship.

The ESS is in many ways a unique policy paper. This is the first time a policy paper has articulated the role that the EU seeks to play in crisis management. The paper has, in general, been received positively as it sums up the EU's security aspirations. Nevertheless, the ESS has been subjected to critical assessments (Heisbourg, 2004; Toje, 2005). Some argue that the ESS is more a reflection and codification of de-facto policy perceptions within the EU than a new policy (Biscop, 2008b, p.7). A top-down approach when drafting the paper ensured that it was kept brief and concise unlike other EU policy papers (Bird, 2007, p.185). Preparatory work on the document was led by the Council

³⁴ The use of Europe instead of the EU throughout the paper makes the aspiration of the Union ambiguous.

Secretariat. The Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and the High Representative for the CFSP (SG/HR) organised a Task Force that prepared a draft paper. This draft was taken to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the European research and policy community to ensure acceptance and adoption by Member States. The European Parliament was also informed informally through the Foreign Affairs Committee (Quille, 2004, p.65). Through this unorthodox process few changes were made and drafting was deliberately undertaken with limited scope for visibility and influence on the part of the Member States (Biscop and Andersson, 2008, p.1). It has also been argued that this was an act of exceptional trust given by Member States to Solana and his team (Bailes, 2005, p.12). By all accounts, this is an extraordinary way of developing EU policy papers. An often-neglected fact is that the ESS was adopted by the European Council as a political gesture. A deeper consensus on the content of the ESS would have allowed the document to have been agreed as a Common Strategy and approved as a legal act, making it authoritative for Member States as well as EU institutions. Despite these limitations, the ESS is the capstone document for EU crisis management, and it has become omnipresent in the EU policy and decision-making processes (Biscop and Andersson, 2008, p.2).

2.4 Summary

This historical account has given depth to and a perspective on the dynamics of the CSDP. Decisions have been based on bargaining, and the outcomes may be as unpredictable as suggested by the tripartite metaphor mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. Consequently, the CSDP cannot be reduced to the least common denominator of Member States' policies; rather, the dynamics produce unique outcomes, the creation of the Civil Military Cell being a case in point. Significantly, this chapter has focused on the influence exerted by Berlin, London, and Paris. If one also considers the power hubs in Brussels and Washington, as will be discussed in Part III, complexity increases further.

This chapter has also demonstrated that the Council decides whether to launch crisis management missions on a case-by-case basis, without using pre-scripted criteria. The intergovernmental decision-making process has distinct dynamics that reflect the combined views of the Member States, as the consensus principle is applied. Notwithstanding the dominance of national agendas, the body of EU law (in particular the TEU) and policies offers guidance on understanding the underlying rationale for these decisions. There is a web of interlinked EU policies to be considered when it comes to external relations. The ESS is by all accounts the most influential policy document for EU crisis

management, although the relevance and authority of individual policy documents are ill-defined. There is a lack of policy coherence in the EU resulting from several factors, including the various legal regimes and decision-making procedures that coexist there. Consequently, Council decision-making focuses on short-term and responsive actions, whereas the Commission tends to take a longer-term perspective when employing its instruments.

Crisis management ambitions and instruments have gradually been introduced and integrated into the legal framework. The period examined in this thesis, 2002 to 2009, correlates with the legal basis provided by the Treaty of Nice amendments to the TEU.³⁵ This book has adapted its usage to post-Treaty of Lisbon terminology and article numbering as far as possible. In practical terms, the latest consolidated versions of the TEU and the TFEU will be used as references.³⁶ References to the pre-Treaty of Lisbon legal regime and obsolete article numbers will be explicitly specified. Consequently, the book uses the term CSDP as opposed to ESDP.³⁷

³⁵ The TEU amendments based on the Treaty of Nice entered into force in 2003 and were superseded in December 2009 by the changes made by the Treaty of Lisbon.

³⁶ See European Council (2010).

³⁷ However, many of the quotations provided, in particular, those in the Annex, use the term ESDP.

Chapter 3

Images of the CSDP

Unity in Europe does not create a new kind of great power

Jean Monnet¹

3.1 European Integration from the perspectives of Realism and Idealism

The two perspectives being studied, i.e., Realism and Idealism, can be seen as different expressions of European integration. Thus a brief examination of theories about this profoundly wider issue is useful as it lays the foundations, whilst at the same time providing a rationale for the research approach. Following World War II, many scholars sought to define new political systems based on peace and international cooperation, and it was in this context that Federalism and Functionalism grew in importance (Cram, 2001, p.52). They often present an idealistic vision of a united, federal Europe, serving the people and not the states, or as Jean Monnet put it, “building union among people, not cooperation between states” (Heinz, 2005). Paul-Henri Spaak, another architect of the European project, adamantly argued for a supranational institution as the only way forward.² However it was not until the 1960s that European integration became established as a scientific field. Initially, these studies sought to *explain* European integration through references to Realism and Idealism, though often in the disguise of

¹ Quoted in Amin (2004, p.4). Jean Monnet was a french merchant who became one of the founding fathers of the European unity after World War II.

² After his resignation as President of the Council of Europe’s Consultative Assembly, Paul-Henri Spaak stated “Do you really want to build Europe without creating a supranational European authority and do you really want to build Europe while maintaining your national sovereignty? If that is your goal, we are no longer in agreement, because I believe you will be blocked by an insurmountable obstacle; wanting to create a new Europe while keeping national sovereignty intact is like trying to square the circle” (Carafa, 2007, p.8).

intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. Richard Haas was in the vanguard of the supranational argument, and he viewed the European level as a 'honest broker' for the bargaining between states (Cram, 2001, p.52).³ Perhaps due to some initial failures of integration, including the French veto on the British applications for membership in 1963 and 1967, the limitations of Haas' Neofunctionalism became evident and the realistic school rose to dominance early in the debate (Cram, 2001, p.60). Entities involved in European integration, in particular, states, were understood as Rational Actors that strived to maximise their utility, including state sovereignty (Wiener and Diez, 2009, pp.6-8). Stanley Hoffmann challenged some of these ideas and developed a theory based on Realism that became known as Governmentalism. When Functionalism and Neofunctionalism predicted an escalating chain reaction of cooperation for further integration, referred to as spillover, he asserted that states were "more obstinate than obsolete" in integration (Hoffmann, 1966).⁴ In particular, he argued that states would not accept surrendering influence in areas involving national vital interests.⁵ Hoffmann's work was later to be labelled as Governmentalism.

It appears that the precursor to the CFSP, the EPC, rested on the principles outlined by Hoffmann, as it was separated from the treaties of Rome and Paris, because it involved 'high politics'. There was a fear of its being subjected to supranational decision-making as well as the involvement of the Commission in the work (Casier and Vanhoonacker, 2007, p.110). The development of the EPC was also accompanied by an academic discussion of Realism and Idealism (Hill, 1993, p.308), and it was dominated by realist thinking (Glarbo, 1999, p.634). In the early days of the EPC, fears were expressed that the European Communities would evolve into a militarised supernational entity (Galtung, 1973). The authoritative realist claim relating to the EPC was formulated by Alfred Pijpers. While concurring with the conclusions of Hoffmann in that the vital interests of states, including 'high politics' such as foreign and defence policy, would hamper integration, he went further by explaining the existence of the EPC from a position based on five principal realist tenets (Pijpers, 1991, p.16-31). The idealist camp was chiefly represented by François Duchêne, who predicted that the European project would remain a civilian power (Duchêne, 1972). Duchêne's work is discussed in further detail below.

While some influential realists dismiss the notion and importance of international institutions, including the phenomenon of European integration (Waltz, 1979, pp.70-1), a

³ His early work on Neofunctionalism can be found Haas (1958). Significantly, Neofunctionalism is driven less by Idealism than its forerunner, Functionalism.

⁴ Although a realist, Hoffmann also challenged some of prevailing principles of Realism when he formulated the theory. In his view it was myopic to view states as homogenous entities.

⁵ Hoffmann distinguished between high politics relating to the vital interests of a state, including, for instance, foreign policy and defence policy, and 'low politics', including economic and social policies.

few scholars have continued Hoffmann's tradition and explored Realism as a conduit for European integration. Integration can also be seen from a perspective of power politics and national interest. Alan Milward et al. posit that the 're-creation' and advancement of the sovereign states justify integration in post-World War II Europe. In order to save the nation-state, governments surrender limited powers to a supranational institution, the Commission (Milward et al., 2000, p.223). Hence, the integration process will only work as long as it is needed by the states. The ability of small states to leverage their influence through the Union has attracted interest (Grieco, 1996; Mosser, 2002).

3.2 The EU Self-Image

The EU often portrays itself as a unique and altruistic actor that has unintentionally become a global actor, and this narrative includes a responsibility for the EU to make the world a better place. It suggests that Europe is morally superior and that the EU reluctantly accepts to enter the world stage in security matters, because this is what the world needs and wants, and no other actor is able to play this role. However, this is not a coherent, well scripted message; on the contrary, it gives the impression of being an collective reflection on the sentiment and aspirations within the EU and the Member States on how they want the world to perceive the EU.⁶ A unique and informative self-reflection was provided by the European Council in 2001, in the Laeken Declaration. It gives the impression of an institution's search for justification and an identity on the world stage.

What is Europe's role in this changed world? Does Europe not, now that is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples? Europe as the continent of humane values, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the French Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall; the continent of liberty, solidarity and above all diversity, meaning respect for others' languages, cultures and traditions. The European Union's one boundary is democracy and human rights (European Council, 2001b, p.19).

Another helpful source for understanding the EU self-image is the ESS, previously discussed. To set the scene, the preamble of the strategy points out the economic power of Europe and notes that the EU is "inevitably a global player" (European Council, 2003a,

⁶ Significantly, research on the EU self-image in the realm of foreign policy has received minimum attention. No in-depth study of the subject has been found and this area is in dire need of further attention.

p.1) that has to share the responsibility of building a better world and serve as an ethical role model for international actors. This strategy envisions the EU, in partnership with the USA, as being a “formidable force for good in the world” (European Council, 2003a, p.13). The narrative implies that the EU acts on behalf of mankind as an altruistic force for good. Solana subscribes to the same notion and frequently describes the EU as a global force for good. He sees Europe as a new form of power, a force for good around the world (Solana, 2006, p.3).

The peaceful unification of our continent has been our great achievement, and now our main challenge is to act as a credible force for good. From a continental agenda, we should move to a global agenda. From building peace in Europe to being a peace-builder in the world. (Solana, 2007a, p.116).

It is likely that this expression has found its way to Brussels from the liberal values of the British Labour Party and was possibly influenced by the French perception that what is good for France is good for Europe and the rest of the world.⁷ Implied in the rhetoric is also a perception of a ground-breaking way of pursuing international relations. The Europeans diffused the Westphalian construct of sovereign nation states as the primary entities in the international arena. With the demise of the nation state in a globalising world, the EU, as a complex and partly supranational regional institution, identifies itself once again as being ahead of its peers, who will follow suit. In this pioneering spirit, Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the Commission, has gone further by stating that he regards the EU as the “first non-imperial empire” (Mahony, 2007).⁸ The top EU diplomat, Robert Cooper, also embodies this train of thought by claiming that the EU is spearheading a ‘post-modern approach’ to conflict management (Cooper, 2003, pp.40-2).

An analysis drawing primarily on EU Council documents and Solana’s early speeches concluded that the dominant discourse during the 1990s positioned the EU as a civilian power employing political and economic means and that the trend continued as the

⁷ The aim of the British Defence policy uses the term ‘a force for good’. The purpose is defined as to “deliver security for the people of the United Kingdom and the Overseas Territories by defending them, including against terrorism; and to act as a force for good by strengthening international peace and stability.” (The Secretary of State for Defence, 2003, p.9). It has been argued the Labour Party developed an ethical dimension to British foreign policy when Tony Blair took office. This helped to define the new role for the military, as a force for good in the world (Farrell, 2008, p.805). Significantly, Solana’s top diplomat and the chief architect of the ESS, Robert Cooper, has worked as an advisor to Tony Blair. For a comprehensive critique of the use of the phrase in relation to the UK’s armed forces see Robinson (2008). For a brief discussion of the French universalist perceptions and the contemporary relevance of the de Gaulle doctrine, see, for instance, (Hyde-Price, 2007, p.101). The de Gaulle doctrine is a form of universalist nationalism. From this perspective France’s mission has a global scope and Europe is a means, not an end (Hoffmann, 1966, p.897).

⁸ For President Barroso the EU is “a very special construction unique in the history of mankind. . . Sometimes I like to compare the EU as a creation to the organization of empire. We have the dimension of empire. . . What we have is the first non-imperial empire.” (Mahony, 2007).

CSDP was established (Larsen, 2002).⁹ At that point in time, in 2000, Solana described military forces as “a last resort, after all possible instruments had been tried” (Solana, 2000a, p.2). Perhaps in response to the European Council decision in Helsinki 1999 to organise a 60,000 men strong military force, the newly installed President of the Commission, Romano Prodi, declared only two months later that becoming a global civil power was necessary to the security of Europe. This was underpinned by a notion that the EU needed to project its model of society onto the wider world. Moreover, one of his four strategic objectives for his Presidency included “boosting Europe’s voice in the world” (Prodi, 2000).

We are not simply here to defend our own interests : we have a unique historic experience to offer. The experience of liberating people from poverty, war, oppression and intolerance. We have forged a model of development and continental integration based on the principles of democracy, freedom and solidarity and it is a model that works. A model of a consensual pooling of sovereignty in which every one of us accepts to belong to a minority. It is not imperialism to want to spread these principles and to share our model of society with the peoples of Southern and Eastern Europe who aspire to peace, justice and freedom. Indeed, Europe must go further. We must aim to become a global civil power at the service of sustainable global development. After all, only by ensuring sustainable global development can Europe guarantee its own strategic security. (Prodi, 2000, p.3).

Consequently, the Prodi Commission capitalised on what they saw as the ‘moral weight’ of the EU. When a policy on human rights was drafted, the Commission concluded that the EU, including its Member States, is unique amongst international actors, in that the application of democratic values gives the EU a substantial political and moral weight (European Commission, 2001a, p.3).

This account reflects an institution that conveys the message that the EU is an unselfish actor. Not only has it a mandate to assist the rest of the world, but also an obligation to do so. The rhetoric gives little insight as to how the interests of the citizens are served, for instance, in relation to international security. Arguably, the EU suppresses its own interests. According to Jørgensen and Laatikainen (2006, p.18), the self-image is characterised by a “curious blindness to own interests”. Instead, the Union tends to

⁹ With the introduction of ESDP, as the forerunner of CSDP, and access to military capabilities, the narrative became slightly changed; another tool has been added to the EU toolbox. This did not constitute a major change for the EU but rather a further consolidation of its unique character as an international actor. Hence, the understanding was that the military was embedded in a civilian power context. However, access to military power was seen as a way to acquire a global role (Larsen, 2002, p.297).

present itself solely through its self-image as a force of goodness in international society". Whether the EU rhetoric correlates with its actions is the subject to be investigated in Part II of the book.

3.3 Soft Power CSDP and the Idealistic Perspective

Against the background of the initial discussion of European integration, it is reasonable to assume that a corresponding multifaceted academic debate is taking place with regard to the CSDP. However, that is not the case. Instead, the views of the academic community resonate well with the EU self-image.¹⁰ It harbours several schools that, at the risk of being overly simplistic, can be clustered around the notions of soft power and idealistic characteristics. The richness of the scientific debate is reflected in the variety of descriptors of the EU as 'soft', 'civilian', 'normative' and 'civilizing'. While these characterisations remain elusive, they fit comfortably with the notion of the EU as an altruistic force for good. Scholars in this camp are united in their understanding that the EU has deliberately and successfully chosen to move beyond power politics. Furthermore, it is often considered that the uniqueness of the EU approach will help it to cope with future challenges to international security.

The idealistic perspective is inspired by François Duchêne's influential article that envisions Europe as a gentle and considerate international actor who brings moral responsibility to international relations (Duchêne, 1972). In his view, the role of the military was declining, and other factors, economic, social and cultural, would become increasingly important to security. Duchêne asserted that Europe could be the first region where war becomes obsolete and conflicts are resolved through 'civilised politics'. From this he inferred that the EU, then the European Community, was well positioned and should take advantage of this situation to establish itself as a civilian power and influence international security "in areas, which, at first sight, have little to do with security" (Duchêne, 1972, p.45). More profoundly, he mused that Western Europe could become a vanguard for civilisation and thereby inspire others to move forward in the same direction.¹¹ Although the strategic context is fundamentally different today, Duchêne's propositions still generate lively academic discussion, partly because his claims were ambiguous (Orbie, 2006, p.124). While there are still various interpretations of his view of military power, some have clearly denounced the idea of making use of hard power. In the aftermath of the Cold War, Germany and Japan were labelled as civilian powers

¹⁰ Sjørusen (2006a, pp.235-6) argues that it is a problematic causality and that it fails to recognise the importance of benchmarks to qualify EU behaviour.

¹¹ However, Duchêne stressed that it was naïve to believe that the European Community could become anything more than a model. Earlier failed British attempts after the Second World War to assert itself, as a moral example for the world were a case in point.

using three criteria: the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation in the pursuit of international objectives; the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management (Maull, 1990, p.92). These criteria became widely used for examining the EU as a civil power although they focus only on the means employed. Another broader definition suggests that four elements constitute a civilian power: civilian means; civilian ends; use of persuasion; and civilian control over foreign (and defence) policymaking (Smith, 2005, p.2).¹² This definition also provides a link to the Soft Power concept which holds that foreign policy outcomes can be achieved by persuasion rather than coercion.

Joseph Nye's widely recognised Soft Power concept suggests that traditional deterrence and the use of force should give way to the exercise of intangible and less coercive power, by using an alternative power base that includes culture, ideology, knowledge and institutions (Nye, 1990). Intangible co-optive power can be as useful as hard command power. Hence, the power of attraction possesses a utility in that it induces other entities to emulate, follow, and support a positive example. The EU enlargement process is often cited as a case in point. By extrapolating this trait of attraction, it has been claimed that Europe will dominate the twentieth century due to its attractive political and economic model. The EU will serve as a basic model for the rest of the world in international relations, including crisis management (Leonard, 2005). This line of thought subscribes to the idea that the EU offers moral responsibility in international relations (Lucarelli, 2006). and that it has unique abilities to stabilise world politics. The EU is considered as a stabilising force, a *puissance tranquille* (Todorov, 2003). In a similar vein, some view the EU as a normative entity (Manners, 2002; Schimmelfennig and Thomas, 2009), whose behaviour provides a role model within the international community. To understand the EU, one needs to take a long-term view of its progress and add the socio-economic model of the EU as a dimension of the 'civil' power that influences other international actors (Telò, 2006). Some regard the absence of military instruments as a mandatory requirement for a civil power (Smith, 2005). Not only would 'hard' power serve to legitimise the utility of military force, but it would also jeopardise the credibility of the EU as a civilian power (Smith, 2000, p.28). The EU also fails to capitalise on its greatest strength, non-military crisis management (Moravcsik, 2003). It has also been argued that a military dimension can also provide a critical obstacle to further integration within the EU (Sangiovanni, 2003, p.201).

¹² According to Smith civilian ends are typically linked milieu goals, which aim to shape the environment in which the operates operates, and include solidarity, strengthening the rule of law in international relations, responsibility for the global environment, and the diffusion of equality, justice and tolerance (Smith, 2005, p.3).

While maintaining the primacy of civilian instruments, some argue that a military contribution could be conceivable. By emphasising the normative aspect of Duchêne's work, the EU can be regarded as a 'Normative Power' that comfortably accepts a hard power element, as long as the civil power remains at the pinnacle. However, the progress of militarisation codified in the ESS is weakening normative credibility (Manners, 2006). The normative claim suggests that the discussion should move away from civil or military capabilities. Instead, the real power of the EU rests with its ability to shape the conceptions of other international actors (Manners, 2002, p.239). As a consequence, it is not its CSDP missions and other external actions that define success, and the international role of the EU is shaped instead by 'but what it is, not what it does or what it says' (Manners, 2002, p.252). Based on the accumulated body of declarations, treaties, and policies, five norms of the EU can be distilled: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights (Manners, 2002, p.242). A similar concept to Normative Power is 'Ethical Power Europe'. While both concepts of Civilian Power and Normative Power predict a decline in the relevance of military means, the Ethical Power concept acknowledges the utility of all the CSDP instruments (Aggestam, 2008, p.3). As an outlier to the Civilian Power, it has been contended that the EU must have military means in order to be a civilian power (Stavridis, 2001). From this point of view, civilian power acts as a force for the external promotion of democratic principles. If the ends justify the means, military power is needed in some situations, where these principles have to be enforced, as was the case of Rwanda in 1994.

All these representations of the EU as a Soft Power are underpinned by the assumption that the EU has deliberately chosen this approach. There is another school that acknowledges the EU as a Soft Power, but which maintains that it is a choice dictated by necessity. If the EU had more power and capabilities, its policies and principles would change accordingly, and come to resemble those of the USA. In the past, when European actors such as the British Empire dominated the world scene, power politics radiated out from Europe. This camp views the soft approach as a sign of weakness and failure. Traditional power politics cannot, it is believed, be successfully replaced by soft power. The many failures of the EU to unite and act decisively form the substance of their arguments. An ardent advocate of this school suggests that the European confidence in soft tools derives from its military weakness (Kagan, 2003), which also distorts the understanding of the nature of the threat. In an influential article questioning the civilian power concept, Hedley Bull argues that the role of a civilian actor can only be played as long as conditions are set by those in possession of credible military instruments.

Possession of scarce resources was a source of power to militarily weak states only as long as militarily strong states chose not to use their force. More

generally, the power or influence exerted by the European Community and other such civilian actors was conditional upon a strategic environment provided by the military power of the states, which they did not control. (Bull, 1982, p.151).

There have also been calls to depart from this position of weakness. European politicians, on both sides, have contributed to a public debate on the subject. In view of the major conflicts of the early 1990s in Kuwait and Yugoslavia, the Belgian Foreign Minister, Mark Eyskens, pleaded for greater EU power by pointing to the inability of the EU to respond; “Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm” (Manners, 2010, pp.75-6). In an article “Don’t laugh: the European Army is on the march” Danie Hannan, a British Conservative Member of Parliament, voiced his fear that the Eurozealots would make use of the lack of public support in conjunction with the invasion of Iraq in 2003.¹³ Some denounce the notion of the EU as a successful soft power and assert that its merits lie in the ability to conceal internal disagreements beneath the rhetoric of pan-European consensus and cooperation (Bickerton, 2008).

3.4 Hard Power CSDP and the Realistic Perspective

A few scholars have contested the idealistic characterisation of the EU as a soft power, and they conclude instead that the EU is a realist actor driven by self-interest. The Soft Power concept does not explain why the EU would embark on its ambitious journey of developing and employing intrusive instruments for external action, as articulated in the ESS. Furthermore, the ambitious deployment scheme of the CSDP missions reflects an opportunistic quest for ‘actionable crises’ that serve to strengthen its role as a unique crisis manager (Kurowska, 2008, p.27).

The period since 2003, when the first operation under the [ESDP] was launched, has witnessed an impressive proliferation of ESDP deployments . . . The expansive dynamic characterisation the ESDP disrupts the received wisdom about the incremental and reactive nature of European foreign policy integration. The neat picture of the [EU] as an economic giant but a political dwarf and a military worm has similarly ceased to reflect the EU stance. (Kurowska, 2008, p.25).

¹³ Daily Telegraph 23 April 2003, available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/1427446/Dont-laugh-the-European-Army-is-on-the-march.html>. The website was accessed on 4 January 2010.

The hard power perspective is generated by examining EU foreign policy through a realist lens, and three sources of arguments can be distinguished. Two of them are intrinsic and assert that Member States and EU institutions, respectively, constitute drivers of Realism. The extrinsic school seeks explanations in a desire to counterbalance the power of the USA. The first approach claims a projection of national interests through EU institutions. Hyde-Price suggests that the CSDP was conceived as the European bipolarity transmuted into a multipolar European setting in a unipolar world (Hyde-Price, 2006, 2007, 2008). With the declining American interest in Europe, nobody can make a credible claim to hegemony in the region. As a consequence, the concern of the Member States shifts from power to security maximisation. The Council has become the common conduit for security maximisation in shaping the external environment through various instruments, soft and hard, and it is primarily driven by the most influential EU states. The second proposition is a composite view that, directly or indirectly, considers the EU institutions as the agent of Realism. The Common Commercial Policy is a centrepiece of the CFSP and an area of competence where the Commission has exclusive powers, while the EU is able to exert significant bargaining strength in the global economic arena (Cameron, 2007; Nugent, 2006). The supranational facet of the EU in international trade negotiations is best understood by applying realist theories. An empirical case study of trade negotiations in conjunction with the accession to the WTO by China and Russia shows that the EU is driven by its interest in maximising its wealth relative to other nations' power (Zimmermann, 2007). Another theme within this school posits that the EU is enhancing its role in international relations because it can. This stems from the institutional development of foreign policy, as was the case in the USA, when the Federal government consolidated its power in the late nineteenth century (Selden, 2010). The extrinsic claim draws on Kenneth Waltz' theories of strategic options for international actors and interprets the evolving CSDP as a means of balancing American power (Posen, 2006). The EU is ensuring that it can respond to conflicts in its immediate interest and have a say in the resolution of more remote conflicts, because it cannot count on the USA to deal with them, while the way the USA approaches conflict may also be problematic. Hence, an autonomous capability would provide the Europeans with another option.

Another way to gain an external perspective on the *modus operandi* of the EU is to examine it together with other actors, preferably the USA. A review that pre-dates the ESS concluded that the USA and Europe had embarked on different approaches to foreign and security policy, with the USA placing its trust in shaping the world by applying power, and the Europeans by putting their trust in international security regimes (Daalder, 2001, p.553). However, a comprehensive comparison between the ESS and the USA National Security Strategy reached another conclusion. Whilst the

USA had a strong tendency towards unilateralism and forward-leaning militarism, the EU was primarily concerned with the process of European integration, and it favoured multilateralism and non-military tools. However, this research also revealed a relatively unexpected feature. The American agenda appears to be driven by utopian thinking, while the European one proved to be founded on a realist approach (Berenskoetter, 2005, pp.77-81).

3.5 The EU is an Idealist Actor - So what?

The preceding discussion has established an altruistic self-image of the EU as a foreign policy actor. It is also evident that, based on an inclusive definition of Idealism, the research community shares this predisposed perception of the EU. With this in mind, it is reasonable to ask why one should devote interest to further studies of the subject. If practitioners and scholars generally concur on the behaviour of the EU as a crisis management actor, it can be inferred that this represents an adequate characterisation, and that there is no urgent need to pursue further research. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the research in this thesis rests on the premise that the understanding of the EU would benefit from challenging this commonly held view. Moreover, it is not clear whether the phenomenon described is uniquely attributable to the EU. In other words, is the self-image of the EU any different from that cultivated by other key international actors? If so, is the research community predisposed differently towards them? To shed light on these pertinent questions and put the EU into perspective, the USA, the UK, France, Germany, and NATO are briefly examined.¹⁴ These actors have been selected because of their importance in world affairs and their roots in Western culture, as has the EU. A brief examination of their respective national security strategies reveals that they all spring from a value-based approach to security.¹⁵ Their univocal rhetoric

¹⁴ Arguably the UN could qualify based on the criteria set. However the UN is neither a Western organisation, although founded on Western values, nor does it have an explicit security concept. The closest policy document to express the organisation's aspirations is the Secretary General's report issued in 2005, following the Millennium Declaration. The report is consistent with the policy documents by other actors examined. It revolves around values. It proposes, in addition to the need to strengthen the UN, three lines of approach: freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom to live in dignity.

¹⁵ Mindful of the time-period of study in this thesis it is rational to start an examination of the US by studying the last National Security Strategy (NSS) issued by President George W. Bush. It rested on principles closely associated with Idealism. The opening paragraph is a case in point: "It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world" (Bush, 2006, p.1). It elaborates further on the importance of values; "The United States has long championed freedom because doing so reflects our values and advances our interests. It reflects our values because we believe the desire for freedom lives in every human heart and the imperative of human dignity transcends all nations and cultures" (Bush, 2006, p.3). Earlier research based on George W Bush's presidency also claims that the US NSS was based on utopian thinking (Berenskoetter, 2005, pp.77-81). While the current US NSS, issued by President Barack Obama, is less articulate when it comes to idealistic values and stresses American leadership more, it puts "respect for universal values at home and around the world" as well as the

originates in universal norms and principles resonating with democracy, freedom and the rule of law. It is in within this fundamental framework that national or organisational interests evolve. The EU and its European Security Strategy conform to this picture and from this brief examination its self-image cannot be singled out as unique. Instead, attention is focused on the academic community's perception of these actors. Given their homogenous self-representation, the ambition is to examine academic currents detached from these self-images and thus explore realist traits.

The ultimate obligation for states is to ensure security for their citizens and national survival. It is therefore not surprising that the application of realist characteristics, including national interests, is a logical path for researchers to take in the quest for a better understanding of states' behaviour in international relations. In the case of the USA, it is safe to assert that the body of scholastic work includes an abundance of realist currents. One needs only to reflect on the scrutiny of the Iraq invasion or the academic debate on the unipolar world order, to arrive at the conclusion that there is a torrent of academic contributions that advance the idea of the USA as the bearer of realist traditions (Foster, 2010; Gewen, 2007; Jervis, 2003; Krauthammer, 2004). Academic coverage of British foreign policy is concerned with its balancing act as a European nation that has a special relationship with the US (Dunne, 2004; Hitchens, 2004; Hood, 2008). Loyalty to the USA, and its security interests, gives the UK an elevated role on the international stage and at the same time it associates the country's politics with Realism (Hoggett, 2005). Furthermore the reluctance to commit to, and cooperate with, the European project is a thread with connotations of Realism. Its efforts to hamper the development of the CFSP, in order to ensure NATO's prominent role, are based on national interests and transatlantic relations (Howorth, 2000; Larrabee, 2009). Studies of French security policy are almost entirely divorced from idealist connotations. There

promotion of "peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges" among its overarching national interests underpinning this strategy (Obama, 2010, p.7). In the first ever British NSS, published in 2008, core values, including human rights, the rule of law, legitimate and accountable government, justice, freedom, tolerance, and opportunity for all, provide the point of departure for defining its national interests. The guiding principles also include aspirations towards preventive action and multilateralism (The Cabinet Office, 2008, pp.6-8). The French White Paper on security and defence, also issued in 2008, has among its overall aim "to contribute to European and international security" and to defend "the principles of democracy, including individual and collective freedoms, respect for human dignity, solidarity, and justice" (Présidence de la République, 2008, p.10). Although Germany lacks an NSS, two incumbent government parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU), released their own NSS in 2008. It identifies as one of the interests, the need to "contribute to the sharing of respect for human rights, freedom, democracy and the rule of law (good governance)" (CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group, 2008, p.3). In addition, the official German White Paper on security policy from 2006 addresses the constitutional responsibility to assist in upholding human rights and to strengthen the international order on the basis of international law (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2008, p.6). In the Strategic Concept of the Alliance, issued in 1999, the purpose of NATO as defined in the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 is paraphrased. It demonstrates the continuing relevance to NATO of the values that underpin its a cooperation based on "common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law", that the Alliance has striven for since its inception (North Atlantic Council, 1999, para.6).

is a general understanding that France is actively pursuing its national interests, alone or in cooperation with others, which pertains to its post-colonial relations with Francophone Africa as well as the realm of EU politics (Gegout, 2009). Moreover, its nuclear deterrence policy attracts academic attention (Gordon, 2009). What is striking about the academic treatment of Germany is that it demonstrates a desire amongst scholars to have Germany act more in accordance with the Realist dicta. In this context one needs to bear in mind the significant steps that Germany has already taken away from its curtailed role during the Cold War, including its ability and willingness to use military force abroad. The treatment of Germany as a realist actor strikes a realist cord in the elaboration of its new security identity and shows that it is starting to articulate national interests (Martinsen, 2010; Meiers, 2002). Germany plays an increasingly greater role in international politics, which is perceived as consistent with the country's political and economic strength (Noetzel and Schreer, 2008). However, it is portrayed as the hesitant power (Brummer, 2006). The gap between what Germany is willing to do and the international community's desire for it to do more, is widely recognised (Meiers, 2007). Currently, the academic debate on NATO is focuses on two subjects, the preparation of the new strategic concept and how to achieve success in Afghanistan (Jones, 2006; Kamp, 2009; Shea, 2007). Both these debates have inherent elements of Realism, as the overarching dilemma is to generate political will and military capabilities to successfully defend the values and territory of the Alliance.

From this brief examination it may be concluded that the EU self-image is consistent with how other Western actors in world affairs portray themselves. However, in considering how the academic community reflects on these foreign policy actors, the EU stands out as unique, because of the significant consistency between scholars and practitioners. To understand the behaviour of states as foreign policy actors, scholars need to contemplate how national interests are pursued, regardless of the idealist rhetoric conveyed by these states, and Realism provides an explanatory power for the advancement of national interest. The link between international organisations and self-interest in the realm of security is not inherent. While any organisation aims to serve its members, there is in general no transfer of responsibility for state survival to international organisations, nor is there any other 'social contract' than that between the state and its citizens. For some organisations, this link has been established and academic interest from a realist perspective seems to accompany this process. In the case of NATO, the organisation is centred on collective self-defence and the use of military force. For scholars in general to ignore Realism in explaining and predicting NATO decisions would be remarkably ignorant. Mindful of the dominance of the realistic school in explaining the EPC, the inception of the CFSP as a legal regime in the EU did not seem to generate compelling arguments for scholars to link crisis management actions to Realism. It is reasonable to

infer that the national prerogative in defence matters, the intergovernmental arrangement of this policy field, still in its infancy, and an appealing idealistic labelling of the CSDP, have swayed the academic community. However, as the CSDP matures, it begs for a more nuanced and critical examination.

3.6 Other Relevant Research

An adjoining policy debate on the military role of the EU has a wide scope, where, at one end of the continuum concerns are being voiced at the militarisation of the EU (Treacher, 2004). The key arguments include a fear of increased military spending by Member States and a change of culture within the EU. At the other end of the spectrum lies the notion of creating a European Army as the best means of dealing with future transnational crises (Gourlay, 2003; Salmon and Shepherd, 2003). Only a minimum amount of research relevant to this thesis has been pursued that is based on empirical data. The research into the CSDP has been “theoretically weak and empirically superficial” (Forsberg, 2006, p.2). On the subject of the EU as a ‘normative power’, the need for empirical work to understand the role of the EU has been argued.

[H]ow can we account for a normative dimension to the EU’s international role? The argument is under-theorized and another concept may be more appropriate. In short, what is needed in order to assess the nature of the EU’s foreign and security policy is meticulous empirical research, based on well-developed criteria and indicators within a broadened theoretical frame of reference. (Sjursen, 2006b, p.172).

There are a few instances of research based on empirical data derived from missions, and Delcourt has made key contributions on the use of force within the context of the EU (Delcourt, 2003). This research includes an empirical investigation of the evolution of the European position on the use of force, from the early days of the EPC before the establishment of the CFSP up to the post-Cold War developments. Her findings suggest that both Realism and Idealism are needed to explain the justification for the use of force. While the rhetoric for legitimising the use of force is underpinned by traditional idealistic arguments for humanitarian reasons, methods of action and some reasons for it are still justified in realistic terms, by reference to the interests of the Union. There is another body of empirical studies that examines the Council’s decision-making, including the role of the Presidency, that has merit for this research (Häge, 2007, 2008; Metcalfe, 1998; Warntjen, 2008), and it addresses the negotiations and the decision-making processes that take place within the Council. However, it is recognised that this body of research

does not especially address the CSDP. A Citizenship and Democratic Legitimacy in the EU research programme¹⁶ has examined the question of the EU as what is termed a normative or civilising power. This research revolves around the question of what kind of Power the EU is in the international arena. The findings question the consistency of developing military capabilities and at the same time, aspiring to be a normative civilising power. Moreover, in order to move forward, it is concluded that a notion of 'normative' or 'civilian' power requires a more precise definition (Sjursen, 2006b).

Whilst specific research into CSDP missions is fairly modest, the UN system has been subjected to this kind of examination. A study examined the UN and its use of force and elaborated the dual nature of an idealist and a realist approach to international relations (Tardy, 2007). It suggests that there is a dichotomy between the theoretical and the practical aspects of the UN's role as a crisis management actor. Another examination of state participation in, and types of contributions to, the eighteen UN peace-keeping operations launched during the Cold War found support for a realist explanation of state involvement (Neack, 1995). Bruneau provides a varied analysis of public and private good from individual cases and larger empirical studies in order to shed light on contributors' motivations for their participation (Bruneau, 2004). However, he argues that it is difficult to separate self-interest from altruistic motives, and it is prudent to accept a mixture of motives based on the state's history and the political context. Research into alliance constructs supports the suggestion that the pursuit of self-interest is not necessarily at odds with achieving collectively desirable outcomes such as peace and stability (Sandler and Hartley, 1995).

Giegerich and Wallace (2004) dismiss the soft power notion based on an empirical claim. By examining European involvement in international crisis management they conclude that the number of states and the level of individual nations' commitments have increased significantly since the early 1990s. Moreover, it is asserted that these missions are becoming increasingly demanding and challenging. However, this research takes a broad approach to the European stance and it does not allow conclusions to be drawn strictly within an EU context.

3.7 Summary

The cardinal scientific debate on European integration has evolved from a dialectic discourse, broadly reflecting Realism and Idealism, to an academic exchange that also

¹⁶ The Citizenship and Democratic Legitimacy in the EU research programme is a joint research project among ten partners in six European countries headed by the Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo. The first results were presented at a workshop held in Oslo in October 2004. A more comprehensive account for the research is provided in Sjursen (2006b).

embraces other reference points and key concepts. A similar journey in the case of the CSDP is rational and desirable, and this is a new policy field in the making. where there is still a need to explain what it is and the role it should assume. Low-complexity concepts such as Realism and Idealism are instructive in building basic knowledge for the first leg of this journey.

The self-image articulated by the EU is a homogenous one that portrays itself as an unintentional and considerate global actor with gentle manners. The EU considers itself as being obligated and committed to making the world a better place for humanity through direct action and by acting as a role model for, and an inspiration to, others. The acclaimed appeal of the EU as a force for good has a wider application than among the neighbouring countries, as it has also captivated most of the research community, and the EU self-image as a 'force for good' is shared by other Western states and organisations. Its uniqueness is defined by the strong correlation that exists between this self-image and the research community's representation of the CSDP. When altruistic claims are anchored in empirical efforts they become less decisive, and, while the idealistic narrative has merit, it is inadequate for a policy on defence matters, and empirical research into CSDP missions is scarce. Realist scholars show little interest in the EU in this policy area, as it does not conform to the traditional characteristics of an influential actor in a state-centric world order.

Scholars attribute three features to the EU as a soft power. It is a 'different power' that 'diffuses norms and values' and it advocates 'non-military means' for policy implementation (Sjursen, 2006b, p.172).¹⁷ These characteristics are elaborated to derive assumptions regarding the EU as a soft power. Firstly, the concept of being different must be seen in relation to other global actors, presumably while striving to define a comfortable ideological space between the EU and traditional power-maximising actors such as the USA. Accordingly, EU actions should be consistent with idealistic values. Secondly, the diffusion of norms and values suggests that the EU should not be driven by the safeguarding of its own interests, and, as a corollary, geography becomes less important. A human-centred approach does not make a distinction between suffering on the doorstep of the EU or in a remote location. Moreover, rather than managing conflicts, an idealist actor should be focused on preventing causes of conflicts. Thirdly, the use of military means is arguably shorthand for the use of forceful, potentially lethal, means. To contemplate the use of forceful military means, the Council must carefully consider the military threats driving the conflict. Finally, when it comes to working with partners, the EU must not become engaged only because it wants a seat at the table. Instead it must be able to deliver new and unique capabilities that are the key to

¹⁷ Sjursen combines diffusion of norms and values with the non-military aspect. Her third criteria is organisational, emphasising the *sui generis* and lack of a single authority.

addressing the conflict. A set of predictions regarding the EU as a soft power can now be formulated:

- EU engagements in international crisis management can be sufficiently explained by idealistic notions related to its perceived role as a ‘soft’ power.
- The EU acts first and foremost to spread values and norms.
- The EU limits its use of military power to well-defined military threats.
- The EU is not predisposed towards acting only in its own neighbourhood.
- The EU is focused on preventing conflicts.
- The EU limits its interventions to situations where it could add a distinct value.

These propositions are revisited in Chapter 7, following the empirical investigation.

Part II

Competing Perspectives

Chapter 4

Method I: Designing a Competing Approach

I keep six honest serving men: They taught me all I knew: Their names are What and
Why and When and How and Where and Who.

Rudyard Kipling ¹

4.1 Framing the Research

4.1.1 Unpacking the Research Question with Security Studies

Recalling the research problem from Chapter 1, i.e., how the Council's decision to engage in crisis management missions can be explained, the scientific inquiry revolves around a desire to 'explain' as opposed to 'understand, and this aspiration has several implications for the research design. There are two basic ways of interpreting events. While outsiders 'explain' the phenomena being studied as being part of Nature and regard the human realm as a part of Nature, insiders 'understand' what actions and events mean distinct from the laws of Nature (Hollis and Smith, 1990, p.1). The outside perspective calls for a scientific approach based on positivism and the inside perspective has clear links to hermeneutics (Petersson and Ångström, 2006, pp.136-7). Nevertheless, research design is seldom as distinct as suggested by these two dialectic perspectives and this project is no exception. Instead, the outside and inside perspectives should be regarded as the endpoints of a continuum, and in this project, the research design in this project

¹ Quoted in Patton (2002, p.276). Rudyard Kipling was a British author and Nobel Laureate in Literature in 1907.

is oriented towards positivism and the natural sciences. Therefore, logical inferences and operationalised terms are important concepts for the ability of this thesis to arrive at its conclusions. The aspiration is to adopt primarily an outside perspective to ‘explain’, which also suggests a clear distinction between the researcher and the phenomena examined, as well as a neutral stance on the empirical findings (Pettersson and Ångström, 2006, pp.136-7). Indeed, the author’s aim is to examine the empirical data objectively, so that an audit trail can be established from these data to the final conclusions. If the endpoint of positivism is defined by Comte’s original ideas, the scope of the research design is positioned on the continuum more towards hermeneutics, beyond a pure positivist approach, as it is not confined to study of facts.²

Mindful of the research question for this part of the project, i.e. how effective Realism and Idealism, respectively, are in assessing the motivation of the EU as a crisis management actor, the study is concerned with EU interactions with other international actors in order to address security challenges. Scientifically, the work is positioned within the realm of the academic field of International Relations (IR), and more specifically, it relates to the sub-field of Security Studies. Drawing on Richard Betts definition, it is possible to define Security Studies by introducing scientific sub-fields into IR, in the form of three concentric circles (Betts, 1997). At the core of this model, the innermost circle, lies Military Science, which examines how technology, organisation, and tactics interact on the battlefield. The middle circle relates to Strategic Studies, which discipline is concerned with the relationship between political ends and military means. In the outer, and most inclusive circle, lies Security Studies, which pertains to the safety of a polity in general and includes the former subsets. As such, it is consistent with the research problem being addressed. While this definition helps to position the research, it cannot compensate for the ambiguity associated with the notion of security which term this dissertation regards as a concept of alleviating threats (Williams, 2008, p.2).³ Security Studies has its roots in the military domain, where its contemporary application includes a major bifurcation (Wæver and Buzan, 2007, p.385). American research remains focused on the military domain, while the European debate adopts a broader agenda, including, for instance, Human Security. To anchor the work in Security Studies, the research question is unpacked by theories from this discipline, which is achieved by deriving independent research variables from research into Security Studies. In reviewing the body of literature in this discipline, six pertinent questions emerge relating to the distinct interrogatives: *Why, What, How, Where, When, and Who*.

² The discussion has benefited from a summary of Comte’s contributions in Patton (2002, pp.91-2).

³ Security is an elastic and subjective term that lacks a universally accepted definition (Collins, 2007; Haftendorn, 1991). A summary of key definitions is provided in Collins (2007, pp.2-3).

Research into the justification and rationale for intervention (cf. *Why*) has been primarily concerned with motivations for starting wars. John Stoessinger examines several wars from World War I onwards and he establishes ‘determinants of war’ that outline different justifications for intervention (Stoessinger, 1998). Graham Allison provides a different perspective on decision-making relating to interventions (Allison, 1971), and his three-pronged study of the Cuban Missile Crisis provides explanatory power by adding two perspectives to the conventional rational actor mode, viz: an organisational process model and a bureaucratic politics model. His work is examined in more detail in Chapter 8.3. The menace posed by nuclear weapons introduced an unprecedented threat to the survival of states and it also advanced a new logic, in which responses and military postures were contemplated (Betts, 1997, p.13).⁴ While the Cold War and the bipolar era produced narrowly focused views of threats, and of the role of the military as a symmetric instrument for deterring and defeating other military forces, new conceptual ideas emerged in its aftermath, while a diversified and more complex threat environment (cf. *What*) evolved. Samuel Huntington took a cosmopolitan view of threats and identified an emerging world order comprising eight competing civilisations (Huntington, 1997). In examining individual conflicts, Mary Kaldor concludes that contemporary threats are constituted by a mixture of war, organised crime, and human rights violations (Kaldor, 2006), and she also offers a new way to respond (cf. *How*) to these conflicts. The monopoly of states in pursuing legitimate organised violence must be surrendered. Transnational law enforcement forces, including both civilian and military components, should be designed to tackle contemporary threats. Others have studied how to cope with these new threats based on counter-insurgency theory (Galula and Nagl, 2006; Hammes, 2006). In the subfield of Strategic Studies, ‘strategy’ concerns *how* to deal with security challenges and an abundance of literature on strategies is available, in particular the relating to military affairs (Gray, 1996, 2005; Luttwak, 2001). Work is also provided by practitioners, civilian and military, that induce knowledge from their own experiences (Bremer and McConnell, 2006; Clark, 2001; Smith, 2007; Zinni and Koltz, 2006). Other areas of study include the design of multinational peace operations (Coleman, 2007; Ramsbotham et al., 2005). While geopolitical considerations (cf. *Where*) often depart from a realist perspective, important contributions are provided in the realm of security studies. David Lake and Patrick Morgan argue that there is a post Cold War trend towards ‘regional orders’ and new regional security arrangements (Lake and Morgan, 1997). Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver lay out unique dynamics for regional security complexes for different parts of the world (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). A temporal perspective (cf. *When*) is also present in Security Studies, and while classical theoretical works relate to waging offensive or defensive wars, contemporary studies

⁴ Betts argues that; “Nuclear war spurred theorising because it was inherently more theoretical than empirical” (Betts, 1997, p.13).

acknowledge the importance of post conflict management (Colletta and Muggah, 2009; Muggah, 2009) as well as preventive engagements (Dombrowski and Payne, 2006; Freedman, 2003; Slocombe, 2003). The latter are fuelled by the debate over the legality and legitimacy of the American intervention in Iraq in 2003 (Corn and Gyllensporre, 2010). Cooperation arrangements with partners and the associated gains are yet another perspective that receives attention in Security Studies (cf. *Who*). In 2005 Thomas Schelling received the Nobel Prize in economics for his game-theory based concepts of negotiations and responses in international conflicts (Schelling, 1997).⁵ Amongst other things, Schelling posits that the ability to coordinate responses is correlated with the parties common frames of reference.⁶ Tatsuro Yoda approaches the value of cooperation by exploring ways to influence partners to allocate more beneficial alliance contributions to USA-led operations (Yoda, 2005). In conclusion, the following topical questions are relevant, from a Security Studies perspective, for addressing the research problem:

- *Why?* This domain is concerned with a broad approach to the concept of interest and objectives.
- *What?* Research in this area focuses on factors that challenges security, peace and stability.
- *How?* Attention is paid to the selection of instruments and their mandate.
- *Where?* This factor considers geopolitical aspects.
- *When?* Research in this field reflects on the phases of the conflict cycle and their distinct dynamics.
- *Who?* This topic address the anatomy of multilateralism and the rationale for international cooperation.

Significantly, these perspectives are reflected in the EU's understanding of security. On the thematic EU website pertaining to 'bringing security, stability, and peace' the structure explicitly revolves around four questions; *Why*, *What*, *Who*, and *Where*.⁷ An adjacent webpage on the CFSP elaborates implicitly on *When* and *How* as the crisis cycle and the instruments for response are the key subjects.⁸ While some scholars address

⁵ The justification by the Royal Swedish Academy of Science is more related to Security Studies than to economics (Wæver and Buzan, 2007, p.401).

⁶ Shelling coined what he called focal points (Schelling, 1997, p.57).

⁷ See http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/peace_security/index_en.htm. The website was accessed on 20 October 2008.

⁸ See http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/index_en.htm. The website was accessed on 20 October 2008.

several of these questions (Borgeryd, 1998; Edström, 2003), most research, as elaborated above, focus on one questions.⁹

4.1.2 Lenses of Examination

Among the schools that seek to explain how actors behave to enhance security Realism and Liberalism are the two dominant ones (Collins, 2007, p.5). To enhance the dichotomy between these two influential schools (henceforth referred to as scientific schools), Idealism, as a subset and outlier of Liberalism, is studied in further detail, while Liberal internationalists are labelled idealists (Burchill et al., 2005, p.7). Martin Wight, an influential IR scholar, argued that there are three dominant traditions in IR theory that coincide with three conditions of international relations (Wight, 1992). Realists cater for advancing ‘international anarchy’, and Idealists, or revolutionists as he called them, address ‘diplomacy and commerce’ that reflect the torrent of peaceful and structured dialogue between sovereign entities. Wight also identifies rationalists as a third tradition, beyond the realist-idealist continuum. The concept of a ‘society of states’ recognises that the body of sovereign states constitutes a moral whole that imposes certain obligations, morally and, in some cases, legally. While idealists take the sovereign state as the analytical point of departure, rationalists assume a cosmopolitan perspective. They are concerned with international society as whole, not individual states. This perspective later evolved into the English School (Burchill et al., 2005, p.10). The application of Idealism in this thesis is not rigid and in some areas it overlaps with Wight’s definition of Rationalism (Wight, 1992).

This research project regards Realism as the point of departure and as the most fundamental perspective for international relations, as it concerns the survival of the polity. Idealism has the role of the challenger, calling for universal interests and higher moral values to be served. As a consequence, examination of these schools should begin with Realism. During the interactive evolution of IR theory, these two competing perspectives have developed and gradually the chasm between them has narrowed. The Realism

⁹ Anna Borgeryd’s PhD dissertation examines how the state system manages conflicts and to what extent efforts to manage conflict are successfully pursued, and for whom. The work adopts two perspectives, realism and legalism, to assess conflict management. As the thesis is focused on one particular phase of the conflict cycle, only five key questions are posed (Borgeryd, 1998, p.27). *Who* is linked to actors that can address the conflict. *Where* relates to the arena where the conflict takes place. *What* is related to the conflict and its components. *How* is applied to the remedying of the conflict. *Why* is applied differently compared to this thesis, as it focuses on the causes of the conflict. Håkan Edström’s PhD dissertation takes a different approach. It examines the coherence of the national defence doctrine between the political and military levels in a small state, Sweden, through comparative studies, drawing on references from Norway and Finland. The study is underpinned by three seminal questions (Edström, 2003, p.20). *How* applies to the conduct of defence. Unlike my usage Edström uses *Who* to denote the threat. Still it underlines the importance of addressing this topic. Finally, it applies *What* to elements that require protection. The latter aspect has no equivalent in the research outlined in this book.

doctrine is relatively well developed. Idealism therefore becomes the complementary or alternative approach. This is particularly evident in next chapter as plausible outcomes of the independent variables are divided into two subsets, in other words, an outcome that is distinct from the realist tradition and has an altruistic element, becomes integral to Idealism. Accordingly, major aspects of the rationalist tradition are accommodated within the idealistic application as they have an altruistic dimension that contrasts with Realism.

4.2 Research Design

4.2.1 Operationalisation of Independent Variables

In the preceding, the research problem has been positioned within the realm of IR theory, and, more specifically, in the field of Security Studies. From that scientific reservoir, six pertinent and topical questions were identified. This section elaborates on how these are operationalised to address the research question.

The unit of analysis is activity focused, and it is constituted by the set of crisis responses from the first ever decision to launch a CSDP mission in 2002 to those decided on by the end of 2009.¹⁰ This set includes twenty-three missions and this number is derived from the following criteria:

- A Joint Action is adopted for the mission
- The mission extends beyond the mandate of political consultations vested in the EU Special Representatives.
- The mission must include elements of intervention.¹¹
- The mission must have been launched after the inception of the CSDP as a policy area.¹²

¹⁰ For all practical purposes this date is consistent with the amendment of the TEU based on the Treaty of Lisbon. It came into force on 1 December 2009.

¹¹ Hence, planning missions or coordination mechanisms (e.g. EUPT Kosovo and EU NAVCO) do not qualify.

¹² Consequently, the EUMM in the Western Balkans is not considered. The mission started in July 1991. On 22 December 2000 the Council adopted a Joint Action that transformed the mission from a Commission-led mission to a CSDP mission. EUMM was completed in 2007. In the ten-year review of the CSDP the Council highlights the fact that twenty-two missions have been launched (General Secretariat of the Council, 2009). The paper does not specify how this number has been arrived at. On the Council website all twenty-three missions elaborated in this thesis are reflected as well as planning missions, see <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=EN>. The website was accessed on 10 January 2010. In February 2010, beyond the timeframe examined in this thesis, the EU decided to launch another CSDP mission, the EU Training Mission for Somalia.

The dependent variable is the motivation for CSDP missions, and it is based on the two scientific schools being studied: Realism and Idealism. Based on the pre-Lisbon TEU, the decision to launch missions was formalised in Joint Actions, a legal act that provides the mandate for a mission. However, it does not provide an exhaustive set of data to explain the motivation for the mission. In order to operationalise the aforementioned six independent variables, they need to be tailored to reflect the CSDP context:

- *Why* is CSDP action justified?
- *What* is the nature of the threat?
- *How* should a CSDP response be tailored?
- *Where* is the conflict taking place?
- *When* is CSDP action needed?
- *Who* is engaged in resolving the conflict?

In the subsequent chapter on theoretical considerations, these questions are expanded and further operationalised, based on an examination of EU policies, and, in addition, a set of plausible outcomes is identified for each question. The body of EU policies, including the treaties, provides boundaries for the CSDP responses. More specifically, it allows a definition of explicit outcomes. Hence, a key step for this research is to analyse EU policies and derive these plausible outputs. Of particular interest are the pre-Lisbon TEU and the ESS. Subsequently, the outcomes are divided into two distinct subsets, correlating with the two analytical perspectives that underpin the research, Realism and Idealism, and this step necessitates an in-depth study of these two scientific schools. Through these considerations an analytical framework is defined, which allows for a structured investigation of the empirical data. This work draws primarily on official EU documents and statements, and to a limited extent on other primary resources, such as UN Security Council Resolutions. Secondary resources are used only to provide context. On the one hand, this approach fails to reflect events beneath the official facade. On the other hand, data limited to official EU information strengthen reliability, as the research is designed to challenge the altruistic views held by the EU itself and a major part of the research community.

The outcome of the empirical investigation is a web of binomial output for each mission along the six questions or independent variables. This begs the question as to how many negative realist (or idealist) outcomes can be accepted without rejecting the explanatory power of Realism (or Idealism) in response to the research question¹³ Taleb argues that a single observation can invalidate a general statement derived from an abundance of

¹³ How effective are Realism and Idealism, respectively, in assessing the motivation of the EU as a crisis management actor?

confirmatory observations (Taleb, 2008). Another approach is to apply a quantitative statistical method by conducting a hypothesis test that draws on a binomial distribution (Russo, 2003, pp.70-7). This algorithm can assist by assigning a probability ratio to the outcome, the issue becomes one of determining an acceptable confidence interval, and intervals of 90% are commonly used. For the purpose of making a robust claim, the criteria are relaxed and conditioned by two criteria, at least one mission with a majority of realist or idealist outputs (i.e., four, or more, outcomes of the six independent variables) and only a minority of all the missions (i.e., eleven or less) is dominated by an idealistic or realistic outcome, respectively.

The research draws exclusively on an analysis of primary data, i.e., official statements and documents promulgated by EU institutions and, as these missions involve other organisations such as the UN, NATO, and the OSCE. To set each mission in its proper context, a short synopsis of the external factors relating to the conflict situation is provided. To ensure a proper reflection of the situation, facts are retrieved from other auxiliary sources in some instances. This also pertains to the facts needed to judge the relative value of the EU mission (cf. *Who*). The examination of the independent variables will be designed to allow the empirical data to contrast perceptions based on Realism and Idealism, respectively.

4.2.2 Model for Empirical Investigation

A model has been constructed to frame and conduct the empirical investigation, and, as a point of departure for its design, the notion of an open system, borrowed from the field of organisational theory, was used. At the most principal level, the model is constituted by inputs, a transformation process and outputs (Robbins, 1987). The open system model allows an examination of the EU as an entity that continuously interacts with its security environment and adapts its behaviour in response to changes taking place there. Another key characteristic of the open system approach is the porosity of boundaries between the object of study and its environment (Ansell and Weber, 1999). This is particularly valuable when examining the EU, since its Community Method is supported by a different type of governance and legal regime than is the CFSP approach (Lundin and Revelas, 2006). Member States pursue their foreign policy objectives on a national basis, often, but not always, in harmony with the CFSP. The general design of the model is strengthened by the rational actor or rational choice theory of decision-making (Allison, 1971; Russett et al., 2009). The model makes simplifications but also reflects an idealised view of the process of foreign policy decision-making including sequenced and cyclical flows of actions.

The process is initiated by the identification of a problem and is followed by the generation of alternative solutions. These alternatives are evaluated and a decision is made as to which options to pursue. This is followed by implementation and maintenance of the solution via monitoring and reviewing progress. Three consecutive phases have been defined: Crisis Development and Agenda Setting, Security Assessment and Decision-Making and Response. The empirical investigation focuses on the middle phase. The set of empirical data will be retrieved through document analysis of official EU documents including CFSP statements, Council Conclusions, European Council Conclusions Common Positions, and Joint Actions.

CFSP statements represent the lowest threshold for forming a view of a conflict in the context of CFSP. These statements also give an insight into how conflicts are initially perceived as they appear on the CFSP agenda. Council Conclusions and European Council Conclusions are also political statements, but at a higher level and are made less frequent, and are thus likely to be based on more in-depth political considerations. Significantly, these conclusions are agreed by the same body that decides on Joint Actions to launch CSDP missions and operations. It is anticipated that the analysis of Council Conclusions will identify a filtering of conflicts and possibly offer a slightly different discourse on the conflicts still receiving attention. Common Positions are legal instruments that could precede the launching of CSDP missions or operations. As such, they are likely to be accompanied by additional considerations that could assist in understanding the deliberations on the crises and the interests that the EU perceives. Common Positions could also be an alternative course of action in relation to CSDP actions. To enhance the understanding of the empirical data and put them into context, auxiliary empirical data will also be collected and examined using discourse analysis (De Witt and Meyer, 1994). The set of information will include other publicly available EU decisions related to security, e.g., Commission Communications, Commission Strategies and Programmes, implementation of development aid programmes, public master messages for CSDP missions and operations, planning documents for CSDP missions and operations, documented speeches by EU officials, press releases by the High Representative for the CFSP, UN Security Council Resolutions, reports by the UN Secretary General, independent analysis of the security situation in the crises concerned, and media reporting. In some instances, facts are retrieved from international partners including the USA, NATO, ASEAN, the UN, and the OSCE.

4.2.3 Additional Research Considerations

During parts of the research, the author was seconded as a national expert to the EU Council Secretariat, at the Policy and Plans Division of the EU Military Staff. The personal experience that comes from some twenty-seven years in the Swedish Army, including assignments at the EU, the Ministry of Defence Department for International Affairs as well as operational experience in some of the conflict areas studied (the Balkans, Sudan and Afghanistan), provides a source of strength for the qualitative work. At the same time, there is an inherent risk of being overly empathic and predisposed towards certain findings. In this case, it could imply an elevation of the role and importance of the military as a CSDP instrument. There are four major constraints on the chosen research approach and the use of official documents and statements as the empirical base. First and foremost, the research question addresses motivation as opposed to motives, and here lies a significant distinction. It is acknowledged that the research has no access to the real motives of the EU, and the articulated motivation by the EU is examined instead. The potential disparity between the real justifications and those articulated is not addressed, which has implications for the scope of the conclusions. The second constraint deals with the accessibility of documents; in the realm of the CSDP operations some documents, particularly on the military side, are classified and cannot be used for the purpose of this research. The design and the research focus have been tailored to avoid dependence on these documents. Typically, operation plans and concepts are classified. As the research is focused on the stages preceding detailed planning, this is a manageable constraint. A third challenge comes from the deconstructing and understanding of official texts (Miller, 1997). The official documents give little insight as to how and why the documents were written, through iterations of compromises in various Council committees. Finally, the fourth challenge is associated with the difficulty as an outsider of being attuned to EU jargon and committee semantics. The author's practical experience in working within the EU structures is valuable and underscore the importance placed on the qualitative analysis. However, this does not intend to challenge the outside perspective chosen. Another way to address this challenge is to draw on and make use of other research as an integral part of the qualitative analysis. These challenges seem to coalesce when examining the justification for CSDP missions. As will be discussed in more detail later, the official EU texts are particularly superficial on this topic and tend to fall back on rhetorical exercises that minimise the risk of being controversial in the media. In deconstructing *why* the EU has decided to launch a mission, the research will have to draw extensively on external resources as well as comprehensive qualitative analysis.

Chapter 5

Theory I: Realism and Idealism in the CSDP Realm

The antithesis of utopia and reality - a balance always swinging towards and away from equilibrium and never completely attaining it - is a fundamental antithesis revealing itself in many forms of thought.

Edward Hallet Carr ¹

5.1 Introduction

In Chapter 1 the research question for this part of the thesis was formulated. It asks how effective are Realism and Idealism, respectively, in assessing the motivation of the EU as a crisis management actor. The discussion also addressed challenges to approaching and understanding the EU as a foreign policy actor due to several unique features, including a mix of supranational and intergovernmental governance, a shared competence among many EU actors in the realm of foreign policy, limited empirical data available, and a nascent and progressive nature of the CSDP. Mindful of these circumstances, Chapter 4 identified a set of independent variables (i.e., *Why, What, How, Where, When, Who*) for further development. The object of this chapter is to further operationalise these variables and, in so doing, produce an analytical scheme for the subsequent empirical investigation. This is accomplished by first establishing the theoretical relevance of treating Realism and Idealism as a dialectic duo, and then by introducing the original sources and key characteristics of these scientific schools. Having done this, it will be necessary to return to the six independent variables, as defined in Chapter 4:

¹ Quoted in Carr (1964, p.11). Carr was a British historian and an influential realist.

- *Why* is CSDP action justified?
- *What* is the nature of the threat?
- *How* should a CSDP response be tailored?
- *Where* is the conflict taking place?
- *When* is CSDP action needed?
- *Who* is engaged in resolving the conflict?

The next phase of the theoretical analysis reviews the independent variables individually, and it involves the identification of plausible outcomes based on EU policies, which outcomes are then divided into two subsets. Thus each outcome is associated with either Realism or Idealism. This is accomplished by drawing on the academic traditions introduced above, bearing in mind their grounding in a state-centred world order, as opposed to the *sui generis* of the EU. Finally, the results are summarised in a table that allows an examination of EU documents and statements relating to CSDP missions to be translated into a dialectic output. Hence, an analytical framework is established for the subsequent empirical investigation.

5.2 Realism and Idealism in the Context of International Relations Theory

The quest to understand EU crisis management actions is addressed through a perspective of IR theory, and more specifically, by examining EU actions and decisions through the lenses of Realism and Idealism. Despite its relative youth, IR as an academic field has become highly diversified, and the proliferation of theories is overwhelming. A supporting objective of this thesis is to add clarity to the relationship between the scientific schools being studied and advancing how they are understood, although the interest is first and foremost an instrumental one. On a meta-level both Realism and Idealism belong to the family of rationalist theory and are thus part of the same epistemological tradition, i.e., positivism (Reus-Smit, 2005, p.188). As such, they both seek their explanatory power in methods of the natural sciences, and Rational Choice is a key underlying construct that assumes that actors are seeking to fulfil goals under certain constraints.

These goals need not be related to self-interest (Snidal, 2006, p.75), and it is this shared underlying scientific fabric of Realism and Idealism that makes a dialectic approach possible. The common logic of rational choice makes it meaningful to find answers to

the same research questions in examining EU actions through lenses of Realism and Idealism, respectively.

While this thesis seeks explanatory power from only a well-defined, albeit limited, part of IR theory, it is prudent to briefly orient oneself within the wealth of schools that could offer additional understanding the EU as a crisis management actor, but this lies beyond the scope of this thesis. In contrast to Realism and Idealism, IR theories in the realm of post-positivism denounce the application of scientific methods taken from natural sciences.

The divide at this juxtaposition imposes a scientific debate over the primacy of the physical and social sciences, respectively (Burchill, 2005, p.2). Within this latter epistemological tradition, Critical Theory challenges the fundamentals of positivism in that it acknowledges actors' inherently social nature as a premise. Critical Theory argues that the identities and interests of actors are socially constructed and not predefined. Moreover, it asserts that theory will always be designed for a target audience and a purpose (Devetak, 2005, p.144). As Critical Theory recognises knowledge as being conditioned by social and cultural influences, research within this field should benefit from a broader set of empirical data than the document analysis outlined in this part of the research. Constructivism has evolved from Critical Theory (Reus-Smit, 2005, p.195), and it also rests on the assumption that knowledge is socially constructed and not absolute. Constructionists seek to understand international relations through non-materialistic structures; consequently an understanding of how actors develop interests becomes crucial, and it is argued that identity defines an actor's interests (Wendt, 1992). The output from Constructionists' research is likely to reveal how actors perceive the EU and could, *inter alia*, provide extensive contributions to the images of the CSDP briefly introduced in Chapter 3.

Another branch of IR theory is Marxism. Despite the universal decline of Marxism as a relevant political practice, the academic debate over its relevance to IR has continued. Marxism distinguishes between in possession of the means of production and those who perform production. The tension and source of conflict is defined by the larger working class' need to subordinate themselves to the rules defined by the upper class in possession of the capital. Marxism seeks to remedy economic and social inequality through the unification of people on a cosmopolitan level. Class, capitalism and means of production are important concepts for Marxists (Linklater, 2005, pp.112-5). An examination of EU crisis management through this analytical lens would involve a broader analysis of economic, trade and development policies. Feminism, a school that emerged in the 1980s, represents another branch of IR theory that rejects the traditional approaches embodied in Realism and Idealism. It embraces another understanding of power and

relations among international actors, moves away from the traditional objective-oriented focus and adopts a transformative approach to IR. Non-state actors and marginalised people are important concepts (True, 2005). In the study of EU action, the situation and the role of women in the society within the conflict zone, as well as the gendered divisions of the Council and the Secretariat, are likely to define the threat perception and how it is addressed.

It is clear that other scientific theories can be useful and prove complementary to those of Realism and Idealism, in enhancing the understanding of the EU. However, their fundamentally different concepts of IR renders an examination based on traditional Rational Choice logic problematic. Instead, they merit independent variables and associated operationalisation derived from their respective scientific traditions. As such academic work is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is recommended as a topic for further research.

5.3 Realism and Idealism as Competing and Evolving Perspectives

Since its inception, the concepts of power and peace have dominated IR theory (Buzan, 1983, pp.1-3). In his seminal work *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, John H. Herz asserts that political thought could be reduced to two archetypes, Idealism and Realism. In his view, two basic instincts, survival and pity, have been the source of continuous tension (Herz, 1951, pp.6-17). While Herz focuses on bridging these theories in 'Realist Liberalism', this thesis exploits their dialectic relationship. Since Idealism and Realism are utilised to contrast actions, the study is primarily concerned with the ideological cores that define endpoints of the realist-idealist continuum. Consequently, in this section no attention is paid to the neo-schools or other outgrowths that seek to reconcile or bridge their fundamental ideological gaps.

Throughout history the narratives of Realism and Idealism have competed for primacy in explaining the world system. They have prevailed and evolved through significant societal changes and alternating world systems. The first known documentation of this duel was produced around 400 B.C., in conjunction with the Peloponnesian War. In Thucydides' account of the war, the famous Melian Dialogue crystallises the dichotomy between these scientific schools. The passage gives a narration of a dialogue after the invasion of the small island of Melos by the powerful and superior Athenians. The Melians are left with an ultimatum: accept the Athenian occupation and survive, or oppose the Athenians and be destroyed. In response the Melians argue that their neutrality should be respected, and that international law guarantees their right to neutrality. The

Melians also presented several other counter-arguments, namely that showing mercy towards Melos will win the Athenians more friends, and that the Spartans will come to Melos' aid. The Athenians, however, refuse to discuss either the justice of their demand or any substantive argument advanced by the Melians. Instead, the Athenians offer a lucid and oft-quoted formula of Realism: "The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" (Thucydides, 2008, p.360). In essence, Thucydides defines the core features of Realism: interest, power and security. However, it was not until the sixteenth century that philosophers started to conceptualise Realism. Niccoló Machiavelli, a civil servant and writer, provided significant contributions in his *The Prince*, written in 1513. Machiavelli was influenced by his experiences of governance in the city-state of Florence as well as the Renaissance, which was emerging in Florence during the late thirteenth century. The scientific branch of the Renaissance was dominated by a contemporary Florentine, Leonardo da Vinci. Machiavelli's narrative in *The Prince* provides a definition of Realism by contrasting it to an idealistic outlook.

[I]t appears to me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of the matter than the imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities which in fact have never been known or seen, because how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much that is evil. (Machiavelli, 1513, Chapter XV).

Truth and reality must be based on tangible circumstances as opposed to wishful thinking. He perceives power and rivalry as not only natural but positive elements, which need to be respected and cherished.

The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed . . . [I]t is much safer to be feared than loved. (Machiavelli, 1513, Chapter III).

Machiavellian morality is often regarded as cynical, as deeds are judged by the outcomes, and thus the end justifies the means.

Early seeds for a counter-theory to Realism can be found in the Melian Dialogue, as the weaker state appeals for mercy and argues for international laws to be applied. This line of thought was advanced further by the works of Hugo Grotius (or Huig de Groot), a Dutch lawyer and philosopher. Grotius experienced the destructive power of

war in Europe during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) and saw the need to establish a new international order, based on international law and distinct from domestic law. His *On the Law of War and Peace*, published in 1625, comprises three separate books. Grotius asserts that states are curtailed by common laws, and he thus denounces the anarchic nature of the world system (Grotius, 1625, pp.34-48). A peaceful co-existence of states was held up as the ideal, with the recognition that some forms of warfare were lawful, including self-defence. The justification for war was believed to be noble: "war is undertaken for the sake of peace" (Grotius, 1625, p.3). His contribution paved the way for a cosmopolitan perspective of security.

Another realist argument was produced in 1651 when Thomas Hobbes, a man passionate about the logic of arithmetic, published *The Leviathan*. Based on a desire to describe the state of nature, i.e., the assumed condition of humanity before the states were founded, he continued the framing of Realism by introducing the concept of anarchy as a 'War of every man against every man', *bellum omnium contra omnes* (Hobbes, 1651). Although this statement was making a case for states' monopolising of security and the need for individuals to cede power to the government, i.e., the social contract, this Hobbesian state of nature is widely used in IR theory to denote the anarchic world order.

[W]here there is already erected a Sovereign[sic] Power, there can be no other Representative of the same people, but onely[sic] to certain particular ends, by the Sovereign[sic] limited . . . The power of a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good. (Hobbes, 1651, Chapter XIX).

Hobbes was influenced by the English Civil War and much of his book is occupied with demonstrating the necessity of a strong central authority to avoid the evil of discord and civil war. Power was an important concept to Hobbes who saw the primacy of the sovereign state as the only representative of its people.

John Locke soon formulated some counterarguments based on a similar desire to describe the state of nature. While Hobbes saw mankind constantly engaged in war, Locke made a fundamentally different inference. In his *Two Treatises on Government*, published in 1690, Locke argued that reason tempers the state of nature and war is regarded as a violation of the fundamental freedoms.

The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions. (Locke, 1690, p.133).

Locke was an advocate of international law, or as he phrases it - natural law, but his idea of international law was not as far-reaching as Grotius'. Locke was a British physician who by coincidence, ended up as a civil servant. He was suspected of involvement in a plan to assassinate King Charles II of the United Kingdom and fled the country and remained abroad for several years. Most of his academic work, including the *Two Treatises on Government*, was published shortly after he returned to the UK. Against this background, it is perhaps not surprising that he emphasised popular consent as a foundation for governments and that rebellion against a government is justifiable when it fails to protect life, liberty, and property. Notwithstanding this progress, a more concise formulation of Idealism was not published until a hundred years later. Idealism was influenced by the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and was inspired by the ideals that sprung from it, including freedom, reason, progress, peace, and harmony between different interests. It was in this context that Immanuel Kant, a philosopher in the theory of knowledge, advanced Idealism. Consequently, his perspective differs widely from that of Locke. Kant formulated some key tenets of Idealism in *Perpetual Peace*, published in 1795. His ideas revolved around the premise that democracies do not embark on war to settle disputes (Kant, 1795b). Contrasting Thucydides' account of the Athenians and Realism, Kant called for a logic without self-interest and power.

No state having an independent existence - whether it be great or small - shall be acquired by another through inheritance, exchange, purchase or donation. (Kant, 1795a, p.108).

He articulates this through 'definitive articles'. The first article argues for a civil republican, construction of the state that ensured representative democracy, in order to curtail the ability of autocracies to wage war. The second article claims that liberal republics should establish a pacific federation, a kind of non-aggression pact or collective security agreement, based on international law. This would provide a moral and legal construct for peaceful conflict resolution. The third article concerns a 'cosmopolitan law' that involves the economic interdependence whose creation would reinforce structural constraints and liberal norms.

The study of IR as a scientific discipline began early in the twentieth century. World peace and optimism characterised the initial period, inspired by the progress at the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. World War I was followed by an enthusiasm for collective security, and this new era was dominated by the idealist school, and different idealist groupings evolved. War was viewed as an international concern requiring multinational efforts. In addition, war was not inevitable and its frequency could be reduced by institutional arrangements such as The League of Nations. The fundamental

concern for welfare of others was believed to make progress possible. Idealism is often personified by President Woodrow Wilson, whose contributions include the establishment of the League of Nations. In his famous Fourteen Points Address to the Congress in 1918, in the aftermath of World War I, he argues for nations coming together and working towards common goals.

A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. (Wilson, 2005, p.263).

However, another war was soon to dominate international relations. World War II, and then the emerging Cold War, had a significant impact on policy formulation and the academic debate promoting Realism as a reaction against the idealist school. The scientific debate that unfolded in the late 1930s and early 1940s is regarded as the first ‘great debate’ in IR theory. In 1939 an influential realist critique of utopianism was articulated by Edward Hallett Carr in *The Twenty Years’ Crisis’: 1919-1939* (Carr, 1964). Carr argued that IR theory, as any new scientific field, was initially the victim of a naive approach due to the first scholars’ desire to achieve their own goals. It is only when a scientific discipline matures, that the facts and real nature are disclosed.

During the [first] stage, the investigators will pay little attention to the existing “facts” or on the analysis of cause and effect, but will devote themselves whole-heartedly to the elaboration of visionary projects for the attainment of the ends which they have in view - projects whose simplicity and perfection give them an easy and universal appeal. (Carr, 1964, p.5).

Carr’s associate, Hans Morgenthau, followed suit and published *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* in 1948. It elaborated *Six Principles of Realism* in which he codified the key tenets of classical Realism (Morgenthau, 2006).

- Politics is governed by objective laws rooted in human nature. This makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible.
- The capstone concept is interest.
- Interest defined in terms of power is universal. However, its meaning is not fixed.
- The moral significance of political action is acknowledged.
- The moral aspirations of a particular nation are divorced from the moral laws that govern the universe.

- The autonomy of the political sphere is maintained. Realists think in terms of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth.

In summary, the explanatory power of Realism and Idealism as competing perspectives lies in their common ontological grounding, as well as their fundamentally distinct core features. The contemporary IR debate pays marginal attention to these fundamental concepts.² The debate has evolved and embraced other reference points and key concepts beyond the epistemological tradition of positivism. While these add value, there are compelling arguments to initially examine the CSDP through an orthodox approach. The CSDP is a new policy field that is in the making, and there still is a need to explain what it is, and low-complexity concepts such as Realism and Idealism can be instructive in building basic knowledge. In addition, deliberations on defence matters are inevitable associated with state sovereignty and national interests.

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to an individual treatment of the independent variables. In this part, the initial requirement to draw only on original theories of Realism and Idealism is relaxed. Secondary interpretations as well as neo-schools or other outgrowths of these theories are also utilised, albeit as a complement.

5.4 *Why* is CSDP action justified?

5.4.1 Identifying Plausible Outcomes

The first question revolves around the justification for employing a CSDP mission. It is concerned with the interest at stake for the EU. For states in general the ultimate *raison d'État* is their survival. The notion of interest is closely associated with the realist school and Lord Palmerston's famous speech at the House of Commons in 1848;

We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow. (Jones, 1914, p.142).

The realist affiliation may explain why this term is widely used by academia and practitioners in the USA, but is less visible in the European context. For the purpose of this research the term is applied objectively to establish an audit trail from the superior

² However, there are still exceptions. A few journals including *Political Theory* maintain a focus on classic theories. A special issue on the Roots of Realism was published by *Security Studies* in 1995 (Volume 5, Number 2).

ambitions. To lend credibility to the application of *interest* as a conceptual domain for both Realism and Idealism in the context of the EU, it is helpful to draw on the work of Robert Cooper, an influential EU functionary. He notes that while the EU is a post-modern system, the current world outside the EU is built on the classical state system. Consequently, the notion of interests also has applicability for idealists (Cooper, 2003, p.23). Although interests may be clearly articulated, actors involved in the decision-making process tend to develop their own concepts. Halperin *et al.* provide a compelling account of the institutional challenges in pursuing national interests in a national, American, setting (Halperin et al., 2006). The acclaimed account of the decision-making during the Cuban Missile Crises gives further substance to this argument (Allison, 1971). However, the research into EU interests is yet to be developed. Instead, there is a rich body of research into EU bargaining and negotiations that indicates that the same logic applies within the Union (Elgström and Jönsson, 2000; Scharpf, 1988).

In contrast to most other EU policy documents, the ESS elaborates on EU interests, specifically making use of the term ‘interest’ eight times. First and foremost, it elevates the role of the EU as a conduit to best advance European interests, implicitly serving the common denominator of European national interests. This is also a narrative that Javier Solana subscribes to when he elaborates on EU interests (Solana, 2007d, 2008c). The EU discourse regarding interests addresses the internal audience of the Member States. Only through EU cooperation can the shared national interests be pursued successfully. Secondly, geopolitical aspects are interwoven with interest rhetoric. The areas mentioned include, EU border areas, the Mediterranean region, Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region in Africa, the Korean Peninsula, the Middle East, and the Southern Caucasus. In addition, the transatlantic relationship is referred to as a strategic interest which implicitly points to NATO and, more importantly, the USA. Despite these references, the document falls short of providing a comprehensive view of EU interests. In a follow-up paper that was initially intended to be a strategic concept for the EU, but was watered down to a ‘Proposal for a White Paper’, an independent taskforce under the auspices of the EU Institute for Strategic Studies elaborated further on some future scenarios for the CSDP (Gnesotto et al., 2004).³ This format allowed some freedom of thought, beyond what was discussed in official EU meetings. The paper bluntly claims that the EU is a strategic actor that needs to be able to project and protect its interests. It singles out international terrorism as the key threat to EU interests. The document also makes a distinction between vital and value interests by linking the former to the security and prosperity of the EU and its Member States. While the first category includes the

³ During their Presidency in 2001, Belgium promoted the idea of developing a strategic concept for the EU. Due to reluctance among some Member States the scope and timeline for the project were adjusted (Biscop and Andersson, 2008).

integrity of Member States, economic survival, social and political security, the second category involves international peace and security, and universally accepted norms and values (Gnesotto et al., 2004, p.13).⁴ Value interests are intended to extend those core principles vested in the Union to other countries and regions. This thinking is also prevalent in the legal sphere of the EU, although slightly different language is used. The TEU makes a distinction between values and interest:

In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter. (European Council, 2010, art. 3.5).

In addition to the elaboration on interests, the ESS identifies three strategic objectives: addressing the threats, building security in our neighbourhood, and an international order based on multilateralism. To seek more specific explanations as to why the EU engages in certain crisis management operations, it is necessary to return to the TEU. Under the pre-Lisbon TEU, the CFSP had its own legal framework that was provided in title V of the Treaty. The first article defines objectives for the common foreign and security policy (European Council, 2002d, art.11.1):⁵

The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be:

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter;
- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;
- to promote international cooperation; and
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

⁴ Gnesotto et al. also argue that stability in the neighbourhood relates to value interests. However, it is not directly linked to the security of the EU, but to assist neighbours by diffusing Western values.

⁵ Article 21.2 in the TEU articulates similar aspirations.

It is striking that these objectives, and the revised objectives in the TEU, seldom receive attention in the scientific debate relating to EU foreign policy, let alone CSDP missions.⁶

In addition to the common foreign and security policy objectives in the TEU, the ESS identifies three opaque strategic objectives: to tackle threats; to enhance security in proximity to Europe, and to bolster international order. Clearly, these aspirations fall within the former objectives laid down. Moreover, the pre-Lisbon TEU had the status of law, while the ESS is a non-binding political declaration, albeit an influential one. From this it can be concluded that the common foreign and security policy objectives in the pre-Lisbon TEU should form a basis for the plausible output. To ensure consistency with the discussion on interests, safeguarding of interests and values are considered separately. While the safeguarding of fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity is linked to the overall cohesion and prosperity of the EU, protecting the values of the EU is linked to extending principles and standards to other parts of the world.⁷ Consequently, the plausible output can be summarised according to Table 5.1:

Keyword	Independent variable	Conceptual Domain	Outcome
Why?	Why is CSDP action justified?	Interests	To safeguard the fundamental interests of the Union [I1] To safeguard the common values of the Union [I2] To strengthen the security of the Union in all ways [I3] To preserve peace and strengthen international security [I4] To promote international cooperation [I5] To develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6]

TABLE 5.1: Plausible outcome on *Why*

As depicted above, each outcome is assigned a label. The first letter, ‘I’, relates to the conceptual domain, i.e., interest. This ensures separation of outcomes from different independent variables. The second letter is the serial within the given domain.

Regrettably, neither the pre-Lisbon TEU nor any policy document elaborate further on the aforementioned objectives. Their meaning is therefore to a large extent left to the readers’ interpretation. To safeguard the fundamental interests of the Union [I1] is understood as the measures related to maintaining the cohesion of the EU and

⁶ Still it seems that this article in the pre-Lisbon TEU served as a point of departure for the deliberations on the Proposal for a White Paper.

⁷ From here on the shorthand ‘fundamental interests’ is used to also include security, independence and integrity.

the desire for new members to accede for the benefit of the Union. Safeguarding the common values of the Union [I2] is achieved by diffusing the norms and values of the EU. The strengthening of the security of the Union [I3] is linked to global stability and international trade so as to ensure the quality of life of EU citizens. It is also to prevent conflicts in the neighbourhood from spreading and directly affecting the security of the EU. Another objective deals with preserving peace and strengthening international security [I4]. It seeks to prevent and mitigate local conflicts with a limited effect on the EU. In some situations international cooperation may be an end in itself [I5]. Rebuilding or strengthening the state apparatus in a conflict zone involves more functional and democratic governance. In this context the EU strives to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6].

5.4.2 Partitioning in Realist and Idealist Outcomes

From a realist point of view, the EU must first and foremost advance its vital interests. In the realist narrative, power and interest becomes intimately linked. Conflicts of interests are inevitable in an anarchic world order. Whilst power concerns capabilities, interest provides the justification for the exercise of power. In his elaboration on *Six Principles of Political Realism*, Morgenthau argues that action must be oriented to, and judged by, the interest at stake and that it is necessary to assume that statesmen act on the basis of interest.

The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers. The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesman's thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil. (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985, p.165).

Underpinning his thinking was a view of the symbiotic relationship between interest and power that defines politics as an 'autonomous sphere of action' allowing separate analysis of political action from other actions (Williams et al., 2006, p.58). Hence, political entities, in particular states, are on their own and that they have to advance their own interests. Since it is deduced that power is relative by nature, international relations becomes a struggle to maximise power (Wight, 1992, p.114). The ultimate purpose of statecraft is the survival of the state in an anarchic international world order. From this thinking flows the central notion of self-help that encapsulates the reliance on own resources to advance one's interests (Kegley, 1997, p.22).

From an Idealism perspective, the EU should contribute to a more secure world. If realists take survival and self-help as the point of departure, idealists believe in the

convergence of interest in humanity. Idealists claim that the interests of the *civitas maxima*, the society of states, override those of the states. It is argued that the premise of international solidarity includes all true national interests (Wight, 1992, p.114). This is postulated in Kant's first supplement to his *Perpetual Peace*, the guarantee of perpetual peace is achieved by the 'great artist', i.e. Nature itself, and its ability to bring harmony among men.

The guarantee of Perpetual Peace is furnished by no less a power than the great artist Nature herself: *Natura Daedala rerum*. The mechanical course of Nature visibly exhibits a design to bring forth concord out of the discord of men, even against their will. (Kant, 1795a, p.58).

In his *Fourteen Points Address* to the Congress in 1918 Woodrow Wilson argued that "We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end" (Wilson, 2005, p.263). From this follows a departure from the realist school in that security is not tightly linked to power, although, an increase in one state's power will have a reverse effect on other states. However, as power and security are separated the relevance of security as a relative concept is denounced.⁸

In partitioning the findings, Sam Tangredi's model for interests is instrumental (Tangredi, 2002). He distinguishes between survival interests, vital interests, and value interests. Survival interests concern survival of the nation, territorial integrity, and economic security. Recalling the current scope of the CSDP, which falls short of collective security, it is clear that this set of interests is not applicable to EU crisis management. Vital interests, or world order interests, are those that are critical to the long-term vitality of the state but do not necessarily pose an immediate threat to the lives and domestic property of the state. The model argues that vital interests are to be the drivers of *Realpolitik*. To revisit the security objectives of the EU (European Council, 2002d, art.11.1), it is helpful to draw on this model for categorising its security interests. It can be concluded that safeguarding the fundamental interests of the Union [I1] and also strengthening its security in every way [I3] qualify as vital interests, while the residual outcomes require examination from an idealistic perspective. It is clear that value interests have strong correlation with the core principles of Idealism. Hence, the EU should contribute to a more secure world. To this end, it should in particular advance the foreign policy objectives related to safeguarding the common values of the Union [I2], preserving peace and strengthening international security [I4], promoting international cooperation [I5], and developing and consolidating democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6].

⁸ The notion of the security dilemma was coined by Herz (1951).

In conclusion, from a realist perspective, the EU must first and foremost advance its vital interest. Following the discussion on foreign policy objectives (European Council, 2002d, art.11.1), Karen E. Smith elaborates on two categories of objectives for EU foreign and security policy: milieu goals and possession goals (Smith, 2003, p.13).⁹ According to Smith, possession goals aim to advance EU interests, while milieu goals are those intended to shape the international environment. They can be implemented by diffusing parts of the legal *acquis* of EU and thus make other states and organisations internalise values and norms of the EU (Lavenex, 2004, p.694). The objectives in the pre-Lisbon TEU reveal some very different foundations and Smith's categorisation into possession and milieu goals will assist in identifying two distinct subsets of objectives related to Realism and Idealism, respectively. One category relates inwards, towards to the well-being and security of the Union, while another focuses on assisting and promoting a positive development externally, outside the EU.

Realist Perspective	Idealist Perspective
<i>The EU must prevent threats from spreading to its territory.</i>	<i>The EU should contribute to a more secure world.</i>
<u>Vital interests</u>	<u>Value interests</u>
To safeguard the fundamental interests of the Union [I1]	To safeguard the common values of the Union [I2]
To strengthen the security of the Union in all ways [I3]	To preserve peace and strengthen international security [I4]
	To promote international cooperation [I5]
	To develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6]

TABLE 5.2: Partitioned outcome on the independent variable *Why*

The ESS establishes clear demarcations between these two subsets. On the one hand, international security is a precondition for ensuring a safe and stable environment within the EU. On the other hand, exporting values serves self-interests. However, the distinction is important as it lays out two fundamentally different perspectives on approaching and addressing conflicts. In the category of inward-looking objectives it is noted that the first two objectives, safeguarding common values and fundamental interests, and strengthening security, have the explicit intention of improving the situation of EU citizens. The latter objectives put the emphasis on shaping the external environment.

⁹ Smith does not clearly define this categorisation. Instead her point is that most objectives fall into the milieu goals category.

5.5 *What is the nature of the threat?*

5.5.1 Identifying Plausible Outcomes

Despite its fundamental importance, interest is not the only qualifier for launching EU crisis management missions. Criteria relating to the other independent variables, including the nature of the threat, also need to be sufficiently satisfied.

Furthermore, in the realm of threat perceptions, the ESS plays a pivotal role. It is the only open-source EU policy paper that seeks to identify the threats that Europe is exposed to, and, it is, at the same time, the only threat-driven analysis of global security undertaken by the EU (Gnesotto et al., 2004; Heisbourg, 2004).¹⁰ By adopting a threat-oriented perception of the security environment, the EU focuses on the threats themselves rather than their political origins, and the threats become sufficiently concrete to prescribe remedies (Bono, 2006, p.157). This mindset fosters a proactive approach towards challenges in the international security environment. Not only the threats themselves, but the way they are understood, changed following the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Meyer and Miskimmon, 2009, p.625). The preamble to the ESS is clear on the intellectual direction of the document, which is primarily about the security of Europe and its citizens: “Europe still faces security threats and challenges” (European Council, 2003a, p.1). The emphasis is on the new complex and unexpected nature of the threats that Europe is exposed to; “Europe faces new threats, which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable” (European Council, 2003a, p.3). The strategy proclaims a proactive approach towards shaping the international environment. Further on, it points out that the first line of defence against these new threats often lies abroad. In this context, it is argued that the EU should take on greater responsibilities. The strategy singles out five key threats: Regional Conflicts, State Failure, Terrorism, Proliferation of WMD, and Organised Crime. Since this is a unique articulation of threats in the EU policy context, it can be concluded that these constitute the set of plausible outcome, see Table 5.3 below.

The reminder of this section is devoted to elaborating on the nature of these threats in the EU policy realm.

Regional conflicts [T1] are the most conventional type of threat, and this refers to conflicts between states that are confined geographically, without the danger of global expansion. This traditional form of conflict, which may culminate in war, is well known

¹⁰ It is recognised that the EU Institute for Security Studies prepared a strategic outlook to 2025 on threats and security challenges as a part of the EU Long Term Vision in May 2006. See <http://www.iss.europa.eu/nc/actualites/actualite/browse/1/article/long-term-vision/long5C20term5Cvision/>. The website was accessed on 28 December 2009. This study is future oriented and has therefore not been considered any further.

Keyword	Independent variable	Conceptual Domain	Outcome
What?	What is the nature of the threat?	Threats	Regional Conflicts [T1] State Failure [T2] Terrorism [T3] Proliferation of WMD [T4] Organised Crime [T5]

TABLE 5.3: Plausible Outcome on *What*

and its basic characteristics need no further explanation. However, there is no unclassified conceptual EU approach to this type of threat. The underpinning and dynamics of regional conflicts have been the object of extensive research throughout the Cold War (Meyer and Miskimmon, 2009, p.625). International law is designed to deal with conflict between states, and national armies, including those of the EU Member States, as well as international actors such as the UN and NATO, are tailored to address these challenges. While most of the contemporary debate is geared towards the new threats, one of the prominent European strategic scholars, Colin Gray, argues that interstate conflicts will not go away (Gray, 2005).

The notion of failed states [T2] relates to an internal inability to govern a territory and its population. There is no unclassified EU document that provides a conceptualisation of this type of threat, and other resources must be consulted instead. In general, failed states are characterised by deep-rooted and intractable conflicts. Often the government-controlled forces are engaged by armed factions or insurgencies. However, it is not the level of intensity that defines a failed state, but the enduring character of violence and a lack of control (Rotberg, 2002, p.85). To obtain a clearer picture of the world's weakest states, The Fund for Peace, an independent research organisation, and the Foreign Policy magazine present an annual Failed States Index. It draws on a wide set of parameters including twelve social, economic, political, and military indicators. The assessment aims at ranking states' vulnerability to violent internal conflict and societal deterioration.¹¹ Only a few of the world's states qualify as collapsed, the end stage of failure. However, many others are fragile and are candidates for failure (Rotberg, 2002, p.85). Failed states that pose a less immediate threat to the EU may become a concern that touches on human rights, good governance and terrorism (Haine, 2008), which has been demonstrated in Sudan and Afghanistan, both highly ranked on the Failed States Index. The J-curve theory explains why failed states are more unstable than authoritarian regimes (Bremmer, 2006). The correlation between stability and openness suggests that undemocratic and introvert states can be very stable. However,

¹¹ See for instance http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings. The website was accessed on 19 December 2009.

when there is progress, stability is likely to decrease for a while. As the ‘openness’ of a state increases, its stability will increase. Hence, a J-shaped curve is formed.

One of what is termed the new threats is terrorism [T3], and in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the USA, the EU adopted a framework for combating terrorism (Council of the EU, 2002g) that provides an authoritative definition of terrorist offences that combines two elements:

- Objective- A list of serious offences is identified including attacks against a person’s life, kidnapping or hostage taking, the seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport, etc.
- Subjective- The acts are considered as terrorist offences when intentionally committed with a specific terrorist aim, including seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a government to perform, or abstain from performing, any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental structures of a country or an international organisation.

The ESS was also prepared in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and was also influenced by this event. Other terrorist attacks in Europe, after the adoption of the ESS, have further impelled implementation efforts. Following the terrorist strike on Madrid in 2004, the Declaration on Combating Terrorism, including the Declaration on Solidarity against Terrorism, was adopted (Council of the EU, 2004m). The solidarity declaration explicitly referred to the plausible use of military means in response to such an aggression, a unique, if not unprecedented statement on the use of EU military means within its boundaries.¹² The Declaration on Combating Terrorism provides the foundation for addressing this threat. Common positions on organisations that are classified as terror networks have been vigorously agreed by the Council. Later in 2004, a conceptual framework for employing CSDP measures in the fight against terrorism was adopted (Council of the EU, 2004f).

The proliferation of WMD [T4] received its first legal foundation in the Euratom Treaty (European Atomic Energy Community, 1957). Following the invasion of Iraq, the EU

¹² The Declaration calls upon the Member States and the acceding States to:

act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if one of them is the victim of a terrorist attack. They shall mobilise all the instruments at their disposal, including military resources to:

- prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of one of them;
- protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;
- assist a Member State or an acceding State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack.

Arguably this declaration was ambiguous with regards to its relation to the CSDP, a policy field only exercised outside EU territory according to the pre-Lisbon TEU.

agreed on a counter-proliferation strategy. The EU advances its nuclear non-proliferation objectives primarily through the CFSP framework and the Commission (European Commission, 2009a). Within the Council, a strategy to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has been adopted (Council of the EU, 2003s). It addresses the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as well as the means to deliver them. The strategy calls for all EU instruments to be employed to deter, prevent, halt and eliminate illegal proliferation programmes, including, as a last resort, coercive measures in accordance with the UN Charter. In this policy area, the EU is deeply involved in the diplomatic efforts to curb Iranian aspirations to become a nuclear state.

The EU regards itself a prime target for international organised crime [T5] including cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons, which accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs (European Council, 2003a). The fight against organised transnational crime is first and foremost an internal policy area in the EU, which addresses this issue within its boundaries. It is based on amendments to the TEU following the Treaty of Amsterdam and has been further developed in a series of policy documents (Council of the EU, 1999, 2000b; European Commission, 2005b,d; European Council, 1997).¹³ Organised crime is defined as a structured association of individuals acting in concert with a view to committing offences. The objective of the organisation is to obtain financial or other material benefits (European Commission, 2005e, p.4). Following the finalisation of the ESS, this policy area has developed its external dimension. This is achieved by bilateral, regional and international initiatives, through agreements and other instruments, as well as by promoting EU benchmarks and international standards. The EU is particularly concerned by organised crime regions on its borders. However, the strategic concept for tackling organised crime does not envisage the involvement of CSDP instruments (European Commission, 2005b, p.9 and annex). In conflicts, the impact of illegal economies, including the illegal trade in natural commodities such as diamonds and timber, can escalate and sustain the crisis. Furthermore, the profits from illegal trade work against incentives for peace (Brown, 2005, p.4).

5.5.2 Partitioning in Realist and Idealist Outcomes

From a realist perspective threats are primarily aimed at states and their institutions. Realism, influenced by Hobbes, views the sovereign state as the central actor. No higher

¹³ The Vienna Action Plan on Organised Crime adopted in 1999, strengthens EU action against organised crime. An integrated approach is outlined at each step, from prevention to prosecution. Policy initiatives to combat organised crime were identified in the Millennium Strategy. and the Hauge Programme outlined an objective for the period 2005 to 2009. A later Communication by the Commission developed a strategic concept for tackling organised crime.

political authority is recognised; therefore, the anarchical nature of international politics is emphasised and conflicts are to be considered inevitable. Power and self-help are regarded as the most important means for the state's survival. The state's overarching objective is to promote the national interest through the acquisition of power, while stability is believed to result from maintaining a balance of power. The realist school of thought is state-centric in that it assumes that the morality needed to become an actor emanates from the people and the laws of the state, and actors are rational entities that map ends and means. Consequently, realists are less occupied with states' internal dimensions including history, structure and culture (Rosenau and Durfee, 2000, p.14). In the light of this frame of mind, and recalling the famous billiard ball metaphor conceived by Morgenthau, it is difficult to accommodate non-state actors within the threat scenarios. Morgenthau's notion of the 'autonomy of the policies sphere' suggests that anything related to policy is in the political sphere (Morgenthau, 2006, p.60). Addressing transnational organised crime, and other broader issues, becomes difficult in that it is either done through political measures or it is outside the political sphere. Hobbes was occupied with demonstrating the necessity for a strong central authority to avoid the evil of discord and civil war. As the state is the component of the international system, safeguarding it becomes important. State centrism is a core realist belief and, accordingly, sovereign states should monopolise interstate conflict (Borgeryd, 1998, p.106). From these viewpoints, it is reasonable to summarise that realists are comfortable with addressing state-centred threats, including internal threats to a state's legal and moral base, but are less prone to engage with threats of a less clear-cut nature. With reference to the threats identified in the ESS, we therefore infer that regional conflicts [T1] and state failure [T2] relate primarily to Realism.¹⁴

From an idealist perspective, threats emerge from complex interdependencies between states and non-state actors, and human security is more important than state security. From its liberal roots it can be deduced that people essentially have good intentions. Idealism, in particular that of post-World War I idealists, claims that people are essentially altruistic and that their deep concern for others' well-being is a prerequisite for achieving progress (Kegley, 1997, p.20). If realists, in their desire to be objective and provide clarity, make a distinct division between evil and good, idealist are less concise and apply a sliding scale between these two extremes. What is related solely to states' security and what concerns the international community tend to be blurred. Grotius pioneered such thinking with regard to the complex security environment. He distinguished between private, public and mixed war (Grotius, 1625, p.34). Mixed wars are

¹⁴ The discussion also raises questions about the applicability of Realism in analysing the CSDP. Clearly, the orthodox Realism reflected in this section suggests that non-state actors play no role in dealing with crises. However, at this point our interest is in operationalising the independent variables. Part III provides an in-depth discussion on the explanatory power of Realism with regard to the CSDP.

understood to be wars that have public authorities (i.e., state actors) on one side and private persons (i.e., non-state actors) on the other side (Neuman, 2003, note 21). Idealism prescribes increased trade and participation in international organisations to prevent and overcome threats. States are regarded as dominant and rational actors, however, with complex interests. More importantly, states are not regarded as the only actors. Keohane and Nye defined this complex interdependence based on three characteristics: (1) multiple channels of communication, such as a regional security organisation, the UN, and international corporations; (2) multiple issues are of interest and there is no hierarchy of issues; and (3) military force is not used to solve conflicting interests (Rose-nau and Durfee, 2000, p.38). Consequently it can be concluded that Idealism is more focused on transnational threats and is more sensitive to breaches of human security, and is not as occupied with state security as Realism.

Realist Perspective	Idealist Perspective
<i>Threats are primarily posed to states and their institutions.</i>	<i>Threats emerge from complex interdependencies between states and non-state actors. Human security is more important than state security.</i>
State centric	Transnational
Regional Conflicts [T1]	Terrorism [T3]
State Failure [T2]	Proliferation of WMD [T4]
	Organised Crime [T5]

TABLE 5.4: Partitioned outcome on the independent variable *What*

In summary, it is inferred that while Regional Conflicts and State Failure are primarily associated with Realism, the transnational and human threats embodied by Terrorism, the Proliferation of WMD and Organised Crime accord well with the tenets of Idealism, see Table 5.4.

5.6 *How should the EU respond?*

5.6.1 Identifying Plausible Outcomes

The Maastricht Declaration by the member states of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1991, argued that the organisation would develop as the defence component of the EU, while at the same it regarded itself as a vehicle to strengthen the European pillar of NATO (Bloed and Wessel, 1994, pp.131-2). To implement this aspiration the foreign and defence ministers of the WEU issued the Petersberg Declaration (Bloed and Wessel, 1994, pp.137-42), which envisaged that forces answerable to the WEU could be employed for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and the tasks of

combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. These tasks are known as the Petersberg Tasks.¹⁵ When the Treaty of Amsterdam was negotiated to define crisis management tasks within CFSP, Member States chose to draw on the consensus established in the Petersberg Declaration (European Council, 1997). However, an important but often neglected distinction is present in the TEU that dates back to the Treaty of Amsterdam. The TEU foresees that the tasks relating to the CFSP shall *include* humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, and, hence, other tasks besides the Petersberg Tasks could be considered. The consensus underpinning the tasks deserves some additional clarification. The original definition of the Petersberg Tasks represented how far a consensus could be taken at that time to galvanise capability development, without upsetting the fragile balance with NATO as to the degree of autonomy between the two organisations (Quille et al., 2005, p.21). However, the consensus primarily applies at what is termed the low-end of the conflict spectrum, which includes rescue and traditional peacekeeping tasks. For the more demanding tasks, it is widely recognised that different interpretations coexist amongst Member States, reflecting their ambitions for the CSDP and their relation to NATO. Some, including France and Italy, envisage the EU as being able to embark on the most ambitious and challenging missions, using Operation Desert Storm in Kuwait in 1991 as a frame of reference (Bono, 2004, pp.447-8). In contrast, the UK and the Netherlands appear to be more cautious by suggesting that operation Allied Force¹⁶ reflects the upper limit of the mission set. In addition, Germany and Sweden adopted restrictive definitions alluding to NATO troop missions in the Balkans as the upper limit (Missiroli, 2003a, p.9). The EU has deliberately avoided seeking further clarity on this subject, and the ‘constructive ambiguity’ in the formulation of these tasks proved essential since it caters for different interpretations of the level of ambition by Member States. Recent studies indicate that Member States’ views may be converging. In a series of interviews with officials in London, Paris and Berlin in 2005 it was found that they all acknowledged the need for the EU to be able to play a role in all phases of a conflict (Lindell, 2005, p.80).

In December 1999 the EU set a military target known as the Helsinki Headline Goal (European Council, 1999c), and Member States agreed that by 2003 they would put at the Union’s disposal, on a voluntary basis, forces capable of carrying out the tasks specified in the TEU (European Council, 2002d, art.17.2), in operations up to army corps level (60,000 troops). This triggered capability development that took the Petersberg Tasks as its point of departure. Following the adoption of the ESS in December 2003, the EU decided to set a new military capability objective, Headline Goal 2010 (Council

¹⁵ For a comprehensive analysis of the Petersberg tasks, see Jørgensen (1997).

¹⁶ The NATO operation that carried out airstrikes against Yugoslavia in 1999.

of the EU, 2004o).¹⁷ Five illustrative scenarios were prepared to identify the types of crisis situations that the EU may wish to address using military means (Council of the EU, 2009b, p.10):

- Separation of parties by force
- Stabilisation, reconstruction and military advice to third countries
- Conflict prevention
- Evacuation operations
- Assistance for humanitarian operations

In the case of the first three scenarios, the EU envisages more robust forces in order to achieve the desired objectives. The threats of terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and organised crime, as outlined in the ESS, are not likely to trigger a military EU response (Council of the EU, 2009b, p.11). The use of these Petersberg Tasks is further complicated by their emphasis on the military instrument of the CSDP (Bird, 2007; Cornish and Edwards, 2005; Ortega, 2004). Instead, the ESS stressed the importance of addressing conflicts with a mix of civilian and military instruments. Despite its predisposition towards civilian instruments, and the acclaimed competitive advantage of the EU's pursuing of civilian crisis management, compared with the USA, the UN and NATO, the development of military capacities has received most of the resources and attention since the CSDP was launched (Jakobsen et al., 2006, pp.299-300).

The CSDP civilian crisis management missions can be deployed autonomously, jointly or in close cooperation with military operations. On a separate track, but within the realm of CSDP, the EU has developed civilian instruments for crisis management in the four priority areas of the police, the rule of law, civilian administration, and civil protection (European Council, 2000a). A Civilian Headline Goal 2008 was set up to trigger pledges from Member States (Council of the EU, 2004d).¹⁸ The headline goal expanded the civilian responses to include monitoring missions as well as the provision of support to Special Representatives of the EU. Hence, six priority sectors of civil crisis management have been established:

- police;
- rule of law;
- civil administration;
- civil protection;

¹⁷ Following the finalisation of the document at PSC level on 4 May 2004 it was approved by the GAERC on 17 May 2004 and endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004.

¹⁸ Following the agreement by the PSC on 7 December 2004, the document was approved by the Brussels European Council on 17 December 2004.

- monitoring missions;
- support for EU special representatives.

These six priority sectors subscribe to the same planning methodology as the military Headline Goal 2010 (Council of the EU, 2007r).¹⁹

For the purpose of this thesis, it is not relevant to further study “support for EU special representatives” as such tasks do not constitute a mission in accordance with the definition provided in Chapter 4.2.1. The plausible ways for the Council to respond with CSDP instruments are therefore defined by the tasks summarised in Table 5.5:

Keyword	Independent variable	Conceptual Domain	Outcome
How?	How should a CSDP response be tailored?	Mission	Peacemaking [R1] Peacekeeping [R2] Rescue task [R3] Humanitarian task [R4] Joint disarmament operation [R5] Security sector reform [R6] Support for third countries in combating terrorism [R7] Police Mission [R8] Monitor mission [R9] Other civilian missions (rule of law, civil protection, and civil administration) [R10]

TABLE 5.5: Plausible Outcome on *What*

Peacemaking [R1] is linked to the scenario of separating parties by force. This mission involves the mandate to use of force to ensure compliance by the belligerents and achieve the objectives of peace and stability (Boulden, 2001, p.3). Taken to the extreme it involves conventional warfare sanctioned by the international community. Within the UN, the term Peace Enforcement is used and such missions draw on Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Corn and Gyllensporre, 2010). The notion of Peacekeeping [R2] was coined when the UN dispatched troops in conjunction with the Suez Crisis in 1956, and it was not formalised until 1992, when the UN Secretary General issued his *Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). The definition refers to deployments of military and/or police forces based on consent by the conflicting parties. This typically involves overseeing compliance with a ceasefire or a peace agreement, and force can be used in self-defence.

¹⁹ However the the illustrative scenarios were slightly different: I.A - Stabilisation and Reconstruction, including a Substitution Mission; I.B Stabilisation and Reconstruction; II - Conflict Prevention, notably Monitoring and Support for EU Special Representative Offices; III - Targeted Strengthening of Institutions; IV - Civilian Support to Humanitarian Operations.

The mandate for peacekeeping is found in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.²⁰ Rescue tasks [R3] refer to evacuation operations where EU citizens and other designated non-combatants threatened in a foreign country are relocated to a place of safety. The Secretariat has put forward a concept paper on evacuation operations using military means (General Secretariat of the Council, 2007a). Military means may comprise different assets and capabilities ranging from disaster response assets, including strategic and tactical transportation assets, to a military force supporting or conducting the operation as necessary. The EU abides by an internationally accepted framework for humanitarian tasks [R4] (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2003) and military and civilian defence resources should be employed by humanitarian agencies as a last resort, in other words, only in the absence of any other available civilian alternative, in order to support urgent humanitarian needs. Humanitarian tasks cover a wide range of arrangements, resources or activities to support, a civil authority or organization in the execution of its tasks; or to sustain the basic humanitarian needs of a civil population (Council of the EU, 2008i). Joint disarmament operations [R5] are codified in a joint Secretariat/Commission concept paper. Disarmament operations involve collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons belonging to the combatants and often also to the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes (General Secretariat of the Council, 2006b). Closely related to disarmament is security sector reform [R6], which, according to the EU Concept paper, seeks to increase the ability of a state to meet the range of both internal and external security needs in a way that complies with democratic norms and good governance (General Secretariat of the Council, 2005c).

Support for third countries in combating terrorism [R7] has not been elaborated in a separate concept, but is embedded in the overall approach to terrorism. Moreover, all military scenarios include elaborations on the task. The declaration on combating terrorism includes objectives that call for development of technical assistance strategies, in order to facilitate vulnerable third countries' enhancing their counter-terrorism capability, and to promote good governance and the rule of law, by incorporating counter-terrorism concerns into all relevant external assistance programmes (Council of the EU, 2004m). The EU concepts for police missions [R8] are classified and outside the remit of this research project (Council of the EU, 2009a; General Secretariat of the Council, 2005a). Based on the EU concept paper on monitor missions [R9], these missions are launched to observe, monitor and report to the deploying organisation on the situation in the host country or in relation to a specific agreement (Council of the EU, 2003n).

²⁰ Notwithstanding the legal base in Chapter VI of the UN Charter, there is a trend towards providing peacekeeping missions with a robust mandate based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Monitoring is the working methodology and is distinct from other forms of conflict prevention and crisis management interventions in that it does not aspire to deter, or to include an inspection authority or implementation programmes. Other civilian missions (rule of law, civil protection, and civil administration) [R10] comprise a wide range of civilian efforts. Drawing on the EU concept, rule of law missions are aimed at either strengthening the rule of law, with deployed personnel to educate, monitor and advise, with the aim of bringing the local legal system up to international standards, or substitution for a local judiciary/legal system, with deployed personnel carrying out executive functions (Council of the EU, 2003c). Civil Protection differs from other civilian crisis management due to the specific nature of the speed and duration of deployment, and the EU concept for Civil Protection addresses disaster relief in the field of crisis management (Council of the EU, 2002d). It focuses on the delicate balance between Council and Community measures, as this policy has a significant degree of overlap of competencies between the Council and the Commission. The purpose of the EU Civilian Administration missions is to establish conditions for local political control and ownership of the Civilian Administration apparatus, with full respect for human rights, the rule of law and good governance principles (Council of the EU, 2003p). Civil administration missions can be focused on strengthening existing structures or substituting local administration by assuming executive powers and might also be deployed in support of an EU Special Representative. From here on the shorthand ‘civilian mission’ is used to denote an outcome [R10], including missions related to rule of law, civil protection, and civil administration.²¹

5.6.2 Partitioning in Realist and Idealist Outcomes

From a realist perspective, deterrence and the use of coercive power must be considered as an option for EU crisis management. Contemporary realists would agree that the use of force is as important to the international system today, as it was during the Peloponnesian War some 2,500 years ago. According to Realism, and in the words of Hobbes, the human passion includes a desire for greater power, and that power is a relative commodity (Borgeryd, 1998, pp.88-9). The inference is an inevitable power struggle, while one of Machiavelli’s key concepts was *Necessitato*. This foresaw that for the benefit of the state, some policies could be adopted, which would otherwise not have been accepted. He claimed that ends justify means, and, accordingly, policies and decisions will be judged by their outcome (Borgeryd, 1998, p.83). Based on this

²¹ It is noted that other missions, reflected in other outcome, can also be viewed as civilian missions. The application of ‘civilian mission’ to denote outcome [R10] does not claim to include all plausible civilian missions. Instead it should be regarded as an abbreviated form of the language used in the pre-Lisbon TEU (European Council, 2002d, art.17.2).

principle any crisis management mission could be contemplated if the circumstances were appropriate. Clearly, Hobbes distilled this principle further by stating that “The Passions that encline [*sic*] men to Peace, are Feare[*sic*] and Death” (Williams et al., 2006, p.52). Hobbes sees self-preservation as ‘the greatest good’, where the right to self-protection confers the right to do what is necessary, including the right to invade others or breach their security (Borgeryd, 1998, p.83).

From an idealist point of view, the EU should aim to alleviate suffering and persuade conflicting parties, and for Idealism non-intervention is the norm, and it has had a significant impact on democratic governments over the past 250 years. Consequently, it regards the internal (domestic) characteristics as crucial in international relations. Modern society finds war wasteful and injurious to the quality of life as well as to the markets. Hence, there is a desire to resolve crises peacefully. Idealism evolved after World War I as a branch, as liberals sought to bring an end to the concept of war as a conflict-solving mechanism (McLean, 1996, p.233). Idealism’s assumptions about world politics can be summarised in the following: (1) international anarchy does not imply a general state of war, (2) states are inherently different ‘entities’, differentiated by how they relate to key issues, such as human rights, and (3) the aims of the state, and those of the individual, go beyond security to the protection and promotion of individual rights (Rosenau and Durfee, 2000, pp.34-7). States respect other nations’ sovereignty through their existence, in the same way as citizens of a country do. However, states have a moral obligation to prevent human rights violations. If sovereignty is violated, force may be used in self-defence or collective defence. States are perceived to behave differently in the international community, depending on their values and internal actions. Increased trade, participation in international organisations, and democratic values reduce the risks of war and violent conflicts. As a principle of international right, states have the right to regulate their own affairs, without external interference. Exceptionally, if a state pursues policies based on principles of hostility to other nations, intervention is permissible in the interests of the international community (Wight, 1992, p.134). Furthermore, if intervention is necessitated, it must be in compliance with the concept of a Just War, which operates in two independent temporal realms. Whilst *jus ad bellum* is concerned with the reasons for the intervention, *jus in bello* addresses the implementation and the use of instruments to intervene (Walzer, 1977, p.21). The preponderance of Grotius’ work was aimed at bringing clarity to the concept of a Just War (Wight, 1992, p.217). For the purpose of this book our interest is limited to the former element. In particular, self-defence and the violation of human rights may justify exceptions to the non-intervention claim. With this noble perception of humans also comes a realisation that bad behaviour, including engagement in violent conflicts, is a result of institutions that foster selfish behaviour (Kegley, 1997, p.20). War, and

implicitly the use of force, is a necessary evil to be limited. In his *Prolegomena* Grotius emphasises the detrimental effects war has on morality and the need to constrain its application:

Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack of restraint in relation to war, such as even barbarous races should be ashamed of; I observed that men rush to arms for slight causes, or no cause at all, and that when arms have once been taken up there is no longer any respect for law, divine or human; it is as if, in accordance with a general decree, frenzy had openly been let loose for the committing of all crimes. (Grotius et al., 1957, p.21).

However, he continues to argue that pacifists have gone too far in the other direction: “For both extremes therefore a remedy must be found, that men may not believe either that nothing is allowable, or that everything is” (Grotius et al., 1957, p.21). Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* revolves around the premise that democracies do not embark on war to settle disputes. His ‘definitive articles’ argue for a civil, republican, construction of the state to ensure representative democracy that could curtail the ability by autocracies to wage war. He also asserted that liberal republics would establish a pacific federation, a kind of non-aggression pact or collective security agreement, based on international law. This would provide a moral and legal construct for peaceful conflict resolution. Kant also addressed ‘cosmopolitan law’ that involves the economic interdependence whose creation would reinforce structural constraints and liberal norms (Doyle, 2006; Russett and Starr, 2000, p.116). The book also offers a two-step peace program. Among the ‘Preliminary Articles’ we note that “Standing Armies shall be entirely abolished in the course of time” and “No State shall intermeddle by force with the Constitution or Government of another State” (Kant, 1795a, section 1.1-3)

In conclusion, the analytic touchstone for Realism, including its belief in power and that the ends justify the means, suggests a value in missions where either some enforcement mechanism, the use of force, could be in place, or where the state or its citizens are at stake. Recalling the previously discussed mission set, it is therefore concluded that Peacemaking [R1], including the mandate to use lethal force to implement the mission, and Rescue tasks [R2] to evacuate EU citizens, are first and foremost relevant from a realist perspective. Less clear is the stance on Peacekeeping [R2] missions, which are mandated to use force only in self-protection. However, as this is done to deter re-emerging hostilities, it is reasonable to also categorise this task within the realist domain.

Realist Perspective	Idealist Perspective
<i>Coercive power has utility.</i>	<i>The EU should primarily alleviate suffering and persuade conflicting parties.</i>
<u>Use of Force</u>	<u>Providing Assistance</u>
Peacemaking [R1]	Humanitarian task [R4]
Peacekeeping [R2]	Joint disarmament operation [R5]
Rescue task [R3]	Security sector reform [R6]
	Support for third countries in combating terrorism [R7]
	Police Mission [R8]
	Monitor mission [R9]
	Civilian mission [R10]

TABLE 5.6: Partitioned outcome on the independent variable *How*

The Idealism perspective puts the emphasis on providing assistance and help to other actors to remedy their security challenges. To this end the remaining tasks mesh comfortably with this qualifier, see Table 5.6.

5.7 *Where is the conflict taking place?*

5.7.1 Identifying Plausible Outcomes

The intellectual point of departure for geopolitical considerations is Mackinder's Heartland Theory (Mackinder, 1904). It is underpinned by the idea that the earth will be divided into two competing spheres: land and sea, and that the source of global power lies in the heart of the Euro-Atlantic landmass (Clover, 1999; Megoran et al., 2005). Any actor controlling this region could gain sufficient strength for world domination. In his view, control of Eastern Europe had pivotal importance. The salient point for this research project is the importance that geography plays in the wider considerations of foreign affairs.

The EU is a global actor due to its weight as an economic and development actor, but also because it is becoming a key player in world politics. Some commentators go further by predicting that the EU will dominate the world scene, not because of military might, but due to other, intangible, assets, including a being a beacon for democracy, human rights, soft power and capitalism (Leonard, 2005; McCormick, 2006; Reid, 2004). The EU Member States constitute the largest economy in the world and, at the same time, the EU is the world's largest exporter and second largest importer (Kotler et al., 2008, p.197). Trade is the "single most important contact with the world beyond [the EU]

borders” (European Commission, 2009c, p.2).²² Recalling that the EU is the world’s biggest donor, providing the majority of development aid in the world (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006a), suggests that the EU, from a geopolitical perspective, has another set of interests beyond those related to the industrialised world. In addition, the EU is an evolving global political actor with increasingly ambitious involvement in various diplomatic fora. In some settings, such as the UN General Assembly, G8, the OSCE and the World Trade Organization (WTO), the EU has a seat at the table alongside some of its Member States. It also convenes summits on a regular basis with prominent world actors such as the USA, China, India, Japan, Brazil, NATO and others. An exhaustive list of external relations is beyond the scope of this elaboration. The point to be made is merely to illustrate that the Union is a cosmopolitan actor with vested interests in all parts of the world.

To provide a geopolitical perspective on EU crisis management, the issue now becomes one of exploring how these interests coalesce in geography. Despite the global perspective, the EU has traditionally subscribed to traditional geopolitical thinking by deliberately emphasising different neighbourhood spheres in external relations. The EU neighbourhood could be viewed and clustered along the different types of association with the EU (Lavenex, 2004):

- *quasi-membership* for comprehensive forms of association such as the European Economic Area and the bilateral treaties concluded with Switzerland;
- *accession association* for the encompassing framework of enlargement negotiations with (until recently) the new Member States of Central and Eastern Europe, Malta and Cyprus, and, although less developed, also with Turkey and the countries of the western Balkans;
- *neighbourhood association* with the Mediterranean and new eastern neighbours;
- *development co-operation* with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries;
- *transatlantic co-operation* with the USA and Canada.

Some of these areas can be immediately be disregarded when considering employment of EU crisis management missions, and North America is not a potential region for CSDP missions. The same applies to the developed countries of the European Economic Area. In consequence, three regions remain that are underpinned by distinct geographical policies. In addition, other regions exist beyond the broad definition of

²² The trade policy seeks to advance the prosperity of Europe (European Commission, 2009c). External trade is primarily embodied in the Common Commercial Policy (Nugent, 2006, p.483). Based on the TEC (art.133) it fell under exclusive Community responsibility.

the EU neighbourhood that the aforementioned categorisation provides, and they also deserve more elaboration.

The accession association region is primarily in South East Europe or the Western Balkans. An understanding of the contextual fabric of the EU with regard to South East Europe emanates from the consequences of the wars fought as Yugoslavia broke up in the 1990s. The Royaumont Process in 1996 was the first EU attempt to stabilise the Western Balkans by promoting regional projects for improved neighbourly relations (Türkes and Gökgez, 2006), and it was devised to support the implementation of the Dayton Peace process. The process was soon complemented by a strategy for the region, the Regional Approach, which included political and economic conditionality in the development of bilateral dialogues with countries suitable for further integration, i.e., Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Council of the EU, 1997). When the Kosovo War erupted in 1999, a more ambitious policy for the region was developed, comprising the Stability Pact and the Stability and Association Process. The Pact was launched in 1999, under the aegis of the UN, to bring peace, stability and economic development to the region. (UN Security Council, 1999a), and while it was an EU initiative, under the stewardship of the Commission, it involved most of the key actors in the world, institutions as well as states.²³

The Stability Pact was designed to provide a vehicle for policy coordination, divided into three thematic Working Tables.²⁴ It was linked to six countries bordering Yugoslavia, namely Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, and Romania. It was believed that the Pact would anchor the countries of South East Europe firmly within the values and institutional structures of the Euro-Atlantic Community (Friis and Murphy, 2000, p.769). At the time of this agreement, in 1999, the EU was engaged in processing the accession of thirteen new states. At short notice and through a ‘turbo-charged process’ (Friis and Murphy, 2000) it was decided to add to this ambitious list another five, namely Macedonia, Albania, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The EU crafted a wide set of policies for the region and the countries concerned. The vehicle for the EU to internally and bilaterally advance this

²³ EU Member States, the European Commission, the Foreign Ministers of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, the United States of America, the OSCE Chairman in Office and the Representative of the Council of Europe representing the participants in today’s Conference on South Eastern Europe; and the Foreign Ministers of Canada and Japan, Representatives of the United Nations, UNHCR, NATO, OECD, WEU, International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The list of participants is included in Para 1 of the Stability Pact Agreement adopted in Cologne 10 June 1999, see the official Stability Pact Website available at <http://www.stabilitypact.org/constituent/990610-cologne.asp>. The website was accessed on 29 December 2009.

²⁴ Democratisation and human rights (Working Table 1), Economic reconstruction, development and cooperation (Working Table 2), and Security Issues (Working Table 3).

ambitious approach was codified in the Stability and Association Process for these five countries (European Commission, 1999a), where the EU identified a responsibility to assist in bringing stability to the region. However, political visibility and ensuring that the EU played a key role in this process were deemed more important (European Commission, 1999a, p.1). However, the purpose of the Stability and Association Process is to enhance relations between the countries concerned and the Union so as to facilitate the necessary reforms on the road to accession. At the 2000 Lisbon Summit, the European Council confirmed that “the Stabilisation and Association Process is the centrepiece of its policy in the Balkans” (European Council, 2000b, para.47), and it was formalised later the same year at the Zagreb Summit. The Stability and Association Process entails Stabilisation and Association Agreements, financial assistance, and trade measures. The Stabilisation and Association Agreements represent a contractual relationship between the EU and the country concerned, including mutual obligations. A Stabilisation and Association Agreement codifies the membership perspective offered by the EU, while financial assistance is channelled through the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) (Council of the EU, 2000a). The aim of this instrument was to support participation by the recipient countries in the stabilisation and association process. Amongst other things, this instrument provided another incentive for applying a comprehensive approach to the development and reconstruction of each country, as it envisaged a strategic framework to be encapsulated in ‘country strategic papers’. The Stability and Association Process was further strengthened at the EU-Western Balkans Summit of June 2003 in order to promote privileged relations between the EU and the Western Balkans (European Council, 2003f). In 2006, the Commission proposed further areas for progress, and a joint agenda agreed between the EU and the countries of the Western Balkans at the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit, has largely been implemented (European Commission, 2006c). To summarise, the Western Balkans, including Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, constitute a geographical policy cluster for the EU, with unique characteristics and it merits its own treatment in a geopolitical context.

Neighbourhood association is defined by a wider set of countries in the proximity of the EU. The ESS maintains the idea that geography is important in a globalised world and that strengthening the neighbourhood is a key priority (European Council, 2003a). The ESS follows a dual-track logic by identifying neighbourhood security as a strategic objective to prevent immigration and organised crime from having an impact on the Union, while at the same time noting that distant threats may also be a major concern for European security (European Council, 2003a, p.7). This appears to be a hedging

strategy, since the new threats as an integral part of globalisation, disrupt the correlation between physical proximity and threat urgency.²⁵ Solana argues that “[w]hat happens half-way round the world, in Afghanistan, Gaza, Kosovo or the Democratic Republic of Congo, affects our own security and prosperity” (Solana, 2007d). The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed in tandem with the ESS and the enlargement phase, culminating in May 2004 with eight new Member States, and no new dividing lines were to be created (European Council, 2002c, p.6). The first outline of the ENP, published in March 2003, (European Commission, 2003e) nurtured the idea of strengthening relations with those neighbouring countries that do not currently have a clear track towards EU membership. The Commission articulated a desire for a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood, a ‘ring of friends’, with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations. Progress in shared values and the effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms are rewarded by closer economic integration with the EU. The ENP set out Action Plans in terms of how the EU proposes to work more closely with these neighbouring countries (European Commission, 2004b), and the aim of the policy relates to both EU value interests and its vital interests.

The European Neighbourhood Policy’s vision involves a ring of countries, sharing the EU’s fundamental values and objectives, drawn into an increasingly close relationship, going beyond co-operation to involve a significant measure of economic and political integration. This will bring enormous gains to all involved in terms of increased stability, security and well-being. (European Commission, 2004b, p.4).

Despite the relative youth of ENP, the Commission has submitted proposals for improvements in a number of policy areas, including addressing regional conflicts (European Commission, 2006b, 2007a). As one of the recommendations “a more active EU role in regional or multilateral conflict-resolution efforts, including participation as appropriate in civil and military peace-keeping missions” is foreseen (European Commission, 2006b, p.10) A key element of ENP cooperation is the bilaterally agreed Action Plans to formalise agendas of political and economic reforms with short and medium-term priorities. The policy applies to Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and the Ukraine. It is concluded that this cluster of neighbouring countries constitutes another unique policy domain for the EU.

²⁵ This logic applies, for instance, to terrorism and the proliferation of WMD and also to threats not addressed by the EU such as cyber-related threats.

The third tier of cooperation involves the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) region. The geopolitical aspect of EU development aid can be derived from the colonial legacy of a few Member States. Former colonies in Africa obtained a privileged status in the Treaty of Rome, and when the UK joined the European Community in 1973, this list of ex-colonies was extended to include countries in the Pacific and Caribbean (Cameron, 2007, p.158).²⁶ The aim of this cooperation association, as articulated in the Treaty, was an altruistic one, that of helping these countries to prosper.

[A]ssociation shall serve primarily to further the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of these countries and territories in order to lead them to the economic, social and cultural development to which they aspire. (European Council, 1992a, article 133).

The arrangements were formalised and detailed in the Lomé Convention signed in 1975 to further promote the ACP countries' economic and social development and also to establish close economic relations. This cooperation opened up the European market to them, based on agreed quotas, primarily for agricultural products, and allocated them aid as well as investment. Following three rounds of negotiations on the Convention it was time for a complete revision. At the time, in the late 1990s, two major factors influenced this need: the changed geopolitical situation with the fall of the Eastern Bloc and the UN Millennium Development Goals, including the overarching target of eradicating poverty. The Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000 and revised in 2005, builds on the experience of the Lomé Convention (European Commission, 2006g), and adds conditionality as well as a political dimension to the *aquis* (Nugent, 2006, p.515), which dimension encompasses security-related provisions by including cooperation against the proliferation of WMD, as well as a joint commitment to the global fight against terrorism (European Commission, 2006g). This resonates with the ESS that proclaimed causality between security and development: "Security is a precondition for development" (European Council, 2003a, p.2). Other areas of security-related cooperation include capacity building and financial support for crisis management operations under the auspices of the AU. As cooperation evolved, the European Development Fund developed as a multi-annual instrument to allocate aid. The Ninth European Development Fund allocated €17.9 billion for 2000-2007.²⁷ To implement policy, development targets are defined in National Implementation Programmes, mutually agreed by the Commission and the an ACP state and followed up in annual reviews. These programmes are based on, and often annexed to, Country Strategy Papers covering a five-year period. EU Member States, the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission agreed to a common EU

²⁶ Part four of the Treaty of Rome outlines the framework for cooperation with developing countries.

²⁷ See Commission (Directorate General for Development) website available at http://ec.europa.eu/development/how/source-funding/edf_en.cfm. The website was accessed on 29 December 2009.

vision of development. Since 2005, a common understanding exists between relevant EU actors on how to pursue policies in this area. A European Consensus on Development exists among EU Member States, the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission (Council of the EU, 2006i). This is further strengthened by a biennial process of policy coherence, culminating in a report by the Commission (European Commission, 2009b).²⁸ Policies on Africa are for all practical purposes linked to the efforts related to development aid. Sub-Saharan Africa has received significant attention in the EU policy context, and it is the only region in the world for which the EU has formulated a legally binding Common Position on Prevention, initially adopted in 2001 (Council of the EU, 2005h). However, it was not until 2005 that the European Council endorsed a strategy for Africa, prepared by the Commission and the Council Secretariat (European Council, 2005a), which streamlined the long-term interaction with the AU and its sub-regional organisations on development issues, through the Commission, with the relatively new engagements by the Council on security matters (Council of the EU, 2005v). As a result, CSDP support for AU operations and capacity building were better integrated and coordinated within the African Peace Facility, a Commission instrument under the European Development Fund. This resulted in the issuing of a joint Secretariat-Commission concept for strengthening African capabilities to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in order to coherently address long-term capacity needs as well as immediate support operations (General Secretariat of the Council, 2006d). Following the second EU-Africa summit in December 2007, at which the future of the strategic partnership was deliberated, a new joint EU-Africa strategy, including a three-year action plan (2008-2010), was agreed, giving further impetus to strengthening peace and security as preconditions for political, economic and social development (Council of the EU, 2007f).

To summarise, relations with the ACP countries, in particular those in sub-Saharan Africa, are dominated by the Development Policy. The policy coordination that is taking place and the inclusion of a security dimension in the Development Policy, suggest that CSDP measures are increasingly being accommodated within this policy area. As a consequence, ACP countries, excluding those involved in the ENP, should be clustered and treated separately.

As a last part of this examination, remaining regions must be considered. So far all continents except South America, Antarctica, Australia, and Asia have been analysed or rejected. No CSDP mission has taken place in South America, Antarctica or Australia. Consequently, only Asia requires further attention. Since the TEU came into force, by August 2006 some 8% of all CFSP decisions pertained to Asia (Smith, 2008, p.56). The

²⁸ Closely associated with these development efforts is the EU policy on Africa. Facts in this paragraph have been retrieved from the Commission (Directorate General for Development) website, http://ec.europa.eu/development/index_en.cfm. The website was accessed on 29 December 2009.

marginal attention to Asia in the ESS further underscores this claim. It is, therefore, no surprise that only two of the CSDP missions, in Indonesia and Afghanistan, have taken place in Asia. EU-Asia relations tend, rather, to be founded on economic and trade interests (Balme and Bridges, 2008, p.3). Another feature of the relationship has been the EU's desire to promote regional integration. The first contacts between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)²⁹ and the Commission date back to 1978 (Smith, 2008, p.56). Following the Cold War these relations took a new turn. From an Asian perspective there were concerns that Europe, a key export market, would become too internally focused as a consequence of German re-unification, which demanded a more proactive Asian approach. From a Commission perspective, economic growth amongst the East Asian 'Tiger Economies' increased European attention (Godement, 2008; Smith, 2008). Later the EU stepped up its ambitions in the fields of development cooperation, human rights and security.³⁰ The relationship with ASEAN has been complicated by relations towards Myanmar, whose military dictatorship has, since 1990, been subjected to increasingly strict EU economic and political sanctions. When ASEAN admitted Myanmar in 1997 it created significant obstacles for this relationship, and the newly established Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) then became the most important conduit for region-to-region dialogue, as it excluded Myanmar. Later, in 2004, the EU/EC accepted Myanmar participation. Currently, multilateral dialogues include ASEM, ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. In addition to multilateral relations, strategic partnerships with China, India, and Japan are fostered. The current strategy acknowledges Asia as a highly industrialised region that at the same time contains two thirds of the world's poor (European Commission, 2007d).³¹ To this end, some €5 billion have been allocated to Asia by the EU for the period 2007 to 2013. This strategy focuses on development aid, but a key objective is to contribute to peace and security in the region, through a broadening of EU engagements with Asia.

It has been demonstrated that the EU policy framework has a regional dimension and that the focus is on the areas of closer proximity. Moreover, the examination provides evidence of a regional approach. It is clear that regions matter for different reasons and that regional policies are designed and exercised accordingly. This study distinguishes between four regions, see Table 5.7.

²⁹ ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok by the five original Member Countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. See official ASEAN website <http://www.aseansec.org> The website was accessed on 6 January 2010.

³⁰ Information retrieved at the Commission website, see http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/asia/index_en.htm. The website was accessed on 6 January 2010.

³¹ The first strategy was issued in 2001, see European Commission (2001c). It is relevant to the CSDP mission launched in Indonesia in 2005.

Keyword	Independent variable	Conceptual Domain	Outcome
Where?	Where is the conflict taking place?	Arena	Accession candidates [A1] The Neighbourhood [A2] Developing partners [A3] Others [A4]

TABLE 5.7: Plausible outcome on *Where*

The first region involves the accession candidates [A1] and is influenced by the desire to integrate them into the European family. Geographically, most of these candidates are found in the Western Balkans, in particular, those that have been under consideration for EU crisis management deployments. The second tier of countries is also found in the neighbourhood [A2]. This cluster unites areas close to the EU, where security and economic interests are strong, recalling the strategic objective of ‘building security in our neighbourhood’ in the ESS. The third sphere of regional dynamics is the developing partners [A3], who share a common bond in the region development policy regime that has evolved from the colonial legacy. Finally, as the EU is indeed a global actor, other areas [A4] must be considered, and for the purpose of this research this region is confined to Asia.

5.7.2 Partitioning in Realist and Idealist Outcomes

When examining the geopolitical dividing lines it is helpful to consider the perceptions of international society. Realists posit that geography is still an important perspective in an era of globalisation. In Hobbes’ basic anarchical understanding of international relations as ‘a war of everyone against everyone’, there is no common bond that holds an international society together, and as a concept it becomes irrelevant. Morgenthau also argues in a way that renders international society irrelevant.

Above the national societies there exists no international society so integrated as to be able to define for them the concrete meaning of justice or equality, as national societies do for their individual members. (Morgenthau, 1952, p.34).

Nonetheless, realists can conceive other geographical entities than states, for instance alliances and spheres of influences around great powers (Wight, 1992, pp.32-3). Undoubtedly, this mindset underpins the origins of geopolitics, formulated by Sir Halford Mackinder, which rests firmly on realist foundations (Fettweis, 2000). Territory forms a key component from which power can be drawn, while the control of vast landmasses

ensures security. Access to sea lines of communication provides opportunities to project power, and at the same time it constitutes a vulnerability to hostile sea powers (Rosenau and Durfee, 2000, p.19). A globalised world does not change these fundamentals.

From an idealist perspective, the security and prosperity of the EU increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. For idealists, geographical boundaries are less important. All the classical idealists bear witness to a global community, where geographical boundaries play a subordinate role. Grotius defined international law as the common bond for an international society. Moreover, he argues that the law of nature implies social behaviour and a capacity for partnership (Wight, 1992, p.38). Kant saw another kind of international society based on the social fabric and international relations, which primarily takes place among individuals, not states (Bull, 1977, p.25). His perception provides an early forerunner for the concept of human security, as elaborated in Chapters 4.1.1 and 5.5.2. According to Locke, people are first and foremost united in reason not in geography.

Men living together according to reason without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of Nature. (Locke, 2004, p.9).

However, there are more nuances to Locke's thinking, in particular, when considering that he was closely involved in the development of colonial policies during his political career, at a point in history when the Great Plague of 1665 and the Fire of London in 1666 dictated a need to raise greater revenues (Arneil, 1994, pp.591-3), and he embraced colonial enterprise. At first glance, Wilson also seems to be distant from geopolitical thinking, as he had an institutionalist approach to preventing states from becoming 'separated in interest or divided in purpose'. It can be inferred that from an idealistic perspective, human suffering must be prevented and mitigated wherever it occurs. However, it is too simplistic to completely separate Idealism from geopolitics. All but three of Wilson's fourteen points include explicit geopolitical statements. These include restoration of boundaries based on ethnicity, as well as a recognition of colonial claims. In the latter case, it is stated that the population of the colonised region must have an equal say with the colonial government.

In conclusion, it is beyond any doubt that there is a strong correlation between self-interest and enlargement of the Union. By definition, admittance of new members must be beneficial to its established members. The elaboration of the accession association revealed that South East Europe is so intertwined with the EU that it is in the interest of the Union to integrate it, and thus make it stable and prosperous. In the same way, it makes sense for realists to prioritise the security of the part of the neighbourhood that

is not considered for accession. Accordingly, the ENP places an emphasis on trade and security, and this forms a sphere of influence that realists explain as regional clustering beyond the state. The realist power calculus also makes a case for intervention in former colonies, and the Cotonou Agreement is increasingly emphasising the security dimension. However, the examination of the development aid policy of the ACP framework suggests humanitarian needs are at the forefront. The legal basis in the Treaty, quoted above, spoke of no other interests than those of the ACP countries concerned. The Treaty also provides a foundation for relations based on equal status that resonates with Wilson's arguments. An idealist perspective is dominant in the ACP relations, while the inclusive notion of 'others' also accords comfortably within the idealist domain and embraces all regions excluded from the geopolitical calculus. When specifically considering relations with Asia, it is also clear that development aid issues play a key role in the EU outlook, although security as well as economic factors are also parts of the equation.

Realist Perspective	Idealist Perspective
<i>Geography is still important in an era of globalisation. It is crucial that countries bordering the EU are secure.</i>	<i>The EU should alleviate suffering wherever it occurs. Former colonies have a special status</i>
<u>Near abroad</u>	<u>Further away</u>
Accession candidates [A1]	Developing partners [A3]
The Neighbourhood [A2]	Others [A4]

TABLE 5.8: Partitioned outcome on the independent variable *Where*

Table 5.8 summarises the categorisation of outcomes. For realists, geography is still important in an era of globalisation, and it is also important that the countries bordering the EU are secure. Idealists, on the other hand, believe that the EU should primarily alleviate suffering wherever it occurs. However, former colonies have a special status.

5.8 *When is action needed?*

5.8.1 Identifying Plausible Outcomes

While the previous section examined spatial aspects of policy and security, this section focuses on the temporal dimension. Although every conflict is unique, some characteristics reoccur. In all conflicts there is a pre-conflict phase, where the foundations of the dispute are being laid and when tensions reach a threshold, violence erupts. Subsequently, in the aftermath of the culminating violence, the parties abandon their violent means. This transition could be facilitated by a ceasefire or peace agreement, or a decisive outcome to the conflict giving one of the parties an overwhelming power. Several

models of conflict cycles use these core phases, sometimes with different definitions or greater granularity (Durch, 2006; Ramsbotham et al., 2005; Sandole, 1998).³² The ESS aligns with the three-phased cycle of conflict. It dictates that “[c]onflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.” (European Council, 2003a, p.7). Perhaps its most unique aspect is the focus on conflict management. More than any other EU policy document, it argues for rapid, and where necessary, robust interventions, including both military and civilian instruments. Moreover, it proposes the set of tasks for rebuilding war-torn countries.

Within the EU, Conflict Prevention is treated as a distinct policy area. From a historical perspective, preventing conflicts, as opposed to managing them, has been an area that fits in with the broader context of the Commission as well as the Council as a ‘soft’ civilian power (Smith, 2004b, p.145). The EU sees itself as a ‘supremely successful’ (European Commission, 2001b, p.5) peace project preventing conflicts in Europe, and it should come as no surprise that conflict prevention as a policy area carries with it a lot of confidence and clout. The notion of thwarting a negative development towards human suffering and other political instability has a political appeal not confined to Europe. However, the necessity and right to prevent, or pre-empt, conflicts remains a contentious issue following the American-led intervention in Iraq in 2003. The EU has a long experience of conflict prevention policy, having started to devote attention to conflict prevention following the end of the Cold War. The early results achieved by the Commission during the period 1970 to 1993, were not entirely well received (Manners, 2006, p.186). A substantial initiative came when in 1996 the Finnish and Swedish foreign ministers suggested that “increasingly, the need is to prevent conflicts from breaking out and to create the conditions for sustainable peace and security by democratic, political and economic means” (Manners, 2006, p.186). The EU contributed to the UN Secretary General’s report in 2001 on ‘Prevention of Armed Conflict’. In 2001 the European Council in Göteborg endorsed the EU Programme for Prevention of Violent conflicts and declared that “Conflict prevention is one of the main objectives of the Union’s external relations and should be integrated in all its relevant aspects, including the European Security and Defence Policy, development cooperation and trade” (European Council, 2001c, p.12). A programme for the prevention of violent conflicts was developed in 2001 (Council of the EU, 2001c) and has generated sustained activities that have been reported by successive EU Presidencies. Moreover, a new Prevention and Crisis Management Unit was set up within the Commission in 2001. The Commission supports a number of conflict prevention activities including, but not limited to, human rights monitoring, democracy and human rights programmes that aim to build capacity in civil

³² For instance the hourglass method provided by Ramsbotham includes three phases; Conflict Transformation, Conflict Settlement and Conflict Containment. Durch provides an overview of models that take third party intervention instruments as the reference.

society and also promote good governance, including security-sector reform and support for independent media (Gourlay, 2004, p.415). The Commission issued a Communication on Conflict Prevention in 2001 (European Commission, 2001b), and this paper sets out priorities in three fields, long-term and short-term prevention, and enhanced international cooperation. The longer-term efforts are directed toward projecting stability through development programmes, regional cooperation and trade. The paper also emphasises the need for the Commission to get more involved in security sector reform, while the stabilisation of the post-conflict security situation is also identified as an important area.

The conflict management phase is the least developed phase with regard to EU policy. In the military realm the EU has developed doctrine or concepts for Conflict Resolution (Bono, 2004; Gyllensporre, 2008), and this phase is correlated with Peacemaking [R1] and Peacekeeping [R2] and the use of force.³³ However, it includes all measures taken during an active conflict, and it is the commitment to engage in a hostile environment that defines this outcome.

In many cases conflict prevention and post-conflict measures overlap and are difficult to distinguish. In the earlier parts of this chapter, relevant concepts for post-conflict engagements have been discussed, including Disarmament and Security sector reform. However, the qualifier for this outcome is not the type of operation the EU engages in, but the environment with regard to the parties which forms the reference point.

To summarise this section, the conflict cycle is divided into three consecutive stages of conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict management. While other models are applied by scholars and practitioners, it is clear that the EU policy approach is three phased.

Table 5.9 summarises the findings of this section, and while the EU policy focus is on conflict prevention, it is active in other phases of conflict as well.

Keyword	Independent variable	Conceptual Domain	Outcome
When?	When is the CSDP action needed? place?	Conflict Cycle	Conflict prevention with deterrence [C1] Conflict resolution [C2] Post-conflict management [C3] Conflict prevention without deterrence [C4]

TABLE 5.9: Plausible outcome on *When*

³³ To this end the EU has a classified Use of Force Concept (Council of the EU, 2006m).

For the purpose of this thesis, a distinction is made between conflict prevention with a deterrent component [C1] and conflict prevention without a deterrent component [C4]. The former is specifically tailored to dissuade parties through direct measures. An executive CSDP mission with a robust task sends a strong signal to the belligerents that ideally will shape their behaviour in a favourable way. The other option seeks to obtain the same objective through an indirect approach. The employment of non-executive CSDP missions with EU personnel in advisory roles will assist in creating better conditions for security and development, and it will thereby contribute towards setting conditions for reconciliation and de-escalation. Post-conflict management [C3] constitutes measures to maintain and further strengthen a settlement between parties, and in some instances the EU chose to get involved during an on-going conflict, as a part of the Resolution [C2] effort.

5.8.2 Partitioning in Realist and Idealist Outcomes

From a realist perspective the EU should project power early to deter and contain conflicts. Hobbes' perspective on human psychology is helpful in understanding deterrence from a realist viewpoint. He established causality between fear and anger control, and if fear can control anger, then it makes sense to use the threat of force as a means of conflict prevention. This is supported by the more general realist assumption that actors are rational and that if they are threatened by overwhelming lethal force, it would be rational to abstain from provocative actions (Borgeryd, 1998, p.109). Morgenthau was an advocate of diplomacy and within the definition of this term, he included persuasion, compromise and also the threat of force (Borgeryd, 1998, p.104). Taking into account earlier discussions of Realism's aspiration to project power and advance its interest with the tools that will be able to get the job done, we can conclude that the Realism discourse has a preference for acting early in order to deter as well as to become involved in conflict resolution. The post-conflict phase is less interesting and has less appeal to realists, and their preference for proactive measures suggests that they are predisposed towards responses during the phases of conflict prevention and conflict resolution.

From an idealist perspective, the EU's multifaceted arsenal of instruments is best suited to post-conflict measures. Non-intervention is an idealist principle, but idealists have also defined exceptions in order to justify some types of intervention (Doyle, 2006, p.394-5). A central theme in Kant's *Perpetual Peace*, is that of non-intervention, which enables the people of a state to design their own society without external interference. Grotius argued that under certain conditions war became legal. As discussed in Chapter 5.6.2, self-defence, and in some instances human rights violations, can justify interventions

from an idealist perspective. Given the nature of the CSDP, which falls short of ambitions to defend EU territory, there is a weak link between Idealism and EU conflict resolution [C2]. Instead, conflict prevention is more attuned to the fundamental premise of Idealism, peace. The League of Nations, pioneered by president Wilson, aimed at preventing war through.³⁴ By the same logic of peace, post-conflict management becomes important in order to prevent conflicts from re-emerging.

In conclusion, the relationship between Realism and Idealism and conflict prevention is particularly difficult to resolve. There is a non-intervention current in both Realism and Idealism. Contrary to the logic of deterrence, realists view self-help as the primary means of obtaining security. Hobbes argued that sovereigns should seek peace whenever they could. When commenting on the peace plan for Abbé St-Pierre he cautioned against engaging in wars and aggression (Doyle, 2006, p.390). Acknowledging that preventive interventions tend to be controversial and that they aim to deter hostilities it is inferred that Conflict prevention with deterrence [C1] is more consistent with Realism. Conversely, Conflict prevention without deterrence [C4] is related to Idealism. This also applies to Post-Conflict management [C3], while Conflict resolution [C2] implies interaction and influence on the belligerents during an unfolding conflict, which will often require a robust mission, possibly with the ability to use force. Hence, this conflict phase is also associated with Realism, see Table 5.10:

Realist Perspective	Idealist Perspective
<i>The EU should project power early to deter and contain conflicts.</i>	<i>The EU multifaceted arsenal of instruments is best suited for longer term post-conflict and pre-conflict measures.</i>
Early and deterrent engagement	Post-conflict engagement
Conflict prevention with deterrence [C1]	Post-Conflict management [C3]
Conflict resolution [C2]	Conflict prevention without deterrence [C4]

TABLE 5.10: Partitioned outcome on the independent variable *When*

5.9 *Who* is engaged in resolving the conflict?

5.9.1 Identifying Plausible Outcomes

This section is concerned with multinational cooperation, or multilateralism, which can serve to differentiate superior aims, to maximise the international community's efforts

³⁴ The preamble of the Covenant of the League of Nations includes an obligation by the member states not to resort to war. The charter of the League of Nations, or the Covenant of the League of Nations, is available at the Yale Law School website, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp. The website was accessed on 20 December 2009.

in a conflict area by providing a substantial contribution, or to boost its own role and influence by providing a symbolic contribution. Amongst the six independent variables, the one related to *Who* is the least developed for two reasons. Firstly, neither the EU nor other international actors sees the benefit of officially declaring that it seeks to boost its own influence and status, as such an approach risks becoming self-defeating in the long run. As a consequence, there is no explicit body of EU policy to draw on in exploring this independent variable. Secondly, the extant research on multilateralism fails to offer much insight and is geared towards the role of a superpower. Nor does it offer much guidance on enhancing the understanding of the EU. Notwithstanding these constraints, the notion of multilateralism, is understood as a key juncture where realists and idealists go in separate directions.

With reference to the internal dimension of the EU, it has been argued that the internal cooperation within the Union “is by far the world’s most successful case of multilateralism” (Smith, 2008, p.47). While this claim may be justified, its achievement does not come easily. Earlier discussions, in Chapter 2, have established the challenges that the Union faces in ensuring policy coherence, let alone within EU institutions in Brussels. Despite this, the EU is still an ardent advocate of external multilateralism, while the ESS elevates multilateralism as a strategic imperative. To this end, it puts the emphasis on the need to address common threats in concert with partners. Its bilateral strategic relationships with NATO and the UN, as well as the transatlantic relation, are of particular importance, but the ESS gives little indication as to their practical nature. Shortly after the culminating tensions in the UN over the intervention in Iraq in 2003, a policy document was issued addressing multilateralism in the context of UN cooperation (European Commission, 2003d). The policy paper is clear on the meaning of multilateralism, which is to serve a greater good as opposed to self-interest.

[E]ffective multilateralism means . . . taking global rules seriously, whether they concern the preservation of peace or the limitation of carbon emissions; it means helping other countries to implement and abide by these rules; it means engaging actively in multilateral forums, and promoting a forward-looking agenda that is not limited to a narrow defence of national interests. (European Commission, 2003d, p.3).

Yet it is striking that it repeatedly stresses the importance of the role of the EU. Immediately after the above quote comes a paragraph that emphasises the need to boost the role of the EU.

The importance of enhancing co-operation with the UN, and of strengthening the EU's voice in the UN, has been underlined repeatedly by all major institutions of the Union. Yet much more can be done. (European Commission, 2003d, p.3).

A closer examination of the policy document reveals several references to the role of the EU, despite its focus being on helping the multilateral system to deliver on its key objectives. In a similar vein, a GAERC discussion on the effectiveness of the Union's external actions and on reforming the management of EU external assistance, provided guidance on further efforts to "reinforc[e] the role of the EU in international organisations, and in particular the UN" (Council of the EU, 2002c, p.11).

The research does not offer any significant contributions to an understanding of EU choices in multilateralism and studies of this subject are dominated by an American perspective (Corbetta and Dixon, 2004; Kreps, 2008; Morningstar and Blacker, 2004; Tucker, 1999). From this viewpoint, legitimacy and legality are of fundamental importance as the USA conducts offensive military operations based on a national agenda. A related topic addresses the degree of multinational cooperation needed to qualify as multilateralism, early conceptualisations of which focused on quantitative aspects. An early definition regarded multilateralism as "the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions" (Keohane, 1989). While early forms of multilateralism were underpinned by shared threats, contemporary cooperation is based on shared values (Finnemore, 2003). This suggests that a qualitative definition has utility. One of the most advanced and most recently proposed qualitative definitions has been developed, which defines five metrics with rated/graded outcomes for assessing multilateralism (Kreps, 2008). The parameters include the number of states, the percentage of lead state's troops relative to the average for the coalition, the percentage of lead state's financial resources relative to the total and to power symmetries in the coalition, and the geo-strategic value of constituent states. However, the utility of these definitions for this research is limited due to three reasons. Firstly, in general the EU is not able to muster the capabilities needed to resolve a conflict on its own. The EU seeks to establish cooperation between those involved in addressing the conflict, it is committed to international law and unless it has been invited by the host nation, an intervention will have to be based on a UN Security Council Resolution. Hence, neither legitimacy nor legality is an issue. Secondly, whereas the definition seeks to determine whether other nations besides the USA are adding value to the coalition, our focus is on assessing whether the EU merely aspires to political partnership or is providing key capabilities in order to significantly change the conditions on the ground. Thirdly, CSDP missions are autonomous operations ranging

from civilian non-executive missions to military interventions. There will always be a unique EU mandate and EU chain of command, in parallel with partners' equivalents. From this perspective the theories available are not sufficient for this research.³⁵

In summary, two plausible options have been elaborated on: to boost own influence or to constructively add critical capabilities to a multilateral effort. Hence, the empirical investigation must determine whether the EU makes tangible and substantial contributions to multinational crisis management or it joins in efforts with partners, putting only marginal or symbolic contributions on the ground, based on self-interest, see Table 5.11.

Keyword	Independent variable	Conceptual Domain	Outcome
Who?	Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?	Multilaterism	The mission seeks to boost influence [M1] The mission seeks to complement other actors [M2]

TABLE 5.11: Plausible outcome on *Who*

In missions that seeks to boost influence [M1] the EU is more committed to addressing the conflict on the political level or through humanitarian instruments rather than deploying EU personnel in a substantial CSDP mission. However, contributing crisis management instruments provides political clout and credibility *vis-a-vis* other partners. In some cases it may ensure that the EU obtains a role in the political process. The role to be boosted can either be that of the EU as a whole or in some cases the Council, in competition with the Commission. In other cases, when the mission seeks to complement other actors [M2], it must be demonstrated that the CSDP mission provides a unique and sought-after contribution. To make assessments on the relative value of the CSDP mission for the situation on the ground, the research must include facts that allow comparability with other international efforts.

5.9.2 Partitioning in Realist and Idealist Outcomes

From a realist perspective cooperation is a power calculus that echoes the Melian dialogue: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (Thucydides, 2008, p.400). Stemming from Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War, Realism is based on three assumptions: (1) states are the primary actors; (2) actors strive for power, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends; (3) actors behave, in general terms, rationally and therefore comprehensibly to outsiders (Keohane, 1986, p.7).

³⁵ The Bandwagoning concept, stemming from the realist tradition, has also been considered in this context, but as discussed further in Part III, this concept starts out with a rivalry with a stronger competitor. However, in this independent variable, the perspective is different. It is not concerned with relative power, but centres instead on the driving forces for the EU to undertake a mission.

Realists argue that the EU should have a role in enhancing its influence. Earlier we have concluded that Realism is closely connected with security and the interests of states, but this link is not absolute. According to Morgenthau, it is a reflection of a state's current prominent role in the international system, which is bound to decline. Other entities may be as relevant: "Nothing in the realist position militates against the assumption that the present division of the political world into nation states will be replaced by larger units of quite a different character that are more in keeping with the technical potentials and the moral requirements of the contemporary world" (Williams et al., 2006, p.61). Morgenthau also considers the Balance of Power an inevitable outgrowth of the struggle for power and one that works to stabilise state relations. Stabilising policies are essential instruments and Morgenthau proclaims that if a state is not strong enough on its own and if it shares important 'national interests' it should seek alliances with other states (Borgeryd, 1998, p.103). If leadership declines, so will cooperation. E.H. Carr argues on a basis of the centrality of power by noting that international order must rest on some hegemony of power and that the authority of law is derived from politics (Wight, 1992, p.104). Clearly, these propositions provide a realist rationale for pursuing a common foreign and security policy. Moreover, it translates into the fundamentally important principle of multilateralism to balance and engage with other partners. We recall the emphasis placed on this term in the ESS. Indeed, the inception of the CSDP generated concerns in Washington when it was fielded, while concerns still remain about the competition between EU and NATO regarding military operations. If the interpretation of arming is widened to include the build-up and projection of power, civilian and military, it becomes rational to view some EU missions as means of boosting its influence on the world stage. This is particularly relevant to small and/or short duration missions, where other actors contribute on a substantially larger scale. The residual operational effect may not be decisive, but it could allow the EU to become a more relevant actor in the partner community and create conditions for advancing political ambitions within the CFSP. With reference to the earlier discussion on actor interaction we can therefore safely conclude that boosting EU influence [M1] is consistent with the realist discourse.

From an idealist perspective the EU should complement contributions by other actors. Idealism is often personified by Woodrow Wilson, and the main thrust of his argument revolved around relationships between nations becoming closer as they work towards common goals. He spearheaded the establishment of the League of Nations and proclaimed that a "general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike" (Wilson, 2005, p.263). From this it can be concluded that Idealism asserts that the EU should complement contributions by other actors and contribute towards ensuring effective multilateralism [M2], see Table 5.12:

Realist Perspective	Idealist Perspective
<i>The EU should enhance its influence.</i>	<i>The EU should complement contributions by others.</i>
<u>Add political weight to EU</u>	<u>Ensure effective multilateralism</u>
The mission seeks to boost influence [M1]	The mission seeks to complement other actors [M2]

TABLE 5.12: Partitioned outcome on the independent variable *Who*

In summary, both Realism and Idealism are low-complexity concepts, defined by a set of straightforward rules. Realists focus on discrete events when analysing, whereas idealists tend to focus on issues (Rosenau and Durfee, 2000). Realists view military assets as the primary source of power; idealists on the other hand regard knowledge and access as crucial. Realists view alliances, formal pacts established after lengthy negotiations, as the primary means of cooperating with other states. Idealists view cooperation as less formal. Cooperation can be established for different issues, creating an overlapping structure of coalitions. Realists recognise the change in world order along bipolar and multipolar lines based on wars. Other changes are not easily recognised, although neo-realists concede that international organisations have an increased importance. The rule of law and open markets allow moderate degrees of change in the international system. Against this background it is reasonable to establish an alignment between boosting its own role [M1] and Realism and a relationship between complementary efforts [M2] and Idealism.

5.10 Summary

This chapter has provided an analytical scheme that allows a dialectic empirical investigation of the CSDP missions. Table 5.13 summarises the findings and reflects the six independent variables with their associated plausible outcomes, categorised by their affiliation to the respective academic traditions.

This chapter has also revealed some additional points of interest, beyond the application of this analytical scheme, notably that Table 5.13 leans somewhat towards the right. This is logical as the dominance of idealist outcomes reflects EU policy rhetoric, which is excessive in the use of altruistic descriptors, but brief and indirect with regard to realist-influenced characteristics. The summarised table also shows that the variables are not mutually independent. At a glance, several patterns of relationship can be discerned. For instance, if the threat is organised crime [T5] a police mission [R9] would seem to be the rational response. Indeed, such a correlation exists. Notwithstanding this, deliberate decisions are needed for each of these independent variables, as the Council agrees to

Realist Perspective	Idealist Perspective
	<i>Why</i>
<u>Vital interests</u> To safeguard the fundamental interests of the Union [I1] To strengthen the security of the Union in all ways [I3]	<u>Value interests</u> To safeguard the common values of the Union [I2] To preserve peace and strengthen international security [I4] To promote international cooperation [I5] To develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6]
	<i>What</i>
<u>State centric</u> Regional Conflicts [T1] State Failure [T2]	<u>Transnational</u> Terrorism [T3] Proliferation of WMD [T4] Organised Crime [T5]
	<i>How</i>
<u>Use of Force</u> Peacemaking [R1] Peacekeeping [R2] Rescue task [R3]	<u>Providing Assistance</u> Humanitarian task [R4] Joint disarmament operation [R5] Security sector reform [R6] Support for third countries in combating terrorism [R7] Police Mission [R8] Monitor mission [R9] Civilian mission [R10]
	<i>Where</i>
<u>Near abroad</u> Accession candidates [A1] The Neighbourhood [A2]	<u>Further away</u> Developing partners [A3] Others [A4]
	<i>When</i>
<u>Early and deterrent engagement</u> Conflict prevention with deterrence [C1] Conflict resolution [C2]	<u>Post-conflict engagement</u> Post-Conflict management [C3] Conflict prevention without deterrence [C4]
	<i>Who</i>
<u>Add political weight to the EU</u> The mission seeks to boost influence [M1]	<u>Ensure effective multilateralism</u> The mission seeks to complement other actors [M2]

TABLE 5.13: Partitioned outcome on all independent variables

launch a CSDP mission. As the empirical work will demonstrate, responses to organised crime can be made through different instruments, including military peacekeeping [R2], although the degree of correlation as well as the relative weight of the independent variables are left undiscovered. These topics should be the subject of further studies.

Chapter 6

Empirical Investigation I: Twenty-three CSDP Responses

Don't laugh: the European Army is on the march.

Daniel Hannan ¹

6.1 Introduction

After the findings in Chapter 5, and in particular the analytical framework summarised in Table 5.13, the next logical step is to examine the CSDP missions, which, as the unit of analysis, are treated individually, and in the order in which they were decided on by the Council. For the purpose of providing an overview of the findings, this chapter contains a synopsis of each mission necessary for understanding the classification relating to Idealism and Realism. A comprehensive account of the analysis is documented in Appendix A. Furthermore, in order to be brief and concise, references to the empirical data are found only in the Appendix. To enhance the accessibility of the empirical work, which covers twenty-three separate and unique CSDP missions, the results are presented in three sections that cover different periods. This grouping reflects the broader context of the CSDP in which they emerged. It must be emphasised that the design of these groups is not a product of a deliberate and structured analytical process, but a conceptualisation that has intuitively matured during the research process. It is intended to be

¹ The quote is from the title of his article in the Daily Telegraph on 23 April 2003, available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/1427446/Dont-laugh-the-European-Army-is-on-the-march.html>. The website was accessed on 4 January 2010. At the time of the statement Daniel Hannan was a British Conservative Member of Parliament. In the article he voiced the fear that the Euro-zealots would exploit the lack of public support for the US-led intervention in Iraq in 2003.

informative but is not regarded as a scientific finding. While some of the missions have been terminated, others are still ongoing. In this regard the text reflects the situation as of 1 August 2010.

6.2 2002 to 2004: The Balkans and the Military Component

Chapter 2 provides an account of the development of CSDP and the impact that the unrest in the Balkans had on European integration in the fields of foreign and security policy. When the CFSP emerged, the Balkans had the highest priority, and from this viewpoint it is not surprising that the initial focus for the CSDP missions was on this region. When the CSDP, then the ESDP, was formulated, political discussion centred on the military dimension. While the Helsinki Headline Goal received a lot of attention, the gradual development of the civil instruments progressed almost unnoticed, which changed around 2005. Indeed, the ‘high politics’ relating to military cooperation became the focus early on. There was a desire to demonstrate that the EU had the will and ability to act through the use of military power. As a consequence, the European Council paid significant attention to the complicated Berlin Plus negotiations.

The EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) was the premier CSDP mission, and the decision to launch the operation was taken in March 2002. The EUPM deployed on 1 January 2003 and replaced the UN International Police Task Force. As of 1 August 2010, the mission is still on-going, albeit with an adjusted mandate. Initially the EUPM comprised some nine hundred staff members, including five hundred police officers, fifty international civilian experts and more than three hundred local staff.

The EUPM was launched as a complementary measure to the Commission’s efforts to allow the EU to take greater responsibility for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and at the same time to influence the progress towards its integration into the EU, once the necessary conditions were met. The mission is linked to the vital interest of the EU to in safeguarding the Union’s fundamental interests [I1]. Although state failure was a legitimate concern, when operations commenced, this threat has not been addressed by the mission. Instead, organised crime [T5] is the theme that the EU highlights, for instance in the Operation Plan (OPLAN). Despite a wide mandate, referring to the Dayton Peace Accord, the mission focused on police matters. The Joint Action establishing the mission outlines a desired end state that stresses policing aspects within the general framework of the rule of law, and the efforts of the EUPM are linked to the definition of a police mission [R8]. The EUPM is being conducted within Europe and in

an accession candidate state [A1]. As the EUPM is operating under the Dayton Peace Accord, the mission is classified as a post-conflict management mission [C3]. The EUPM did not add any essential capabilities compared to its predecessor, the UN International Police Task Force, and thus the mission was launched to boost the influence of the EU. In conclusion, the EUPM was underpinned by a mix of EU self-interests in securing its neighbourhood through the gradual integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the EU sphere and a realisation of the need to contribute towards mitigating a deteriorating situation. The empirical investigation rendered an even distribution of realist and idealist output. Table 6.1 summarises the outcomes related to the EUPM.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X			X	X	X	X			X	X	

TABLE 6.1: EUPM: Summary of Outcome

Only weeks after the launch of the EUPM, the Council decided to strengthen the presence in the Western Balkans and to deploy the first military CSDP mission. The Joint Action establishing the *EU Military Operation in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Concordia)* was adopted on 27 January 2003. The mission was officially initiated on 31 March 2003 and terminated on 10 December 2003, and the force comprised some three hundred and fifty military personnel.

The mission was launched as a follow-on force for the NATO mission Allied Harmony, in order to continue supporting the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. This transition from a NATO mission to an EU-led operation was driven by strategic interests, and at the EU summit in Laeken in December 2001, the Union declared itself to have a limited military operational capability and this provided an opportunity to demonstrate it. Moreover, it made sense for the EU to aspire to more responsibility for, as well as influence over, the reform of the country in view of the Stabilisation and Association Process. The mission primarily served the vital interests of the EU within its overall scheme of integrating the country into the Union and thus safeguarding the latter's fundamental interests [I1]. Neither the Joint Action establishing the mission nor the Ohrid Framework Agreement explicitly elaborates on the nature of the threat. However, the opening paragraphs of the Ohrid Framework Agreement stressed the centrality of the state construct and the need to rectify internal tensions. The overall key threat prompting the post-conflict peacekeeping mission was related to state failure [T2], and the Key Military Tasks of the mission underscore its peacekeeping character. The OPLAN puts the emphasis on providing a visible presence, particularly in areas of potential instability and ethnic tension, in order to contribute towards stability and confidence-building. Accordingly, the mission profile is consistent with a peacekeeping

mission [R2]. This mission was conducted in the proximity of the EU, in South Eastern Europe, in a country that is spearheading the Stability and Association Process and thus the mission is linked to an accession candidate state [A1]. The Ohrid Framework Agreement was developed in response to the erupting violence, and it was drafted as an instrument for implementing security rather than merely preventing conflict escalation. It is therefore prudent to regard Concordia as a post-conflict mission [C3]. The transition from a NATO mission to an EU-led operation was driven by a strategic calculus and less motivated by the local context on the ground. The military capabilities were not enhanced. Allied Harmony included some four hundred and fifty troops and operated in order to provide assistance to the government in taking over security throughout the country, by providing the capability to liaise with local authorities and helping to support the international monitors. Not only was the force size reduced when the EU assumed responsibilities, but it had also relied on strategic NATO assets, based on the Berlin Plus arrangements. In the declaration at the Barcelona Summit, not only was the mission conditioned by the Berlin Plus arrangements, but most of the declaration on deploying forces in Macedonia elaborated on the EU-NATO relationship. Hence, the mission was launched to strengthen the role of the EU [M1] and ensure its access to NATO assets when conducting military missions. The overall outcome from the empirical investigation suggests that this mission was dominated by realist influences. Table 6.2 summarises the outcomes related to Concordia.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X		X		X		X			X	X	

TABLE 6.2: Concordia: Summary of Outcome

Soon after the first EU military mission had deployed in Macedonia and following a rapidly deteriorating situation in the Ituru province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), the EU responded swiftly to a UN request by deploying a military force, the *EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis)* to bridge a reinforcement of the UN mission, and decision-making was conducted with unprecedented speed. Following an initial request for support by the UN Secretary-General to the President of France on 10 May 2003, a Joint Action was agreed on 5 June 2003, and within days the first EU troops, comprising a 1,500 men strong force, arrived on the scene. The mission was completed in September 2003.

This swift and decisive EU response was conditioned by the political impetus and military contributions provided by France. It can be deduced that this rapid intervention was a reflection of the concern over the security situation. In addition, the statements made by Solana suggest that the EU responded to the atrocities that were committed.

However the instability in the country appears to have been more important than the humanitarian situation. In its justification the Council put the emphasis on peace and stability in the Great Lakes region and in the country. It is argued that the mission was to contribute to a more secure world and was thus linked to EU's value interests. The EU strove to preserve peace, strengthen security and mitigate local conflicts with limited security implications for the EU [I4]. In line with this rationale, the EU perspective on the nature of the threat was first and foremost state-centric and primarily linked to state failure [T2], and the force was deployed in the midst of an on-going conflict [C2], and was mandated to conduct peace enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In the EU vernacular this mandate equates with peacemaking [R1]. The operation took place in Sub-Saharan Africa with a developing partner as the host nation [A3]. The EU force was regarded as a bridging force to give MONUC sufficient strength within the region, and the capabilities and commitments provided by the EU were critical to the UN. As a consequence, the mission was extended to allow the UN sufficient time for force generation and deployment. Hence, it is argued that the mission was focused on complementing other actors [M2]. In summary the mission demonstrates an evenly distributed set of realist and idealist influences. Table 6.3 summarises the outcomes related to Artemis.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
		X	X		X			X	X		X

TABLE 6.3: Artemis: Summary of Outcome

In tandem with deliberations to extend Concordia until December 2003, a civilian sequel was contemplated. A Joint Action for the *EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL Proxima)* was agreed on 29 September 2003, and the mission was launched the same day Concordia terminated, 15 December 2003, and completed in December 2005 when EUPAT (discussed below) was deployed. The mission comprised approximately two hundred international staff, including around one hundred and fifty police officers.

Although the mission was launched at the termination of Concordia, the EU emphasised that the operation was not to be regarded as a sequel to that mission. However it was argued that EUPOL Proxima needed to build upon the results achieved by its military forerunner and to maintain a strong EU presence. The master messages of the mission also addressed the need for full implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the immediate needs of the police. This mission forms an integral part of the overall EU effort to secure its neighbourhood and augment its role in preparing Macedonia for EU membership, although its most fundamental rationale appears to be linked to

full implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and reforming the police. This suggests that the mission was driven by value interests and the need to create conditions for progress on the rule of law. The outcome is therefore assessed as being primarily linked to the development and consolidation of democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6]. Although the Joint Action establishing the mission elaborates on threats as being a deterioration of the security situation and the potential impact of this on *international* security, it concludes that the consolidation of law and order, including the fight against organised crime, is a part of the mission. It is concluded that the key threat to be addressed by the mission was organised crime [T5]. The EUPOL Proxima was given a broad mandate to consolidate law and order, and these tasks fall within the remit of police and security sector reform domain. Due to its direct impact at the local level, it is classified primarily as a police mission [R8]. This mission was conducted in the proximity of the EU, in South Eastern Europe, in a country that is spearheading the Stability and Association Process, and thus the mission is linked to an accession candidate state [A1]. Bearing in mind that Concordia is being defined as a post-conflict mission, and the commitment to implement the Ohrid Framework Agreement, EUPOL Proxima should also be categorised as a post-conflict management mission [C3]. The unique value added by this mission is difficult to define. It did not fill a capability void, while in its role as a complement to the Commission and the on-going OSCE police mission, it seemed to add little new. Instead, it ensured a continued involvement by the Council. As a consequence it is concluded that the mission sought to boost the latter's influence [M1]. In conclusion, this mission was dominated by idealistic influences. Table 6.4 summarises the outcomes related to EUPOL Proxima.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
	X		X		X	X				X	X

TABLE 6.4: EUPOL Proxima: Summary of Outcome

Following the decision to launch EUPOL Proxima, it was to take some nine months until the next mission was agreed. A Joint Action for the *EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia (EUJUST Themis)* was agreed on 28 June 2004. The mission was launched the following month and completed a year later. EUJUST Themis, comprising some ten senior and highly experienced personnel to support, mentor and advise ministers and senior officials at the level of the central government, was the first rule of law mission within the framework of the CSDP.

Following the inauguration of President Mikheil Saakashvili, in January 2004, the EU expressed aspirations to support the new administration. Two weeks before the Joint Action establishing EUJUST Themis was agreed, the EU decided to include Georgia

in the ENP. Arguably, the timing of this as CSDP mission was dictated by the overall objectives within the framework of the ENP, in order to enable the reform programme to gain momentum. EU-Georgia cooperation objectives included consolidation of democracy and economic development. The decision to launch EUJUST Themis was driven by a desire to strengthen the security of the Union [I3] that is linked to global stability and international trade, in order to ensure the quality of life of EU citizens. Although the security situation and regional stability were EU concerns, EUJUST Themis was confined to the criminal justice sector, with a particular focus on anti-corruption measures. It is reasonable to assume that corruption and, implicitly, organised crime were a more relevant threat to address than regional security. Hence, it is asserted that the threat relating to the mission is primarily organised crime [T5]. The mission operated in four areas within the criminal justice sector that aimed at capacity building. In EU rhetoric the mission is labelled the first rule of law mission within the CSDP. The scope of the mission is also consistent with the definition of rule of law missions in Chapter 5. Hence, it is concluded that this mission should be labelled as part of other civilian missions [R10]. The unprecedented enlargement of the EU on 1 May 2004 changed the political and geographic landscape of the EU, bringing Georgia closer to the EU. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement highlights the fact that the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia will contribute towards safeguarding peace and stability in Europe. Moreover, it has been established that Georgia is participating in the ENP, and, hence, the mission is conducted in the neighbourhood [A2]. The Joint Action establishing EUJUST Themis suggests that there was neither an on-going conflict nor any post-conflict efforts to implement. Moreover, with reference to the lack of coercive capabilities of this non-executive mission, EUJUST Themis is categorised as a conflict prevention mission without deterrence [C4]. On account of the scale of the mission, the division of labour between first and second pillar measures, and the magnitude and focus of the existing EU instruments, it seems that the activities of this mission would either have marginal effect and/or could have been integrated into existing Commission activities. The additional fact that EUJUST Themis performed rule of law tasks outside the predefined policy area of the Council and that it did so for a limited duration (one year) further support this finding, and it is concluded that the mission sought to boost the influence of the Council [M1]. In short, the influences on this mission are evenly balanced between Realism and Idealism. Table 6.5 summarises the outcomes related to EUJUST Themis.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X			X		X	X				X	X

TABLE 6.5: EUJUST Themis: Summary of Outcome

Concurrent with the launch of EUJUST Themis, the Council agreed a Joint Action for a military mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the *EU Military Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea)*, on 12 July 2004. The mission was launched on 2 December 2004 as a successor to the NATO-led operation, SFOR. To ensure a seamless transition the force levels were initially kept unchanged, at 7,000 troops. This makes Althea the largest ever CSDP operation. As of 1 August 2010, the mission is still on-going, albeit with a changed mandate and force structure.

By 2002, the European Council had already indicated its interest in taking over the military mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 2003, at the Thessaloniki Summit, the EU was very optimistic about the prospects of bringing the region closer to the EU. The rationale for the EU to field EUFOR Althea was, to a large extent, driven by the idea of a greater and more comprehensive role for the EU, as well as an increased European integration of that country. EUFOR Althea therefore falls within the category of missions that are intended to safeguard the Union's fundamental interests [I1]. Neither the UN Security Council Resolution nor the Joint Action, defining the mandate, provides a clear picture of the threat. However, military planning placed significant emphasis on the need to prevent a recurrence of major violence, and the force was tailored to deter military forces from resuming hostile activities. It is inferred that the threat comprised military action by the factions and that the threat addressed is categorised as a state failure [T2]. The UN Security Resolution underpinning the mission was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and was thus categorised as a Peace Enforcement mission. Based on the robust mandate of this mission, including the UN mandate, it is concluded that the EUFOR Althea mission relates to peacemaking [R1]. EUFOR Althea is conducted in Europe and in an accession candidate state [A1]. As the mission is operating under the Dayton Peace Accord, the mission is classified as a post-conflict management mission [C3]. The transition of responsibility for the military component of the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina from NATO to the EU, was driven by political agendas in the framework of a Euro-Atlantic security calculus, and not by the situation on the ground. This conclusion is underpinned by several arguments. Firstly, EUFOR Althea did not enhance military capabilities available to address the conflict, and it was also dependent on NATO assets and capabilities, as NATO provided planning, logistic and command support for this EU-led operation. Despite its termination of SFOR, NATO maintained a military posture in the country to conduct specific tasks. It is concluded that EUFOR Althea was driven by a desire to add more political weight to the EU and to boost its influence [M1]. In summary, the mission has a majority of realist influences. Table 6.6 summarises the outcomes related to EUFOR Althea.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X		X		X		X			X	X	

TABLE 6.6: EUFOR Althea: Summary of Outcome

Following the support for the UN and its MONUC mission with Operation Artemis, the EU remained engaged in DR Congo and committed to strengthening the UN. In October 2004, a UN Security Council Resolution was adopted to increase the strength of MONUC and empower the mission with further responsibilities, pertaining to security sector reform as well as the training and mentoring of the police. On 9 December 2004, the Council decided to launch the *EU Police Mission in Kinshasa in DR Congo (EUPOL Kinshasa)*, the first civilian CSDP mission in Africa, which was to support the Police's Integrated Police Unit in Kinshasa. The mission commenced in April 2005. On 1 July 2007 EUPOL Kinshasa was succeeded by another CSDP police mission, EUPOL RD Congo. At the time of its inception EUPOL Kinshasa comprised some thirty personnel.

This successful undertaking to assist the UN with a bridging operation brought the two organisations closer together in the field of crisis management, and it also gave further impetus to the Council's ambition to support the transition process. Within this context, support for the electoral process, leading to presidential elections, was a priority. Following a joint EU-UN declaration that included aspirations to assist in contributing to an integrated Police Unit, the Council called upon the Commission, and to some extent also upon the Member States, to provide this support. The complementary CSDP mission was contemplated to provide monitoring and mentoring of the build-up of the Integrated Police Unit. The aspiration to actively contribute to a successful transition process is first and foremost linked to developing and consolidating democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6]. The Joint Action setting up EUPOL Kinshasa does not provide an explicit definition of the threat. However, it emphasises that the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) is intended to strengthen the internal security apparatus. Hence, it is concluded that the key threat is primarily related to state failure [T2]. The mandate of EUPOL Kinshasa stipulates that it was to conduct a police mission in Kinshasa including monitoring, mentoring, and advising the establishment and initial operations of the IPU. As the EUPOL Kinshasa focused on police matters, the mission should be categorised as a police mission [R8]. The operation is taking place in Sub-Saharan Africa, and it has already been established that the DR Congo is a part of the ACP cooperative framework. It is therefore inferred that the mission is taking place with a developing partner as the host nation [A3]. The mission took place against the background of the peace agreement signed in December 2002 and, as such, it is defined as a post-conflict mission [C3]. The capabilities provided by the mission could have

been integrated into the Commission's technical assistance or MONUC. Indeed, both of these missions had a substantial body of national experts (civil police) provided by the Member States. Had the resources for the mission been allocated to augment the Commission's efforts instead, the effects on the ground would have been more substantial. The mission was an end in itself and it was set up with the aim of boosting the EU [M1], and in particular the Council. In summary, EUPOL Kinshasa was dominated by idealist influences. Table 6.7 summarises the outcomes related to EUPOL Kinshasa.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
	X	X			X		X		X	X	

TABLE 6.7: EUPOL Kinshasa: Summary of Outcome

6.3 2005 to 2007: Africa and the Civilian Instruments

Following the decision to launch Althea, a new dynamic was set in motion for military CSDP missions. On 1 May 2004, ten new countries joined the EU, an unprecedented expansion of the Union, which included eight Eastern Bloc countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), and the Mediterranean island states of Malta and Cyprus. The latter two would prove an obstacle to EU-NATO cooperation and thus in effect block the synergy embodied in the Berlin Plus arrangements, by means of which the EU could draw on NATO assets and capabilities. Another obstacle to further military engagements related to other commitments of forces, in particular in Afghanistan. When NATO assumed responsibilities for ISAF in late 2003, it was confined to operations in Kabul and the surrounding area. However, an ambitious expansion plan was soon launched, the first phase of which was completed in October 2004 by expanding the mission into the Northern provinces of Afghanistan.

As this expansion continued, the number of troops also increased. During this stalemate in military CSDP missions, other areas were promoted. A Tri-Presidency initiative emphasising Civ-Mil Coordination was launched by the UK Presidency in 2005 and maintained by Austria and Finland during their subsequent presidencies. Furthermore, the Civ-Mil Cell was organised within the EU Military Staff by mid-2005. The Civilian instrument was developed in a dynamic fashion, and 2005 is, to date, the most productive year in terms of agreeing new CSDP missions.

On 7 March 2005 the Council agreed a legal mandate to initiate the *EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST Lex)*. The mission was launched on 1 July 2005.

At the start-up, EUJUST Lex comprised some thirty personnel, most of whom were based in the coordination office in Brussels, and there was also a small liaison team in Baghdad. As of 1 August 2010, the mission is still on-going.

The deliberation for this mission was very much driven by the European Council. It formed a piece of the strategic puzzle to, on the one hand, find and display EU unity following the initial political rift. On the other hand, it was important to be seen as a relevant global actor contributing to this important endeavour. Clearly, there were some strategic EU interests to be served, but this could not be done by the scope of this mission. It is therefore concluded that the mission was devised to safeguard the common values of the Union [I2] in that it demonstrated unity and commitment. The major concern of the Council revolved around the stability of the country, with a potential ripple effect on the region, and therefore it is concluded that the mission is primarily related to state failure [T2]. The EU claims that EUJUST Lex is the first EU integrated rule of law mission, comprising the police, the rule of law and civilian administration. The mission is mandated to address the urgent needs of the Iraqi criminal justice system by providing training. Whilst police matters are addressed, the mission does not have any executive powers, and therefore, this mission is labelled as a civilian mission [R10]. As the mission was set up, training activities were scheduled in the EU, with a liaison office in Baghdad. According to the Joint Action, training activities in Iraq are conditional upon improved security conditions and the availability of appropriate infrastructure. Given the actual location of training in Europe and the mission area in a non-ENP country in the Middle East, the assessment of the mission is that it should be classified as taking place in ‘other parts of the world’ [A4]. The EU threat assessment and the conduct of training activities in the EU bear witness to an on-going conflict. Therefore, the conflict phase is labelled as conflict resolution [C2]. EUJUST Lex is modest in its ambition, compared to other EU efforts and engagements by other key actors. As a consequence, the mission received minimum attention at the time of its inception, and EUJUST Lex was deployed to boost the influence [M1] of the EU, in particular, that of the Council. In summary, the influences on the mission are balanced between Realism and Idealism. Table 6.8 summarises the outcomes related to EUJUST Lex.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
	X	X		X		X	X	X		X	

TABLE 6.8: EUJUST Lex: Summary of Outcome

In May 2005 the Council decided to further step up the support for DR Congo and agreed to initiate the *EU security sector reform mission in the DR Congo (EUSEC*

RD Congo). EUSEC RD Congo² comprised eight experts and was launched on 8 June 2005. As of 1 August 2010, the mission is still on-going, albeit with a different focus and ambition.

The Council argued that the transition process had reached a decisive phase and that there were considerable challenges still to be met. The demobilisation of the combatants and reform of the security sector were identified as crucial components of the success of the transition and of the post-crisis strategy in the DR Congo. From this, it is clear that the justification of the mission was designed to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6]. The Joint Action setting up the mission does not explicitly address the threat. Instead, it is necessary to consult earlier deliberations of the Council, which placed an emphasis on the critical transition process. Security sector reform was one avenue of approach towards preventing a failed transition, and it is therefore reasonable to conclude that the main threat to be addressed was state failure [T2]. The EUSEC RD Congo was mandated to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform with the aim of contributing towards a successful integration of the army. Consequently, the scope of the mission is consistent with the definition of security sector reform missions [R6]. In accordance with earlier elaborations on the DR Congo, it is concluded that the mission took place with a developing partner [A3] as the host nation. The mission took place against the background of the peace agreement signed in December 2002 and, as such, it is defined as a post-conflict mission [C3]. While MONUC is responsible for the overall support of security sector reform, EUSEC RD Congo provides a valuable complement that aims for tangible outcomes, beyond the scope of the UN mission, including budgetary and financial control and management, public procurement, accountancy and financial monitoring. Therefore it is concluded that EUSEC RD Congo is focused on complementing other actors [M2]. In summary, EUSEC RD Congo was dominated by idealist influences. Table 6.9 summarises the outcomes related to EUSEC RD Congo.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
	X	X			X		X		X		X

TABLE 6.9: EUSEC RD Congo: Summary of Outcome

In July 2005 a legal mandate was agreed for the *EU to support the African Union Mission in Darfur (EU AMIS)*³ in order to assist efforts to help stabilise the situation in Darfur. The mission was launched on the same date as the Council adopted the Joint

² The name is based on the French abbreviation of RD Congo, *République démocratique du Congo*.

³ The mission often referred to as EU support to AMIS II. The formal name of the mission is 'AMIS EU Supporting Action' (Council of the EU, 2005m, art.1). For brevity EU AMIS is used throughout this thesis.

Action for it, and the personnel had actually already been deployed in 2004 (Solana, 2004a). The mission was terminated on 31 December 2007, when it was succeeded by the African Union/United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur. EU AMIS included some sixty military and civilian personnel. In addition to the personnel deployed, the mission provided the AU mission with equipment and assets as well as assistance with tactical and strategic transportation.

From 2004, the EU and its Member States provided a wide range of support for the African Union's efforts to help stabilise the situation in Darfur. The European Council had expressed its profound concern at the continuing humanitarian crisis and large-scale human rights violations in Darfur, and it is relevant to relate the justification of this mission to respect for human rights. The critical situation of this humanitarian crisis, assessed by some as genocide, resonates with the core beliefs and universal human rights that are the bedrock of EU values and principles. Arguably the justification of the mission relates to the development of, and respect for, human rights [I6]. However, the graveness of the situation, as it was understood by the EU, demands a more profound value-based justification. It is therefore deemed appropriate to classify the mission as an effort to safeguard the common values of the Union [I2]. The threat to regional stability was acknowledged from the onset, and was articulated by Solana. As will become apparent below, the conflict was to spread and destabilise neighbouring Chad and the Central African Republic, triggering another CSDP mission. It is therefore concluded that the threat is regional conflicts [T1], and The mission mandate outlines military as well as civilian support. The military component included planning and technical assistance, military observers, training, equipment and assets, as well as strategic and tactical transportation. On the civilian side, the support included assistance to the police. As the EU mission included provision of the Vice-Chairman of the Ceasefire Commission and eleven monitors throughout Darfur, this is interpreted as its critical element. Hence, the outcome is defined as monitor mission [R9], which is taking place in Sudan, an ACP country, and EU AMIS is therefore categorised as being hosted by a developing partner [A3]. The European Council stated that the EU pursued its commitment to restoring peace and development through its support for AMIS. It is clear that this crisis was seen in the context of conflict resolution [C2], and that the EU was a key player in making the AU operation possible, providing most of the funding. In addition, the CSDP mission ensured access to critical enabling capabilities for the AU. The practical support on the ground provided a valuable complement and prerequisite for the effective use of the funding allocated through the Commission and the African Peace Facility, and it is inferred that the EU sought to complement other actors [M2]. The mission was subject to a preponderance of idealist influences. Table 6.10 summarises the outcomes related to EU AMIS.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X	X			X	X			X			X

TABLE 6.10: EU AMIS: Summary of Outcome

Following the EU involvement in the mediation that resulted in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on 15 August 2005, the Council agreed on 9 September 2005 to launch its first mission in Asia to assist with the implementation of the MoU. The *Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)* was formally launched on 15 September 2005, in conjunction with the initiation of GAM disarmament and the relocation of military and police forces. At its inception, the AMM comprised two hundred and twenty-six international unarmed personnel, including one hundred and thirty from Member States, as well as Norway and Switzerland, and ninety-six from the five participating ASEAN countries. The AMM was completed on 15 December 2006, in conjunction with local elections in Aceh.

There are no signs that suggest that the mission was driven by vital EU interests. Instead the tsunami in combination with the window of opportunity that the peace talks presented seem to have been the driving factors. Accordingly, the mission aimed to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6]. The Crisis Management Concept for the mission foresaw EU involvement as support for resolving a threat to Indonesia's territorial integrity and to its regional stability. From this it can be concluded that the main threat was the resumption of hostilities by the signatories to the MoU and it is thus associated with state failure [T2]. According to the Joint Action establishing the mission, the key mandate of the AMM was to monitor the implementation of the commitments undertaken by the Government of Indonesia and the GAM pursuant to the MoU. The MOU, as well as the Joint Action, further specified tasks to be pursued, focusing on the monitoring of demobilisation, re-integration of the GAM and its members, as well as monitoring of the human rights situation. It is inferred that the mandate is first and foremost linked to a monitor mission [R9]. In accordance with the definition in Chapter 5, the mission takes place in other parts of the world [A4]. The AMM was the first CSDP mission in Asia, and its timing was critical to its success, as the initial deployment had to coincide with the signing of the MoU. The mission qualifies as a post-conflict management [C3] mission. The AMM was a joint venture with ASEAN,⁴ and it demonstrated commitment and leadership on the part of the EU, while it is assessed that effective multilateralism was the key rationale. The deployment of AMM sought to add concrete capabilities and complement other actors [M2]. In

⁴ Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines and Singapore contributed to the mission.

summary, the mission is dominated by idealist influences. Table 6.11 summarises the outcomes related to AMM.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
	X	X		X		X		X		X	

TABLE 6.11: AMM: Summary of Outcome

The Council appointed an EU Special Representative for Moldova in March 2005 to strengthen EU contribution to the resolution of the Transnistria question. This region stretches along the border region between Moldova and Ukraine, and at the heart of the problem was a struggle for independence. The Orange Revolution that started in late 2004 and changes in Ukrainian policy created conducive conditions for a more active EU approach to conflict resolution in this area. On 7 November 2005 the Council agreed to initiate the *EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM Moldova)*, which was fielded on 30 November 2005, at which time it comprised some two hundred personnel. As of 1 August 2010, the mission is still on-going.

The rationale for the mission is well embedded in the ENP. With specific reference to the conflict, it argues that the EU must play a more active role in conflict settlement and demonstrate its willingness to assume a greater share of the burden of conflict resolution in neighbouring countries. A key motivating factor for the Council was to build security in the EU neighbourhood [I7]. The Commission Country Strategy paper on Moldova argues that fighting organised crime and trafficking, widespread corruption and money laundering are key objectives of the EU action in support of Moldova. In a similar vein, Solana stressed these issues when the mission was launched. This bears witness to a focus on organised crime [T5]. EUBAM Moldova is mandated to support capacity building for border management along the entire Moldova-Ukraine border, including the Transnistria region. The mission was mandated to assist Moldova and the Ukraine in the creation of an international customs control and a monitoring mechanism. EUBAM is an advisory mission without executive powers, and it falls within the remit of a monitor mission [R9]. Earlier discussions have established the proximity to the EU and the geopolitical interest that the Union was paying to the conflict, including the specific reference to the Transnistrian Conflict in the ENP. Clearly, the conflict takes place in the EU neighbourhood [A2]. While the mission sought to establish preconditions for a settlement of the Transnistria conflict, it was of a latent nature, with an absence of overt hostilities since 1992. EUBAM Moldova is viewed as a conflict prevention measure without deterrence [C4], and it has a very complex relationship with the Commission, on whose funding it was from the onset dependant. The Council's involvement in the field activities provided limited added value, and the mission could have been exclusively

executed through a Commission chain of command. Therefore, it is inferred that the Council sought to boost its influence when fielding EUBAM Moldova. The mission was a product of a balanced set of influences from Idealism and Realism. Table 6.12 summarises the outcomes related to EUBAM Moldova.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X			X	X	X				X	X	

TABLE 6.12: EUBAM Moldova: Summary of Outcome

Within a week after endorsing the EU BAM Moldova, the Council agreed the mandate for the *EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)*. Earlier, in April 2005 the European Union Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS) was established within the office of the EU Special Representative. The EU COPPS office, including four EU Police experts, was set up without any legal instruments. Following its progress and in conjunction with the Israeli withdrawal in July 2005, the Council agreed that the EU COPPS should be enhanced and established as a CSDP mission, EUPOL COPPS. When the mission was launched, in January 2006 it included thirty-three personnel, and as of 1 August 2010, it is still on-going.

It is recalled that the EU has devoted strategic priority to addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict and creating conditions for a two-state solution, an effort that should be seen as a practical and immediate attempt to assist with the critical phase of Israeli withdrawal. Hence, despite the strategic priority of the Middle East, it is assessed that it was the evolving situation on the ground and the urgent need for security that triggered this mission. Amongst the value interests identified in Chapter 5 that apply to this conflict, the aspiration to promote international cooperation and the ambition to develop and consolidate the rule of law stand out. However, at this critical juncture in the peace process, it seems that the focus was first and foremost on international security. The CONOPS also argued along the lines of the EU facilitating compliance by the Palestinian Authority with its Roadmap-obligations. It is inferred that this mission was launched to preserve peace and to strengthen international security [I4]. In July 2005, the Council articulated serious unease about the security situation in the Occupied Territories, in particular with regard to recent terrorist attacks. However, the mission was not designed to address this type of threat. An examination of the Draft CONOPS reveals that assistance in enforcing law and order was the key. Mindful of that fact that the Palestinian Authority is not a state as such, the characteristics relevant to this research still apply, and it is concluded that EUPOL COPPS primarily addresses state failure [T2]. The mandate is to contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership. It is primarily concerned

with advising and mentoring the Palestinian Civil Police with respect to implementing the Police Development Programme. Accordingly, the mission is categorised as a police mission [R8]. Both Israel and the Palestinian Authority are partners in the ENP, and consequently, the mission takes place in the EU neighbourhood [A1]. When it comes to the Middle East Conflict, it is particularly challenging to identify the phase of the conflict cycle. The issue at stake at this point was the fear of renewed violence and security deterioration in conjunction with the Israeli withdrawal. As this has been the underpinning rationale for the above discussion, it is assessed that this mission was in the realm of conflict prevention without deterrence [C4]. The CSDP mission was reinforcing the priorities set by the Commission, and, moreover, it was complementary in that it provided practical assistance on the ground. Neither of the other Quartet members was in a position to field a police-related mission in the region. The picture that emerges is a complementary one, as the mission is adding value to the process at a critical time and it has been established that EU seeks to complement other actors [M2].

The CONOPS also argued along the lines of the EU facilitating compliance by the Palestinian Authority with its Roadmap-obligations (Council of the EU, 2005t). From this elaboration it is inferred that this mission was launched to preserve peace and strengthen international security [I4]. The mission was dominated by idealist influences. Table 6.13 summarises the outcomes related to EUPOL COPPS.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
	X		X		X	X			X		X

TABLE 6.13: EUPOL COPPS: Summary of Outcome

On 24 November 2005 the Council agreed a mandate to launch the *EU Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPAT)*. This mission entered its operational phase on 15 December 2005, in conjunction with the termination of Proxima, and was completed after six months. EUPAT included some thirty police advisors.

Whilst the Joint Action reflects continued positive progress in Macedonia, it still argues for continued political and practical measures by the EU. Hence, it is inferred that the justification for this mission is the same as for EUPOL Proxima, i.e., to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6]. The mandate directs the EUPAT to fight corruption and organised crime. Accordingly, the threat is categorised as organised crime [T5]. The Joint Action specifically directs EUPAT to focus on overall implementation of police reform in the field, police-judiciary cooperation, and professional standards/internal control, which tasks fall within the definition of a police mission [R8]. Clearly, this operation took place in South East Europe, close to the

borders of the EU. A review of the plausible outcomes reveals that this mission should be classified as linked to an accession candidate [A1]. Mindful that EUPOL Proxima was defined as a post-conflict mission, this mission qualifies for that category on the same merits and is accordingly labelled as post-conflict management [C3] mission.

A gap of six months was identified between the termination of Proxima and the initiation of the field-oriented part of the Commission-run project, and the need to bridge these efforts was apparent, as in December 2005, Macedonia was granted candidate status by the European Council. This mission provided an essential link between EUPOL Proxima and the Commission programmes, and it is concluded that the Council seeks to complement other actors [M2] through EUPAT. In summary, EUPAT was dominated by idealist influences. Table 6.14 summarises the outcomes related to EUPAT.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X			X	X	X	X			X		X

TABLE 6.14: EUPAT: Summary of Outcome

In concert with the EUPOL COPPS, the EU was advancing additional support to mitigate the Arab-Israeli conflict in conjunction with the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. The mandate for a *EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories (EUBAM Rafah)* was agreed on 12 December 2005 by the Council. An agreement on movement and access, including agreed principles for the Rafah crossing (Gaza) was concluded on 15 November 2005 between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. On 21 November 2005 the Council agreed that the EU should assume the third-party role, as articulated in the agreement. EUBAM Rafah initiated the operational phase prior to the agreement on its legal mandate, on 30 November 2005. At its inception the mission included some seventy personnel. As of 1 August 2010, the mission is still on-going.

The mission was a logical and important step in advancing the overall process of a Palestinian State and regional stability. Accordingly, the Joint Action points out that the Rafah Crossing Point has economic, security and humanitarian implications. A comparison of EU actions in this case with those in the Balkans suggests that this process was driven by the situation on the ground, as opposed to the political landscape in Brussels, and the EU agenda. Hence, it is inferred that this mission has been justified from an idealistic perspective, more specifically to preserve peace and strengthen international security [I4]. The Joint Action is not distinct in its treatment of the threat, and it argues that the mission will operate in the context of a situation, which poses a threat to law and order, the security and safety of individuals, and to the stability of the region. However, the mission mandate is focused on the third-party role in order to build

confidence between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Implicit in this role is the aim of facilitating harmonious relations and thus mitigating regional conflicts [T1]. According to the Joint Action, EUBAM Rafah actively monitors, verifies and evaluates the performance of the Palestinian border control, security, and customs officials working at the Rafah Terminal in accordance with the Framework, Security and Customs Agreements. These tasks are consistent with a monitor mission [R9]. Both Israel and the Palestinian Authority are partners in the ENP. The mission takes place in the EU neighbourhood [A1]. Based on the same arguments presented for the concurrent EUPOL COPPS, it is assessed that this mission was in the realm of conflict prevention without deterrence [C4]. The mission was crafted by the Quartet, in particular the USA. From this point of view the mission draw on the unique role and status that the EU enjoyed in the Quartet as the only realistic provider of on-the-ground support through a mission. During the eighteen months that the EUBAM Rafah monitors were present at the terminal, a total of 443,975 passengers used through Rafah Crossing Point. The aim of the mission was to ensure effective multilateralism, and the discussion testifies that the EU sought to complement other actors [M2]. The decision to launch EUBAM Rafah was dominated by idealist influences. Table 6.15 summarises the outcomes related to EUBAM Rafah.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
	X		X		X	X			X		X

TABLE 6.15: EUBAM Rafah: Summary of Outcome

Following the wave of civilian missions during 2005, on 27 April 2006 the EU agreed to launch another military mission. The deliberations on the *EU military operation in support of the UN Mission in the DR Congo (EUFOR RD Congo)* were initiated by a formal request by the UN to support MONUC with a ‘deterrent force’ during the electoral process. The mission was conducted from 12 June to 30 November 2006, and comprised a force of some 2,000 personnel.⁵

The master messages, as a part of the information strategy, provide clarity on the justification of the mission. Whilst most of the themes are related to the importance of a successful transition process and the ability to assist the UN, the first theme resonates with the vital interests of the EU, as it stresses the need to mitigate migrations, human

⁵ The figures are conflicting. In an interview with the Operation Commander in La Figaro it was stated that some 1,000 personnel was deployed the area: with half in DR Congo, primarily in Kinshasa, while the remainder were stationed in Libreville, Gabon (de La Grange, 2007). Others claim that some 400-450 troops were located in Kinshasa (Loeser, 2007, p.168) According to the High Representative, some 500 soldiers were deployed in the country while the larger force comprising some 1,100 soldiers was stationed in adjacent Libreville, Gabon, see Newswire Media Monitoring 7 June 2006, ‘La mission européenne en RDCongo, un exemple pour le futur’.

trafficking and terrorism. It is therefore argued that the mission aimed at strengthening the security of the Union in every way [I3]. Just as earlier missions in DR Congo have focused on state failure, this assessment suggests a state-centric perception of the threat. Furthermore, in a post-mission report to the UN, the Secretariat argued that it understood MONUC's role as providing reassurance to the population of the country through the deterrence of potential 'spoilers' during the election process, and that the EU force was to reinforce MONUC in that context. The major threat linked to the elections was state failure [T2] which could also threaten regional security. The response concept revolved around providing a mobile force that could be deployed in support of MONUC, wherever needed. The mission was based on a UN Chapter VII mandate, including peace enforcement, thus making this a peacemaking [R1] mission in view of the aforementioned tasks. DR Congo is an ACP country and therefore it is concluded that the mission takes place with a developing partner [A3] as the host nation. Given the context of supporting a peace process originating in a peace accord from 2002, it could be argued that this mission was being conducted in a post-conflict environment. Indeed, this assessment has been made for the security sector reform missions in the country. However, the nature of this mission is conditioned by two additional, critical factors. The force was deployed for a critical event, the election, and it was also intended to deter violence. From this it is deduced that the mission profile was foremost related to conflict prevention with deterrence [C1]. EU support was consistent with the UN request for the EU to initially approach the situation with caution. Moreover, the value added was also at the political level, further emphasising the international community's commitment. The mission provided a valuable complement to the UN and a stabilising factor on the ground, and it is inferred that the EU sought to complement other actors [M2]. In summary, the decision to deploy the EUFOR RD Congo was dominated by realist influences. Table 6.16 summarises the outcomes related to EUFOR RD Congo.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X		X		X		X		X		X	

TABLE 6.16: EUFOR RD Congo: Summary of Outcome

On 30 May 2007 the Council decided to launch the *EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan)*, which was initiated in mid-June 2007. At its inception it included one hundred and sixty police, law enforcement and justice experts deployed at various levels of the administration throughout the country. As of 1 August 2010, the mission is still on-going, albeit with an adjusted mandate.

The aim of the mission was to assist in the establishment of sound civilian policing arrangements under Afghan ownership. EUPOL Afghanistan builds on the efforts of the

German Police Project Office and other international actions in the field of police and the rule of law. It was added as a complementary measure in relation to the Commission's security-related assistance, as well as Member States' military efforts through the NATO mission. The rationale for embarking on this mission was not evident in the EU documents preceding the decision. However, the aspiration to improve the rule of law sector was consistent with the trajectory set by both the Council and the Commission in earlier decisions, and it can be concluded that the justification was to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6]. There is no clear assessment of threat in relation to the mission. Despite the armed Taliban insurgency with terrorist affiliation, the EU puts the emphasis on other aspects of the security challenge, such as organised crime, which is perhaps explained by the non-military engagement. The Commission Country Strategy for 2007 to 2013 asserts that the narcotics trade is a primary threat to stable political development. And it therefore prudent to link the threat to organised crime [T5]. According to the Joint Action, the mission is a non-executive engagement to promote effective civilian policing arrangements, and also to address interaction with the wider criminal justice system. As the Council outlined that the practical support to the police was to include the provisional level, in addition to the national level, it is reasonable to classify the mission as a police mission [R8], which is taking place in Asia. Despite British interventions in Afghanistan during the three Anglo-Afghan wars, their influence never did measure with colonial control. In accordance with the definition in Chapter 5, the mission should be classified as taking place in 'other parts of the world' [A4]. Although the process started with the Bonn Agreement and the fall of the Taliban regime, the internal security challenges as outlined above are extraordinary. Indeed, the on-going NATO mission is in a state of war. It is inferred that the mission takes place in a conflict resolution [C2] phase. While the ambition of the mission is welcomed, the resources provided did not measure up to the requirements or to other partner contributions. From an EU perspective, the mission was an opportunity to boost its own influence. On the other the hand, other Afghan partners saw merit in an enhanced EU commitment. It is concluded that the mission was a vehicle for the EU to boost its influence [M1]. The decision to field EUPOL Afghanistan was dominated by idealist influences. Table 6.17 summarises the outcomes related to EUPOL Afghanistan.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
	X	X			X		X		X		X

TABLE 6.17: EUPOL Afghanistan: Summary of Outcome

In May 2007, following the election process in DR Congo, the UN Security Council

strengthened the mandate of MONUC, which stimulated the government's own efforts in the field of security sector reform. Within this context the Council decided in June 2007 to launch the *EU Police Mission in DR Congo (EUPOL RD Congo)* to step up its efforts and replace EUPOL Kinshasa by a more ambitious mission in support of national Security sector reform programmes, which mission in the field of policing was deployed in June 2007 and included some thirty-nine international staff. As of 1 August 2010, the mission is still on-going, albeit with an adjusted mandate.

The Joint Action establishing EUPOL RD Congo states that the aim of the mission is to contribute to Congolese efforts to reform and restructure the National Congolese Police (PNC) and its interaction with the judicial system. Clearly, this aspiration is the primary link to the EU objective to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6]. This is further underscored by the Council's emphasis that EUPOL RD Congo is a continuation of EUPOL Kinshasa. In May 2007, the Council reaffirmed that progress in security sector reform remains a key issue for the consolidation of the security and stability of the DR Congo. Hence, in line with other civilian EU missions in RD Congo, the key threat addressed by the EUPOL RD Congo is state failure [T2]. The mission is mandated to support security sector reform in the field of policing and its interface with the justice system, by means of monitoring, mentoring and advisory action, with emphasis on the strategic dimension. A closer examination of its tasks reveals that engagement with the police is related to setting up forces as opposed to mentoring, and assisting police forces during operations. This testifies that the mission should be categorised as a security sector reform [R6] mission in the field of police forces. Consistent with earlier missions in DR Congo, EUPOL RD Congo is categorised as a mission conducted with a developing partner [A3] as the host nation. The mission is taking place against the background of the peace agreement signed in December 2002 and as such it qualifies as a post-conflict management [C3] mission. Whilst EUSEC RD Congo is focused on security sector reform for army units, EUPOL RD Congo is assisting security sector reform for the police. Consequently, the missions are complementary. However, the Joint Action establishing the mission articulates a desire to merge the two missions, following a review in 2008. Clearly, maintaining two separate security sector reform missions with forty international experts each is inefficient. Moreover, bearing in mind that the country is larger than Western Europe, these small size missions have a limited ability to accomplish change outside the capital. There appears to be no compelling argument for having these security sector reform efforts in a separate mission in DR Congo. Hence, it is inferred that the EU sought to boost its influence [M1]. However, the decision to deploy the EUFOR RD Congo was dominated by idealist influences. Table 6.18 summarises the outcomes related to EUPOL RD Congo.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
	X	X			X		X		X	X	

TABLE 6.18: EUPOL RD Congo: Summary of Outcome

By 2007 the Sudan crisis had gradually evolved so that it increasingly influenced the neighbouring countries of Chad and Central African Republic. The Council decided on 15 October 2007 to deploy the *EU military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA)*. EUFOR Tchad/RCA was launched on 28 January 2008 and terminated a year later when it was replaced by the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). When fully deployed EUFOR Tchad/RCA involved 3,700 troops.

The official statements do not disclose the context in which the EU considerations started. In July 2007, Solana discussed with President Sarkozy the possibility of providing a bridging force for the UN in order to protect refugee camps. Later that month the Council articulated a desire to field a CSDP operation in support of the multidimensional UN presence in Eastern Chad and the North-East of Central African Republic, with a view to improving security in those areas. It is concluded that the mission was first and foremost launched to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6]. The mission grew out of the growing unrest caused by the Darfur crisis, and from the outset, regional stability was at the heart of the problem. In October 2007, the Council urged all states in the region, in particular Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic, to work to promote regional stability and ensure security along their common borders. Thus, the major threat to the success of this mission was regional conflicts [T1]. EUFOR Tchad/RCA was a bridging operation, and its mandate, extended under chapter VII of the UN Charter, included the protection of civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons; facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, and protecting United Nations personnel. Although the force was provided with a peace enforcement mandate, its focus was on humanitarian tasks [R4]. The mission was conducted in Africa in former French colonies, and both countries are ACP partners. EUFOR Tchad/RCA is categorised as a mission conducted with a developing partners [A3] as host nations. The urgency and the deteriorating situation with spillover effects from Darfur indicate that the mission took place in an unfolding conflict situation. EUFOR Tchad/RCA is categorised as a conflict resolution [C2] mission. As a bridging operation the CSDP mission filled a security void in Chad and the Central African Republic. Moreover, the aspirations and ambitious programmes of the Commission in Chad and the Central African Republic were dependent on regional peace and stability. It is clear that the mission added unique capabilities to the region and it should

be concluded that the Council sought to complement other actors [M2]. The motivation for engaging in the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission was influenced equally by Realism and Idealism. Table 6.19 summarises the outcomes related to EUFOR Tchad/RCA.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
	X	X			X		X	X			X

TABLE 6.19: EUFOR Tchad/RCA: Summary of Outcome

6.4 2008-2009: Regionalisation and EU interests

By the end of 2007 the proliferation of small-scale civilian missions and the focus on Africa had peaked, at least temporarily. The trend for engagement became more selective and increasingly linked to EU interests, to some extent in new ways. The EU was a key player in finding a political way forward on the status of Kosovo, and there was a great deal of EU prestige attached to a mission. In Guinea-Bissau drug tracking was a key consideration, while the freedom of movement off the Somali coast has a significant impact on international trade, and the crisis in Georgia became linked to European energy security. These challenges and their responses demonstrated a higher degree of regionalisation than before, including improved integration with community instruments, as well as finding regional solutions to the problems. In retrospect, it appears that a new phase of maturity has been reached as the CSDP came of age (ten years in 2009).

Following a prolonged planning effort due to the political deliberations over the future status of Kosovo, the Council decided to field the *EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo)* in February 2008, which was launched in December 2008 and is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the CSDP and includes some 1,800 international police officers, judges, prosecutors and customs officials and approximately nine hundred local staff. As of 1 August 2010, the mission is still on-going.

Since the conflict erupted, it has been on the political agenda of the EU. On 24 March 1999, when NATO initiated its military air operation to enforce its non-negotiable conditions and terminate the humanitarian catastrophe, the European Council stressed the ‘moral obligation’ of the EU to respond to the humanitarian catastrophe in the ‘middle of Europe’. At the European Council summit in June 2005 a comprehensive declaration on Kosovo was issued that also articulated EU aspirations to assume greater influence in the process of determining the status of Kosovo. It can be inferred that the decision to launch EULEX Kosovo was driven by the vital interest in safeguarding the Union’s fundamental interests [I1]. The Joint Action establishing EULEX Kosovo mandated the

mission to monitor, mentor and advise the competent Kosovo institutions in all areas relating to the wider rule of law. These efforts are seen in the context of regional security, and a review of the specified task reveals a focus on addressing organised crime and corruption. The major threat to the mission's success was the deterioration in Kosovo's judicial capacity. Mindful of the ambiguity over the status of Kosovo, it is inferred that the key threat was primarily linked to state failure [T2]. The mission has features related to security sector reform, police missions and monitor missions as well as other civilian missions (the rule of law, civil protection, and civil administration). The Mission Statement argues that EULEX Kosovo will implement its mandate through monitoring, mentoring, and advising, while retaining certain executive responsibilities. As the mission has an executive component, security sector reform is a too narrow description. Likewise, police missions and monitor missions do not capture the scope of the mission. Instead, it is asserted that EULEX Kosovo should be categorised as a civilian mission [R10]. The mission takes place in Western Balkans, and, as discussed above, the EU regarded this area as being 'in the middle of Europe'. EULEX Kosovo should be classified as linked to an accession candidate [A1], and the geopolitical aspects are influenced by the desire to integrate the country into the EU. The above discussion related to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 which establishes EULEX Kosovo as a post-conflict management [C3] mission.

Although the mission succeeded a UN mission, the EU mission had a broader mandate, which illustrates the significant responsibility that the EU has assumed, and that the Union is a part of the cause, complementing other actors, which, it is concluded, the EU has sought to do [M2]. In summary, the decision to deploy EULEX Kosovo demonstrated an even set of influences between Realism and Idealism. Table 6.20 summarises the outcomes related to EULEX Kosovo.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X			X		X	X				X	X

TABLE 6.20: EULEX Kosovo: Summary of Outcome

Later in February 2008, within weeks after agreeing on EULEX Kosovo, the Council decided to launch the *EU mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau (EUSSR Guinea-Bissau)*. It was launched in June 2008 and included some thirty-five personnel at its inception. As of 1 August 2010, the mission is still on-going but is planned to be terminated on 30 September 2010.

Following an initial joint Council-Commission information gathering mission to Guinea-Bissau in May of 2007, the Council considered in November 2007 that a CSDP action in

the field of security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau would be appropriate. It emphasised the need for coherence with, and complementarity to, activities financed by the European Development Fund, and other Community activities. The master messages for the mission provide more insight into the justification for the mission. They depict the EU's objective as revolving around assistance in establishing conditions for a stable and sustainable security sector capable of responding to society's security needs, including the fight against organised crime and drugs trafficking. Under the Portuguese Presidency, an international conference on drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau was convened in Lisbon on 19 December 2007. Notably, one of the priorities of the Portuguese Presidency was cooperation with West Africa, specifically, the tackling of the flow of cocaine into Europe from that region. The justification for this mission was primarily related to ensuring the quality of life for EU citizens and it is therefore classified as strengthening the security of the Union [I3].

The master messages for the EUSSR Guinea-Bissau argue that the mission mitigates threats related to state failure by addressing organised crime, and it is concluded that the main threat addressed is state failure [T2]. The Information Strategy for the mission concluded that this is the first CSDP mission in the field of security sector reform to bring together three sectors (defence, justice and police). For the purpose of this research, it can be concluded that EUSSR Guinea-Bissau is a security sector reform [R6] mission. The mission is taking place in sub-Saharan Africa in a former Portuguese colony that is an ACP partner and is supported by the European Development Fund. Thus, EUSSR Guinea-Bissau is categorised as a mission conducted with a developing partner [A3] as the host nation. The structures and challenges addressed are all the results of the country's periodic conflicts and instability. In particular, the way the army has evolved as an institution and has influenced political development needed to be rectified. It is inferred that EUSSR Guinea-Bissau is a post-conflict management [C3] mission. Within Guinea-Bissau's investment plan for security sector reform, it is also benefits from assistance from other international bilateral and multilateral partners. However, EUSSR Guinea-Bissau was regarded as a unique and valuable contribution, and it is inferred that it was launched to ensure effective multilateralism and that EU sought to complement other actors [M2]. In conclusion, the decision to deploy EUSSR Guinea-Bissau demonstrates an even set of influences between Realism and Idealism. Table 6.21 summarises the outcomes related to EUSSR Guinea-Bissau.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X		X			X		X		X		X

TABLE 6.21: EUSSR Guinea-Bissau: Summary of Outcome

During the summer of 2008, the security situation in Georgia deteriorated and tension between Russian peacekeepers and Georgian police and military forces escalated. On 8 August, following a Georgian large-scale attack and fatalities amongst Russian peacekeepers, Russian tank columns crossed the border into Georgia and fighting between Georgian and Russian forces unfolded which lasted five days. On 26 August Russia formally recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. The EU, under the French Presidency, took a leading role in the de-escalation and negotiation processes. The decision was taken on 15 September 2008 to launch the *EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia)* comprising some two hundred unarmed monitors, which was launched on 1 October, in accordance with the ceasefire arrangements it had negotiated. As of 1 August 2010, the mission is still on-going.

The EU Presidency played an important role in drafting a ceasefire plan. An extraordinary GAERC meeting was held on 13 August, which welcomed the Six Point Plan. On 1 September, the European Council reiterated GAERC's concerns regarding the deteriorating security situation as well as the readiness of the EU to commit, including a mission deployment (European Council, 2008). More importantly, it confronted Russian power politics by calling its recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 'unacceptable'. It is reasonable to assert that the European Council would have settled for reinforcing the OSCE mission in a less hostile situation. From this discussion, it is concluded that the mission was launched to strengthen the security of the Union in every way [I3]. The EU was concerned by the violation of Georgia's sovereignty, Russia's recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and also the threat of further escalations. The major threat to the EU and the CSDP mission was that of a regional conflict [T1]. The Joint Action establishing EUMM Georgia mandated the mission to monitor, analyse and report on the situation pertaining to the stabilisation process, centred on full compliance with the Six Point Plan as well as the normalisation process of civil governance, focusing on rule of law. The mission was set up as, and has continued to be, a monitoring mission [R9]. The mission is taking place close to EU borders, and the European Council argued for the need to energise regional cooperation and step up relations with its eastern neighbours, in particular through the ENP and the development of the Black Sea Synergy initiative. It is concluded that the mission is being conducted in the EU neighbourhood [A2]. Based on the fragile and unstable situation at the time of deployment, it is concluded that EUMM Georgia was a conflict resolution [C2] mission. To reconfigure this mission to accommodate EU aspirations, the number of monitors would have to be ten times as great and the mandate re-drawn to accommodate the implementation of the Six Point Plan. The attempt to make such a major change to the mission and involve another international actor appears to have

been less helpful. Given its rapid deployment, EUMM Georgia added unique capabilities on the ground. It is concluded that the mission was fielded so as to ensure effective multilateralism and that the EU sought to complement other actors [M2]. In conclusion, the decision to deploy the EUMM Georgia was dominated by realist influences. Table 6.22 summarises the outcomes related to EUMM Georgia.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X		X			X	X			X	X	

TABLE 6.22: EUMM Georgia: Summary of Outcome

Concurrently with the culminating efforts to launch the EUMM Georgia, in September 2008, the Council agreed to launch its first military naval mission, the *EU Counter-Piracy Naval Operation off the Coast of Somalia (EUNAVFOR Somalia)*. The mission was agreed in response to unprecedented levels of piracy against World Food Program shipments as well as shipping in the Gulf of Aden, a strategic bottleneck for global merchant shipping activities. The mission was launched in December 2008 and included more than twenty vessels and aircraft and some 1,800 military personnel during its first six months of operation. As of 1 August 2010, the mission is still on-going.

Following UN Security Council Resolution 1814, the Council acknowledged the problem of piracy, stressing the implications for international maritime traffic as well as the humanitarian efforts. During the summer of 2008 the Council agreed to set up a military coordination unit (EU NAVCO) in Brussels to support the activities of Member States in deploying military assets in theatre, with a view to facilitating the availability and operational action of those assets. In a EU Military Staff presentation on European Union Initiatives in support of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1816, it was stated that piracy off the coasts of Somalia is a growing security threat to the sea lanes. The justification for this mission is twofold. Due to the explicit references to EU interests, we will conclude that these take precedence and provide the overarching rationale for the mission. Thus, it is concluded that mission has been devised to strengthen the security of the Union in every way [I3]. The Joint Action as well as the UN Security Council Resolution identified the threat as acts of piracy and armed robbery. The EU documents do not elaborate any more on the issue. Clearly, the threat is a transnational one with similarities to organised crime. Therefore, we categorise piracy as a subset of organised crime [T5]. The mission is designed to enforce compliance with the UN Security Council Resolution, and by force, if necessary. Therefore, the mission is categorised as a peacemaking [R1] mission. The mission is conducted in international waters in the proximity of Somalia, a country in Eastern Africa. Somalia has no significant colonial links remaining, therefore it is concluded that the mission takes

place with a developing partner [A3] as the host nation. This operation takes place as the conflict is on-going and is defined as a conflict resolution [C2] mission. Following a request by the UN Secretary-General in September 2008 NATO is providing naval escorts under Operation Allied Provider, pending a commitment by the EU. During the course of the operation, WFP escort ships are provided with close protection, while NATO ships providing a deterrent presence patrol various routes most susceptible to criminal acts against merchant vessels. The extensive area of operation suggests that the total number of anti-piracy vessels, including EU, NATO and other national operations, operating in the area is insufficient. The EU actions must be seen as an effort to ensure effective multilateralism. It is concluded that the EU seeks to complement other actors [M2]. In conclusion, the decision to deploy the EUNAVFOR Somalia demonstrated an even set of influences between Realism and Idealism. Table 6.23 summarises the outcomes related to EUNAVFOR Somalia.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X			X	X			X	X			X

TABLE 6.23: EUNAVFOR Somalia: Summary of Outcome

6.5 Summary

The empirical work reflected in this chapter and elaborated in detail in Appendix 1 is summarised in Table 6.24. In the following chapter conclusions are derived from these findings.

CSDP missions	Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
EUPM	X			X		X	X			X	X	
Concordia	X		X		X		X			X	X	
Artemis		X	X		X			X	X			X
EUPOL Proxima		X		X		X	X			X	X	
EUJUST Themis	X			X		X	X			X	X	
EUFOR Althea	X		X		X		X			X	X	
EUPOL Kinshasa		X	X		X		X			X	X	
EUJUST Lex		X	X		X		X	X		X	X	
EUSEC RD Congo		X	X		X		X		X	X		X
EU AMIS		X	X		X		X	X				X
AMM		X	X		X		X			X		X
EUBAM Moldova	X			X		X	X			X	X	
EUPOL COPPS		X	X		X		X			X		X
EUPAT		X		X		X	X			X		X
EUBAM Rafah		X	X		X		X			X		X
EUFOR RD Congo	X		X		X			X	X			X
EUPOL Afghanistan		X		X		X		X	X			X
EUPOL RD Congo		X	X		X		X		X	X		X
EUFOR Tchad/RCA		X	X		X			X	X			X
EULEX Kosovo	X		X		X		X			X		X
EUSSR Guinea-Bissau	X		X		X		X			X		X
EUMM Georgia	X		X		X	X			X		X	
EUNAVFOR Somalia	X			X	X			X	X			X

TABLE 6.24: Outcome of the empirical analysis of CSDP missions

Chapter 7

Conclusion I: Neither Soft Nor Hard

The European Union is the best example in the history of the world of conflict resolution and it is the duty of everyone, particularly those who live in areas of conflict to study how it was done and to apply its principles to their own conflict resolution.

John Hume ¹

The aim of this chapter is to address the first research questions by drawing conclusions based on the empirical investigation presented in Chapter 6.

7.1 Auxiliary Research Observations

The empirical investigation generated some auxiliary observations that are not directly related to the research question but still worth discussing briefly. The empirical work made it clear that there is a transparency deficit within the EU. By comparing the availability of EU official information sharing with that provided by the UN and NATO, one cannot avoid drawing the conclusion that the limitations go beyond the security considerations applying to the missions. Most of the decision-making process in the Council is withheld from public scrutiny, even after the missions have been completed. In particular, presentations by Solana and the Secretariat, which form the basis for these deliberations, as well as the deliberations themselves, are difficult to retrieve and reconstruct. In several cases important steps in the decision-making, referred to in the

¹ Quoted in the Nobel Lecture, Oslo, December 10, 1998, see the official Nobel website http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1998/hume-lecture.html. The website was accessed on 15 December 2009. John Hume is a former politician from Northern Ireland.

legal mandate of the mission, i.e. a Joint Action establishing the mission, are not retrievable.² By comparison, the deliberations of the UN Security Council are accessible in verbatim on its website. The information on the CSDP website includes inconsistent and superficial information about on-going and completed missions. It has been argued that the information flow with regard to the CSDP missions is deliberately controlled by the Secretariat in an effort to present the CSDP as a success story and thereby create conditions for its continued progress (Kurowska, 2008, p.39). In contrast, this research suggests that rather than being subjected to a generally restrictive policy on information dissemination, the magnitude of information sharing appears to be haphazardly dictated by the missions themselves, while both the UN and NATO provide more complete and in-depth information on their missions. For some CSDP missions, such as Concordia, NATO offered more mission-related information than did the EU. Official EU information on the organisation of missions, as well as on the conduct of the operations is very limited. Another general observation, although not substantiated by the statistics, is the tendency of low-level committees to use idealist rhetoric, while, at times, high-level committees can be very clear about realist justifications. Furthermore, Solana's statements tend to be more skewed towards realistic rhetoric compared to what the low-level committees produce. The conditions described have curtailed the research, as it deliberately relies on EU official documents and statements as its primary source of empirical data.

As a final observation, it is noted that the decision-making process for arriving at a Joint Action, differs widely. The extent of the involvement of various actors within the Council, the Secretariat and the Commission, the reliance on policy documents, and the sequencing and timing of their deliberations show little commonality among the missions. The ad hoc nature of the decision-making process has been substantiated by the empirical investigation.

7.2 Outcome of the Independent Variables

The outcome of the first independent variable, *Why*, is close to being evenly divided between Realism and Idealism, and thirteen missions generated idealist output, whereas ten produced realist output. A more detailed examination of the outcome of the independent variables reveals that the most frequently articulated rationale for missions is to consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6]. Following the

² For instance, discussions and presentations that take place on ministerial meetings are in several cases not reflected in the official reports. Often there are no references that the subject has been discussed. However, the Joint Action for launching the mission may still make reference to such a meeting.

initial missions in the Balkans that were driven by the association process towards EU integration, and were thus linked to safeguarding the fundamental interests of the Union [I1] and related to the realist outcome, the trend has been towards the pre-dominance of idealist justifications. However, the last four missions in Kosovo, Guinea-Bissau, Georgia and Somalia (off shore) have been driven by self-interest justifications. This indicates that the Council is finding it less uncomfortable to stress the Union's interest, particularly when missions are conducted in remote areas. The plausible outcome, that of promoting international cooperation [I5], did not generate any output. While international cooperation is important to the EU, it is not an adequate qualifier for launching CSDP missions.

The outcome of the second independent variable, *What*, is dominated by state-centric threats and Realism. Sixteen missions generated realist output, whereas seven produced idealist output. This variable is most strongly influenced by Realism of all the independent variables. With the exception of EUFOR CHAD/RCA, EUPOL COPPS, and EUBAM Rafah, which related to regional stability, all the other missions were linked to either state failure [T2] (Realism) or organised crime [T5] (Idealism). Neither terrorism [T3] nor the proliferation of WMD [T4] generated any output. This suggests that EU threat perception is based on state-centric concerns.

The outcome of the third independent variable, *How*, is overwhelmingly dominated by idealistic responses. Seventeen missions generated idealist output whereas six produced realist output. Whether this is due to the lack of capabilities for robust missions, or a reflection of the desired mode of response, is beyond the scope of the research. Only the deployment of military forces generated output related to Realism. Several tasks identified in the set of plausible outcomes did not generate any output, including rescue tasks [R3], joint disarmament operations [R5], and support for third countries in combating terrorism [R7]. However, disarmament tasks have been included in missions, for instance in AMM.

The outcome of the fourth independent variable, *Where*, suggests that close to half of the missions are conducted in proximity to EU territory, and this variable is close to being evenly divided between Realism and Idealism; twelve missions generated idealist output whereas eleven produced realist output. The ACP countries have been categorised in a separate group, due to particular EU interest in terms of development aid that applies to this region. The creation of the ACP originated from national interests in assisting former colonies, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa. As discussed earlier, there is also a Common Position in place for conflict prevention in Africa. If the ACP countries are treated as part of the geo-strategic interests of the EU, not only would the outcome of this variable be dominated by realist output, but only the missions in

Iraq and Afghanistan would fall outside the realist influence, and more importantly the total balance would swing over to Realism. Some 80% of the total output would then be related to Realism. The missions in Somalia, Chad/Central African Republic, and Artemis would go from being evenly balanced to becoming dominated by Realism.

Ever since the first CSDP mission, there has been a strong preference for intervening in the post-conflict stage or in preventive engagements without any deterrence. As a consequence, the outcome of the fifth independent variable, *When*, is dominated by idealistic output. Fifteen missions generated idealist output, including ten linked to post-conflict management and the reminder to conflict prevention without deterrence, while eight missions produced realist output.

The outcome of the sixth independent variable, *Who*, is evenly divided between Realism and Idealism, and twelve missions generated idealist output, whereas eleven produced realist output. At the core is the ability and willingness of the EU to contribute capabilities that positively change the security conditions on the ground. The data demonstrate a clear trend, i.e., that initially the EU was focused on boosting its own influence. In later missions, however, this trend is reversed, and most missions provide tangible value on the ground.

A summary of the outcome distribution of the independent variables is depicted in Figure 7.1.




FIGURE 7.1: Output Distribution of Independent Variables

The figure suggests that the EU has a strong preference for operating based on idealistic principles (cf. *How*). This variable reflects, to a large extent, the official and explicit mandate derived from the Joint Action given to the contingent, and it is consistent with the altruistic image of the EU. In terms of the timing of interventions (cf. *When*) there is also a clear preference for an idealistic approach. Most deployments are conducted in

the post-conflict state or as preventive engagements without any deterrent component. While these variables suggests idealistic action, they are underpinned by realist thinking. The threat perception, *cf. What*, is dominated by state-centric threats and Realism. These three independent variables are the only ones that produce a distinct difference in outcome between Idealism and Realism, while the outcome of all the remaining variables is balanced. The justification for the mission (*cf. Why*) is less consistent with the idealistic narrative, and only a slight inclination towards idealist motives is detected. One explanation could be that this element is less formalised, and often the preamble in the Joint Actions asserts open-ended and general motives for the mission. This necessitated further empirical investigations into communications products and statements by officials, and sometimes the motive has been inferred from EU presentations, while, in addition, the application of multilateralism is not clear. Only a minimal preference is detected for adding value to international co-operation, as opposed to advancing own interests (*cf. Who*). The responses show only a slight inclination towards addressing threats beyond the EU neighbourhood and, as such, indicate a geo-strategic rationale (*cf. Where*). The threats addressed are biased towards state-centric realist-focused threats (*cf. What*).

We now recall the assumptions made in Chapter 3 about the EU as a soft power:

- EU engagements in international crisis management can be sufficiently explained by idealistic notions relating to its perceived role a 'soft' power.
- The EU acts first and foremost to spread values and norms.
- The EU limits its use of military power to well-defined military threats.
- The EU is not predisposed towards acting only in its own neighbourhood.
- The EU is focused on preventing conflicts.
- The EU limits its interventions to situations where it could add distinct value.

It is clear from the empirical analysis suggest that none of these propositions can be supported.

7.3 Mission Review

According to the output presented in Table 6.24 no single CSDP mission produced a consistent idealist or realist output, and a distribution diagram is presented in Figure 7.2. No clear trend emerges when examining the missions chronologically, although it could be argued that initially, when the focus was on the Balkans, realist influences were




FIGURE 7.2: Idealist Outcome per Mission

relatively high. As CSDP progressed and increasingly involved civilian missions and other regions, idealist values increased in relative importance.

As can be seen, eleven of the twenty-three missions are dominated by idealist outcomes (i.e., those with four or more idealist outcomes in the table).³ Eight missions generated an even distribution of realist and idealist output.⁴ while the remaining four, Concordia, EUFOR Althea, EUFOR RD Congo, and EUMM Georgia, are dominated by realist influences, and this latter category is discussed in later chapters. The table also indicates that there is a relatively narrow span within which the outcome varies. Seventeen of the missions are either balanced or have a deviation of a maximum of one outcome (i.e. columns 2 to 4 in Figure 7.2). This indicates, on the one hand, a relatively coherent approach to addressing conflicts; on the other, it also suggests that the approach comprises a mix of idealist and realist influences.

Finally, a comparison between outcomes in Table 6.24 and Figure 7.1 reveals that only two individual missions, EUSEC RD Congo and AMM, generate the same output profile for all six variables as the aggregate output, including idealistic dominance, of all outcomes but the second (cf. *What*). Moreover, the twenty-three missions generated seventeen different outputs, and no set of outcomes occurs more than twice. The dispersed set of outcome substantiates the ad hoc decision-making behind the CSDP missions. Each mission is the product of a unique set of considerations relating to the external context as well as the character of the EU contribution. For instance, missions conducted in the same country have resulted in very different outcomes.⁵

³ EUPOL Proxima, EUPOL Kinshasa, EUSEC RD Congo, EU AMIS, AMM, EUPOL COPPS, EUPAT, EUBAM Rafah, EUPOL Afghanistan, EU POL RD Congo, and EUSSR Guinea-Bissau

⁴ EUPM, Artemis, EUJUST Themis, EUJUST Lex, EUBAM Moldova, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, EULEX Kosovo, and EUNAVFOR Somalia.

⁵ See, for example, the missions in DR Congo and Macedonia, respectively.

7.4 Minding the Gap: The EU Self-image and CSDP missions

The above discussion suggests there is a considerable gap between the EU self-image and how policies are implemented in reality. This delta can be explained as a deliberate or an unintended deviation, which can be analysed in two steps, see Figure 7.3 below.




FIGURE 7.3: Delta between Self-image and Empirical Results

Firstly, there is a difference, or delta, between the EU self-image and the values codified in the EU policy framework, $\Delta 1$ and the plausible realist outcomes derived from EU policies in Chapter 5 account for this gap. Secondly, there may be a deviation between these general policies and how the CSDP missions are designed, $\Delta 2$. To explain the inconsistency, a study of theories on deliberate and emerging strategies is helpful. Unintended deviations are explained by three criteria (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). Firstly, misinterpretations with regard to intentions and aspirations occur when there is a lack of clearly articulated and detailed objectives, and, in general, the policies examined in Chapter 5 substantiate this criterion. For instance, the EU has not authoritatively determined the precise meaning of its foreign policy objectives.⁶ Secondly, Joint Actions must be commonly understood by practically all the EU actors. Referring to the analysis of the Joint Actions in Appendix A it is clear that these, in general, leave significant room for interpretation. Consequently, the empirical analysis regularly included other, less authoritative EU documents and statements in order to arrive at distinct conclusions. Thirdly, these collective EU intentions must be implemented exactly as intended. Since a study on the implementation consistency of the Joint Actions initiating CSDP missions is beyond the scope of this paper, it is not possible to assess adherence to this criterion. Deliberate differences between declaratory and operational policies have primarily been examined in the context of nuclear doctrine and the arms race (Nitze, 1956). Recent empirical research into the CFSP suggests that there are incentives for explaining decisions in liberal or idealist language (Schoen, 2008). Both these steps of deviation merit more attention and it is recommended that further research be devoted to this issue.

⁶ See discussion on article 11.1 of the pre-Lisbon TEU in Chapter 5.4.1.

7.5 Validity

As a final point, before concluding this chapter, it is prudent to critically examine the internal and external validity of the work. Internal validity relates to the research design and is primarily concerned with the causality between the dependent variable and the independent variables. The research design has adopted a broad approach including six independent variables identified as representative for the research into Security Studies. However, there could be other factors that carry relevant information that would contribute towards an explanation of the research question. Perhaps the most significant issue relating to internal validity is the two-step procedure of categorising output relating to the independent variables into two subsets that are associated with Realism and Idealism, respectively. The first step includes partitioning plausible outcomes based on EU law and policies into two subsets, relating to Realism and Idealism. Some EU policies are not designed with a view to conducting crisis management missions and some policy options may therefore be vague or not reflect the EU's realistic intentions. Consequently, the plausible outcomes may be difficult to reconcile with real missions. For instance, Chapter 2 highlighted that there is no EU interpretation of its foreign policy objectives in the pre-Lisbon TEU. More importantly, there is no authoritative analytical scheme that maps Realism and Idealism to decision elements of crisis management, such as those reflected in the independent variables. Arguably, some of the plausible outcomes of the independent variables are not inherently linked to either of these schools, and the model does not take into account how strongly the plausible outputs are related to these scientific schools. However, criticism claiming that the research model presents an overly simplified interpretation of the EU actions should bear in mind that the Realism-Idealism dichotomy underpinning the research in Part II intends to broaden the almost unipolar perception of the EU as an altruistic actor. To strengthen the causality, it would have been possible to define more detailed and specific independent variables. However, the empirical data available and the varying nature of the CSDP missions are limiting factors.

The second step includes interpreting the CSDP missions and mapping their characteristics to the predefined plausible outcomes. Considered in isolation a certain mission output may seem rational and consistent with the model. However, when considering the broader context, the causality may change. For instance the concept of the use of force is closely related to Realism, but according to the logic of Idealism it may under certain conditions be rational to resort to lethal force to satisfy idealistic aspirations. Notwithstanding the comprehensive examination of official texts and statements, the reconstructed decision-making situations and the deliberations provided in Appendix A, cannot fully reflect the complexity of these decision-making situations. The research

design is not capable of generating a rigid analysis of the individual missions. When reflecting on the discussions and interpretations, in particular in Appendix A, it is clear that some outputs required considerable analysis to arrive at a conclusion, while others were straightforward almost to the extent of being free from judgement. In the first category we find interpretations relating to interests (*cf. Why*) and multilateralism (*cf. Who*). The output of these independent variables could rarely be inferred from key texts such as Joint Actions, and, instead, several additional sources, albeit more informal and less committing for the EU, were needed, which included, for instance, speeches, Council Secretariat documents and master messages. Moreover, the examination of multilateralism required facts to be obtained from other international actors. In short, Why and Who required a significant degree of judgment by the author, and they were assessed as the most significant element of the research that limits its validity. Conversely, outputs relating to the arena (*cf. Where*) and, to a lesser extent, to the conflict cycle (*cf. When*) have generally been straightforward to interpret.

External validity refers to the extent that the conclusions can be generalised. To compensate for the challenges associated with internal validity, the author derives no distinct conclusions but rather nullifies the prevailing perceptions. The research concludes that neither Idealism nor Realism possesses a dominant explanatory power for the CSDP.

To mitigate the limitations on validity, a number of measures have been taken. Verbatim accounts are frequently used, and although other independent variables could help to address the research question, no additional factor was identified as particularly relevant, given the empirical data available. A considerable number of missions are analysed, while the number of independent variables is also considerable. The research is also comprehensive in its analysis of the official EU documents and statements. It can be asserted that there is a strong correlation between what is being observed and what is intended to be studied. Furthermore, the author has worked within EU institutions and is well acquainted with EU concepts and how these documents are prepared. The author believes that his ability to decipher EU policies and actions is considerable. However, there are classified and internal documents beyond the reach of the research that would have been able to add more clarity to the choices made and to the motivation to move in certain directions. Mindful of the EU self-image, the selection of EU sources only strengthens the validity.

7.6 Concluding Observations

The research summarised in Table 6.24 suggests that only some 55% of the empirical output collected indicated idealist preferences⁷ while some 45% of the empirical evidence supports the counter claim of Realism as the key incentive for the CSDP. The strength of this finding is further amplified when considering that motivation as to the supposed motives has been examined. In Chapter 4.2.3 it was established that the real motives of the EU are not accessible for the research. Instead, the motivation articulated by the EU is examined. It is safe to assume that the idealistic self-image distorts the motivation and that the motives are more influenced by Realism than is conveyed. The findings of this part of the research are not consistent with the EU self-image or the common view amongst scholars. However, the validity of these findings is strong when it is considered that the empirical data are limited to official EU documents and statements. At this point, it is important to recall that the research neither aims to assign relative importance to the independent variables or their output, nor is their mutual dependence the subject of scrutiny. Such work would have indeed been of interest, but it is beyond the scope of this paper. Given the results, assigning relative weight to the variables from exploring their intra-dependencies will not change this overarching claim.

The results clearly demonstrate that Idealism and Realism have a nearly equally strong explanatory power for the justification for the CSDP missions. Through ample empirical support it is concluded that neither Idealism nor Realism possesses a dominant explanatory power for the CSDP. In conclusion, on the one hand, it is hard to contend that the EU is a soft power, on the other hand, the explanatory power of Realism is soft.

⁷ Of the 138 outcomes, 76 are linked to Idealism.

Part III

Complementary Perspectives

Chapter 8

Method II: Designing a Complementary Approach

In [the EU], policy packages are like a patent remedies: if they promise they can cure one or two ills, they might be worth a try; if a dozen suspect quackery

The Economist¹

8.1 Framing the Research

8.1.1 Introduction

Contrary to the EU self-image and the commonly held view amongst scholars, Part II concludes that Idealism does not provide a dominant explanatory power for the CSDP. It also reveals significant influences of Realism. To progress towards a better understanding of the EU along the Idealism-Realism continuum, further clarity with regard to these realist influences is needed. The academic community's lack of interest in exploring the merits of Realism in understanding the CSDP provides another justification for this effort. Given the general perception of Idealism as the ideological repository of the CSDP, this part seeks to invigorate the research through alternative perspectives. Bearing in mind the second research question from Chapter 1, i.e. what is the explanatory power of various schools within Realism to understand the motives of the EU as a crisis management actor, this part of the book concerns a focused examination of the realist drivers. To this end, it builds on the work of Part II in that it re-examines four selected CSDP missions and subjects them to additional analysis, and namely those that

¹ In "Charlemagne: Roll up, roll up, get your energy here". Issue: January 19-25, 2008, p. 30. The quotation starts with 'In Europe', however the article addresses EU policies.

produced a dominance of realist outcomes in Chapter 6. This additional analysis draws on a wider set of empirical data, and includes secondary sources, while the analysis is not limited to official EU texts and statements. This chapter outlines the research design and defines an analytical scheme including three complementary realist schools, Classical Realism, Neorealism, and Neoclassical Realism, with each realist school linked to a unique level of analysis by drawing on models developed by Waltz and Allison are examined. Chapter 9 examines theories relating to the CSDP and Realism, in particular, contributions by Posen and Hyde-Price. The analytical scheme is further refined by identifying criteria for the assessment of realist drivers, and two criteria for each level of analysis are identified. Chapter 10 provides an account of the empirical examination of four CSDP missions, Concordia, EUFOR Althea, EUFOR RD Congo and EUMM Georgia, and the analytical scheme developed is used to identify the realist drivers in these missions. Finally, in Chapter 11, conclusions are drawn that relate to the second research question.

8.1.2 Research Challenges

There are theoretical challenges relating to the application of realist theories to the CSDP. Theoretical constructs that originate in Realism and seek to provide explanatory power for the CSDP, have in general three common limitations. Firstly, they are only concerned with the strategic level, thus their explanatory power is limited to the CSDP in general. Typically, this involves predictions about the pace, progress in integration, and the political impact of the CSDP as a whole. Secondly, they also lack empirical grounding in operations, and their argumentation derives instead from generic realist theories. As such they are not developed with rigour and do not qualify as theories about the CSDP.² Thirdly, Realism, in general, perceives international institutions as auxiliary in the study of IR. From this viewpoint one must critically assess the utility of Realism in the quest for understanding the CSDP. As a counterargument Morgenthau argues that Realism does not exclude that other entities can emerge and become important political institutions; “Nothing in the realist position militates against the assumption that the present division of the political world into nation states will be replaced by larger units of a quite different character” (Morgenthau, 2006, p.61).

² Waltz argues that a theory has to explain facts collected during observations, (Waltz, 1979, p.6).

8.1.3 Deductions on Realism from Part II

Before the research design for Part III is addressed, the findings from Chapter 6 are revisited, albeit from a realist perspective. It was concluded that twelve of the twenty-three CSDP missions were dominated by idealist influences. Is what appears to be utopian action really Idealism? An alternative explanation could be derived from a realist perspective. As Morgenthau explains, many international actors are tempted to cloak their goals and actions in moral purposes.

All nations are tempted - and few have been able to resist the temptation for long - to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral purposes of the universe. To know that nations are subject to the moral law is one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty what is good and evil in the relations among nations is quite another (Morgenthau, 2006, p.61).

Bearing in mind Table 6.24, none of the twenty-three missions examined has been driven exclusively by Idealism. This is consistent with the views of Carr, who asserts that reality and utopia are inextricably blended in policy formulation (Carr, 1964, p.92).³ Four missions are dominated by Realism, Concordia, EUFOR Althea, EUFOR RD Congo, and EUMM Georgia (hereafter denoted R4). These R4 missions are homogenous in that they all resonate with vital interests of the EU (cf. *Why*) and that they responded to state-centric threats (cf. *What*). However, other variables reveal less coherence. This set of missions neither consists exclusively of military missions nor is it limited to coercive police or military missions mandated to use force (cf. *How*). Furthermore, the missions are distributed among different geographical regions (cf. *Where*), involving accession states, the EU neighbourhood as well as ACP countries. Of the seven military missions⁴ three are found in the category of equally distributed idealist/realist missions. Thus, it can be concluded that militarising, in the sense of employing military forces to advance EU political objectives, does not necessarily imply a shift in *actorness* towards increased power politics. In the EU context, the notion of a correlation between power politics and the use of military interventions is weak. The timing of interventions (cf. *When*) also lacks a consistent output amongst R4, as does the approach to multilateralism (cf. *Who*). What are the drivers for Realism in the CSDP context? Do contemporary realist theories account for the findings summarised in Table 6.24?

³ The argument can of course be applied with regards to missions exclusively driven by realist influences.

⁴ This figure includes all military missions (Concordia, Artemis, EUFOR Althea, EUFOR RD Congo, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, and EUNAVFOR Somalia) and the Civil-Military mission (EU AMIS).

8.2 Research Design

8.2.1 Triangulation and Methodological Comparison

Addressing the above questions requires some consideration of the independent variables and their operationalisation. The quest for clarity as to realist influences embodied in the aforementioned questions shall be underpinned by its own research design and shall thus be deliberately as well as methodologically separated from that of earlier chapters. This serves two purposes. It avoids circular reasoning and improves the credibility and the validity of the overall research findings.⁵ Several key aspects of the research design are be configured differently. While the previous part of the research employed CSDP missions as the unit of analysis and produced a total investigation of all CSDP missions over a given period of time, this section takes a qualitative approach with selected realist theories as the analytical object or unit of analysis. This allows an investigation of the explanatory power of these realist theories in the context of the CSDP. To test these realist theories, the selected CSDP missions become the independent variables that enable the theories to be populated with empirical data. This study is limited to those four CSDP missions that reveal the dominance of realist traits, (cf. R4). By testing the realist theories using the missions most influenced by Realism, it could be argued that the examination is bound to be successful. However, this is an intentional aspect of the design. A conclusion that is able to produce any correlation between the empirical data (cf. the CSDP missions) and contemporary realist theories relating to the CSDP would be a valuable finding. Conversely, if the test fails, the arguments for rejecting the theory will be stronger, and it should be recalled that the same principle was applied in the previous empirical investigation. By drawing on empirical data from official EU documents and statements, the EU self-image as an idealist actor was shown to be refuted in Chapter 7. Furthermore, in Part II six independent variables (i.e. *Why, What, How, Where, When, Who*) were applied to the realm of Security Studies and IR theory. This part of the research takes Realism as the theoretical point of departure, and realist theories are utilised to design the independent variables. The criteria for operationalising these variables, as well as those for the empirical examination are therefore derived from a different body of theory. A related, more subtle, difference is the use of political theory. In Part II, the quest to identify dichotomies between Realism and Idealism, and the subsequent categorising of plausible outcomes led to an exploration of the intellectual roots of these theoretical paradigms. Accordingly, the research relied on original and early theory formulations. By contrast, this section draws on a combination of classical

⁵ In social science triangulation is utilised to make the research findings more robust (Patton, 2002, pp.247-50). Triangulations includes the use of three, or more, methodological approaches. In this case, two different research configurations are set, albeit with the same aspirations.

and contemporary realist theories. Finally, the competing perspective applied in Part II is replaced by a complementary one. It is assumed that realist drivers are derived from different realist theories can co-exist.

8.2.2 Empirical Considerations

The research design in Part II emphasised basic principles and contrasting characteristics. To this end, it focused on original and basic IR theories, and on empirical data from the primary sources. The change of approach in this part of the research not only provides scope for a wider empirical scope, but it also necessitates a variety of perspectives to be explored. Using different research principles is in itself a strength for the overall research findings, yet it introduces some constraints on reliability and validity that require methodological considerations, as the inter-method reliability is reduced by the variation in measurements between Part II and III. Different sources are likely to interpret and apply different terms, as well as arrive at different conclusions. There is an increased risk of making errors in the interpretation of the data, and in order to limit these errors, the sources are, with a few exceptions, limited to those drafted in English. As previously mentioned, the researcher possesses practical experience, which is thought to mitigate some of the risks. From a validity perspective, there are concerns with regard to the internal Part III perspective. By defining an inclusive set of plausible empirical data, the sources have to be selected, and there is an inherent risk of selection bias. To minimise negative effects on validity, secondary sources are first and foremost selected from high-ranking journals, where the objective has been to consider all the relevant articles found in them. However, during the research process, it became clear that this approach was too ambitious, as many articles address the research problem of this work only in passing. Hence, articles that have a similar scope to this research are those that have primarily received attention. Moreover, it must be emphasised that Part III does not reproduce or replicate the findings of Part II but provides another building block for the final conclusions.

Semi-structured interviews with key actors were contemplated for this phase of the research design, but were ultimately rejected. The interviews considered included several interest groups, the Presidency, national representatives from each of the most influential Member States, the EU3 (i.e. the UK, France and Germany), the Secretariat, and the Commission. There are several challenges associated with this kind of data retrieval, and, ideally, the respondents should be able cover all missions of interest uniformly. However, many national representatives and some EU officials serve for a limited term, often three years. Hence, identifying individuals with sufficient length of experience to cover the full set of R4 is a challenge. Finding a few relevant volunteers who satisfy this

criterion, but who are not from all the interest groups, would introduce another dilemma with respect to the consistency of the empirical data, and it would require the use of an asymmetric configuration of interviewees from the groups identified. Furthermore, in accordance with the division of labour in the Council, most personnel specialise in dealing with civilian or military missions, respectively.⁶ Only a few experts are closely involved in both military and civilian missions. As the Presidency rotates, the decision time for the respective mission involves different Presidencies and longitudinal consistency becomes difficult to maintain. For some missions, one of the EU3 countries will also act as Presidency and will thus represent two interview categories. Another obstacle is the fact that the researcher holds a position with a Swedish government agency with vested interests, and relations with these actors. It may therefore be awkward to reveal positions and underlying rationale to the researcher, which is particularly emphasised in conjunction with the Swedish Presidency during the second semester of 2009.

8.3 Operationalisation of Independent Variables: Levels of analysis

Scholars of IR conduct a lively debate on how to analyse security (Buzan, 1994; Collins, 2007), which has traditionally been concerned with levels of analysis.⁷

When Idealism and Realism were examined in Chapter 5, it became evident that these two meta-theories implicitly focus on different levels of analysis.⁸ Idealism takes as a starting point the individual and the social contract with the governing bodies. A

⁶ Under the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), are found the competent bodies for military and civilian crisis management, respectively. In the Secretariat they were supported by the Directorate-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs (DG E), including DG E VIII (Defence Aspects) and DG E IV (Civilian Crisis Management) as well as the EU Military Staff (EUMS). In 2005 the Civ-Mil Cell was organised within the EU Military Staff (EUMS) as a bridging entity between parts of the Secretariat and the Commission. Through an incremental reconfiguration of the Secretariat, including the organisation of Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability in 2008, a new organisational structure was launched in 2009 to further strengthen the comprehensive civil-military approach (Blair, 2009). In conjunction with the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) was organised by merging relevant civilian and military elements of the Secretariat. While this progress is taking place it does not significantly change the situation with regards to R4.

⁷ However, more recently, the focus has started to shift towards expanding the scope of the different sectors. The newly introduced sector topics include, but are not limited to, human and environmental security. Given the main thrust of this thesis, with the CSDP missions at the core, it is reasonable to exclude any further deliberations on sector analysis, since the CSDP as a policy field places constraints on what could be examined. For instance, conceptualisation of environmental security aspects is still in a nascent phase within the CSDP and calls for adopting a human security doctrine within CSDP have, by and large, been ignored. An independent Study Group financed by the EU provided recommendations for Solana on human security in 2004. However these have yet to be implemented (Glasius and Kaldor, 2006, pp.x-xviii). In addition, this research project has a traditional approach, with Realism at the core. Adding additional topical perspectives on security would run the risk of blurring the research focus.

⁸ It is noted that other political meta-theories uses other levels of analysis. For instance Marxism introduces *class* as a level of analysis.

central proposition in Idealism argues for the application of individual moral virtues to the international system, while Realism revolves around the state level. The traditional realist concept is formulated around the notions of interests and power from a state perspective. Accordingly, the analytical scheme applied in Part II uses state centrism as a qualifier for realist interpretations. In this part of the research, however, the instrumental use of Realism is different, and Realist theories are the objects of investigation or unit of analysis. The scope of Realism is relaxed to include contemporary interpretations, without discarding classical Realism. Both Neoclassical Realism and Neorealism offer analysis on other levels. Neoclassical Realism focuses on the internal dynamics within a state, while Neorealism, on the other hand, is more concerned with how states operate in the anarchic international system.

The five most commonly used levels of analysis include International systems, International subsystems (including regional institutions such as the EU), Units (for instance states), Subunits (e.g., organisational entities and lobbies) and individuals (Buzan et al., 1998).⁹ For the purpose of this research, it is prudent to adopt a more focused model. To this end, two of the most common models, both including three levels, are examined.

The first model was devised by one of the originators of Neorealism, Kenneth Waltz (Waltz, 1959, 1979), who professes that behaviour in IR is conditioned by international competition and the pressures exerted on states as a consequence of this, which limits and constrains their choices. His original work seeks to explain war as a product of a political process. At the first level, or *First Image*, state behaviour is predicated by the nature of man, and thus explanations are based on individual behaviour and psychological factors. Consequently, sound policies can only be adopted when decision-makers know what they entail. War can be caused by erratic and irrational individuals. If the first level is underpinned by psychology, the second level takes sociology as its point of departure. This level, or *Second Image* addresses the internal structures of states and pays attention to internal actors, political and social institutions and processes, and culture. At this level, war can be explained by defects within an organisation. The third level, or *Third Image*, advances the interaction between actors in the international system. Distribution of power and the international environment's influence on state behaviour are central to this level of analysis. Although the system of sovereign states is anarchic, actors are believed to act in predictable ways based on theoretical paradigms of interests.

⁹ However there are other approaches that take even more aspects into consideration. For instance, Luttwak applies five levels and two dimensions in his analysis of strategy. The five levels are the technical, the tactical, the operational, the theatre strategic and the grand strategic. He also emphasises that their interaction is critical and must be understood. The two dimensions are the impact between the levels (the vertical dimension) and within each level (the horizontal dimension)(Luttwak, 2001).

The second model is provided by Graham Allison, who examined the American decision-making process during the Cuban Missile Crisis by applying a three-level analysis (Allison, 1971). This study was partly motivated by a desire to demonstrate the limitations of the rational actor hypothesis underpinning Realism, in particular. Accordingly, at the first level, or *Model I*, behaviour and decision-making are explained using the rational actor model. At this level Allison draws on Classical Realism theory. States that are embodied by governments are the analytical objects and their goals and intentions are examined. Foreign policy is the outcome of deliberate choices made by states through their governments. Logic and unified actions are based on deliberate decisions based on a rational scheme that optimises the outcome. The second level, or *Model II*, adopts an Organisational Process Model. Governmental behaviour results in semi-independent outputs from different parts of organisation. Foreign policy is therefore not a product of a deliberate process, but is shaped by the processes and routines that the policymakers are subjected to and how options are presented, thus limiting the influence of the leaders. Problems are divided into sub-problems and solved in various parts of the organisation based on the 'satisficing'¹⁰ model, and thus not by striving for an optimal, maximising, solution. They combine the economic aspect, maximising profit, with the bureaucratic aspect, trying to achieve satisfactory and sufficient outcomes. This model regards the government as a diverse and fractional entity with distributed power. At the third level, or *Model III*, foreign policy outcomes are explained by competition among key players guided by personal goals of power attainment, referred to as the Governmental Politics Model. Furthermore, at this level, decisions are shaped by other circumstances than rational choice, and are instead, products of compromises and negotiations. Relative power and bargaining skills amongst the key players have a significant impact on the outcome. As a consequence, unintended policies may be adopted.

These models must be adjudicated to assist further operationalisation and subsequent empirical investigation. Waltz's third level, unparalleled in Allison's model, provides vital contribution in that it allows for an examination of international and external EU interactions. This image also forms the basis that Waltz later developed as Neorealism. Its importance as an influential contemporary realist school provides another incentive for its application to further research. The systemic logic that follows from this level is different from all the other levels examined in the two models, since they are reductionist models that try to explain behaviour in the international system by examining parts of it. Waltz maintains that systemic and reductionist approaches are complementary and it is important to study both.

¹⁰ Herbert Simon coined the term when recognising that human intentions to make a rational decision rarely succeeded as they are constrained and possess only 'bounded rationality' (Simon, 1997, pp.295-8).

Thinking in terms of systems dynamics does not replace unit-level analysis nor end the search for sequences of cause and effect. Thinking in terms of systems dynamics does change the conduct of the search and add a dimension to it. (Waltz, 1986, p.344).

Allison's first level offers a unit-level analysis that is underpinned by Classical Realism. The modelling of actors according to this level is the key to understanding how Member States diffuse their national interests through positions in EU committees, and how these influences are absorbed into the EU policy process. These two analytical perspectives view the EU differently. Waltz's third level makes the EU the entity to be examined, in an external context in interaction with other international actors. In Allison's first level, on the other hand, the EU system is externalised as it constitutes the environment in which Member States operate and project their self-interest, which is associated with Classical Realism. Member States become the object of study, not the EU as a whole. Consequently, no principal difference is made between states operating in the international system or within the EU, and it is states' external behaviour that the EU system assesses.¹¹

In examining a large bureaucratic international institution such as the EU, it is relevant to address its internal dynamics. The power-maximising forces within the bureaucracy should comprise the study of interest, and, Neoclassical Realism, in particular, acknowledges the need to reflect on these aspects. Waltz's second level of the model is relevant as it examines the intra-institutional dynamics. It correlates to some extent with Allison's third level, which focuses on governmental politics, and helps to explain occurrences of unintended policies relating to Figure 7.3. It suggests that decisions are also shaped by intra-institutional negotiations and bargaining.

The "leaders" who sit on top of organizations are not a monolithic group. Rather, each individual in this group is, in his own right, a player in a central, competitive game. The name of the game is politics: bargaining along regularized circuits among player positioned hierarchically within the government. (Allison, 1971, p.144).

This study could pertain to the Council, including its Secretariat, and the Commission and its services.¹² Significantly, the Council is intergovernmental and is made up of Member States. When Member States are scrutinised at this level, they are treated as

¹¹ In Chapter A.13 the porosity of Member States' foreign policy is discussed briefly.

¹² Hyde-Price provides an exhaustive list of all actors with a formal role within the second pillar that should be subject to this scrutiny (Hyde-Price, 2004, pp.105-6). In the following the discussion is limited to power of the Council, the Secretariat and the Commission.

institutional entities based on the same principles as other organisation. As such, their treatment differs from that on the previous state-centred level.

Waltz's *First Image* addresses the individual level based on psychological factors and has some correlation with the Organisational Process Model by Allison. Both suggest that the outcome is shaped by the decision-making process, albeit for different reasons. There are two principal constraints within the CSDP on addressing decision-making on an individual basis. Firstly, Chapter 2 established that the intergovernmental decision-making process applied to the CSDP generally lacks transparency, as most of the deliberations take place in Member States' capitals and in the corridors of Brussels, and are thus not subjected to an open and formalised exchange of views. Secondly, the essential parts of the process that are codified in principles and political guidelines, in particular, the Crisis Management Concept (CMC), Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and Operations Plan (OPLAN), are, with few exceptions, classified and not accessible to the research community. In addition, in view of the collective decision-making aspect and the involvement of additional actors such as the Commission, the Secretariat and a rotating Presidency, all with a high personnel turnover, this becomes a gargantuan task that should be the focus of a separate thesis. For these reasons the latter two perspectives offered by Waltz and Allison are not applicable to this research project. Table 8.1 summarises the framework as it has been elaborated.¹³

Level of analysis	Theoretical influences	Waltz's model	Allison's model	Adjudicated model
External	Neorealism	Third image	-	Systemic
Internal MS	Classical Realism	-	Model I	State centric
Internal EU	Neoclassical Realism	Second Image	Model III	Bureaucratic

TABLE 8.1: Analytical Scheme for Part III

These different views, or schools are illustrated by the fact that they result in different explanations about the inception and role of the CSDP. The External School would argue that the Balkan crisis in the early 1990s instigated this development. Europe's inability to respond effectively, combined with initial American reluctance to commit, clearly demonstrated that it needed an autonomous and capable force to ensure its own security. On the other hand, the Internal Member States School would acknowledge this important event, but it would emphasise that this was merely a contributory factor. In the end, what mattered was the Franco-British agreement in St Malo, where the two most powerful Member States joined forces, albeit for different reasons. Finally, the Internal EU School would confirm the importance of St Malo as well as that of the Balkan Crisis, but it would claim that these trigger events would not have led to the

¹³MS: Member States.

CSDP, unless there had been a long, but not always linear, institutional and political development within the EU and its previous configurations, which ultimately paved the way. The socialisation of foreign policy cooperation at the European level that started with the EPC is a key explanation. In addition, the bargaining over the Treaty of Maastricht, with the introduction of the second pillar, made the introduction of EU crisis management inevitable. Indeed, concepts similar to the CSDP were intensely discussed both before and during the crafting of the Treaty of Maastricht.

Finally, it is acknowledged that Allison's work was devised to demonstrate the limitations of the rational actor hypothesis underpinning Realism. Therefore, its application to a study of Realism can be questioned. However, in this particular case, the relevance of Allison's work is justified by two arguments. Firstly, only two of Allison's three models are used. Bearing in mind that *Model I* represents the Rational Actor, i.e., the traditional realist perception that he sought to question, it must be seen as pertinent to this study. Accordingly *Model I* is linked to Classical Realism, see Table 8.1. Secondly, in Allison's *Model III* foreign policy outcomes are explained by competition among key players guided by personal goals of power attainment, referred to as the Governmental Politics Model. Indeed, this perception is not consistent with Classical Realism, since it is indifferent to internal structures in explaining states' behaviour. Instead it is believed that given the same external stimuli, all states will behave in a similar way, sometimes referred to as the 'Black Box' metaphor (Rosenau and Durfee, 2000, pp.29-31). However, when Waltz introduced structural realism, he expanded the logic of Realism such that it became less mechanistic. There is a current of realist research that 'seeks to integrate domestic variables in ways that do not violate the core logic of realist theory' (Finel, 2001, p.189). It is in this context that *Model III* is applied in the above framework, see Table 8.1. It is therefore linked to Neoclassical Realism, which focuses on the internal dynamics within a state.¹⁴ Moreover, both Posen and Hyde-Price confirm the relevance of a bureaucratic model for realist theories as well as foreign policy. Hyde-Price confirms the relevance of Allison's model in the context of understanding EU foreign policy (Hyde-Price, 2004, p.105). Posen views the first level (Rational Actor) as consistent with Waltz's model, as well as the concept of the Balance of Power. Allison's Levels II and III are in his view closely related to Level 2 of Waltz's model. In his work on military doctrine, Posen applies a combination of Balance of Power and organisational theory to explain the sources of military doctrine (Posen, 1984, pp.38-47).

¹⁴ Finel (2001) uses the term Functional Realism to denote the research that seeks to integrate domestic variables into Realism.

Chapter 9

Theory II: A Three-Level Model for Realist Drivers

If Europeans wish to influence the management of global security affairs, they need to be able to show up globally with capabilities, including military capabilities, that matter to local outcome

Barry Posen¹

The methodological discussion in the previous chapter arrived at an analytical scheme to examine realist drivers underpinning the CSDP missions. This chapter proceeds by identifying a set of criteria to enhance the scheme, and its outline is straightforward. The three levels of analysis in the analytical scheme are expanded through a set of representative criteria to allow further elaboration by means of empirical data.

An examination of the scientific debate about the EU as a realist actor reveals an animated discussion of policy areas with supranational characteristics (cp. first pillar), which fall primarily within the competence of the Commission. Few studies are concerned with the CFSP, which should come as no surprise, for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Commission has pursued policies for a much longer period of time than has the Council, and within a wider field. Secondly, the supranational characteristics of the Community are more conducive to forceful means. Thirdly, the most influential EU policies from a national perspective were part of the portfolio of the Commission. The research related to Realism is occupied with enlargement policies (Behr, 2007; Collard-Wexler, 2006; Lavenex, 2001), the role of the EU in international trade (Brunner, 2009; Young and Building, 2007; Zimmermann, 2007) and also, the role of the EU as a global

¹ Quoted in Posen (2006, p.159). Barry Posen is an American scholar, perhaps best known for his work on military doctrine. He has also published work on Realism.

actor (Attina, 2003; Mayer, 2008) against the foil of imperialism (Dunne, 2008; Zielonka, 2008). From this it is understood that EU external policies are increasingly coming under scrutiny from a realist perspective, thus inevitably gravitating towards an audit of the CFSP that includes the CSDP.

Few scholars have examined and explained the CSDP from a realist perspective, let alone have formulated realist theories tailored for the CSDP based on Realism as an explanation in the context of this topic. Catherine Gegout provides an inductive proposition on how Western realist interests in Africa are capitalised, from a realist perspective (Gegout, 2009, p.232). On the basis of this understanding of Realism, the national interests of Western countries would involve: (1) safeguarding their own security; (2) ensuring that foreign policy enhances their trade relations with third states, or at least does not harm them; (3) promoting their prestige; and (4) promoting peace with limited risk. While this work contributes towards an enhanced understanding of the CSDP it does not satisfy the requirements for the purpose of this chapter. The criteria sought should be firmly embedded in realist theory based on a deductive approach. In addition, the criteria identified by Gegout do not easily lend themselves to an examination on different levels. Furthermore, Western interest can be pursued by Member States of the EU, the USA and some other states on a national basis or in different multinational settings. The objective here is to tailor the criteria for the assessment of the CSDP missions. However, this model has some merit for this research, in particular, with regard to safeguarding own security and promoting prestige.

Although the propositions relating to the CSDP presented by Barry Posen and Adrian Hyde-Price, fall short of being theories, their work can help to develop the three-level analysis. They both focus on the CSDP, as opposed to the CFSP, and firmly anchor their interpretations of the CSDP in Realism theory, through a deliberate and structured process. However, neither has developed complete theories that can be applied without amendments. Posen, an American scholar best known for his research into military doctrine and the use of force in support of American foreign policy,² offers a neorealist explanation for the *raison d'Etat* behind the CSDP.³ The claims offered by Posen not only stem from the intellectual framework of Neorealism, but they are also deduced from it. Accordingly, his work neither presents any systematic treatment of empirical data nor does it elaborate on the CSDP mission that has been conducted. The work is formulated as a test theory “to develop an understanding of the forces acting on Europe” (Posen, 2006, p.184). Hyde-Price is another advocate of explaining the CSDP through a Neorealism lens (Hyde-Price, 2006, 2007, 2008).⁴ While Posen’s ambition is

² See for instance Posen (1984, 2003).

³ Posen uses the term *Structural Realism*. It is synonymously with *Neorealism*.

⁴ Hyde-Price also prefers the term *Structural Realism*.

to test neorealist theory, Hyde-Price limits his aspirations to a critique of the ethical and normative characteristics of the CSDP, to which most of the researchers subscribe, based on a neorealist analysis. Hence, he is not formulating his own theoretical claims based on Neorealism, and, instead he cautions policymakers and scholars against the application of idealist theories to the exercise and assessment of policies within the framework of the CSDP. To enhance the value of Posen's and Hyde-Price's work in the context of this research, their contributions will be reviewed from different levels of analysis, in order to construct a set of criteria to support this empirical treatment.

9.1 The External Level: Systemic Analysis and the Relations with the USA

The goal of this section is modest, and it will not offer an overview of the ample research relating to Neorealism. Instead, it is limited to a brief introduction of this school of political science, in order to provide a trajectory and context for subsequent discussions. Following his formulation of the three images of IR, Waltz laid particular stress on explaining the highest level. In his view, it contained an element new to Realism in that it embraced systems theory. He asserted that the international system itself (i.e., the structure of international order) produced different outcomes in the behaviour of the actors. Hence, it was a constraint on the states. The structure is not only separated from the states and their characteristics, it is also a key determinant for predicting policy outcomes. Other theories, at state-level and below, are reductionist, as they only examine parts of the international system, and therefore they produce explanations of international behaviour based on national and sub-national factors. Systemic theories, on the other hand, reflect outcomes and interaction based on the dynamics among states (Waltz, 1979).⁵

Given its importance in IR theory, Neorealism has received only peripheral attention in the quest to explain the CSDP. This disproportional treatment has at least four viable explanations (Hyde-Price, 2006, pp.218-9). Firstly, there is a conceptual deficit in Realism when it comes to multinational institutions. Secondly, Neorealism is predisposed towards military matters and state-centric dynamics, albeit on a systemic level. Neither of these topics is at the core of EU external relations. Thirdly, the explanatory power of Neorealism is not common knowledge. Scholars of the CSDP come from other research environments less exposed to Realism traditions. Hence, the explanatory power of Neorealism in the realm of the CSDP has not received sufficient attention. Fourthly, as

⁵ Although pioneering and influential, Waltz's systemic theory has been criticised for being too simplistically defined, see Jervis (1997, pp.107-10) and Keohane (1986, pp.14-6).

previously discussed, many scholars in this field sympathise with the notion that the EU wields a soft and normative power. Therefore it is appealing to explore realist traits.

The Balance of Power concept does not emanate from Neorealism, but it is often framed in this context, and it implicates a law of equilibrium and predicates a state of desired stability and security.⁶ As a theory, it aspires to explain and predict the behaviour of states. For the purpose of this thesis, the scope of the theory is relaxed to encompass actors in international relations in general, thus including entities such as the EU. According to Waltz, the theory assumes that while operating in an anarchic system, the actors strive, at the very least, to preserve their relative power. Diplomats and politicians behave as rational actors in order to achieve the desired political objective by considering all reasonable options at their disposal. These options include internal as well as external measures, with the latter ranging from increasing or maintaining the EU's own power base to reducing the power of its competitors. The application of these options, and their interaction, defines the dynamics of the Balance of Power. It includes a tendency for weaker actors to balance and offset the power of more powerful actors in order to prevent them from becoming too powerful (i.e., system imbalance) (Waltz, 1979). The Pleven plan in the 1950 to launch the European Defence Community as a response to the plan by the USA to rearm West Germany and integrate it into NATO, as discussed in Chapter 2.2.1, is a classic example of the Balance of Power. This concept was refined by another neorealist, Stephen Walt, as he coined the term Balance of Threat (Walt, 1987). He argues that a study that includes only power is myopic. On the one hand, the counterbalancing of power is applied against actors that pose a threat. On the other hand, foreign policy decisions of strategic importance, such as those that define the posture towards actors posing a threat, encompass additional factors besides power, which are synthesised in threat assessments. Hence, the theory has greater explanatory power through this redefinition. However as discussed below, in the CSDP context, the Balance of Power is primarily related to the USA and the crisis management missions. As EU-USA relations do not project threats of a survival nature, in any direction, it is relevant to apply Waltz's definition. Another valuable contribution is provided by Mearsheimer, another neorealist, who has a more offensive understanding of the Balance of Power than Waltz. Great powers are not satisfied with survival or status quo but seek to maximise their relative power. In addition to emulating the success of others, great powers are inspired by innovation. Security competition, he maintains, provides incentives to deviate from common and anticipated practices (Mearsheimer, 2003). The scholars who follow different realist paths will be examined in more detail.

⁶ For a comprehensive theoretical discussion on the roots and evolution of the concept see Wight (1992, pp.164-79).

While Hyde-Price takes his inspiration from the offensive school, Posen is an advocate of the defensive school (Hyde-Price, 2007, p.29).

Posen's contribution is unique in that it opens up lucid lines between the CSDP actions and policies, and the concept of Balance of Power applied to the interaction between the USA and the EU. Why else, asserts Posen, would Europe put effort into yet another security mechanism, at a time when Europe is safer than ever (Posen, 2006, p.149-50)? Posen posits that the construct of the CSDP plays a part in a larger scheme to bolster the EU as a global actor and at the same time increase its ability to influence its own security. In both cases, the interests of the EU intersect with those of the USA. Indeed, Posen's understanding of the CSDP and how it relates to its external environment is valuable. From a realist point of view, a degree of conflicting interests is logical and uncontroversial. Accordingly, Posen does not view this as abnormal in the bilateral relations between these two partners; it is not a confrontational approach but rather a 'soft balancing'.⁷ Instead Posen acknowledges that the USA, as the only remaining superpower, can be perceived as an unreliable, albeit prominent partner, whose agenda and priorities cannot be taken for granted, as its interests and commitments to European security may change. From this perspective, it makes sense that the EU is seeking autonomy so as to ensure its own integral capabilities to address security threats, especially in the neighbourhood. To this end, the CSDP provides a vehicle for the gradual enhancement of the European ability to respond to security threats. This accounts for the deployment of missions as well as for the development of capabilities (Posen, 2004, 2006).

On a grander scale, the EU is a global actor in several areas, but still relatively without influence in international relations. As its aspirations grow, its unease with some the virtues of American foreign policy becomes problematic. The ideological rift between the USA and Europe over pre-emptive attacks, as dictated by the Bush Doctrine, is a case in point. Therefore, it is not self-evident that the EU and its Member States are comfortable with opting for the 'Bandwagoning strategy'. From a European perspective, the EU is seen as an alternate force to the USA, and the management of global affairs is not always best handled unilaterally by the USA. Choosing a Balance of Power approach towards the USA, European values and norms are taken into account. Posen notes that the Balance of Power regime is particularly delicate in the EU context. Striking the right balance for the EU also encompasses considerations of how to relate to NATO, which due to its strong transatlantic dependence on the USA, is consistently opting for a global Bandwagoning strategy towards that power. Hence, whenever the EU adopts a Balance of Power approach, it implicitly challenges NATO's strategy, as well as its role

⁷ Soft balancing was coined by Pape to describe Balance of Power without using military means, see Pape (2005)

as a security provider in Europe. This can be tolerated, but only to a certain level. As a consequence, the EU options to develop the CSDP are curtailed (Posen, 2004, p.11). For instance, the establishment of a permanent military command structure, in parallel with the existing NATO structure, has not been possible. Another dilemma with which the EU has to deal, is striking a balance between regional efforts and global aspirations.

Hyde-Price reverses the logic that applies to a principal Idealism claim. He asserts that the EU self-perception as a diffuser of universal norms suggests that it sees itself as the ‘universalist’, thereby assuming that its own interests are cosmopolitan interests, a common trait amongst hegemonic and power-maximising actors (Hyde-Price, 2008, p.33). His arguments about what Neorealism implies for the EU and Member States, respectively, are intertwined and to some extent ambiguous. However, as the analytical framework developed requires a multi-level analysis, this is not a concern. In Hyde-Price’s view, that the fact the recurrent principle of the international system is anarchic, has a major impact on the CSDP on the systemic level, which involves a self-help system in which states must cater for their own security. As a corollary, powerful states have greater freedom of action, or more policy options, than weaker states. Hence, the USA can choose to a greater extent than any other actor, how and when to intervene. As a consequence, the USA becomes an unreliable partner.⁸ To compensate for this uncertainty the EU must develop independent options.

9.2 The First Internal Level (Member States): Advancing National Interests

Classical Realism is covered in Chapter 5, and there is hence no need to revisit its theoretical foundation. Moreover, in Chapter 3, theories were introduced to explain the genesis of the EU as an instrument for advancing national interests. Alyson Bailes testifies that the deliberations at the commencement of the CSDP were not occupied with utopian aspirations, and instead the thinking revolved around self-interest (Bailes, 2008). To this end, Janne Haaland-Matlary offers eight compelling arguments from a national interest frame of reference, as to why states should advance military cooperation

⁸ The reluctance of the Clinton administration to get involved in Bosnia is a case in point. James Baker, then Secretary of State, framed this in June 1991 when he said, “We don’t have a dog in this fight”. The statement is available on the official website of the US Department of Defense, see <http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=703on5July2009>. The website was accessed on 10 July 2009.

within the EU (Haaland-Matlary, 2009, pp.8-10).⁹ She concludes that post Cold War security policy in Europe is primarily driven by national factors and interests and that special attention must be given to the Big Three, or the EU3,¹⁰ whose primacy both Posen and Hyde-Price acknowledge. Hyde-Price argues that Realism predicts that the most powerful states would drive this development despite its intergovernmental nature (Hyde-Price, 2006, p.230). Posen, who once again approaches the issue from a Balance of Power frame of mind, argues that the CSDP came to fruition only because the powerful Member States needed to assert themselves as an autonomous force not linked to the USA (Posen, 2004, pp.10-1).

As states are the primary actors in Classical Realism, and the role of multinational institutions is downplayed, the EU becomes primarily a vehicle for advancing Member States collective interests. However, core national interests are not surrendered to the EU (Hyde-Price, 2008, pp.29-30). Instead, Member States funnel second-tier security interests, such as conflict resolution in remote and low-intensity crises, to the Union for it to handle (Hyde-Price, 2006). Of course, realist logic applies among Member States in that they compete. Neorealists, such as Hyde-Price, posit that cooperation is easier to achieve in a bipolar setting than in multipolar ones. Hence to move the CSDP forward there is merit in having a few Member States dominate and project their interests, despite the formal consensus relationship in which all have an equal vote that underpins the CSDP. From this perspective it could be argued that the common interests among Member States in the late 1990s, driven by the EU3, were an alternative to dependence on the USA. (Hyde-Price, 2006; Posen, 2004). Taking the perspective of national interests further, Hyde-Price maintains that while the EU is only given responsibility for second-tier interests, the neighbourhood has a logic of its own. Even before the inception of the CSDP, the EU was wielding 'hard power' in its periphery through coercive economic policies with 'conditionality clauses', in order to impose a desired economic and political order on the former communist countries (Hyde-Price, 2006, p.227). The underlying rationale, according to Hyde-Price, is the role of milieu shaper that Member States have entrusted to the EU in order to address second-tier security challenges (Hyde-Price, 2008, p.31). From a realist perspective milieu shaping as well as second-order concerns are drivers for enhancing multinational cooperation.

⁹ Haaland-Matlary identifies the following arguments: (1) Governments must prioritise force protection because the public is sensitive to casualties in non-existential or 'optional' wars. This induces governments to opt for multilateral risk sharing; (2) Due to declining defence budgets governments today can no longer afford balanced defence structures and must integrate with other states; (3) If something goes wrong, governments need a scapegoat. Political failures can be diverted to international organisations such as the EU; (4) Governments today have few, if any, unique security interests of their own. Instead they fight against enemies that are common; (5) Multilateralism provides legitimacy for interventions; (6) States enjoy world power status when they are in the EU; (7) States use the EU to forge issue linkages depending on their strengths and weaknesses; (8) The security architecture of Europe is evolving. The future relevance of NATO is debated.

¹⁰ The so called EU3, i.e. France, Germany and the UK.

Hyde-Price infers that “EU external policy co-operation constitutes a collective attempt at milieu shaping, driven primarily by the Union’s largest powers” (Hyde-Price, 2006, p.222). In this context it must be pointed out that a threat’s proximity to a Member State may elevate its interests, and impact on how the EU addresses the conflict. For instance, while Portugal was recognised as a driving force for the CSDP mission in Guinea-Bissau it was less active in the launching of the CSDP operations in the Balkans. For Italy, the reverse logic applies, and it has been most active in addressing threats in the Balkans.

9.3 The Second Internal Level(EU): Bureaucratic Analysis

Both Classical Realism and Neorealism recognise states as rational actors, but how decisions are made at a state level is, in effect, ignored. Instead, they view the state as a monolithic body that produces power-maximising decisions that rest on the assumption of a rational calculus. This neglect has been subjected to criticism.

As a consequence, the burden of proof lies initially on justifying the examination of intra-state, or in the case of the EU, intra-institutional, dynamics, a topic not at the core of Realism. To this end, the discussion starts with an elaboration on Neoclassical Realism, as it pays attention to the domestic factors that shape outcomes in international relations.¹¹ While neorealist arguments are based on the structure of the international system, neoclassical realists are anchored in the relative power that a state can wield. A central thesis of the latter school is that the relative amount of power resources a state has at its disposal will shape the ambition and magnitude of its foreign policy objectives (Rose, 1998, p.152). There is a reciprocal relationship with Level 1 and Neorealism, discussed above, in that it asserts the balance of power as an incentive for improving capabilities to act. Conversely, Neoclassical Realism argues that the more capabilities a state possesses, in relative terms, the more likely it is to adopt an active foreign policy. Furthermore, this school provides additional explanatory power as to why the EU has extended its policy to the realm of foreign policy. As it is a global economic actor, it wishes to become increasingly involved in international affairs in general, including security and defence policy.¹² In this context, it is helpful to pay attention to Hyde-Price’s observation that Member States are moving away from territorial defence concepts based on mass conscription. Instead they design forces based on concepts of

¹¹ Arguably, this perspective falls within the remit of foreign policy theory as opposed to IR. Such a claim does not lessen its relevance to the purpose of this research.

¹² The Commission describes the EU role as a world player as unintentional (European Commission, 2004g, p.3).

expeditionary warfare and power projection, thus making them more suitable for out-of-area crisis management and deployment in multinational settings. From a perspective of Neoclassical Realism, this development serves as a motivation for overseas military deployments, including those that come under the CSDP umbrella. Furthermore, this assertion is further supported if one considers the high profile EU capability development, ranging from robust military forces to a variety of civilian capabilities (Council of the EU, 2004o; European Council, 2003a). The capability declaration made by the European Council in Laeken in 2001 aligns with this logic.

Through the continuing development of the ESDP, the strengthening of its capabilities, both civil and military, and the creation of the appropriate EU structures, the EU is now able to conduct some crisis-management operations. The Union will be in a position to take on progressively more demanding operations, as the assets and capabilities at its disposal continue to develop. Decisions to make use of this ability will be taken in the light of the circumstances of each particular situation, a determining factor being the assets and capabilities available. (European Council, 2001b, p.2).

In particular, the development of EU battlegroups illustrates this phenomena. In 2007 the EU declared this capability fully operational, and it comprised two military forces on continuous high-readiness standby. However, neither force has ever been used. The EU has received external criticism for not employing this available capability in crises where it is needed (Sain ley Berry, 2008). An internal debate over the use of battlegroups is also taking place. During the second semester of 2009, the Swedish Presidency launched an initiative to increase the utility of battlegroups without revising the military concept for the force. Hence, the initiative was focused on the political conditions for deployment (Council of the EU, 2009c).

So far the study of Neoclassical Realism has provided justification for the study of EU internal factors as drivers for Realism. More specifically, it has identified the fact that the capacity to act can, in itself, be an incentive for taking action. This rationale can also be applied when projecting national interests onto the CSDP. Forces of that nature are defined in Level 2 above. Mindful that the origins of bureaucracy as a entity of power and influence stems from Marxism (Heywood, 2007, p.387),¹³ this assumption is adopted with the logic provided by Realism in general, i.e., that of the quest for power maximisation. For the purpose of this paper, bureaucracies include the Council, the Secretariat and also the Commission Services.

¹³ It is also acknowledged that Machiavelli as well as Max Weber made critical contributions in this field.

Hyde-Price argues that multinational cooperation, of the nature experienced in the CFSP, generates its own interests at the institutional level that are distinct from the interests of Member States and which are somewhat unpredictable, however “diffuse and amorphous they may be at times” (Hyde-Price, 2004, p.102). Based on Hyde-Price’s assertion this section examines how the level of bureaucracy can influence the launch of CSDP missions as a part of a power play in two dimensions. The external dimension seeks to boost the CSDP as a success and position it as being influential in international relations. The internal dimension pertains to the advancement of the CSDP instead of Commission programmes, as a part of the struggle for influence and power within the EU between these two entities.

The Secretariat has gradually evolved as an influential actor, and since the era of the EPC, its role has been strengthened, and there are six main arguments that can serve as an explanation (Dijkstra, 2008b). Foreign policy as a policy area has grown, because the EU has assumed the role of a global actor, as discussed above, and also on account of the deficiencies exposed by the Balkan Crises. Additional structures have been added, in particular as a consequence of the Treaty of Nice, see Chapter 2.2.4. At the same time, Member States have been persistent in their reluctance to subordinate this competence to the Commission, as security and defence are regarded as ‘high politics’, and are therefore best suited for intergovernmental management, according to Member States. As a consequence, the responsibilities of the Secretariat have increased. The former High Representative, Solana, was widely perceived as a successful holder of this office, and Member States gradually gave him more responsibility. Moreover, the CSDP operations have given the Secretariat a new role in which they participate actively in policy implementation. As such, it plays another type of expert role that enhances its standing as an expert body and it has undoubtedly gained in relative influence with regard to the Commission. Another reinforcing factor is the informal convergence of perceptions relating to policy formulation and implementation that takes place in Brussels among functionaries, Member States representatives and others resident in Brussels. This is often referred to as Brusselisation or a third way of governance (Barbé, 2004). This socialising process implicitly adopts a more European perspective than those of the Member States in general, and Member States representatives tend to adhere increasingly to the proposals put forward by the Secretariat. Considering that between 85% and 90% of Council decisions are taken below the level of ministers (Wallace and Hayes-Renshaw, 2006, p.52), there is considerable potential for informal power diffusion to the EU structures.

In an attempt to capture *l’esprit de corps* within the Secretariat, Kurowska defines the ‘Solana milieu’ as a proactive approach to establishing a global role for the EU in security affairs (Kurowska, 2009), which involves a ‘learning on the job’ mindset. CSDP

missions are launched to improve the ability to act, and the Secretariat spearheads this development. It refers to the EU being invited by the host country to conduct a mission, but the reality in many cases is quite different and involves an “opportunistic search for actionable crises” through fact-finding missions to explore if there is room to establish a CSDP mission (Kurowska, 2008, p.27). Apart from the needs assessment on the ground, the prestige that can be generated by the mission is assessed early on. With this frame of mind, the significant number of civilian missions can be explained as a desire to put the EU flag on the map. At the same time, these missions are cost-effective in three ways. They are financed by the CFSP budget and Member States do not have to fund them, and thus, are one less obstacle less for decision-making. The costs associated with a civilian mission are marginal compared with deploying a military force with all its heavy equipment and logistic support. Moreover, civilian CSDP missions are very small, sometimes numbering no more than ten to fifteen international staff, which, of course, limits what the mission can achieve. Another aspect of the role of the Secretariat is the Solana effect. His personal commitment and qualities have energised not just the Secretariat, but have also brought greater credibility and prestige to the EU, including the CSDP, as it interacts on the international stage. He and his staff increasingly set the agenda for CSDP issues within the Council Committees (Dijkstra, 2008b; Kurowska, 2008). Solana also argues for a stronger role of the Member States by pooling their interests through the EU.

But we should also lift our eyes from the crises of today and look at the medium and longer-term challenges ahead. By far the biggest challenge will be to protect and develop a system of strong institutions capable of tackling the problems of our globalised world to build an international order with the rules that will help us navigate the choppy waters ahead. We will have to do this as the world moves to a system of continents. In this new strategic landscape, Europeans will only be able to project and protect their interests if they are united. (Solana, 2007a, p.2).

Although the power of the Secretariat has grown in relative and absolute terms, Realism limits this development, at least its official aspects, at the same time. As Member States retain their prerogative to address threats to their survival, there is no vested interest in delegating significantly more power to the EU institutions. This explains not only why the CSDP is underpinned by the principle of consensus decision-making, but it also predicts that it will remain so (Hyde-Price, 2006, p.231). However, the socialisation of diplomats working in Brussels towards a European perspective as opposed to a national one, is another factor that endows the Secretariat with further power to promote the

CSDP and certain parts of it, in the power game that is played out at EU headquarters in Brussels (Bono, 2006, p.151).

Bureaucracy theory indicates that an overlapping of responsibilities give rise to institutional competition, if not a struggle for bureaucratic survival (Radaelli, 1999). The analogy to Realism is apparent, and in order to survive and become successful, the importance of its own competences is elevated. In the case of the Secretariat, this may involve promoting CSDP instruments instead of Commission measures, or possibly civilian crisis management solutions instead of military ones, or vice versa. Within the Secretariat a source of friction has been the boundary between civilian and military crisis management. The asymmetry between the disciplines is manifested by the different funding and command arrangements, civilian perceptions of uneven resource allocation, and also by the late, and somewhat hesitant, expansion of the CSDP to include a civilian dimension that provided fertile ground for institutional frictions. While these frictions may at times have delayed the process, hampered civil-military coordination, and challenged the preference for choosing a military or a civilian organisation as the executive body for a mission, another divide of much more significance is the one compounded by the pre-Lisbon TEU in terms of the pillar structure as well as by the lack of clarity as to how consistency between the pillars was to be ensured, a shared responsibility, and the somewhat overlapping competences and their different perspectives. With the advent of TEU and its successive amendments as discussed in Chapter 2, the Commission has seen a new entity, the Secretariat, not only rise, but also carve out a significant part of the high politics of the EU. It has also been introduced as a somewhat new culture within the EU, consisting of temporary assignments of national experts, and, in particular, a body of some two hundred military officers. The Commission is generally regarded as an executive body with the responsibility for 'guarding the treaties'. It has gradually lost power to the Secretariat whose role is as an expert bureaucracy and honest broker (Dijkstra, 2008a, p.3). At the time when the High Representative was installed, the Commissioner for External Relations acknowledged this shift of power, albeit in a pragmatic way:

Two officials were responsible for implementing the common foreign policy: the EU High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana . . . and myself, the Commissioner for External Relations. Solana was the representative of all the foreign ministers; I had charge of the Commission's external services . . . As far as I was concerned, Solana occupied the front office and I was in charge of the back office of European foreign policy. Some of my staff did not like this analogy. They would have preferred me to have a grab for

foreign policy, trying to bring as much of it into the orbit of the Commission. (Patten, 2006, p.157).

Despite good working relations and constructive cooperation, it is no surprise that the quest for influence between these two relatively large administrations, particularly the Commission, involves power plays and institutional rivalry. Most of these turf battles take place without any transparency outside these organisations. However, when the Commission brought the Council to the European Court of Justice over a Joint Action relating to small arms in Western Africa, in an attempt to delineate Community and CFSP competences, and also to defend its position, it attracted external attention.¹⁴ More specifically, with regard to the CSDP, the introduction of a military component to Council and the Secretariat proved unproblematic, as the Commission neither had, nor aspired to, any military competence. However, the expansion of the CSDP into the civilian domain clearly infringed on the Commission's activities relating to conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, areas that had reached institutional maturity and which also included a significant degree of policy implementation on the ground. For instance, in the case of Palestinian territories, the CSDP mission (EUPOL COPPS) was preceded by a Commission-led police mission. Few changes were made to the mandate and capabilities, when the mission became a CSDP responsibility. The CSDP monitoring mission in Moldova, EUBAM Moldova, was in fact a hybrid Commission-CSDP mission funded by the Commission budget. In respect of the engagement in the CSDP mission in Aceh, the Commission wanted to retain control over its personnel deployed under the CSDP umbrella. The perception of losing power is perpetuated by the fear of the CFSP paying increased attention to humanitarian and development issues, which are traditionally competences within the Commission (Dijkstra, 2009, p.442-3). Examining this sensitiveness from an intra-institutional perspective raises other issues from a realist viewpoint. How may Member States quest for control impact on the division of labour between the Commission and the Council? Bearing in mind that the Commission has, for a long time, been in the business of civilian crisis management, albeit without deploying robust missions, the development of the CSDP increases the overlap of institutional competence and the institutional rivalry. In Part I the ambiguous role of the Commission as fully associated with the CFSP issues was discussed, and indeed the complex relationship also transcends the CSDP.

¹⁴ For a discussion on the legal case, see Van Vooren (2009).

9.4 Summary

In conclusion, this chapter has explored three levels of realist drivers for the CSDP mission. Six criteria or explicit drivers, two from each level, have been distilled from the discussion as a reflection of the findings. Analogous with Part II, these drivers will be tagged as [D1-D6]. The first criteria, or [D]river, is labelled Competition with the USA [D1]. It suggests that the EU pursues independent policies in a competitive environment with the USA. Moreover, it assesses whether EU policy replicates that of the USA or whether it is an independently formulated policy. If the latter applies, the empirical investigation must seek to clarify to what extent this policy is formulated in cooperation with the USA. In a continuum between confrontational politics towards that country and opting for Bandwagoning, and it is relevant to identify situations where CSDP missions are deployed based on uncoordinated policies. The nature of this criterion suggests that the overarching political landscape relating to a mission is of interest, as well as a narrow examination of the last steps of the Council decision-making process. From the nature of the Balance of Power theory, it is inferred that the level of disconnect between these policies correlates with the degree of Realism applied by the EU. The second proposition derived from the first level is labelled Reducing security dependence on the USA [D2]. It pertains to the enhancement of capabilities, practices and policies in order to create conditions for future EU responses to its security threats, without relying on the USA. It is recognised that it is a difficult criterion to quantify, and the empirical investigation can examine trends and relative consequences. Discerning the extent to which the CSDP mission is deployed for this specific purpose, is also a challenge. Significantly, since an increase in European responsibility and capability for its own security may be in the interests of the USA, this measurement is not dependent on the former.

The third claim is deduced from the second level analysis covering national interests, and is recorded as National interests of the EU3 [D3]. The motivation for Realism is the level of national interests that pushes the EU towards engagement. The dominance of the EU3, not at least from a Realism perspective, allows a study that only considers the national interests of the UK, France and Germany. This measurement is also difficult to quantify, and, instead, the empirical investigation should paint as complete a picture as possible of their motives and interests. The fourth benchmark is termed Securing the Neighbourhood [D4] and relates to core principles of Realism. The EU must assist in protection of its Member States, and in this case this relates to all Member States, not just the EU3. Compared with other criteria, it is straightforward to quantify, and it corresponds to the independent variable *Who* and the outcome defined as EU neighbourhood. While these are equivalent, it is important to note that their origins are different. In Part II the independent variable was derived from the policy field of security studies

together with five other parameters that were deemed representative of that policy field. In the further refinement, Realism and Idealism were applied to partition the plausible outcomes into two disjoint subsets. When the neighbourhood is approached in this section, it is from a Realism perspective. Having clarified this important distinction, it is still relevant to draw on the findings of Part II, and a new examination of this subject is bound to yield the same results.

The fifth criterion is obtained at the third level and the bureaucratic analysis. It is labelled Ability to act [D5] and it builds on Neoclassical Realism. The realist motivation in this case is institutional forces promoting action, because the EU has the capability, or it wants to demonstrate its ability to act. Arguably, there is a fine line between what is to be regarded as institutional and what must be categorised as national interests. This is particularly so in the case of the Council and its subcommittees, since the delegates are representing their capitals. One the other hand they are also a part of the bureaucracy and are subjected to ‘Brusselisation’. Unless the research has established a clear national interest in the mission in question, statements by national delegates will be treated as efforts to advance European interests. Finally, the sixth proposition is termed Prestige and Promotion of the CSDP [D6]. In contrast with the previous criterion, this benchmark is not linked to the available capabilities. It examines CSDP deployments as a part of the bureaucratic power game, and the prestige that comes with a CSDP mission is an important factor in the bureaucracy promoting it. Power and influence relate to the external environment, in order to demonstrate that the EU is a competent and credible actor. It is also associated with the internal power struggle within the EU, in particular that relating to the Commission and its employment of instruments in crisis management situations.

Level of Analysis	Criteria	Concordia	EUFOR Althea	EUFOR RD Congo	EUMM Georgia
External	D1: Competition with the USA				
	D2: Reducing security dependence on the USA				
Internal MS	D3: National interests of the EU ³				
	D4: Security in the neighbourhood				
Internal EU	D5: Ability to act				
	D6: Prestige and Promotion of the CSDP				

TABLE 9.1: Enhanced Analytical Scheme Part III

The level of adherence to these tenets, when CSDP missions are examined, will indicate the degree of explanatory power that Posen’s and Hyde-Price’s claims possess. Moreover,

there is a degree of internal dependency between the variables. However, the temptation to assign relative weight to the propositions is deferred, as is the aspiration to ensure full independence between the propositions. Instead, the ambition is a modest one, and the empirical investigation examines CSDP missions using the criteria identified and in order to make a qualitative overall judgement on the explanatory power of Realism. Table 9.1 summarises the enhanced analytical scheme for the empirical investigation.

Chapter 10

Empirical Investigation II: Four Realist Responses

Nothing is possible without men; nothing is lasting without institutions.

Jean Monnet ¹

This chapter reviews the decision-making of four CSDP missions, Concordia, EUFOR Althea, EUFOR RD Congo and EUMM Georgia, albeit from another perspective and with new empirical data. Furthermore, the structure of this chapter differs from the earlier empirical investigation in Chapter 6. Instead of focusing on the specific mission, the structure follows the criteria identified in Chapter 9, that is, D1 to D6. For a general outline of events and factors associated with the missions, readers are referred to Appendix A.

10.1 *D1*: Competition with the USA

10.1.1 Concordia

The EU pursued an independent agenda in the case of Concordia, although it was well coordinated and consistent with American policy. At the Barcelona Summit, in March 2002, the European Council presented a declaration on the EU's willingness to take over the NATO mission in Macedonia provided that the Macedonia invited the EU and that permanent arrangements for EU-NATO cooperation, the Berlin Plus

¹ Quoted in Uglund (2009, p.14). Jean Monnet was a french merchant who became one of the founding fathers of the European unity after World War II.

arrangements, would be in place (European Council, 2002a). These deliberations on fielding Concordia had a unique strategic setting for three reasons. The new Bush administration signalled policy changes, especially following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the associated transatlantic rift. Moreover, this was the first military CSDP mission, which also served as a test case for relations with the USA, and with NATO, based on the Berlin Plus arrangements, see Chapter 2.2.4. The Bush administration announced changes in policy on the use of the military for stability operations. In contrast with how this was done by President Clinton in the Balkans and in Africa, Bush ran for office on a restrictive policy on the use of the military for state-building, and during his presidential campaign he expressed a desire to withdraw troops from Europe, a position that he maintained after his inauguration,² and a view also firmly held by Secretary Rumsfeld. Although the USA Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, published in October of that year, and statements by Secretary Powell reassured the European audience that no major changes were foreseen in the force posture in Europe, concerns remained and were further exacerbated as the USA flexed its military power in a global war on terrorism (Joseph, 2005; Mace, 2004). Just days before the USA launched the Afghanistan operation, it signalled a change of position on nation-building, and, under certain conditions, it could undertake such tasks.³ However, it turned out that this shift applied only to engagement in Afghanistan (Chesterman, 2004, p.102). Hence, it could not be taken as a revival of Clinton's policy as embodied by his engagement in Balkans. Indeed there was a significant degree of uncertainty about the position of the USA, as the Macedonian crisis unfolded. During the culminating mayhem in 2001, Macedonian politicians indicated that they had taken signals of USA withdrawal seriously, and that it had influenced their calculations (Whyte et al., 2001, p.22).

The EU played a key role in crafting the Ohrid Framework, the foundation for settling the conflict, and the legal basis for Concordia (Eldridge, 2002, p.62). They did so in close cooperation with the USA and NATO, and Solana was personally involved as an

² At a Roundtable Interview with Foreign Press in Washington DC, on 17 July 2001 the President made the following statement: “[D]uring the course of the campaign, I made it clear that I thought that our military should be used to fight and win war. That’s what I thought the military was for. And that I was concerned about peacekeeping missions, and that we’ve got to be very clear about – to our friends and allies about how we use our troops for nation-building exercises, which I have rebuffed as a – basically rebuffed as a kind of a strategy for the military.”, see the White House archives at <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/07/20010718.html>. The website was accessed on 9 July 2009.

³ During an interview the President made the following remarks: “Q[uestion]: Mr. President, you’ve said on repeated occasions that you’re not into **nation-building**. Yet, it appears in this case, given the politics of the region, it may play a crucial role in resolving this crisis... THE PRESIDENT:... It would be a useful function for the United Nations to take over the so-called “nation-building, – I would call it the stabilization of a future government – after our military mission is complete. We’ll participate; other countries will participate.” Transcript from George W. Bush, ‘President Holds Prime Time News Conference’, Washington DC, 11 October 2001, available at the White House archives at <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011011-7.html>. The website was accessed on 9 July 2009.

unofficial mediator, together with the Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Robertson. As the Iraq crisis mounted, less attention could be paid to Macedonia by the American administration, and the negotiations were conducted in two strands. The EU and the USA facilitated political reconciliation and confidence-building measures to create conditions for a ceasefire, while at the same time, NATO acted as a mediator in the security arrangements (Eldridge, 2002, p.65). The EU Special Envoy (see below) was teamed up with an American counterpart, James Pardew, to form a joint mediation team (Schneckener, 2002, p.34). The EU also provided substantial funding assistance and emergency relief through the Commission. More importantly, the EU controlled Macedonian integration into Europe. To shape the conflict settlement, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement was entered into with conditionality as to candidate status (Eldridge, 2002; Mace, 2004). Despite somewhat different priorities and agendas, it was clear that the most persuasive external incentive that could be provided was European integration (Whyte et al., 2001, p.9). This was understood in Brussels as well as in Washington. The EU, through its Special Representative, also took the helm in coordinating the international community's assistance in implementing the Ohrid agreement. Indeed, the negotiations and the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement had an impact on the power balance with the USA. It signalled, a "decisive if little-noticed . . . shift in the balance of power between the USA and the EU in the Balkans" (Peterson, 2001, pp.3-4). In a wider sense the engagement in the Balkans on the part of the EU as a regional power was seen as a stepping-stone towards its becoming a truly global actor.

[The Balkans] "will be a test for the EU's CFSP. We are extending the capabilities which are available under this policy to enable us to be more effective in promoting our values and interests throughout the World. (Solana, 2000b).

Notwithstanding these global aspirations, the accounts of EU-USA interactions leading up to Concordia show that they were undertaken on a cooperative basis.

10.1.2 EUFOR Althea

With regard to Althea, the EU pursued its own agenda independently and, initially, in competition with the American agenda, while the strategic environment during 2003 added some additional features. The transatlantic rift over Iraq escalated further as Secretary Rumsfeld made the infamous distinction between old and new Europe.⁴ Another

⁴ Official News Transcript of Secretary Rumsfeld Briefs at the Foreign Press Center on 22 January 2003. Information retrieved from the Department of Defense website, see <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1330>. The website was accessed on 5 October 2009.

issue linked to the Iraqi invasion was the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its impact on the situation in the Balkans.

On the eve of the war in Iraq, US diplomats publicly threatened to punish Balkan governments if they failed to join the American-led coalition (only Macedonia fully complied). Shortly thereafter, Washington and Brussels, dueling over the International Criminal Court, forced Balkan states to choose sides in their dispute (and offend one or the other in the process). Most recently, when the EU tried to take over military missions in Macedonia and Bosnia from NATO-assuming the burden that Washington has long hoped it would-negotiations were undermined by the acrimony over Iraq (Joseph, 2005, p.177).

In late 2002, in conjunction with the agreement on the Berlin Plus agreement, the European Council made an early declaration on the intention to take over the military NATO mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, SFOR (European Council, 2002c). As no similar statement came from NATO at that time, it is clear that this was either not consensual or not coordinated with the USA. It took NATO and the EU a year to unite and officially declare their intentions to relinquish NATO authority to the EU.⁵ In the meantime, a "Framework for an enhanced NATO-EU dialogue and a concerted approach on security and stability in the Western Balkans" was agreed by the two organisations on 25 July 2003 (General Secretariat of the Council, 2003b). This interim period also made possible detailed planning and coordination between NATO and EU planners, and the key to the agreement on a transition was that the EU could draw on the Berlin Plus arrangements.

Contentious issues included the posture of the remaining NATO presence. Despite the change of command, NATO retained some tasks relating to intelligence collection, counterterrorism, and the apprehension of indicted war crimes suspects, security sector reform and interoperability issues. This was a clear case of the Balance of Power. NATO (i.e., the USA) wanted to retain a robust presence and substantial tasks, whereas EU officials wanted the EU to be the sole security provider (Kim, 2008, p.3). Another factor was the American position itself, as mixed signals were coming from its representatives. For instance, during negotiations prior to the handover, the USA appeared to send somewhat contradictory signals on the desired level of its engagement in the Balkans. Military representatives, in particular, expressed a desire to terminate the American military role due to other, more urgent, commitments. This position was in line with American goals for the Western Balkans that included a complete integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina

⁵ Joint Press Statement by the NATO Secretary General and the EU Presidency NATO-EU Ministerial Meeting, NATO Press Release(2003)153 4 December 2003.

into the EU. However, other American officials were troubled by the build-up of long-term ambitions for European military structures independent of NATO, and feared that missions such as EUFOR Althea could degrade NATO and implicitly limit American influence in Europe (Kim, 2008, p.4).

10.1.3 EUFOR RD Congo

The EU maintained a role independently of the USA in DR Congo (Fritsch, 2008, p.20), although this was not contentious for two reasons. Their respective policies were compatible and the EU did not challenge the USA. On the contrary, good cooperation prevailed. Moreover, in terms of priority, this conflict was far down the list on the part of the USA. The EU was the key actor in DR Congo, with extensive political clout through the Commission Delegation as well as the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes region. To date, five CSDP missions have been launched in the country. In terms of the number of missions, this was an unparalleled commitment by the EU, whose aid, including that from Member States, accounted for more than half of what DR Congo received, which funded some 80% of the election costs in 2006. In many ways, the EU played a greater role in DR Congo than the USA. However, the approaches and outlooks of the EU and the USA were consistent, in particular when considering policies pursued by the EU3, see below. Nonetheless, the EU was much more active on the ground than the USA, due partly to a risk adverse posture adopted by Member States. Rather than dispatching national projects, the Member States used the EU, including CSDP missions, as a vehicle for becoming more active in that country (Gegout, 2009, pp.236-7).

Following the termination of the conflict phase, in 2003, the transitional power-sharing government of DR Congo was set up. European and American support accounted in particular for development aid rather than conflict resolution capabilities.⁶ This was consistent with a realist rationale, as neither the USA nor the European states⁷ saw the conflict as a vital interest or a threat to national security (Gegout, 2009, p.236). The genocide in neighbouring Rwanda in 1994 was still a political burden for the USA, France and, to a lesser extent, the West in general. Their reluctance to commit at the height of that humanitarian catastrophe undermined their credibility. Hence, subsequent policies towards DR Congo were shaped so as to at least appear to be active, without their exposing themselves to political risks or risking the safety of their personnel. Accordingly, the American aim was to pursue a role without diplomatic or military exposure,

⁶ However there was an ongoing conflict in Eastern Congo where the EU was assisting with operation Artemis for a limited duration.

⁷ The most engaged Member States in DR Congo included Belgium, France, the UK and the Netherlands.

although it took an active part in mediation on the disarmament of the militias in 2004. Instead, the American focus was on development aid and access to natural resources (Gegout, 2009, p.236).

10.1.4 EUMM Georgia

Prior to the conflict there was a significant overlap in the major policy goals and approaches of the EU and the USA in the Black Sea Region. Nevertheless, there were some differences between the two policies. While the Europeans tended to treat Russia with more caution, the USA was more proactive in pursuing democracy agendas (Mitchell, 2008, p.136). On 8 August 2008, hours before the Russian military intervention, the UN Security Council convened at the request of the Russian Federation. Another meeting was held later on 8 August and a third on 10 August (UN Security Council, 2008a,b,c). At these initial meetings a pattern emerged, where the USA was increasingly confrontational towards Russia, holding it accountable.

[W]e must condemn Russia's military assault on the sovereign State of Georgia and the violation of that country's sovereignty and territorial integrity, including the targeting of civilians and the campaign of terror against the Georgian population. Similarly, we need to condemn the destruction of Georgian infrastructure. (UN Security Council, 2008c, p.6).⁸

The European delegates (UK, France, Croatia, Italy) applied a softer and slightly different rhetoric, emphasising concern about the humanitarian situation, Georgia's sovereignty and the regional security situation with fewer accusations aimed at Russia.⁹ The European tone became tougher as the European Council made a declaration on 1 September and the European Parliament passed a Resolution on the Situation in Georgia on 3 September. At the latter meeting, the European Parliament also emphasised the need to pursue policies on an equal basis and in coordination with the USA.¹⁰ From the outset the French representative at the UN Security Council, Ambassador Lacroix, seized the initiative in mediating on behalf of the EU. He made it clear that the

⁸ Intervention by the US representative, Ambassador Khalilzad.

⁹ For instance at the 5952nd meeting of the UN Security Council the French Ambassador stated "We have a simple message for the Ossetians, the Georgians and the Russians: there is no way out through the military option. Nothing can be gained by a *fait accompli* policy for either side. Such an approach is unrealistic because it will only succeed in opening deep wounds and compromise the only way out: the peaceful definition of the status of South Ossetia within the internationally recognized borders of sovereign Georgia" (UN Security Council, 2008b, p.5).

¹⁰ European Parliament Resolution on 3 September para 25 "Underlines the importance to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area of EU-US relations that are on an equal basis and insists that a joint policy on the part of the transatlantic partners is the most effective way of dealing with problems that affect both sides of the Atlantic" (European Parliament, 2008, p.5).

EU, through the French Presidency, was able and willing to take on a mediating role. Prior to the second meeting, it had devised a mediating scheme that included the USA as well as the OSCE.¹¹

Russian perceptions of close USA-Georgian co-operation gave the EU an opportunity to act, seize the initiative and assert an independent but cooperative role with regard to the USA. In an interview the Russian Prime Minister even accused the US President of being behind the scenes and orchestrating the crisis for the benefit of the Republican candidate in the Presidential elections (Chance, 2008). Another farfetched speculation was that President Bush needed a war to persuade Poland to sign a missile-defence agreement (Antonenko, 2008, p.28).¹² The USA feared that the motive behind the operations was to overthrow the democratically elected leadership of Georgia (Seppo and Forsberg, 2009, p.7). From an American perspective, Georgia had geostrategic importance due to the issue of energy supplies and its proximity to Afghanistan and the Middle East (Mitchell, 2008, p.137),¹³ as access to airspace was needed to sustain operations. The USA was a key supporter of Georgia and President Bush regarded the country as a role model for the region due to its peaceful and successful transition towards becoming an independent democracy.¹⁴ Accordingly, Georgia enjoyed a significant level of aid per capita from the USA (Tagliavini, 2009, p.15), and a bilateral security cooperation with Georgia had been established, the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) (Akakoca et al., 2009, p.30).

On 10 August, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Matthew Bryza, joined the French foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, in Tbilisi to assist with the EU peace plan, and through a coordinated effort, also involving the American Secretary of State, the Six Point Plan was signed on 13 August (Nichol, 2008, p.26). As events unfolded, President

¹¹ At the 5952nd meeting of the UN Security Council the French representative stated “the European Union (EU) is in close contact with all of the protagonists in the crisis. Under the French presidency, the EU spare no efforts to pursue these discussions. It has been decided that Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe envoys as well as envoys from the European Union and the United States will go to Georgia to attain a ceasefire as soon as possible” (UN Security Council, 2008b, p.5).

¹² On 14 August the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed an missile-defence agreement in Warsaw to deploy US anti-missiles in Poland and to provide interceptor missiles to protect it against any possible attack from Russia (Roy, 2009, p.14).

¹³ For Russia, too, energy security was a parameter. Its growing export of energy was threatened by Georgia’s aspiration to supply energy to Europe (Asmus, 2010, p.9).

¹⁴ In 2005 when visiting Georgia on its Independence Day he articulated his support for the country.

[O]n April 9th, 1991, you declared to the world that Soviet Georgia was no more, and that the independent nation of Georgia was born . . . And because you acted, Georgia is today both sovereign and free, and a beacon of liberty for this region and the world . . . The path of freedom you have chosen is not easy, but you will not travel it alone. Americans respect your courageous choice for liberty. And as you build a free and democratic Georgia, the American people will stand with you.

Transcript from George W. Bush, President addresses and thanks citizens in Tbilisi, Georgia, address at Freedom Square Tbilisi, Georgia on 10 May 2005, available at the White House archives at <http://georgewebush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050510-2.html>.

Bush's tenure was coming to an end and he was seen by some as a 'lame duck'. The British House of Lords regarded the EU as the "obvious and perhaps only credible" actor that could assume leadership in this situation (The House of Lords, 2009, p.9).¹⁵ On 12 August President Sarkozy was in Moscow as the head of the EU Presidency to negotiate the Six Point Plan with President Dmitry Medvedev. The negotiation process was in motion with the EU at the helm. To get the agreement of the Georgian President, Mikhail Saakashvili, and President Medvedev, the text referring to the final status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was removed to accommodate the Georgian President. As a consequence, references to respecting the territorial integrity of Georgia were omitted in the final French proposal (Seppo and Forsberg, 2009, p.8). However the USA and the EU continued to support Georgia's territorial integrity (Eduard, 2008). On 13 August the plan was endorsed by the warring parties, and the same day it received unanimous support from the Member States at an extraordinary GAERC meeting. Following talks in Moscow with Sarkozy, Solana and Barroso, Russia agreed on 8 September to withdraw its forces from Georgian territory surrounding South-Ossetia and Abkhazia within a week. The redeployment of the remaining Russian forces was linked to the deployment of EUMM Georgia on 1 October (Seppo and Forsberg, 2009, p.10). On 8 September an agreement was made that talks should be held in Geneva. Subsequently, the parties involved agreed to establish two working groups, one focusing on security and stability and the other on internally displaced persons and refugees (Akakoca et al., 2009). In this new negotiating format, the USA also remained in a supporting role, as the EU was leading the diplomatic efforts involving Russia and Georgia, with the participation of the USA, the UN, the OSCE, Abkhazia and South Ossetia (The House of Lords, 2009, p.8).

Both the USA and the EU received criticism for their inability to predict and prevent the triggering of the conflict. According to Oksana Antonenko, the war could have been avoided, had the extraordinary EU summit on 1 September been held a week before the conflict erupted (Antonenko, 2008, p.30). However as a consequence of the way the EU handled the mediation, it emerged a stronger and more respected actor in the Caucasian region (Antonenko, 2008, p.34).

10.1.5 Summary

The Concordia mission was pursued based on an EU agenda. Notwithstanding this, the mission was well coordinated with the USA, and it was in the latter's interest to promote greater EU responsibility for European security, at a time when the American focus was on the fight against terrorism in the Middle East. However, there was a limit to how

¹⁵ This judgement was made in a follow-up assessment.

great an extent the USA was willing to surrender its leading role as a security provider in Europe. When the EU continued its effort to assume greater responsibilities by aspiring to replace NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it created a competitive relationship with the USA. This was only resolved after prolonged negotiations and compromises. In the DR Congo, the EU was acting independently of the USA. This did not create competitive relations with it, since the EU's ambitions did not challenge the American agenda. Moreover, in terms of priority, this conflict was far down the American list. With regard to EUMM Georgia, there was significant overlap of the major policy goals and approaches of the EU and the USA in the Black Sea Region. Rather than competing, they adopted opposing but coordinated approaches to the conflict situation, resembling the 'good cop bad cop' tactics applied in police interrogations. In summary, the outcomes from the empirical investigation suggest a negative correlation with the criteria being studied. Hence, it is inferred that the EU is not advancing the CSDP to challenge American dominance in international security.

10.2 *D2: Reducing Security Dependence on the USA*

10.2.1 *Concordia*

The launching of Concordia was an important step towards increased security independence, as it coalesced with the forging of the Berlin Plus arrangements, which were a prerequisite for the operation, and it has been suggested that these prolonged negotiations delayed Concordia by a year (Martinsen, 2003, p.22).

The crafting of the agreement took place concurrently with the negotiations on replacing the NATO-led operation in Macedonia by an EU-force, which was based on the assumption that the Berlin Plus arrangements were in place. It is in this context that Concordia should be assessed as a vehicle for making this arrangement come into fruition. In the political EU statements preceding the deployment, the mission was consistently made conditional on access to NATO assets and capabilities, i.e., the Berlin Plus arrangements being in place. However, given the scope of the operation, including some three hundred and fifty personnel, it has been questioned whether, from a military perspective, it was an unconditional requirement to access NATO resources (Mace, 2004, p.481). Such a claim substantiates the notion that the mission configuration primarily addressed strategic issues in the transatlantic relation embodied in the Berlin Plus arrangements. Given the time, when the transatlantic relations had soured due to divergent views on Iraq, this stands out as an achievement. While the Berlin Plus arrangements catered for reduced reliance on the USA (i.e., not independence), they were also unifying in that they

were regarded as a part of a strategic partnership between the EU and NATO, and indirectly with the USA (Flanagan and Schear, 2001, p.217). With regard to the practical implementation of the Berlin Plus arrangements in Concordia, some criticism was generated regarding the convoluted command configuration involving NATO Headquarters in Naples as an extra layer of command and control. However, the general evaluation of the mission with respect to EU-NATO cooperation reinforced the positive message of a strategic relationship that had practical utility (Mace, 2004). Notwithstanding the reduced reliance on the USA for security, the overall EU-USA relationship in respect of Concordia did not take place in a spirit of competition.

10.2.2 EUFOR Althea

With regard to EU aspirations to become increasingly independent, Althea can be seen as a continuation of what began with Concordia. Hence, it provided another important step towards increased security independence in relation to the USA. Indeed, Concordia was a small-scale and short-term test case in a benign environment for the EU in terms of managing security in its backyard. As a part of the discussion at that time, a division of labour between NATO and the EU was contemplated. With NATO evolving as a global actor, the EU would assume responsibilities for its own backyard and for Africa (Keohane, 2003, p.77). The real demonstration of ambitions of own security responsibilities would come with Althea, by far the largest EU operation ever launched, and, at that time, during a crisis that generated key engagements for NATO through its SFOR commitment. In addition, one cannot disregard the symbolic value of the EU being able to deploy a robust mission at the heart of this crisis in the Balkans, where it failed to intervene in the early 1990's.

10.2.3 EUFOR RD Congo

The deployment of EUFOR RD Congo made the EU take another step towards independence (Fritsch, 2008, pp.20-2), albeit a minor one, and not with the same level of importance as the previous operations examined. The mission included some 2,000 personnel from twenty-two countries. In addition to the ground forces it comprised fixed-wing fighters, cargo planes, helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (Gegout, 2006). Moreover, the force had integral capabilities to conduct special operations and information operations. The EU demonstrated its ability to deploy a multinational force over long distances in a coordinated manner. More importantly, it was the first ever multinational independent EU military chain of command. For Concordia and EUFOR Althea, the chain of command used was based on NATO headquarters and assets. For Artemis,

France acted as the Lead Nation and ensured connectivity between forces deployed and the political leadership in Brussels. For this operation a deployed headquarters in Libreville, with a French nucleus, was linked to the operations headquarters in Potsdam, provided by Germany, but ‘multinationalised’. This set-up was not without friction, and many important lessons were identified (Fritsch, 2008, pp.71-6). Given the time allowed to prepare for setting up the command arrangements, and the limited area of operation, the force that operated during the mission constitutes a minor step towards independence.

10.2.4 EUMM Georgia

The fielding of EUMM Georgia did not enhance the ability to act independently. The deployment of two hundred unarmed civilian monitors without any freedom of movement in the contested areas being ensured, does not qualify as a robust mission needed to address the security challenge. There were also additional external factors that prevented the EU from deploying a more robust mission. For once, a UN mandate was not achievable due to Russia’s role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. However, the international community appreciated the swiftness of the EU actions (Seppo and Forsberg, 2009).

10.2.5 Summary

The launching of Concordia was an important step towards increased EU security independence from the USA, which was embodied first and foremost in the Berlin Plus arrangements. Another significant step was taken with EUFOR Althea, which combined the Berlin Plus arrangements with a robust EU force. Yet another step, albeit less significant, towards EU independence was taken with the launch of EUFOR RD Congo. This mission demonstrated the EU’s ability to deploy forces on other continents based on a multinational and autonomous organisation for command and control. The development of increased independence was not present in the deployment of EUMM Georgia, as it comprised only unarmed civilian monitors without any ensured freedom of movement in the contested areas. In summary, the outcomes from the empirical investigation suggest a weak correlation with the criteria being studied. It is concluded that the EU is influenced by a desire to reduce its security dependence on the USA.

10.3 *D3*: National interests of the EU3

10.3.1 Concordia

Operation Concordia was in the national interests of France. Against the background of the Laeken declaration in December 2001, on the EU's ambitions to develop military capabilities, the European leaders wanted to confirm the EU as a security actor through its heading the Macedonia operation, and they were keen to take over the security mission from NATO. In particular, President Chirac of France, with the support of the Spanish Presidency, was pushing for the mission (International Crisis Group, 2002, p.9). France was in many ways acting to facilitate a decision to launch the operation. During the prelude to the mission, an EU Special Envoy to Skopje was needed. France provided a very experienced high-level candidate, François Léotard, a former Defence Minister who was widely supported. His successor as EU Special Representative, Alain LeRoy, also came from France. Moreover, France took on lead nation responsibilities for the military deployment. The core of the Force Headquarters for the mission in Skopje, including the commanding officer, was provided by France.

The UK emphasised the importance of the mission through an EU-NATO relationship lens. When Foreign Secretary Jack Straw commented on the launch of the operation, he first referred to its strategic importance for the EU-NATO relationship.

The first ESDP military mission in Macedonia marks the start of a new strategic partnership between the EU and NATO, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said today. Speaking as Operation Concordia was launched, . . . Europe's Security and Defence Policy today comes of age with the launch of Operation Concordia. The operation will complement the full range of EU activity in Macedonia - the sum of which should realise our vision of a stable, prosperous and democratic country, closely integrated with the EU. (Straw, 2003).

The allocation of soldiers to the mission is somewhat indicative of the national commitments. Of the three hundred and fifty-seven personnel in the mission, three hundred and eight were provided by Member States, and France's allocation of one hundred and forty-five personnel was the largest national contingent. Germany provided twenty-six and the UK was symbolically represented by three personnel (Missiroli, 2003b, p.499). Other Member States provided a total of one hundred and thirty-four troops.

10.3.2 EUFOR Althea

EUFOR Althea advanced the national interests of France and the UK. At the Franco-British Summit in Le Touquet in February 2003, they declared their strong support for the EU's taking over NATO's stabilisation role in Bosnia-Herzegovina in early 2004. By proposing joint proposals to launch EU planning in late February 2002 to replace the NATO force, they assumed a leading role in influencing the EU process. The Le Touquet Declaration also expressed an ambition to better balance the USA.

Our two countries actively support the work under way to prepare the European Union to launch its first military operation in March, in the former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia. We welcome the European Union's intention to undertake a military operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in early 2004, working with the international community and with NATO in particular to take over the stabilisation role from the Alliance. We see this as supporting the efforts of Lord Ashdown, as High Representative and EU Special Representative, to pursue the EU's agenda in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to complement the EU's efforts to promote the development of that country. These operations will build on the close relationship that the EU and NATO have developed in the Balkans, taking it to a new level and contributing to a renewed and balanced transatlantic partnership.¹⁶

The hot topic at Le Touquet Summit was to try to bridge the French-Anglo divide over Iraq. However, that aspiration never materialised (Gregory Marfleet and Miller, 2005, p.338). It is plausible that the constructive meeting in Le Touquet in other respects, including the advancement of a stronger EU posture on crisis management, served as compensation or balancing for the UK stance over Iraq. If the UK was regarded as dividing Europe by aligning with the US over Iraq, the Franco-British declaration on a stronger and more independent Europe would return the UK to the centre-stage of European politics. While the Iraq issue centred around US interests, Le Touquet was a kind of a European declaration of independence, particularly on capability development, although the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina was also a part of this equation (Penksa and Mason, 2003, p.263). The UK, in particular, became an active proponent of Althea, and it had started to shift its national focus to Bosnia-Herzegovina, increasing its contribution to SFOR at the expense of its commitments in Kosovo. Moreover, Lord Ashdown became the EU's Special Representative/OHR in Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 2002. As a sign of its commitment, the UK offered to become the framework nation for Althea at an early stage (Hoon, 2004, p.33).

¹⁶ Excerpts from the Le Touquet declaration are available at <http://www.fco.gov.uk>. The website was accessed on 20 November 2009.

In November 2004 the German *Bundestag* decided on the participation of the *Bundeswehr* with a maximum of 3,000 soldiers. At times Germany was the principal troop contributor to Althea (Fritsch, 2006, p.36). In conjunction with this decision, the Minister of Defence, Peter Struck, identified five EU as well as German interests, including protection from terrorism, illegal immigration, organised crime, and energy supply as well as containment of destabilising conflict in the European neighbourhood (Fritsch, 2006, p.18). At least three of these interests were at stake at this conflict: protection from illegal immigration, organised crime and containment of destabilising conflict in the European neighbourhood. From this viewpoint, the German position was clear on the need to engage the EU to address the conflict.

10.3.3 EUFOR RD Congo

France has traditionally played an active role in Africa, in particular in the Francophone regions, and EUFOR RD Congo was initiated in the interests of France (Fritsch, 2008, p.22). France has been close to the Kabila regimes in DR Congo and French policy was not motivated by economic interests. Instead DR Congo provided it with an arena in which to defend Francophone influences in Africa and to advance its own influences on the UN, in particular after the Rwandan genocide (Gegout, 2009, pp.238-41).

From a Member State's perspective there are speculations as to how and why the UN's request to the EU was initiated at the end of the UK Presidency in December 2005. Some believe it was about French-German cohesion (Olsen, 2009, p.253), while others suggest that France acted behind the scenes to trigger the request that was made by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno a former French diplomat (Ehrhart, 2007, p.2). It took some time for the EU to respond to the UN request, and at that point in time, three military CSDP operations had been launched with either France or the UK acting at the forefront.¹⁷ France argued that it wanted to remain in the background given its dominant role during Artemis (Fritsch, 2008, p.20), while the UK was heavily committed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Neither of them saw any appeal in assuming patronage for this mission, and it was time for Germany to take responsibility (Gegout, 2006). However, Germany had little aptitude for missions in Africa, and the *Bundestag* was found it difficult to endorse such missions (Gegout, 2006). In an interview, a German official gave voiced reluctance, arguing that Germany did not want to be instrumentalised by France and deploy troops in Africa, a mission for former colonial powers (de La Grange, 2007). Following this initial resistance, opinion changed in January 2006. Multilateral crisis prevention finds appeal in Germany, (Fritsch, 2006,

¹⁷ While Concordia and Artemis were dominated by France, the UK took the leading role in EUFOR Althea.

p.44) and from a national perspective the commitment served two main purposes. It provided visible and substantial support for the UN system, which was important, given its aspiration to gain a permanent seat on the Security Council. Moreover, it helped to progress the CFSP, another key German interest (Gegout, 2006).

The UK has also traditionally focused its attention on former colonies. However, through the Department for International Development, increased attention has been paid to DR Congo. One of its justifications was a desire to focus on a relatively poor and populous African country, and its aid commitment has surpassed both France and the USA. However, its policy does not envision military commitments (Gegout, 2009, p.136). Accordingly, the UK did not commit any troops to EUFOR RD Congo.

10.3.4 EUMM Georgia

The mission was in the interest of all EU3 countries in that they wanted to find a quick and balanced response. However their national interests did not cause the EU to alter its posture on, or approach to, the operation. As France quickly seized the initiative on behalf of the EU in the Security Council, the UK quickly closed ranks, but there were still internal divisions. France, Germany, Italy and Spain had a softer approach towards Russia than the UK, Sweden and the Central and East European countries. Germany's main concern was regional security problems, as isolation of Russia could create major security problems in the region (Gupta, 2009, p.10).

At the second UN Security Council meeting on 8 August, the UK gave its support to the EU and the French Presidency in what appeared to be a well-coordinated European approach.¹⁸ Due to its energy dependence, the EU was in a weak position in relation to Russia and bilateral negotiations on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement continued. Furthermore the French Presidency hosted the EU-Russia Summit in November 2008 as scheduled. On October 21, 2008, the European Parliament debated the status of EU relations with Russia in the light of the Russia-Georgia conflict. The EU's Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, emphasised that the EU viewed the violation of Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity as unacceptable, but maintained the important interests of the EU relating to energy security and trade that it shared with Russia, and on that occasion, the French Europe Minister, Jean-Pierre Jouyet, conveyed the same message.

¹⁸ Ms. Pierce, the UK representative, stated "My Government is pleased to support the efforts outlined by the representative of France, speaking for the European Union, setting forth what is happening on mediation from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union" (UN Security Council, 2008b, p.6).

Indeed, the French President was very proactive and successful in taking charge of the situation and advancing EU interests. “The EU’s prime objective was to stop the violence from escalating beyond the Caucasus. The six principles of the cease-fire agreement brokered with the Russians by the French EU presidency, could in essence be interpreted as the common EU goals in the resolution of the conflict” (Seppo and Forsberg, 2009, pp.17-8). In a follow-up report by the UK House of Lords, it was concluded that the EU response was “rapid and reasonably successful, and owed much to the effectiveness of a strong EU Presidency” (The House of Lords, 2009, p.9). However, a German Member of the European Parliament complained that Sarkozy was pursuing French interests and did not consult sufficiently with other EU actors (Seppo and Forsberg, 2009, p.25). During the crisis another EU Member State, Finland, was holding the Presidency of the OSCE,¹⁹ and it worked closely with the EU Presidency.

10.3.5 Summary

Operation Concordia was in the national interest of France, as it wanted to lend credibility to the EU as a military actor. From a UK perspective, the mission served as a vehicle to advance a close cooperation with NATO. EUFOR Althea also advanced the national interests of France and the UK, and this mission re-energised the international commitment to Bosnia-Herzegovina, at a time when the UK was shifting focus from Kosovo to this part of the Western Balkans. For France, the earlier aspiration to bolster the EU as a credible military actor still seemed relevant. Moreover, in respect of EUFOR RD Congo, France had been working behind the scenes. However, it chose not to take on lead responsibility, and instead, the EU became a proxy-actor in advancing French interests in Francophone Africa, while Germany reluctantly became the lead actor for the mission. Once it assumed this responsibility, it added national interests to these considerations. Support for the UN fitted in well with its aspiration to become a permanent member of the Security Council, and, moreover, it helped Germany to advance the CFSP. EUMM Georgia was in the interest of all EU3 countries in that they wanted to find a quick and balanced response to the crisis. In summary, the outcomes from the empirical investigation suggest a moderate correlation with the criteria being studied. It is concluded that the progress of the CSDP is driven by national, in particular, French interests.

¹⁹ The Secretary General of the OSCE, Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, was Director for Strategic Affairs at the French Defence Ministry until 2005.

10.4 *D4: Security in the Neighbourhood*

As already established in previous chapters, three of the missions were conducted in the EU neighbourhood. In March 2001 the European Council elaborated on the situation in Macedonia and stated strongly “there is no future in *our* Europe for those who follow the path of intolerance, nationalism and violence” (European Council, 2001d, annex III, *emphasis added*). Clearly, EUFOR Althea was launched in the vicinity of EU territory, and its justification was based on further European integration. As stated by the European Council at Feira in 2000 and at Thessaloniki in June 2003, the EU was strongly committed to the European perspective of Bosnia-Herzegovina (European Council, 2000a, 2003f). The European Council as well as the European Parliament regarded the situation in Georgia as a threat to the security of energy supplies (European Council, 2008), which was defined by the conflict’s proximity to EU territory, Russia’s involvement, and the strategic location of the conflict in relation to Europe’s energy supply. As discussed above, Poland signed the missile-defence agreement with the US in the midst of the Georgia crisis. However, the EUMM provided only symbolic capabilities to deal with the security threat, and it can be argued that the crisis triggered the signing, as Poland’s security concerns resemble what they perceived as Georgia’s experience, i.e., a rapid and unanticipated Russian military occupation. Only EUFOR RD Congo failed to satisfy this criterion. However, in an interview about the missions in Sudan and DR Congo the German Minister for Defence, Franz-Josef Jung, stressed that Africa is Europe’s neighbour and there is an humanitarian obligation as well as interests in preventing migration flows (Müller, 2006). In summary, the outcomes from the empirical investigation suggest a moderate correlation with the criteria being studied. It is concluded that the deployment of CSDP missions is driven by a desire to secure EU borders.

10.5 *D5: Ability to Act*

10.5.1 *Concordia*

Operation Concordia was driven by an aspiration to show the world that the CSDP was not just a policy statement but delivered security on the ground. The pivotal role and performance of Solana as a mediator and facilitator during the Ohrid negotiations is widely recognised. He was one of the most ardent advocates of a CSDP mission in Macedonia (International Crisis Group, 2002; Piana, 2002). Solana and several Member States argued for the need to flex European power and demonstrate a capability to act, “the EU should be taking over the role to show the world, and probably above

all the USA, that its military force is indeed operational” (Piana, 2002, p.218). At a follow-up Defence Ministers’ meeting, Solana established logical links between the Laeken Declaration on military capabilities and the aspiration to launch Concordia.

Work to implement the Barcelona conclusions [on offering that the EU would succeed the NATO mission in FYROM] has now started in the relevant Council bodies, with a view to enabling the EU to take the appropriate decisions. I am sure that today’s discussion of Defence ministers will give the right impetus to this endeavour, thus bringing us closer to making operationality - as declared at Laeken - a reality. (Solana, 2002d, p.3).

The ability to act was a key consideration when launching Concordia.

10.5.2 EUFOR Althea

When deploying EUFOR Althea, the EU intended to demonstrate its ability to act along the same lines as for Concordia. Althea is, to date, the largest and most enduring CSDP military operation. It is a clear demonstration of the development of EU capabilities, despite the recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. The American commitment in SFOR included some 1,000 soldiers and framework nation responsibilities in the Northern Sector. Their replacement became one of the challenges for the EU before deploying EUFOR Althea. However, the EU demonstrated its ability to resolve this (Bertin, 2008, p.61).²⁰ It was a significant step for the CSDP and the Union’s role as an international actor (Bertin, 2008, p.61), and EU officials saw this mission as a logical step for the EU in many ways (Kim, 2008, p.2). It was an expansion of the CSDP based on the successful military missions in Macedonia and DR Congo (Artemis) as well as a logical continuation of the EU’s growing ambitions in the Western Balkans. As was the case in Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina was negotiating a Stabilisation and Association Agreement towards eventual EU membership, and a plethora of Commission programmes were linked to this relationship. Earlier, the EU had conducted a special mission in Mostar and an EUMM was launched prior to the inception of the CSDP. Moreover, the EU took over the UN Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina in January 2003. In accordance with the Dayton Peace Agreement, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) is ‘double-hatted’ as the EU Special Representative in Bosnia. For EU Member States the mission aim served two purposes. It further developed the CSDP on an operational level and at the same time complemented the broader EU integration strategy for Bosnia-Herzegovina (Kim, 2008, p.2).

²⁰ Finland assumed framework nation responsibilities in the Northern sector.

10.5.3 EUFOR RD Congo

The EUFOR RD Congo was not driven by a desire to show the EU's ability to act, for two major reasons. Firstly, the EU reluctantly accepted the UN request to assist MONUC. Secondly, the EU failed to employ a battlegroup for the operation. The development of high-readiness military battlegroups had, since 2003, been the EU's flagship in demonstrating its ability and willingness to become a proactive crisis management actor, but it failed to deploy such a unit. From a capability perspective, the UN has repeatedly argued for the EU battlegroups to be used in support of UN operations as in the Artemis operation, but at that point it had received little response from the EU on this conceptual approach. Indeed, the UN request to the EU envisaged a short-term deployable, deterrent force with high readiness (UN Secretary General, 2006a, annex 1), and what the UN was in fact requesting, was a battlegroup. Coincidentally, during the first half of 2006²¹, the battlegroup on stand-by was German-led.²² From an EU perspective, it was a good opportunity to field a battlegroup for the first time ever, and Germany was one of the most credible actors to develop them. Despite its desire for a visible multinational participation and burden-sharing, Germany assessed that their battlegroup was not up to the job (Ehrhart, 2007, p.2).²³ Hence, Chancellor Merkel was quick to rule out a deployment of a German-led battlegroup (Fritsch, 2008, p.29). The limited EU commitment, due to the short duration of the mission and the limited force size, generated some criticism (Fritsch, 2008, p.2).

10.5.4 EUMM Georgia

While the diplomatic effort to stage the peace plan is widely recognised as a success, EUMM Georgia did not demonstrate a convincing capability to act. At the extraordinary EU summit on 1 September, sanctions against Russia as well as sending armed EU peacekeepers to Georgia were discussed but rejected (Seppo and Forsberg, 2009, p.10). This suggests that the EU had neither the ability nor the will to respond using hard power. By the time the EU deployed a monitoring mission comprising some two hundred personnel, Russian plans were to keep some 3,700 troops deployed in each region (Eduard, 2008). The EU posture was by no means a demonstration of coercive power. Significantly, neither the OSCE nor the EU monitors were allowed into South Ossetia.

²¹ I.e. the planned election period. However the election process was delayed.

²² Before reaching full operational capability in January 2007 one battlegroup was on standby each semester.

²³ There were two battlegroups that had been considered for this operation. However, none had the required capabilities. The Spanish-Italian battlegroup was specialised in amphibious operations and the Franco-German battlegroup was designed to conduct evacuation operations (Fritsch, 2008, p.28).

It has been argued that the war could have been prevented if the EU had deployed its monitors one year earlier (Asmus, 2010, p.12).

10.5.5 Summary

Operation Concordia was driven by an aspiration to show the world that the CSDP was ready to move from words to deeds. The Secretary General of the Secretariat, Solana, played a key role in making it possible to deploy the mission. In a similar vein, EUFOR Althea intended to demonstrate the EU's ability to act. Althea is, to date, the largest and most enduring CSDP military operation. EUFOR RD Congo was not driven by a desire to show the EU's ability to act, for two major reasons. Instead, it failed to demonstrate the utility of the battlegroup concept. In addition, the EU was reluctant to provide the support requested by the UN. In a similar manner, the EU did not demonstrate a convincing capability to act when deploying EUMM Georgia. In summary, the outcomes from the empirical investigation suggest no correlation with the criteria being studied. It is concluded that the deployment of the CSDP missions is not driven by a desire to demonstrate the EU's ability to act.

10.6 *D6*: Prestige and Promotion of the CSDP

10.6.1 Concordia

When deploying Concordia there was no significant additional impetus to promote the CSDP other than those described above. The earlier discussion of Concordia concluded that the mission was partly explained by a desire to show resolve and an ability to act. This was related to the capability declaration but also to the first military CSDP mission, which was a showcase for the CSDP as a policy field. There was neither any need nor room for advancing additional arguments to propel the CSDP. Moreover, coordination with the Commission was undertaken in a spirit of cooperation, and this was not a mission that was driven by an internal turf war between the Council and the Commission. On the contrary, the urgency of the Ohrid framework brought EU institutions closer together. The EU Special Envoy, François Léotard, proved to be at the centre of attention, and the Commission representatives kept a low profile, possibly influenced by Commissioner Patten's acknowledgement of being the back office of EU

foreign policy (Piana, 2002, pp.213-5), although the Commission played an active role. Amongst other things, it employed the Rapid Reaction Mechanism for the first time.²⁴

10.6.2 EUFOR Althea

As in the case of Concordia, for EUFOR Althea there was no significant additional impetus to promote CSDP other than those described above. The earlier discussion of Althea has concluded that the mission was partly explained by a desire to show resolve and an ability to act. The internal efforts did generate any additional drivers for this mission, and, internally, the planning focus was twofold, and joint planning sessions were held with NATO planners. At the same time there was a need to reconcile EU efforts. For the first time the EU would have two CSDP missions in the same area. Significantly, the EUPM did not have executive powers, and in addition, an EU Special Representative with extensive authorities was deployed. As a consequence, the mandates were reviewed and the EU Special Representative was given extended authorities for coordination. After all, multifaceted crisis management was the hallmark of the CSDP. Indeed this cooperation worked well, in particular with General Leakey as the Force Commander and Paddy Ashdown as the EU Special Representative. The cooperation with the Commission was maintained in a constructive manner without competing interests (Bertin, 2008, pp.71-3).

10.6.3 EUFOR RD Congo

EUFOR RD Congo was partly driven by a desire to promote the CSDP. It was not so much the security surrounding the elections that was at stake for the EU but the credibility of the CSDP, in particular, after both referenda in the Netherlands and France had rejected the Constitutional Treaty. If the EU had been a credible security actor it would have responded more rapidly to the UN's request and provided a more robust force that operated outside Kinshasa, in particular, in the east. Moreover, curtailed rules of engagement, basing most of the troops in a neighbouring country (i.e. Gabon), and inexperienced troops²⁵ also suggest that mission effectiveness was not a key issue

²⁴ The Rapid Reaction Mechanism was installed to enable rapid action to be taken in specific areas in response to or to avoid real or potential crisis situations or conflicts (European Council, 2001a). In 2007 the Rapid Reaction Mechanism was replaced by the Instrument for Stability (IfS).

²⁵ Germany as framework nation contributed a substantial part of the troop contributions together with France. However, unlike the French soldiers, the Germans lacked experience of sub-Saharan operations.

when planning the mission (Haine and Giegerich, 2006).²⁶ Several commentators have argued that the mission, at least in part, was initiated to promote the CSDP and the EU as well as enhancing their prestige (Gegout, 2009; Haine and Giegerich, 2006; Olsen, 2009). At the UN Secretariat, too, there was a perception that promoting the EU was a key objective.²⁷ From their point of view, the EU forces could have been integrated into the much larger MONUC force, thereby streamlining the chain of command, but now two autonomous chains of command were maintained, New York and Brussels. This, it was argued, was proof of the Member States eagerness to run high profile missions under the EU flag (Gowan, 2007).²⁸ The mission was driven by the desire for prestige and to promote the EU as a viable and proactive global power *vis-a-vis* the USA (Gegout, 2009, p.238). If the humanitarian and security aspects were the main concern, there had been several occasions when an intervention in DR Congo would have been more justified (Gegout, 2009; Olsen, 2009, pp.239-41). On the other hand, the Commissioner for development and humanitarian aid, Louis Michel (former Belgian Foreign Minister) had a special interest in DR Congo (Cameron, 2007, p.160). EU crisis management in Africa is primarily motivated by European interests and concerns (Olsen, 2009, p.246), and despite the invitation by the UN, some criticism of the utility of the mission was generated. An official of DR Congo stated that the mission was a way for Europeans to prove that they were capable of leading a successful mission. The South African Defence Minister, Mosiuoa Lekota, stated that there was no need for EU troops during the elections (Africa Confidential, 2006, p.4). In Kinshasa demonstrations against the EU deployment took place before the mission was deployed, and concerns relating to impartiality and imperial ambitions were raised (Bouderbala, 2006). However, by the end of the mission the general perception of the EU in DR Congo was a positive one.

10.6.4 EUMM Georgia

EUMM Georgia was to some extent driven by the desire for prestige and to promote the CSDP. This crisis emerged rapidly and unexpectedly, and the short response time and intense negotiation period did not leave much room for internal power politics. On the one hand, heavier options, involving armed personnel, were considered, but that did not appeal to the European Council. On the other hand, there were two monitoring missions

²⁶ In addition, it was assessed more important to ensure that the German soldiers could celebrate Christmas with their families than to extend the mission for a week due to the delayed second round of elections. The results of the second round only a week before EUFOR was scheduled to withdraw. However, Germany's defence minister Franz-Josef Jung, argued that he had promised that German troops would be home for Christmas and therefore rejected the proposal for extension (Ehrhart, 2007, p.3).

²⁷ Some 400-450 troops were located in Kinshasa and a rapid deployment force in Libreville, Gabon (Loeser, 2007, p.168).

²⁸ In contrast many African and South Asian countries provide their commitments to UN contingents. Moreover, European countries concurrently provided an urgent augmentation for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon from August 2006 after a EU-coordinated force generation.

already deployed, by the UN and the OSCE, respectively. Was the EU mission needed? The EU mission ensured that the EU remained at the centre of attention, after the Six Point Plan was endorsed. Indeed, EU leadership through President Sarkozy's personal commitment was widely appreciated internationally. At the same time it improved the EU's prospects on the international scene (Seppo and Forsberg, 2009; Whitman and Wolff, 2010).

Nevertheless, the complete withdrawal of Russian troops was intimately linked to the deployment of the EUMM, during the negotiations between Nicolas Sarkozy and Dmitry Medvedev. In addition, that part of the Six Point Plan materialised as Russia complied with its provisions. Within the EU there seem to have been a coordinated approach, and to ensure that other measures were addressed, a Georgia Donors Conference was held in Brussels on 22 October, chaired by the Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner. It also signalled the EU's support for Georgia in the aftermath of the crisis. The Commission raised the existing aid contributions by up to €500 million, rebuilding confidence in the Georgian economy, amongst other things (Ferrero-Waldner, 2008).

10.6.5 Summary

When deploying Concordia and EUFOR Althea there was no significant impetus to promote the CSDP other than the desire to show resolve and an ability to act. EUFOR RD Congo was partly driven by a desire to promote CSDP. It was not so much the security surrounding the elections that was at stake for the EU but the credibility of the CSDP, in particular after both referenda in the Netherlands and France had rejected the Constitutional Treaty. EUMM Georgia was partly driven by prestige and a desire to promote the CSDP. However, the short response time and intense negotiation period did not leave much room for internal power politics. In summary, the outcomes from the empirical investigation suggest no correlation with the criteria being studied. It is concluded that the deployment of CSDP missions is not driven by prestige or a desire to promote the CSDP.

Chapter 11

Conclusion II: Realists Must Offer More

[O]ne cannot rise to be . . . the leading community in the . . . world without being involved in its problems, without being convulsed by its agonies and inspired by its causes. If this has been proved in the past, as it has been, it will become undisputable in the future.

Winston Churchill ¹

11.1 Empirical Output

The aim of this third part of the research was to investigate the drivers for explanatory power of Realism with regards to CSDP missions, and the results of the empirical investigation in Part III are condensed in Table 11.1.

11.2 The External Level: Relations with the USA

An examination of the first driver (cf. *D1* in Table 11.1) reveals that for the missions concerned, the EU plays a role that is independent from that of the USA. However, their agendas are mostly coherent, and, at least, there are no principal disagreements. This could be explained by either early considerations of American positions and an intrinsic desire to conform, possibly inspired by a strong UK influence, or a significant degree of shared values and interests. Moreover, the EU and the USA interact in a

¹ Address at Harvard University on September 6, 1943. Quoted in Coicaud (2007, p.2).

Level of Analysis	Criteria, i.e. realist driver	Con-Cordia	EUFOR Althea	EUFOR RD Congo	EUMM Georgia	Correlation
External	<i>D1</i> : Competition with the USA	No	Yes	No	No	Negative
	<i>D2</i> : Reducing dependence on the USA	Yes	Yes	Yes (-)	No	Weak
Internal MS	<i>D3</i> : Interests of the EU3	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Moderate
	<i>D4</i> : Security at borders	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Moderate
Internal EU	<i>D5</i> : Ability to act	Yes	Yes	No	No	Neutral
	<i>D6</i> : Prestige and CSDP promotion	No	No	Yes	Yes	Neutral

TABLE 11.1: Assessment of drivers for Realism

spirit of cooperation. The exception the early and uncoordinated announcement of the intention to relinquish responsibilities for SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, this split did not escalate further, and it can also be argued that the takeover was already planned prior to Concordia and thus was not a surprise. However, the EU and the USA arrived at different conclusions with regard to the timing and the design. In the case of EUFOR RD Congo, this conflict was a low-priority concern for the USA, as are most conflicts in Africa. These situations provide ample room for the EU to manoeuvre without jeopardising its relations with the USA, while at the same time demonstrating its independence. It is inferred that this criterion and the associated outcome do not have any explanatory power for realist drivers for CSDP operations. On the contrary, the outcome has negative correlation with the model.

In examining the reduction of security dependence (cf. *D2*), the missions under investigation fail to provide a definitive and decisive outcome. Two missions are closely associated with post-crisis management in the Balkans and strategic arrangements with NATO, thus substantially moving the EU in the direction of increased independence. However, it must be emphasised that the Berlin Plus arrangements are as much about the EU being able to conduct robust military operations as about ensuring that NATO, and ultimately the USA, remains involved, and so has the influence to curtail EU ambitions, and there is a limit on the level of independence that the EU can achieve within this framework. It was these competing and partly overlapping interests that made the Berlin Plus arrangements possible. An assessment of whether this is a substantial contribution to independent operations depends on the time perspective adopted. On

the one hand, advocates of an independent Europe would claim that the dependence on the USA is reduced by adopting a long-term perspective, as the EU is gradually enhancing its abilities to operate independently. On the other hand, 'Atlanticists' are likely to adopt a short-term perspective and postulate that the EU remains dependent on NATO assets and capabilities, whenever demanding military operations are under consideration. The EUFOR RD Congo mission also signalled independence, albeit on a limited scale. On the one hand, the operation was the first real independent, multinational EU mission deployed far from the European continent. On the other hand, it took time for the EU to act, and, if there had not been a delay in the election process, the EU force would possibly have arrived too late. Moreover, the force size, mandate, and deployment duration were all limited, while EUMM Georgia does not add any value in terms of independent operations. On the contrary, deployment of two hundred unarmed civilian monitors without any ensured freedom of movement in the contested areas, suggests that the absence of a robust mission can be perceived as a sign of dependence. In summary, applying the Balance of Power theory gives a weak explanatory power in explaining the drivers for Realism.

11.3 The First Internal Level (Member States): National Interests

The national interest of the most influential Member States (cf. *D3*), particularly France, played a role in the missions examined. France is an ardent promoter of the CSDP as a means of highlighting its virtues on the world scene. However, the French interest is also about making Europe a global and independent actor, thus preventing the USA from acting unilaterally (New York Times, 2002). However this latter aspiration, to the extent that France is able to mobilise the EU, relates to the Level 1 analysis. The empirical findings are also consistent with regard to British and German policies. The UK is first and foremost interested in the EU as a vehicle for capability development, and not for deploying EU-led military missions. EU-developed capabilities are preferably employed by NATO. However, the UK has to balance its posture between the EU and the USA. During the period studied, the Iraq engagement had a major impact on the strategic considerations of the UK. In those circumstances, compromises with France were made and they occasionally allowed the CSDP to move forward. With the exception of Althea, the UK's engagement in CSDP operations has been symbolic. Germany has not appeared to have been proactively promoting any of these missions, despite the importance of promoting the CFSP as a part of their national policy. The Balkans have been a priority for Germany ever since it had to deal with the crises there and show leadership during its EU Presidencies in 1994 and 1999. However, due to legal constraints

and parliamentary reluctance to deploy military forces abroad, Germany has not been very active in the CSDP. Germany assumed responsibility for EUFOR RD Congo only because it was cornered. The Georgian crisis emerged rapidly and unexpectedly, and not surprisingly, the EU's deliberations revealed differences of opinion on how to deal with Russia, which, however, did not affect the mission, and, instead the Member States displayed unity. In summary, the correlation between this criterion and the outcome related to the CSDP missions is moderate.

Three of the four operations are conducted in the proximity of the EU (cf. *D4*). Only EUFOR RD Congo fails to meet this criterion, and it bears witness to the geopolitical priorities of the EU3. In conclusion, Classical Realism provides a moderate explanatory power as to what drives Realism in the CSDP missions.

11.4 The Second Internal Level (EU level): Bureaucratic Analysis

The ability to act criterion (cf. *D5*) showed a good match with the Balkans missions and the early phase of the CSDP. At that time, the EU felt compelled to demonstrate its ability to put the CSDP into operation. In both cases, it had the luxury of setting the timeline, together with NATO, well in advance, and both operations involved over a year of preparations. The EU could thus gradually prepare and build a case for its ability to act.² In no way did the situation on the ground put pressure on the deployment timeline. Conversely, neither EUFOR RD Congo nor EUMM Georgia were 'controlled operations'. Timeliness were externally dictated and EU deliberations did not start with an internal consensus on the feasibility of CSDP engagements. Initially, the initiative did not lie with the EU, although in the case of EUMM Georgia it was swiftly seized by the Presidency. For the EU it was unfortunate that a battlegroup response was not deemed appropriate and available for EUFOR RD Congo. It would have signalled that the EU had the ability to respond with a high-readiness force in line with the high-profile battlegroups concept, and it would also have demonstrated a viable alternative to the NATO equivalent, the NATO Response Force.³ Based on the evenly distributed outcome, it is inferred that there is no correlation between the missions examined and the criterion. In these circumstances, when capabilities were not prepared, the EU bureaucracy is more inclined to resort to prestige (cf. *D6*). Conversely, when capabilities are available, this is not required. In the theoretical elaboration in

² The same pattern emerged for EULEX Kosovo, however a closer examination of that mission is beyond the scope of this chapter.

³ Battlegroups and NATO Response Force were developed in a competitive environment. The NATO force is more robust and to a larger extent able to conduct autonomous operations.

Chapter 8, significant attention was paid to the intra-institutional power play between the Secretariat and the Commission, and also to the Secretariat search for ‘actionable crises’. However, these claims are not substantiated in the empirical investigation. It is likely that this criterion is primarily relevant to non-emergency civilian missions. In such cases, particularly when there are no high political stakes involved, there is more room for institutions to manoeuvre and to have an impact on the EU response. Further research is needed to add clarity to this relationship. In conclusion, the bureaucratic power influences deliberations on the CSDP missions, but not decisively. Based on the evenly distributed outcome it is inferred, that there is no correlation between the missions examined and the criterion.

11.5 The Mission Perspective

A review of the missions in relation to Table 11.1 reveals that both Concordia and Althea produce outcomes strongly correlated with the predefined criteria for realist drivers. The EUFOR RD Congo mission does not generate a convincing correlation with the framework for the identification of realist drivers. Realism, as it has been inferred by drawing on Posen’s and Hyde-Price’s theoretical work, does not provide sufficient explanatory power for the EUFOR RD Congo mission. The lack of correlation with the model is even more evident in the case of EUMM Georgia, and it yields negative correlation and the realist drivers cannot be adequately explained by the model.

11.6 Concluding Observations

Table 11.1 suggests that only some 58% of the output generated a positive output in supporting realist claims, and only their combined output provides explanatory power for Realism. The results of this investigation must also consider that the four most ‘realist-prone’ missions were part of the study. It is therefore concluded that this finding is robust. In view of the outcome, it is prudent to critically examine the realist criteria, and as long as military interventions in the EU neighbourhood are examined, the theory has explanatory power. This is either a result of Realism’s being an insufficient theoretical paradigm for explaining the CSDP, or is due to shortcomings of the tailored model applied in this section, which fails to address the relevant issues. Both Posen and Hyde-Price, as most scholars do, pay significant attention to the Balkans crisis and to the critical phase of establishing the CSDP as a viable policy, focusing on the Balance of Power as the theoretical thrust for understanding the CSDP. At the same time, they fail to reflect on the geographical and instrumental diffusion of the CSDP, which covers

the Caucasus, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa, and on the application of a wide range of civilian and mixed civilian-military instruments. The CSDP is amorphous and clearly able to be adapted to regional conditions, amongst other things. For all the 'low key' civilian CSDP missions not examined in this part, the Balance of Power theory, and the enhancement of European security independence, seem to be insignificant drivers. On the other hand, the realist currents induced by the bureaucracy are most prevalent in those missions, and further research is needed to explore and clarify this relationship. A relevant realist theory must be less occupied with the historical rationale of CSDP and its high politics, and more closely correlated with how it is evolving on the ground, a bottom-up approach as opposed to the current top-down one. Any theoretical construct of the CSDP that is confined to the Balkan experience fails to produce satisfactory explanatory power. In conclusion, it is inferred that the explanatory power in explaining drivers for Realism is, to borrow an adjective often used about the CSDP, soft.

Part IV

Synthesis

Chapter 12

A Soft Power with a Hard Core

For we must face the fact that in 30 or 40 years Europe will constitute a UPO
- a sort of unidentified political object -
unless we weld it into an entity enabling each of our countries to benefit from the
European dimension and to prosper as well as holds its own externally.

Jaques Delors¹

12.1 Correlation of Research Findings in Part II and III

As identified earlier, the two investigations are united in examining the geopolitical considerations, albeit for different reasons. In Part II the related independent variable, *cf. Where*, returned an indecisive result. However, the sensitivity analysis in Chapter 7.2 pointed out arguments for also including the ACP countries in the realist category, and such a change would make it a very influential realist driver. The corresponding variable in Part III, *security at borders D4*, rendered an explanatory power for Realism. In conclusion, the research suggests that geopolitical considerations produce an explanatory power for Realism

In Part II it was concluded that tailoring of the response and the mandate given to the mission (*cf. How*) as well as the timing of intervention (*cf. When*) are the significant drivers for Idealism. This finding is further substantiated when it is considered that they have a weak correlation with the realist missions examined in Part III, see Table 12.1. Two missions are post-conflict missions and generate an idealist output on *When*, while EUMM Georgia is a monitoring mission and generates an idealist output on *How*.

¹ Speech to the inaugural session of the Intergovernmental Conference in Luxembourg 9 September 1985. Quoted in Drake (2000, p.24). At the time of the statement Jaques Delors was the President of the European Commission.

Mission	I-drivers	
	<i>How</i>	<i>When</i>
Concordia		X
EUFOR Althea		X
EUFOR RD Congo		
EUMM Georgia	X	

TABLE 12.1: Correlation of mission output and idealistic drivers

Table 12.2 depicts the correlation between mission output and realist drivers by combining the realist drivers from Part II and III of the research and comparing their influence with the overall outcome for the most realist-prone missions. EUFOR Althea stands out as the most consistent mission in terms of realist output, and the findings also suggest that relevant realist drivers have been identified. At the other end of the spectrum, EUMM Georgia demonstrates weak correlation between the two investigations. The research in Part III does not produce a compelling identification of realist drivers for this mission. Significantly, amongst the missions examined in Part III, this is the only non-military one, and it generates an idealistic output on a variable with strong idealist influences (cf. *How*), see Table 12.1. A corresponding examination of the other strong idealist incentive (cf. *When*) reveals no resemblance. In this regard, both Concordia and EUFOR Althea generate idealist outcomes, while EUFOR RD Congo and EUMM Georgia yield realist outcomes. As depicted in Table 12.2 all missions result in realist output on the variable in Part II that provides a realist explanatory power (cf. *What*).

Mission	Outcome		R-drivers				Correlation
	Part II	Part III	<i>What</i>	<i>D2</i>	<i>D3</i>	<i>D4</i>	
Concordia	5*R	4*Y	X	X	X	X	Moderate
EUFOR Althea	5*R	5*Y	X	X	X	X	Strong
EUFOR RD Congo	4*R	3*Y	X	X	X		Moderate
EUMM Georgia	5*R	2*Y	X			X	Weak

TABLE 12.2: Correlation of Mission Output and Realist Drivers.

The correlation between mission output and realist drivers for Concordia is moderate. While key drivers are identified, this produces only nine of twelve possible realist outcomes. For EUFOR RD Congo the overall correlation is also moderate, but partly for different reasons. It produces less realist output (seven of twelve) and the mission is not driven by *Security at borders D4*. As a final observation, the *Who* variable in Part II is somewhat related to the *External* level as well as the *Internal EU* level in Part III. The common denominator is the relation with other actors, which in Part II encompasses all external actors outside the Council. In Part III it is specified as the USA (External level) and the Commission (Internal EU), respectively.

12.2 Addressing the research questions

It is time to review the research questions and sum up the findings. In Chapter 1 the research was framed by the overarching question: *How can the Council's decision to engage in crisis management missions be explained?* The objective of this thesis was to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the EU as a crisis management actor. The twofold aim of the research is to help a broad audience to understand the kind of actor the Union is, whilst contributing to the research community's quest to provide additional explanatory power devised in order to research the following questions:

1. How effective are Realism and Idealism, respectively, in assessing the motivation of the EU as a crisis management actor?
2. What is the explanatory power of various schools within Realism to assess the motivation of the EU as a crisis management actor?

12.2.1 How effective are Realism and Idealism at the meta-level in explaining the CSDP?

The first question was addressed in Chapter 7. The investigation produced indecisive results in that neither Realism nor Idealism generated a dominant explanatory power for the CSDP. Contrary to the prevailing perception of the EU as a soft power, only some 55% of the empirical output collected, indicated idealist preferences. This finding is even more striking when considering that the empirical work was limited to official EU documents and statements. Moreover, the research question addresses the articulated motivation as opposed to real motives. This makes the findings stronger, since it is safe to assume that any potential disparity between the real justifications and those articulated, would suggest that the motivations communicated are more biased towards Idealism than the real motives. Consequently, the commonly held view that the EU is an altruistic foreign policy actor must be rejected as being too simplistic. Since neither Idealism nor Realism carry sufficient explanatory power to explain decisions to launch CSDP missions, branches of these on these meta-theories should be further explored.

12.2.2 How effective are schools within Realism and Idealism in explaining the CSDP?

The second question was addressed in Chapter 11, and this empirical investigation also generated a somewhat indecisive result in that none of the six criteria produced compelling explanatory power. It is only when the realist schools are regarded as complementary and their results are combined that they provide explanatory power for Realism. Some 58% of the output generated a positive output. If competition with the USA is eliminated as a criterion, the result improves, with an overall output ratio of 65%. Significantly, this criterion is one of the most common arguments applied by scholars arguing for a realist perspective of the CSDP. This inconclusive result must also take into consideration that the four most 'realist-prone' missions were subject to the study.

12.2.3 Explaining the EU as a Soft Power with a Hard Core

A synthesis of the findings suggests that the EU pursues crisis management based on an evenly balanced mix of realist and idealist influences. CSDP missions are as much about satisfying vital self-interests as about advancing universal value interests. Responses are based on realist perceptions of the security environment and are tailored to address state-centric threats in the neighbourhood of the EU or in former colonies of Member States.² These actions are guided by idealist principles, often involving non-coercive measures, and responses tend to provide assistance with civilian instruments rather than military force. Deployment deliberations also involve considerations of enhancing the political weight of the EU and the Council along with the aspiration to ensure effective multilateralism. Furthermore, the EU prefers intervening in post-conflict situations or preventive engagements without applying deterrence. It is hard to contend that the EU is a soft power, on the other hand, the explanatory power of Realism is soft.

The EU is not advancing the CSDP to challenge the USA's dominance in international security; on the contrary, it prefers complementary efforts, and, moreover, the EU is influenced by a desire to reduce its security dependence on the USA. Realist drivers for the EU are primarily generated by Member States, and the motivation for the deployment of CSDP missions is affected by national interests, in particular French ones, as well as a desire to secure EU borders. Furthermore, the EU bureaucracy contributes to shaping EU behaviour based on Realism. It does so for prestige, a desire to promote the CSDP, and to demonstrate the EU's ability to act. None of these aspirations by the EU bureaucracy has a strong influence on EU behaviour, but in combination they

²Afghanistan is not considered as a former colony. Despite British interventions in Afghanistan during the three Anglo-Afghan wars, their influence never did amount to colonial control.

constitute a driver for Realism. Since the empirical investigation reveals the lack of a convincing correlation with the analytical framework and the realist criteria examined, it is inferred that the explanatory power in explaining drivers for Realism is, to borrow an adjective often used for the CSDP, soft.

To summarise, the EU thinks like a realist but acts as an idealist, and it is a soft power with a hard core. The Council is predisposed towards operating based on idealistic principles when tailoring the mission mandate and timing the intervention. However, its considerations are underpinned by a realist calculus, and it responds to state-centric threats and assigns geopolitical priorities in the neighbourhood. Travestyng the initial quotation in Chapter 1, 'Europa' has become a benevolent Amazon.

12.3 Towards a better understanding of the EU as a crisis management actor

The previous section presented the key contributions of this research towards a more nuanced understanding of the EU as a crisis management actor. As discussed, the research has also produced several indecisive results as well as revealed areas for further research. In the following, these key observations are further elaborated.

12.3.1 CSDP Scholars: File for divorce from the EU

Meta-theories such as Idealism and Realism are helpful in understanding the primitive forces of international relations, and, in particular, they are instructive in acquiring a basic knowledge of nascent policy fields such as the CSDP. Ever since the genesis of academic debate on international relations, their utility has also been due to their contrastive ability. In Part II, the research benefited from the dialectic relationship between Realism and Idealism in order to isolate the driving forces for the CSDP. However, none of the meta-theories should be applied as a descriptor of the CSDP in general. The EU self-image as a 'force for good' is shared by other Western states and organisations, and its uniqueness is defined by the strong correlation that exists between that self-image and the research community's representation of the CSDP. Indeed, the EU has captivated most CSDP scholars, and it enjoys descriptors with positive connotations of spreading universal values. When the USA aspires to diffuse the universal values, this rhetoric is often labelled as imperialistic or hegemonic, and it seems that the CSDP scholars have fallen for the charm of the EU. To enhance their understanding of the EU, the academic community must adopt a more critical approach to its examination of the CSDP. The use of monolithic descriptors such as normative, soft, and ethical should be conditional.

12.3.2 Cooperation Trumps Competition

In their theorising about the CSDP, scholars are advised to draw on more than one scientific tradition, and the coexistence of different scientific schools can be achieved by adopting a complementary approach, so that the independent variables collectively contribute towards the explanatory power. Moreover, it allows more nuances of the EU behaviour as a crisis management actor to surface. Both Idealism and Realism harbour several branches that makes them more nuanced but also less divergent. Furthermore, academic schools beyond the positivist realm, including, for instance, Constructivism, should be considered in the same context. To understand the EU, it is desirable to move beyond such broad concepts as self-interest and altruism. Indeed, greater granularity is required.

12.3.3 Realists Scholars: Welcome to the EU

The CSDP perpetuates forces that cannot be comfortably absorbed into an idealistic account. When one delves beneath that soft and thick surface, the realist logic is revealed. However, too few realist scholars have contributed towards a better understanding of the EU as a crisis management actor. While both Posen and Hyde-Price add value, they, as do most realist scholars, tend to overemphasise the Balkans crisis and the critical phase of setting up the CSDP as a viable policy. They concede to Balance of Power as the theoretical thrust for understanding the CSDP, but the research in this thesis does not support this proposition. A comprehensive understanding of the CSDP must reflect on its progressive nature and on its geographical and instrumental diffusion, covering the Caucasus, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, it needs to take into consideration the panoply of civilian and mixed civilian-military instruments applied in CSDP missions. The CSDP is amorphous and is clearly adapted to regional conditions, amongst other things. For all the ‘low key’ civilian CSDP missions not examined in this part, the Balance of Power theory, and the enhancement of European security independence, seem to be an insignificant driver. On the other hand, the realist currents induced by the bureaucracy are most prevalent in those missions, and further research is needed in this domain. A relevant realist theory must be less occupied with the historical rationale of CSDP and its high politics, and must more closely study how it is evolving on the ground, a bottom-up approach as opposed to the current top-down one. To progress, realists should engage more in the CSDP, in particular, from an empirical bottom-up perspective. Realism, including Neorealism, has more to offer in the understanding of this policy field.

12.3.4 Socialisation Trumps Competition

The findings suggest that the EU is not challenging the USA and that the Balance of Power concept lacks applicability in the context, and instead, it could be argued that EU is emulating the USA in some respects. The EU explicitly views itself as a global actor, and the clout that the EU can wield in economic and political terms is not paralleled by its military capabilities. However, increasingly active EU crisis management portrays the Union as not only a policy machine, but as an institution that is ready and willing to take action to promote international security. The ESS provides ample evidence in this regard. Significantly, in terms of the number of missions deployed, the EU outnumbers NATO. It acts on almost all continents, and U -missions, although limited in scale and time, give the EU additional credibility. In the Palestine territories, Iraq and Afghanistan, CSDP missions may not significantly change the outcome on the ground, but their existence emulates the USA as a global and credible crisis management actor, able and willing to tackle the most challenging conflicts for the sake of international peace and security. In reviewing the string of missions that it has deployed, it is also helpful to reflect on what this does for the EU. It socialises the EU into a new normal behaviour that intervenes in crises when appropriate. From this perspective, it is possible to understand Brusselisation, as discussed in Chapter 9, as a process through which the EU emulates and matures as a realist actor. To improve the understanding of the EU in this capacity, theories relating to socialisation and emulation must be further developed within the context of Neorealism. Moreover, empirical and also theoretical work addressing the specific circumstances of the CSDP, also needs to be developed. However, other regional organisations could benefit from the findings. The rationale and the context of applying EU findings to other organisations are discussed below.

12.3.5 The CSDP does not equal the UK, France and Germany

National interest is an indisputable factor in understanding the EU as a crisis management actor. Not only are decisions to launch missions based on intergovernmental principles and consensus, but Member States also project their national interests onto the European level. The research in this thesis has shown how the EU3 have shaped policy outcomes. However, decisions are influenced more by actors and factors than by being hammered out in a bargaining process. To explain EU crisis management, it is not sufficient to find the least common denominator amongst the EU3. The CSDP is more unpredictable, as it has its own dynamic. When Waltz transformed Realism through his seminal theories on Neorealism, his key contribution was the revelation of the impact of the 'super-state' level. He argued that the structure of the world system has an impact

on explaining the actions of states, and that it is a complementary perspective to that of the state level. Systems theory should also inspire theories to enhance the EU as a crisis management actor, as a complement to the existing reductionist propositions on national interests. Systems theory is a relative new discipline that has been proven useful in other areas dealing with complex and uncertain environments, and the EU may be defined as a system. Systems theory challenges several underlying assumptions of traditional problem solving and decision making. The rule of additivity does not apply, $1+1$ does not necessary equal 3, and interactions and relationships between actors can change the outcome to zero, or 145. It also suggests that no action should be seen in isolation, as it is likely to have ripple effects in other parts of the system, whether desired or not. This perspective merits further attention in order to better understand the EU as a crisis management actor.

12.3.6 Suggestions for Further Research

Four areas that warrant additional research to further enhance the understanding of the EU as a crisis management actor, have been identified above. In the research, additional auxiliary questions have surfaced.

To better understand the EU, it is relevant to understand why the EU is so keen on conveying an idealist narrative. Morgenthau explains that the population finds an appeal in an idealistic narrative, and indeed, this resonates with the pacifist origins of the EU. However, is it reasonable to assume that EU citizens find it more appropriate that the EU is focused on the security of others rather than on adding an EU layer to their national security? Is it possible that the credibility of NATO to act as a satisfactory regional security provider makes the EU redundant in terms of survival interests? Another way to find explanations is through the evolving European identity. The idealistic perspective finds merit in distinguishing Europe from the USA. However, in other policy areas, the EU takes pride in being a strong and assertive global player that acts in the interest of its citizens, which is certainly the case in international trade. A common denominator is perhaps that it is competitive. The self-image carries a notion of the EU as something new, unique and morally supreme. Hence, this identity is constructed through relative references, by implicitly comparing the EU with other actors. This is a form of competition between ideas. For every credit the EU gains, others will lose.

Another pertinent area for further studies is to expand the research conducted in Part III to encompass a broader set of empirical data, and at the same time, to consider emulation as a criterion. In the above discussion, it was concluded that the independent

research design in Part II and Part III, respectively, resulted in limited correlation of mission output and realist drivers, see Table 12.2. The prospect of reviewing missions that rendered a balance of realist and idealist influences, as well as those that generated an idealistic dominance in Part II, should also be subject to further scrutiny. It is, for instance, plausible that the competition between the Council and the Commission can produce a significant degree of realist output amongst those missions that generated an idealistic dominance in Part II. Many non-executive missions have been deployed and the EU flag has been raised in many places. Most missions include less than one hundred personnel, excluding local staff. In some cases, the CSDP mission has been an outgrowth, replacement or complementary action to ongoing Commission programmes. An analysis of four balanced and four idealist-dominated missions would provide a more nuanced representation of the realist drivers, and, at the same time, enhance the understanding of the EU as a crisis management actor.

A final area to consider is to expand the application of the aforementioned analytical framework and populate it with empirical data from other multinational institutions. Regional integration, crisis management ambitions and possibly a mix of supranational and intergovernmental jurisdiction are also prevalent in other institutions, for instance the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Organization of American States (OAS). Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver have developed an analytical framework for Regional Security Complexes (RSC) to enhance the understanding of international security (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The potential of cross-fertilisation between their framework and the one discussed in this chapter merits further studies. What kind of conclusions can be drawn when examining other RSCs that share some of characteristics that make the EU a *sui generis*? Arguably, the EU is spearheading regional integration and, as such, it serves as a role model for other RSCs. What could be derived from the EU experience that would enhance the explanatory power to predict the actions of RSCs? When do aspirations of regional integration transform into the perception of being a regional actor?

Part V

Annex

Appendix A

Empirical Investigation

A.1 EUPM: The EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina

A.1.1 Context

The disintegration of Yugoslavia started in 1991 when Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. This move was opposed by the Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, and the Yugoslav People's Army. Following unsuccessful European efforts, including those of the European Community, to respond to the deteriorating security situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, other actors stepped in. After failed diplomatic attempts to restore stability in Croatia, the UN deployed a peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR)¹ in 1992 as an interim solution to provide peace and security required for the negotiations (UN Security Council, 1992a,b). At the same time, the OSCE and the WEU conducted missions in the region. The EU supported the international effort to negotiate a settlement for independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as protection of human rights (European Council, 1993). However, the decisive commitment came from the other side of the Atlantic. Although initially with great reluctance, the US stepped in politically and later with a deterrent military force, and galvanised NATO to launch a more robust operation to succeed the UN mission. When the human suffering continued² and the international criticism mounted, NATO initiated an active air strike policy (North Atlantic Council, 1994) that through the US political impetus finally brought the warring factions together in Dayton, in November 1995, to negotiate a peace agreement. The peace conference at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, near

¹ The United Nations Protection Force. Initially the force comprised only observers.

² In February 1994, a mortar round fired at a Sarajevo market killed at least sixty-eight persons and wounded two hundreds others in the worst single incident of the twenty-two-month war (Donia, 2006, p.327).

Dayton, Ohio, was chaired by the US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher. The EU Special Representative, Carl Bildt, acted as one of the two co-chairpersons. According to Bildt's own account some European influences helped shape the agreement (Bildt, 1998). The warring parties signed the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, commonly known as the Dayton Peace Agreement, in December 1995. The agreement included eleven annexes for implementation, of which 10 covered civilian matters. An Office of the High Representative (OHR) was created to oversee implementation of civilian aspects, whereas NATO would assume responsibilities for the military aspects. The UN Security Council decided to establish the UN International Police Task Force in direct support of the annex regarding police matters (UN Security Council, 1995b). The mission was consolidated with several other UN offices and organised as the United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH).

A.1.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

The necessity of Europe being able to express itself with a single voice in the international stage became evident during the crisis in the Balkans. It was also during this crisis that it was exercised for the first time, however it took longer than hoped for to unite.³ With the launch of the Stabilization and Association Process in 2002 states in the region became potential candidates for future EU enlargement. Still, several criteria had to be met before entering negotiation for accession to the EU. In tandem with this process, a political intention to field a police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina was surfaced by the Council in January 2002.

An EU police mission would contribute to the overall peace implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is under the authority of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Peace Implementation Council, and would also help the achievement of the objectives of EU's overall policy in the region, notably the Stabilisation and Association Process. (Council of the EU, 2002a, p.21).

The Council continued its discussion on the need for an EU mission during its meeting in February 2002 and initiated planning for such an undertaking (Council of the EU, 2002b, p.16). In an illuminating speech at the UN Security Council Debate in March 2002, Solana made it clear that Bosnia-Herzegovina faced a crucial and dialectic decision, to integrate with the EU or move towards international isolation.

³ Still, during this period of perceived European cacophony, the EU, through its community programmes remained committed to alleviate suffering, see further discussions in Chapter 5.7.1.

On the one hand, [Bosnia-Herzegovina] could make a positive choice to make a determined effort rapidly to implement reforms and join the path that leads towards the European Union. Alternatively, the country could choose a path that will I believe lead to ever greater isolation, to missed economic opportunities, and to a political wilderness where it will be left behind by more ambitious and more far-sighted neighbours. (UN Security Council, 1995a, p.11).

Indeed, the High Representative held on to this narrative of a mutual rationality, from the Europeans as well as the people in the conflict region. He published an article in *Le Figaro*, *Le choix des Balkans*, on 11 May 2002 subscribing to the same theme (Solana, 2002a). Shortly after his intervention in the UN, the Council agreed the legal instruments to ensure, by 1 January 2003, the follow-on to the International Police Task Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Joint Action offers two justifications. One takes the conflict as the point of departure and asserts the need to continue the implementation of the Dayton/ Paris Agreement (Council of the EU, 2002h, preamble para.2). The other justification takes the EU overall ambitions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the region as the reference point. The EUPM was to operate in concert with the Community's institution building programmes under the CARDS Regulation, and thus contribute to the overall peace implementation in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as to the achievements of the Union's overall policy in the region, notably the Stabilisation and Association Process (Council of the EU, 2002h, preamble para.3). In conjunction with the decision to launch EUPM, the EU successfully sought to extend its influence of the overall development in the country by proposing that the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina also became integrated in the EU administration by letting this office also assume responsibilities as the EU Special Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Council of the EU, 2002b, p.20). The inauguration speech for the mission, by the High Representative/EU Special Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lord Paddy Ashdown, on 15 January 2003 summarises the essence of the EU perception at that time:

By taking on this mission, the EU is ... demonstrating that establishing the Rule of Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an absolute requirement - a non-negotiable basic condition - upon which EU entry depends. (Ashdown, 2003, pp.1-2).

In conclusion, the issue at stake at this point in time was much more profound than maintaining the security and ensuring compliance with the peace accord. The EU sought to rebuild Europe, with Bosnia-Herzegovina ultimately integrated into the European

Union. From this perspective it is not surprising that the Joint Action makes reference to “European” police standards whereas the Dayton Peace Agreement aspires to “internationally recognized standards”.⁴ The underlying strategic considerations for this approach were derived from the interest of the EU and encapsulated in the Stabilization and Association Process, and it served as the overriding vehicle for increased ambitions. Clearly, Solana’s rhetoric articulated this view. The mission was launched as a complementary measure to the Commission’s efforts to allow the EU to take greater responsibility for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina and at the same time influence the progress towards a integration to the EU, when the conditions were met. As such the mission is linked to the vital interests of the EU to safeguard the fundamental interests of the Union [I1]

A.1.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

The Joint Action gives little insight to the perceived threat, as does the peace accord. Drawing on the categorisation of threats in Chapter 5, the conflict, at the stage when EUPM was launched, was primarily linked to state failure and organised crime. Although state failure was a legitimate concern when commencing operations, this threat is not addressed by the mission. Instead, organised crime is identified as the key threat. Organised crime and corruption are key aspects of police work pursued by the EUPM (Council of the EU, 2002i,j). In a speech in London on 25 November 2002, it was clear that Solana understood organised crime to be the pinnacle of obstacles prohibiting positive development in the Balkans. Also, it was made clear that this threat had direct impact on the internal security of the EU states; “Fighting crime in the Balkans should no longer be seen as something different from fighting crime at home. The criminal networks are the same” (Solana, 2002b, p.3).

In an updated Operation Plan (OPLAN) for the extension of the mission in 2006, a mission review was included in which the first achievement highlighted the enhanced capability of the State Investigation and Protection Agency to fight major and organised crime. The plan also points out the remaining challenges in countering organised crime and corruption since it is “intrinsicly connected and deeply entrenched” in the country (Council of the EU, 2006k, p.4). From this discussion it is deduced that the primary threat addressed is organised crime [T5].

⁴ Dayton Peace Agreement Annex 11 accessed at <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/dayann11.html> on 25 December 2009.

A.1.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

In accordance with a UN agreement, the EUPM took over from UNMIBH/UN International Police Task Force on 1 January 2003 (UN Security Council, 2002b, p.5). From the onset it was clear that the new EU mission was designed as a continuation effort and would not change the trajectory of support initiated by the UN. The underpinning UN mandate of the EUPM and the Joint Action establishing the mission both emphasise the need for a seamless transition of responsibilities (Council of the EU, 2002h; UN Security Council, 2002a). The mandate for the mission stems from the general objectives of Annex 11 of the Dayton Peace Accord, which was initially designed for the UN International Police Task Force. The mandate included broad and ambitious tasks to advance capacity building for improved rule of law.⁵ Despite this wide definition, the mission focused on police matters. The Joint Action outlines a desired endstate that stresses policing aspects within the general framework of rule of law:

[T]he European Union Police Mission (EUPM) should establish sustainable policing arrangements under [Bosnia-Herzegovina] ownership in accordance with best European and international practice, and thereby raising current [Bosnia-Herzegovina] police standards. The EUPM, entrusted with the necessary authority to monitor, mentor and inspect, should achieve its goals by the end of 2005. (Council of the EU, 2002h, preamble para 2).

To accomplish these aspirations the operation was divided in three strategic pillars (Solana, 2008b): (1) The support to the fight against organised crime; (2) police restructuring; and (3) police accountability. With reference to the plausible outcomes laid out in Chapter 5, this mission is focussed on police matters and hence categorised as a police mission [R8].

⁵ The Agreement on International Police Force provided in Annex includes an article (art.3) on the assistance programmes foreseen as a part of the implementation plan:

- monitoring, observing, and inspecting law enforcement activities and facilities, including associated judicial organisations, structures, and proceedings;
- advising law enforcement personnel and forces;
- training law enforcement personnel;
- facilitating, within the UN International Police Task Force's mission of assistance, the Parties' law enforcement activities;
- assessing threats to public order and advising on the capability of law enforcement agencies to deal with such threats.
- advising governmental authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the organisation of effective civilian law enforcement agencies; and
- assisting by accompanying the Parties' law enforcement personnel as they carry out their responsibilities, as the UN International Police Task Force deems appropriate.

A.1.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

The EUPM is conducted in Europe and in the proximity of the EU territory. Notwithstanding the geographical issue there was also a sense that Bosnia-Herzegovina has a more profound connection to the core of Europe. In a speech in November 2002, Solana reflected on the subject:

It is an affront to justice, a barrier to the progress and development of the countries of the region, and a threat to the security of us all. Quite simply, it must stop. *The Balkans are in Europe*. We have a common future. (Solana, 2002b, pp.1-2, *emphasis added*).

A review of the plausible outcomes reveals that this mission should be classified as linked to an accession candidate [A1]. The geopolitical aspects are influenced by the desire to integrate the country into the EU.

A.1.6 Conflict Cycle: When is CSDP action needed?

As illustrated above the mission took place in the aftermath of the civil war. The international mandate for this mission stemmed from the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, signed by the warring parties, and associated resolutions by the UN Security Council. Consequently, the EUPM is classified as a post-conflict management mission [C3].

A.1.7 Multilaterism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

It has been established that this mission succeeded a UN mission, the UN International Police Task Force, to implement the same mission, as outlined in Annex 11 of the peace accord. In conjunction with the transition, the need for a seamless transition was stressed. Indeed, the cooperation was close from the onset as the EUPM planning and advance teams were preparing the mission. Notably, the UN International Police Task Force was predominately a European mission. All five Police Commissioners who headed the organisation were EU citizens.⁶

The seamless transition was manifested in the leadership of the mission. The last Police Commissioner of the UN International Police Task Force, Sven Christian Frederiksen,

⁶ Sven Christian Frederiksen (Denmark), May 2002 - December 2002; Vincent Coeurderoy (France), April 2000 - May 2002; Detlef Buwitt (Germany), April 1999 - April 2000; Richard Monk (UK), February 1998 - March 1999; Manfred Seitner (Denmark), March 1997 - February 1998; and Thomas Fitzgerald (Ireland), January 1996 - February 1997. The information is obtained at the UN website, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmibh/facts.html>. Last accessed on 20 December 2009.

became the first Head of Mission for EUPM (Council of the EU, 2002f). Moreover the Joint Action states that the mission would be open to non-EU states that provided staff to the UN International Police Task Force (Council of the EU, 2002h, preamble). A significant contribution of police officers were made by non-EU members (Council of the EU, 2002i). Some 120 UN International Police Task Force officers were retained in their positions as the EU assumed responsibilities, many of them in crucial areas.⁷ At its peak the UN International Police Task Force included some 2,000 personnel. Prior to the handover, on 30 September 2002, the UN International Police Task Force manning was reduced to 1,414 civilian police personnel; 395 international civilian personnel and 1,174 local staff.⁸ When the EUPM was launched, the Council aimed at a total strength of 900, including some 500 police officers (Solana, 2002c).⁹

While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to assess the impact of the organisational changes, it can be concluded that the EUPM, as a successor mission, did not have more ambitious goals, perhaps with the exception of introducing European police standards. Hence, the transfer of authority had an impact on the EU as an international actor but less so for the rebranded police mission and the situation on the ground. By relinquishing responsibilities for an ongoing mission, without enhancing its capabilities or ambitions, the EU strengthened its own abilities to influence the development, but had very little impact on the situation on the ground. Accordingly, it is concluded that the EUPM was launched to strengthen the role of the EU [M1].

A.1.8 Summary

Table A.1 summarises the outcomes of all independent variables as discussed above:

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X			X		X	X				X	X

TABLE A.1: EUPM: Summary of Outcome

The launch of the EUPM was underpinned by a balanced mix of realist and idealist influences. On the one hand it promoted the EU's self-interest to secure its neighbourhood through gradual integration of the Bosnia-Herzegovina into the EU sphere, on the other hand the mission addressed the need to mitigate the deteriorating security situation.

⁷ See the UN mission information on UNMIBH <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmibh/background.html>. The website was accessed on 25 December 2008.

⁸ See official UN information on the mission <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmibh/facts.html>. The website was accessed on 25 December 2008.

⁹ The information is contained in an attached to the transcript of the High Representative's speech.

A.2 Concordia: The EU Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

A.2.1 Context

Since the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Macedonia experienced tensions between the Government and elements among the ethnic Albanian population, who were demanding improved social and political status. To more precisely determine the nature of the problem a census, partly funded by the EU, was conducted in 1994 to clarify the ethnic topology of the country. The census concluded that an overwhelming proportion of the inhabitants, some 67 per cent, were ethnic Macedonians (Rossos, 2008, p.8). This result was disputed by ethnic Albanians. A combination of ethnic tensions, rising unemployment and a declining economy, in conjunction with the 1994 elections in gave impetus to increased unrest (UN Secretary General, 1994, 1995). In response, the UN deployed a preventive military force, UNPREDEP, in 1995, its first ever mission of this nature (UN Security Council, 1995d). Later, in 1999, there were concerns of spill over effects from the civil war in Kosovo (UN Secretary General, 1999b).

From the onset of the Stability Pact in 1999, the Commission viewed Macedonia as a stabilising force in the region (European Commission, 1999a). In February 2001 an armed conflict between ethnic Albanian extremists in the National Liberation Army (UÇK) and the Macedonian army erupted that resulted in more than 200 casualties, including over sixty Macedonian soldiers and policemen (Brunnbauer, 2002). More than 100,000 persons were exiled or internally displaced. The underlying source of tension was the ethnic Albanians concern for their inadequate representation in state institutions, particularly within the police. Conversely, many ethnic Macedonians feared that the ethnic Albanians pursued a separatist agenda (Mace, 2004). The Commission assessed that both the Macedonian security forces and the UÇK had committed serious violations of international humanitarian law in the course of the conflict (European Commission, 2002, p.4). In August 2001 in Ohrid, the leaders of Macedonia's main political parties agreed to end the violent conflict. The EU took an active role in the negotiation process and was instrumental in the preparation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The Commission provided financial support and it also, for the first time ever, made use of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) for financial assistance for emergency relief, conditioned by a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The EU made efforts to balance its statements and not take sides. When Macedonia's President, Boris Trajkovski appeared at a European Council meeting, the EU denounced the use of violence by ethnic Albanians. At the same time it urged the Macedonian government to avoid further escalation and to start a dialogue on political reforms (European Council, 2001d, annex

III). Still, the annual Stabilisation and Association Report for 2001 by the Commission admitted that the perception of the EU in the country was that it had taken sides.

the EU image suffered a certain setback among parts of the population (apart from the Albanian minority), because the EU was perceived by the Slav-Macedonian majority as forcing them into unpopular concessions to the Albanian minority. (European Commission, 2002, p.31).

The Ohrid Framework Agreement called upon the EU to take a leading role in the implementation, while it designated NATO to assist in military aspects.¹⁰ Notably, NATO already had a military footprint in the country. Supporting elements of their mission in Kosovo, KFOR, were stationed in Macedonia.

A.2.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

At the Stockholm Summit in March 2001 the European Council confirmed that the EU objectives were ‘fully reflected’ in the UN Security Resolution adopted days before the summit (European Council, 2001d). The resolution addressed the need to put an end to the violent conflict and for the nations in the region to respect territorial integrity and to cooperate on measures that foster stability and promote regional political and economic cooperation (UN Security Council, 2001). With the Stabilisation and Association Process, it is evident that EU aspirations went beyond this ambition. Macedonia became the first country to sign the bilateral programme, within the framework of the Stability Pact and the Stabilisation and Association Process, in April 2001, in the midst of violence between government forces and UÇK (Council of the EU, 2001b,d). The Göteborg Summit in June the same year added an EU perspective on the crisis by declaring

¹⁰ The document has been accessed at the Council of Europe’s website on 10 October 2008, see http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/police_and_internal_security/OHRID+%20Agreement%2013august2001.asp. Para 2.1 outlines the role of NATO:

There shall be a complete cessation of hostilities, complete voluntary disarmament of the ethnic Albanian armed groups and their complete voluntary disbandment. They acknowledge that a decision by NATO to assist in this context will require the establishment of a general, unconditional and open-ended cease-fire, agreement on a political solution to the problems of this country, a clear commitment by the armed groups to voluntarily disarm, and acceptance by all the parties of the conditions and limitations under which the NATO forces will operate.

At Annex C Implementation, para 2.1, the leading role of the EU is outlined:

The parties invite the international community to facilitate, monitor and assist in the implementation of the provisions of the Framework Agreement and its Annexes, and request such efforts to be coordinated by the EU in cooperation with the Stabilization and Association Council.

This appeared to be a logical delineation of tasks, given the EU’s broader political and economic relation with Macedonia and NATO’s peacekeeping experience.

that the Union would promote the stability, democratic development and prosperity, in particular through the Stabilisation and Association Process and the Stability Pact (European Council, 2001c). At the same time, the expectations of the EU as a military actor were mounting. At the Laeken summit in December 2001, the heads of EU states and governments declared the Union to have limited military operational capability.

[T]he EU is now able to conduct some crisis-management operations. The Union will be in a position to take on progressively more demanding operations, as the assets and capabilities at its disposal continue to develop. (European Council, 2001b, annex II).

The declaration, implicitly referring to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, concluded that the Union needed additional tools to deal the security challenges. The prospect of launching the first-ever EU-led military operation had some appeal for the EU to become a more credible actor in the sphere of crisis management. The Barcelona Summit in March 2002 declared the EU willingness to take over the NATO mission, provided that the permanent arrangements on EU-NATO cooperation, Berlin Plus, would be in place by then (European Council, 2002a, p.26). No justification as to why that would benefit the situation in Macedonia was provided. At a follow-up Defence Ministers' meeting Solana established logical links between the Laeken Declaration on military capabilities and the aspiration to launch a military operation in Macedonia.

Work to implement the Barcelona conclusions [on offering the EU to succeed the NATO mission in Macedonia] has now started in the relevant Council bodies, with a view to enabling the EU to take the appropriate decisions. I am sure that today's discussion of Defence ministers will give the right impetus to this endeavour, thus bringing us closer to making operationality - as declared at Laeken - a reality. (Solana, 2002d, p.3).

Also, the Joint Action fails to shed more light on this (Council of the EU, 2003k). Instead it elaborates on the continued implementation of the Ohrid Framework and the overall EU priorities set in the Stabilisation and Association Process and the associated Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS). Clearly, the transition from a NATO mission to an EU-led operation was driven by strategic agendas. On the one hand, the EU was building up forces. In the wake of the terrorist attack in the US it was clear the EU had to take on a greater responsibility for its backyard. On the other hand, against the backdrop of the Stabilisation and Association Process and the bilateral programmes, it made sense for the EU to aspire to more responsibility as well as influence. In conclusion, the transition primarily served

the vital interests of the EU within its overall scheme to integrate the country in the Union thus safeguarding the fundamental interests of the Union [I1].

A.2.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

Neither the Joint Action nor the Ohrid Framework Agreement explicitly elaborates on the nature of the threat. Given the context of the Ohrid Framework Agreement a return to hostile activities and potential civil war between Macedonian security forces and the National Liberation Army (UÇK), would constitute the worst case scenario. Indeed, the annual country assessment by the Commission underlined the grave concerns over the situation: “The year 2001 was marked by political and security instability and the country was several times near to a civil war” (European Commission, 2002, p.4). A closer examination of the preamble and opening paragraphs of the Ohrid Framework Agreement reveals the centrality of the state construct as opposed to being human security oriented.

The following points comprise an agreed framework for securing the future of Macedonia’s democracy and permitting the development of closer and more integrated relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic community. This Framework will promote the peaceful and harmonious development of civil society while respecting the ethnic identity and the interests of all Macedonian citizens.

1. Basic Principles

1.1. The use of violence in pursuit of political aims is rejected completely and unconditionally. Only peaceful political solutions can assure a stable and democratic future for Macedonia.

1.2. Macedonia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the unitary character of the State are inviolable and must be preserved. There are no territorial solutions to ethnic issues.¹¹

Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that the overall key threat underpinning this mission was related to state failure [T2].

¹¹ The Ohrid Framework Agreement has been accessed at the Council of Europe’s website on 10 October 2008, http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/police_and_internal_security/OHRID%20Agreement%2013august2001.asp.

A.2.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

The Ohrid Framework Agreement called for “a complete cessation of hostilities, complete voluntary disarmament of the ethnic Albanian armed groups and their complete voluntary disbandment” and foresaw that NATO would assist in this mission.¹² The mandate provided in the Ohrid Framework Agreement suggests that the implementation effort could qualify as a disarmament mission or a security sector reform mission. However, the Joint Action establishing Concordia does not lend support to such a focus. Instead it makes references to objectives in a ‘general concept’ approved by the Council (Council of the EU, 2003k, art.1). Hence, to learn how this force intended to operate it is necessary to consult the OPLAN (Council of the EU, 2003w). The Commander’s Intent in that document articulates an aspiration to base the operation on deployment of field teams to build confidence amongst the local population. The Key Military Tasks in the document further underscore the peacekeeping character of the mission as the OPLAN put emphasis on providing a visible presence, particularly in areas of potential instability and ethnic tension, in order to contribute to stability and confidence building. The deployment of forces is based on consent by the conflicting parties, involving a peace agreement, and the force is designed to contribute to a stable and secure environment with military presence, without a mandate for use of force to ensure compliance. Accordingly, the profile is consistent with a peacekeeping mission [R2].

A.2.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

This operation was conducted in the proximity of the EU, in South Eastern Europe, in a country that is spearheading the Stability and Association Process. In March 2001 the European Council elaborated on the situation in Macedonia and stated that “there is no future in *our* Europe for those who follow the path of intolerance, nationalism and violence” (European Council, 2001d, annex III, *emphasis added*). It is inferred that the mission is linked to an accession candidate [A1]. The geopolitical aspects are influenced by the desire to integrate the country to become part of the EU.

A.2.6 Conflict Cycle: When is CSDP action needed?

Based on the EU desire to prevent further outbreak of violence it could be argued that the mission was a preventive mission, as the earlier deployment of UNPREDEP. However,

¹² The quote is extracted from article 2.1 of the agreement. The Ohrid Framework Agreement has been accessed at the Council of Europe’s website on 10 October 2008. http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/police_and_internal_security/OHRID+%20Agreement%2013august2001.asp.

the Ohrid Framework Agreement was developed as a result of erupting violence, and was drafted as an instrument for implementing security rather than merely preventing conflict escalation. This perspective is also shared by the OPLAN (Council of the EU, 2003w). Neither document devise preventive measures. Hence, it is concluded that Operation Concordia was a post-conflict mission [C3].

A.2.7 Multilateralism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

Following the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement NATO fielded Operation Essential Harvest / Task Force Harvest, involving some 3,500 troops. The operation monitored the collection of arms from ethnic Albanians. Later, the NATO commitment was embodied in Operation Amber Fox / Task Force Fox, with some 750 personnel (with a reserve of 300 personnel). While Task Force Harvest established conducive conditions for a peaceful solution of the crisis, Task Force Fox was to contribute to the protection of international monitors who were overseeing the implementation of the peace plan with the responsibility of supporting Macedonian security. Operation Amber Fox was completed on 14 December 2002 (Joint Forces Command Naples, 2003). A further extension and force reduction to some 450 troops was made in a third mission, Allied Harmony. The mission included assistance to the government in taking over security throughout the country by providing the capability to liaise with local authorities and helping to support the international monitors (NATO, 2002). The mission was conducted from December 2002 until the transition to Operation Concordia.

Of fundamental importance for this mission was the evolving strategic EU-NATO partnership. In June 2000, the European Council concluded that when a given crisis gives rise to an EU-led operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities, the EU and NATO will draw on the Berlin Plus arrangements (European Council, 2000c). However, the practical arrangements had not been agreed. In 2000, the new Bush administration was elected with a platform that called for withdrawal of American forces from peacekeeping missions. The aspiration of reducing troops in operations like NATO missions in the Balkans was further amplified after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The reduced USA ambitions in the region coincided with EU aspirations to develop and implement its crisis management capabilities. In parallel with the deliberations on this mission the Berlin Plus arrangements were forged between NATO and the EU, to ensure EU access to certain NATO capabilities. This negotiation was challenged by the strained Greek-Turk relations within the context of EU-NATO relations. At the pinnacle was the upcoming EU mission. It constituted a time critical argument to complete the prolonged negotiations, as the EU plan was conditioned by the use of NATO assets. It is striking that almost all EU statements in preparation for this mission made reference

to the necessity of having the general NATO agreements in place, not ad hoc solutions. In the declaration at the Barcelona Summit not only was the mission conditioned by the Berlin Plus arrangements, most of the declaration to deploy forces to Macedonia elaborated on the EU-NATO relationship.

The European Council recalls the central role of the European Union in the process of stabilisation, reconciliation and reconstruction in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In this context, the European Council expresses the European Union's availability to take responsibility, following elections in Macedonia and at the request of its Government, for an operation to follow that currently undertaken by NATO in [Macedonia], on the understanding that the permanent arrangements on EU-NATO cooperation ("Berlin plus") would be in place by then. To this end, the European Council requests the relevant political and military bodies of the Council to develop as of now, in consultation with NATO, the options to enable the European Union to take the appropriate decisions [...] The European Council stresses the importance of achieving permanent arrangements between the European Union and NATO at the earliest possible date. To this end it also asks the Presidency together with the High Representative to make appropriate high-level contacts to ensure a positive outcome. (European Council, 2002a, p.26).

The October Summit went further by identifying the transition of responsibilities as an objective:

[T]he European Council reaffirmed its readiness to take over the NATO military operation in [Macedonia] on 15 December. It requested the relevant bodies of the European Union to examine all the necessary options in order *to achieve this objective*. (European Council, 2002b, p.9, *emphasis added*).

On 17 March 2003¹³, two weeks prior to launching Operation Concordia, EU and NATO agreed on a set of key cooperation documents, known as the Berlin Plus arrangements. The planning of Operation Concordia helped to move the Berlin Plus arrangements process forward. The master messages prepared prior to the launch of the operation explicitly state that rationale for replacing NATO represented "a way further to strengthen its overall approach to improving the stability of this country" (Council of the EU,

¹³ The same day NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) decided to terminate Operation Allied Harmony as of 31 March with a view to transition responsibility to the commencing EU-led operation. See NATO website at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-025e.htm>. Accessed on 25 December 2009.

2003q, p.2). In addition to the political rhetoric the mission relied on NATO, in particular regarding command and control (and reserves). The Joint Action emphasised the continuation of the NATO effort (Council of the EU, 2003k, article 1.1). Notably, some NATO force elements remained in Macedonia as a rear element for KFOR. The deployed force did not enhance the capabilities in itself and thus made little difference on the ground. From this discussion it can be concluded that the transition from a NATO mission to an EU-led operation was driven by strategic agendas and less motivated by the local context on the ground. Hence, it is concluded that the mission was launched to strengthen the role of the EU [M1].

A.2.8 Summary

Table A.2 summarises the outcome of the independent variables related to Concordia.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X		X		X		X				X	X

TABLE A.2: Concordia: Summary of Outcome

In conclusion, the justification for this operation seems to have been three intersected interests. The EU wanted to take on more responsibilities for the Stabilisation and Association Process. The OPLAN outlines the long-term political objective of the mission.

EU's long-term political objective is the successful implementation of the [Stabilisation and Association Process] leading to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia being part of a region of stable, prosperous and democratic countries who co-operate with each other and which are closely integrated with the EU. (Council of the EU, 2003w, p.2).

It also had an interest in showing that its long sought for military capabilities were real and thus substantiating its political declarations, and finally it used the planning as a vehicle to conclude the Berlin plus agreement. In his speech at the inauguration of the mission the NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson remarked on the desire of the EU to prove its ability to act.

By taking on its first military mission, the European Union is demonstrating that its project of a ESDP has come of age. Based on new institutional ties with NATO, the EU can now even more effectively bring to bear its full range of political, economic and military tools. (Robertson, 2003).

A.3 Artemis: The EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo

A.3.1 Context

The Great Lakes region¹⁴ has a troubling record of conflicts and violence with the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Unfortunately, this tragic event did not put an end to violence and despair in the region. Instead, it created a massive influx of refugees to Zaire (now DR Congo) that destabilised the neighbouring country. A rebellion attack in 1997 led by Laurent Kabila and supported by forces from Rwanda and Uganda ousted the long-time ruler of Zaire, Mobutu Sésé Seko, and put him in power. However, the fighting did not end. Another rebel attack was staged against Kabila. The war that unfolded, referred to as Africa's World War, is one of largest in recent African history. It involved some eight states in the region.¹⁵ Despite a cease-fire, the Lusaka Ceasefire agreement in 1999 (UN Secretary General, 1999a), intermittent fighting continued, leading to the killing of Kabila in 2001 (UN Secretary General, 2001). He was succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila, as the new head of state. From 2000, a peace process was slowly taking shape. Uganda had gained a degree of control in the northeast, including the Ituri province. In September 2002 a peace agreement between DR Congo and Uganda was signed in Luanda (UN Secretary General, 2002b). Uganda committed to withdraw its troops from Bunia, the main town in Ituri, following the establishment of an administrative authority in Ituri. The agreement foresaw withdrawal of the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) within 100 days, once a plan was approved (UN Secretary General, 2002a).

In conjunction with the cease fire agreement the UN mandated deployment of a United Nations mission, MONUC¹⁶ (UN Security Council, 1999b). The operation had a three-phased approach; deployment of military observers; monitoring of the withdrawal of foreign troops; and verifying the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Congolese territory. Following the peace agreement, MONUC was reinforced to include two operational task forces and the overall personnel strength increased to 8,700 (UN Security Council, 2002c).¹⁷ The taskforces were not deployed by May 2003 when the deliberation for

¹⁴ The region is defined as to include Burundi, Rwanda, north-eastern DR Congo, Uganda and north-western Kenya and Tanzania.

¹⁵ DR Congo was backed by troops from Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe while the rebellions were once again formed by forces from Rwanda and Uganda.

¹⁶ Mission de l' Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo. The English translation of the name used by the UN is United Nations Organization Mission in DR Congo.

¹⁷ The Resolution also took stock of the Peace Agreement signed with Rwanda, the Pretoria Agreement on 30 July 2002. At this point in time MONUC consisted of approximately 640 military observers and 3,600 troops. The task forces were to be based in Kindu and Kisangani. The task forces were intended for, *inter alia*, "point security" at disarmament and demobilisation sites for the conduct of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process, support the engineering preparation of disarmament and demobilisation sites, destroy weapons and munitions, and provide limited demining capability.

Operation Artemis started. A Uruguayan UN battalion was deployed in Bunia under Chapter VI mandate when the Ugandan forces redeployed in early May 2003. In the void a militia, the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), sought to take control of Bunia. Spiralling violence ensued. Between 6-16 May some 500 civilians were killed and most of the 150,000 inhabitants fled Bunia (UN Best Practices Unit, 2004). Still, Kabila announced the forming of a transitional government in mid 2003, as called for in the agreed peace process.

A.3.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

The Council was committed early-on to supporting the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the peace process in the DR Congo. It was involved in the process towards a peaceful settlement since 1996 and specifically, the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes region was instrumental for the EU role in the conflict resolution (Council of the EU, 2003v, p.4). Common Positions were adopted in order to politically support actions taken by the UN and the AU in their efforts to implement the peace process (Council of the EU, 2002e, 2003f). In April 2003, the PSC not only gave support to the ongoing peace process but also echoed the UN Security Council recommendation to step up MONUC's presence in the Ituri region (Council of the EU, 2003l,u; UN Security Council, 2003b). According to the UN account, the Secretary General contacted the President of France on 10 May regarding the possibility of providing a robust force able to intervene. Then, on 15 May, the Secretary General addressed the UN Security Council requesting a multinational force to provide security and protect civilians in Bunia (UN Best Practices Unit, 2004). Shortly thereafter the issue was discussed informally by EU foreign and defence ministers at the GAERC meeting on 19-20 May 2003 (Council of the EU, 2003a, p.21). As an outcome the Secretary-General/High Representative was tasked to study the feasibility of a military CSDP operation (Council of the EU, 2003i, preamble para 3). Later that month the Council commended the initiation of the Ugandan troop withdrawal and at the same warned against action that could "reignite the violence after the Ugandan withdrawal" (Council of the EU, 2003m, p.1). The first official declarations on the intention of a CSDP operation came from the High Representative on 2 June. He talked about the need to stabilise the situation. At that stage it was still not clear how the EU would possibly contribute.

Dans le contexte des efforts en cours en vue de stabiliser la situation dans la région de l'Ituri... L'Union européenne étudie actuellement la possibilité de soutenir ou de mener au titre de la Politique européenne de sécurité et de

Details are provided in the Secretary-General's report on 10 September 2002 (UN Secretary General, 2002a).

défense une opération à Bunia (région de l'Ituri) dans le cadre d'une force multinationale intérimaire, en application de la Résolution 1484 (2003) du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies. Le Comité politique et de sécurité de l'UE est saisi de la question. (Solana, 2003a, p.1).¹⁸

However, only two days later Solana declared that a Joint Action had been agreed on the PSC level to launch an operation with France as framework nation. He also shed light on the justification for the mission: "The EU is particularly concerned by the atrocities perpetrated in that region. That is one of the main reasons of our quick reaction to the request of Kofi Annan" (Solana, 2003d, p.2). Other, less important objectives included assistance to the UN by providing a short term interim force, until the reinforcements of the MONUC could be deployed and to re-energise the support of the overall peace process. In his address to the European Parliament, Solana explained that the value added by the mission was to mobilise the international community and to act as a global force.

La valeur ajoutée d'une opération de l'UE est de contribuer à mieux mobiliser les efforts ; elle est aussi d'avoir une plus grande force de conviction, non seulement par un déploiement de force, mais aussi par ce que représentent les moyens d'action de l'UE et de l'ensemble des États Membres. Ensemble, nous signifions davantage. Et, quand la volonté politique est là, nous pouvons agir vite. (Solana, 2003e, p.3).¹⁹

The Council agreed with this argumentation. When it came to its conclusions on 16 June the Council followed the same line of argumentation and the humanitarian situation was given a less prominent role.

This force will contribute to the stabilisation of the security and humanitarian situation in Bunia and will allow the UN Secretary-General to reinforce MONUC's (United Nations Organisation Mission in the Congo) presence in Bunia. This operation demonstrates the political will and the capability of the EU to react rapidly and effectively in a crisis situation. It reaffirms the EU's commitment to peace and stability in the Great Lakes region and in

¹⁸ The author's translation to English: "In the context of ongoing efforts with a view to stabilising situation in the region of Ituri . . . The EU is reviewing the possibility of supporting or leading efforts with an ESDP mission in Bunia, in the Ituri region, as interim multinational force, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (2003). The PSC is considering the issue."

¹⁹ The author's translation to English: "The value added with an EU operation is to contribute to mobilise efforts better; it is also to generate a stronger and more committed force, not only as a show of force, but also by demonstrating the determination of the EU and its the Member States to act. Together, we signal strength. And, when the political will is there, we can act quickly".

the [DR Congo] in particular. This EU operation reflects the contribution which European security and defence policy can make to crisis management in cooperation with the United Nations. (Council of the EU, 2003g, p.2)

Given the speed in forging the decision it is reasonable to conclude that the former justification, related to the humanitarian situation was the overriding one. From the account above it can be inferred that the intervention, particularly as it all happened so quickly, was to contribute to a more secure world and thus linked to EU's value interests. The EU strived to preserve peace, strengthen security and mitigate local conflicts with limited security implications to the EU [I4].

A.3.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

The military force was deployed to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town (Council of the EU, 2003d). The underpinning UN Security Council Resolution mandating the mission also addresses the human security dimension. However it puts more emphasis on the threat to the peace process.

Determining that the situation in the Ituri region and in Bunia in particular constitutes a threat to the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to the peace and security in the Great Lakes region. (UN Security Council, 2003c, p.2).

Reviewing the threat based on the analytical framework defined in Chapter 5, it is concluded that from an EU perspective the nature of the threat was first and foremost state-centric and primarily linked to state failure [T2].

A.3.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

The mission was to rapidly deploy an interim emergency military force to Bunia to establish the local conditions for effective deployment of the reinforced United Nations (Council of the EU, 2003d). The force was deployed in the midst of an on-going conflict with sporadic fighting. It was mandated to conduct peace enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The resolution authorised the force in Bunia to take all necessary

measures to contribute to the stabilisation of security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia (Council of the EU, 2003i; UN Security Council, 2003c). In EU vernacular this mandate equates to peacemaking. Hence, it is concluded that the response is categorised as peacemaking [R1].

A.3.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

The operation took place in Sub-Saharan Africa. The DR Congo was established as a Belgian colony in 1908 but became an independent state in 1960. It is an ACP country and therefore it is concluded that the mission took place with a developing partner as the host nation [A3].

A.3.6 Conflict Cycle: When is CSDP action needed?

As established above, the force was deployed during an on-going conflict and Artemis is therefore defined as conflict resolution [C2] mission.

A.3.7 Multilateralism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

In contrast to the previous conflict examined, the conflict in Bunia was subject to a swift EU response. It was the situation on the ground rather than Brussels that set the tempo. Moreover, the mission took place in a limited and remote area that did not enjoy any significant Commission interests or political engagement, possibly with the exception of humanitarian relief by ECHO. While Concordia relied on NATO capabilities this was the first independent military operation that drew substantially on French forces, as it framework nation responsibilities. The military mission focused on establishing conducive local conditions for the effective deployment of a reinforced UN presence by 15 August 2003 (Council of the EU, 2003d). The EU force was regarded as a bridging force to allow MONUC sufficient strength in the region. The capabilities and commitments provided by the EU were critical for the UN. As a consequence, the mission was extended to allow the UN sufficient time for force generation and deployment. It is clear that the EU set conditions for MONUC (UN Best Practices Unit, 2004). Hence, it is concluded that the mission was focused on complementing other actors [M2].

A.3.8 Summary

Table A.3 reflects the outcome of the independent variables.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
	X	X		X		X	X				X

TABLE A.3: Artemis: Summary of Outcome

The mission reflects a balanced influence of Realism and Idealism. From a realist perspective Artemis was particularly influenced by the peace enforcement mandate, the time of intervention, i.e. in the midst of a conflict, and the threat of state failure.

A.4 EUPOL Proxima: The EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

A.4.1 Context

In the discussion above on Operation Concordia, the main features of the context for this mission was defined. By 2003 the EU had established a complex web of policies and implementation efforts to assist the Macedonia (European Commission, 2003b). The Stabilisation and Association Process was in progress. In addition to the Community Assistance, Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme the Commission provided funding under specific budget lines in the fields of Environment, Justice and Home Affairs. The Commission's Humanitarian Office (ECHO) was still engaged alleviating the consequences of the 2001 conflict, but was phasing out its activities (European Commission, 2003b). These efforts fell under the responsibility of the Commission, and were managed by the European Agency for Reconstruction in Skopje. Another line of operation was the Council's efforts to stabilise the situation through political consultations by the EU Special Representative as well as the military mission, Concordia.

A.4.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

In conjunction with the extension of the military EU mission (Concordia), until 15 December 2003, an EU police mission was considered a means of contributing to a comprehensive police reform and improving the border security management. Although the mission was launched in conjunction with the termination of Concordia, Solana emphasised that EUPOL Proxima was not to be regarded as a sequel to the military mission (Solana, 2003c, p.3). Nevertheless, the Joint Action to initiate planning for EUPOL Proxima and provide the mandate for the mission emphasised the need to build

upon the results achieved (Council of the EU, 2003j, preamble para 4). The rhetoric in December 2003 also indicates that continued CSDP presence was of importance.

In close co-operation and in agreement with the FYROM authorities, the EU has decided to remain engaged in the area, notably through the EU Police Mission in FYROM (EUPOL PROXIMA) starting on 15 December. PROXIMA will support the development of an efficient and professional police service and promote European standards of policing (Council of the EU, 2003o, p.2).

The master messages prepared for the mission resonated with this rationale. They address the need for continued commitment to support the full implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and at the same time they argue for bringing the country closer to the EU (Council of the EU, 2003r). Moreover it was stated that the mission aimed at assisting the Macedonian authorities in consolidating stability and the rule of law. Also, significant attention was paid to responding to the immediate needs of the police. This mission formed an integral part of the overall EU effort to secure its neighbourhood and augment its role in preparing Macedonia for EU membership. Still the most fundamental rationale appears to be linked to the full implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and reforming the police. This suggests that the mission was driven by value interests and the need to set conditions for progress in rule of law. The outcome is therefore assessed to be primarily linked with the development and consolidation of democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6].

A.4.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

The threat is identified as being a deterioration of the security situation and potential impact of this on *international* security.

The current security situation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is stable but may deteriorate with potentially serious repercussions on international security. A commitment of EU political effort and resources will help to embed stability in the region. (Council of the EU, 2003j, preamble article 5).

The risk for horizontal escalation was viewed in the wider context of the fragile security situation on the Balkans. However, Solana offers a more reasonable assessment given the capabilities provided; “the main threat to stability is no longer armed conflict but

criminality, the emphasis of our support must be police and not military” (Solana, 2003b, p.2). Further to this conclusion the Joint Action for the mission identifies consolidation of law and order, including the fight against organised crime, as a part of the mission (Council of the EU, 2003j, article 3). It is concluded that the key threat for the mission was to address is organised crime [T5].

A.4.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

The EUPOL Proxima was given a broad mandate to consolidate law and order, including the fight against organised crime, and to undertake the practical implementation of the reform of the Minister of Interior, police and border police. Although the mission was not authorised to conduct police operations to enforce law and order, it was mandated to include an “armed protection element consisting of around 30 police officers” for the safety of its personnel as well as personnel of other international contingents (Council of the EU, 2004c, art. 8). The name of the mission, Proxima, was supposed to reflect the desire to be close to the population by supporting the local police to build confidence at community level (Council of the EU, 2003j, article 3). The tasks fall within the remit of police and security sector reform domain. Due to the mission’s direct impact at the local level it is classified primarily as a police mission [R8].

A.4.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

Clearly this operation took place in South East Europe, close to the borders of the EU. A review of the plausible outcomes reveals that this mission should be classified as linked to an accession candidate [A1].

A.4.6 Conflict Cycle: When is CSDP action needed?

Mindful of Concordia, defined as a post-conflict mission, and the commitment to implement Ohrid Framework Agreement, EUPOL Proxima should also be categorised as a post-conflict management mission [C3].

A.4.7 Multilateralism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

Several international actors were involved in bolstering the police. The implementation annex of the Ohrid Framework Agreement included a passage that invited the OSCE, the

EU, and the USA to increase training and assistance programmes for police.²⁰ Several programmes and initiatives were taken forward since this agreement came into effect. The late arrival of a new police initiative created some challenges even before the mission was launched. As a consequence, a Police Expert Group was set up to mitigate institutional tensions within the EU (Council of the EU, 2003e). The EU, through the Commission was already engaged in the improvement of the police force (European Commission, 2003a).²¹ It included the effort in helping the Ministry of the Interior to draft and implement a comprehensive Police Strategy Reform. To this end the Commission's Justice and Home Affairs Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was assessing the needs in terms of specialised police units (European Commission, 2003c). This turned out to be a key project for providing support to the Macedonian authorities in the development of reform strategies for the police and judicial sectors. In addition to the competing programmes within the EU, the Council recruited the personnel from the OSCE to set up the mission. On 1 October 2003, following the adoption of a Joint Action, planning for EUPOL Proxima began under the direction of Bart D'Hooge (Council of the EU, 2003h).²² He was already in the country working on police matters, albeit for another organisation. He transitioned from the appointment as director of the OSCE Police Development Unit in Macedonia.²³ Indeed, the Joint Action confirms that this mission was focusing on boosting the EU, more precisely the Council), as opposed to adding new and complementary capabilities to the international community's efforts.

In the interest of preserving and building upon the significant results achieved in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia through a considerable commitment of EU political effort and resources, the EU is to *enhance its role* in policing to further contribute to a stable secure environment to allow the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia government to implement the Ohrid framework agreement. (Council of the EU, 2003j, preamble para 4, *emphasis added*).

In conclusion, it is evident that the unique value added by this mission is difficult to define. It did not fill a capability void and in its role as a complement to the Commission, and the on-going OSCE police mission, it seemed to add little new. Instead, it ensured a

²⁰ See Annex C para 5.3 of the Ohrid Framework Agreement available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/police_and_internal_security/OHRID+%20Agreement%2013august2001.asp. The website was accessed on 26 December 2009.

²¹ In 2003 a total of €38.5 million was allocated within the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) Programme in assisting Macedonia. Some €12.5 million were dedicated to efforts within Justice and Home Affairs, including police matters.

²² Bart D'Hooge was previously Unit Director at the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, see OSCE website: <http://www.osce.org/item/7684.html>. Last accessed on 20 December 2009.

²³ EUPOL Proxima was initiated on 15 December 2003, initially for a year and then extended for another year, to 14 December 2005. At its peak it employed 200 EU police officers and civilian experts.

continued involvement by the Council. As a consequence it is concluded that the mission sought to boost the influence of the Council [M1].

A.4.8 Summary

Table A.4 compiles the findings of EUPOL Proxima.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
	X		X		X	X			X		X

TABLE A.4: EUPOL Proxima: Summary of Outcome

This mission demonstrated the ability and flexibility of the EU to adjust and draw on a wide set of instruments. The table concludes that the mission had a predominately idealistic nature.

A.5 EUJUST Themis: The EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia

A.5.1 Context

Georgia gained its independence in 1991 as the Soviet Union dissolved. Shortly thereafter, in 1992, relations with the EU were established. Ever since, the EU has been one of the major donors to the country. At the end of 2001 the Commission summarised the political challenges in Georgia and concluded that there they were dominated by the two internal conflicts, widespread corruption and increasing divergences between reformers and conservative forces (European Commission, 2001d). The latter resulted in the ‘Rose Revolution’ in 2003 and brought a new administration to power that put market reforms and democratisation on top of the political agenda. As a consequence, the bilateral relations with the EU were intensified. Georgia repeatedly expressed a desire to become a member of the EU and later also referred to its aspiration to join NATO (European Commission, 2003f, p.5). The bilateral relations between Georgia and the EU are regulated by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement from 1999. The cooperation objectives included consolidation of democracy and economical development (European Commission, 1999b, art. 1). It also foresaw technical assistance programmes on democracy and human rights to draft and implement relevant legislation and regulations (European Commission, 1999b, art. 71). In the revised Country Strategy for 2003-2006, a Council/Commission Response Strategy was formulated around three key

areas, including promotion of the rule of law (European Commission, 2003f, p.21). The Commission assistance included the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programme as the main financial instrument. Notably, CFSP instruments were limited to other policy areas (European Commission, 2003f, p.23). The Country Strategy Paper identified EU interests for the region, and more specifically towards Georgia, as centred on trade and political stability (European Commission, 2003f, p.5). In an earlier version of the Country Strategy Paper similar priorities were made based on a long term perspective.

The EU has a strategic long-term interest in the success of transition to democracy and market economy in Georgia. It is based on the EU's interest in a stable neighbourhood, mutually beneficial political and economic relations and in supporting development. (European Commission, 2001d, p.4).

Furthermore, the Country Strategy expressed dissatisfaction with the progress made by Georgian government and the deteriorating internal security situation. In this context rule of law was regarded as weak and corruption as pervasive (European Commission, 2003f, p.9).

A.5.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

Immediately following the inauguration in Tbilisi of President Mikheil Saakashvili, the Council, on 26 January 2004, expressed aspirations to support the new administration with 'early action', without further specifying what that could entail (Council of the EU, 2004a, p.11). In his remarks at the Council meeting in February 2004, Solana argued that stronger economic cooperation with Georgia and its neighbours would prevent new dividing lines to emerge as the EU was enlarged. At the same time he signalled the intention of deploying a CSDP mission in the country without giving any indication of its scope (Solana, 2004e). Two weeks before the Joint Action was agreed, the EU decided to include Georgia in the ENP. Arguably, the timing of the as CSDP mission was shaped by the overall objectives within the framework of the ENP, to gain momentum in the reform programme. Accordingly, the Joint Action puts the mission in the context of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement implementation (Council of the EU, 2004i, preamble para 2).

In summary, this elaboration has suggest that the decision to launch EUJUST Themis was driven by a desire to strengthen the security of the Union [I3] that is linked to global stability and international trade to ensure quality of life for EU citizens.

A.5.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

The Joint Action for launching EUJUST Themis assesses the security situation as stable with the potential to deteriorate and have serious impact on regional and international security. The political commitment and resources including the mission was seen as a stabilising factor (Council of the EU, 2004i, preamble para 3). However, the mission statement, articulated in the same document, confines the EUJUST Themis to the criminal justice sector with particular focus on anti-corruption. It is reasonable to assume that anti-corruption and implicitly organised crime was a more relevant threat to address than regional security. Hence, it is asserted that the threat related to the mission is primarily organised crime [T5].

A.5.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

The Joint Action specifies four areas within criminal justice sector that the mission could be involved in; all are non-executive and aiming at capacity building (Council of the EU, 2004i, art. 2). In the EU rhetoric the mission is labelled as the first rule of law mission within the CSDP. According to the definitions in Chapter 5 rule of law missions are either aimed at strengthening the rule of law, with deployed personnel to educate, monitor and advice with the aim of bringing the local legal system up to international standards, or aimed at substituting the local judiciary/legal system, with deployed personnel carrying out executive functions. As EUJUST Themis fits into this wide definition it is concluded that this mission should be labelled as part of other civilian missions [R10].

A.5.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

The unprecedented enlargement of the EU on 1 May 2004 changed the political and geographic landscape of the EU. In the words of the Commission: “The enlargement process will bring the EU frontier closer to Georgia and the southern Caucasus” (European Commission, 2001d, p.5). The EU has both trade and political interests in promoting regional cooperation. The preamble of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement highlights that the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia will contribute to the safeguarding of peace and stability in Europe. Moreover, it has been established that Georgia is participating in the ENP. Hence, the mission is conducted in the Neighbourhood [A2].

A.5.6 Conflict Cycle: When is CSDP action needed?

In February 2001 the Council expressed willingness to play a more active role in the South Caucasus region, particularly emphasising the political dialogue with Georgia. It also expressed a desire to be involved in all phases of conflict: “the EU will look for further ways in which it could support efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts as well as in post conflict rehabilitation in the region” (Council of the EU, 2001a, p.11). Later, in 2003, an EU Special Representative for the Southern Caucasus was appointed to advance the interest of the Council. The timing of this mission is linked to the instalment of a new and more reform-oriented government. The Joint Action establishing EUJUST Themis suggests that there was neither a conflict on-going nor any post-conflict efforts to implement.

The security situation in Georgia is stable but may deteriorate with potentially serious repercussions on regional and international security and the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law. A commitment of EU political effort and resources will help to embed stability in the region. (Council of the EU, 2004i, preamble)

Recalling the definition of conflict prevention in Chapter 5 and the lack of coercive capabilities of this non-executive mission EUJUST Themis is categorised as a conflict prevention mission without deterrence [C4].

A.5.7 Multilaterism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

It has been established that the Commission had been most active in the rule of law sector for a long time. Indeed, it enjoyed top priority in the country strategy. The TACIS Indicative Programme 2004 to 2006 allocated approximately €11.5 million for support to institutional, legal and administrative reform (European Commission, 2003f, p.26). The budget of EUJUST Themis provided a modest contribution in terms of resources. It amounted some €2 million for the first year of operation and some 10 personnel co-located with the Commission delegation in Tbilisi (Council of the EU, 2004i, art.10). While the Council was expanding into a well established community policy area involving democracy, rule of law, and economic development, the Commission envisaged a narrow role of the Council and the CFSP. In a Strategy-Instrument matrix depicting the EU/EC Response Strategy, it confined second pillar activities to conflict prevention and settlement (European Commission, 2003f, p.23). In this context rule of law/governance was advanced by TACIS.

Reviewing the scale of the mission, the triggering factor, the division of labour between first and second pillar measures, and the magnitude and focus of the existing instruments, it seems that the activities of this mission would either have marginal effect and/or could have been integrated in the existing Commission activities. Adding that the EUJUST Themis performed rule of law tasks outside the predefined policy area of the Council and that it did so during a limited duration (one year) further supports this finding. It is concluded that EUJUST Themis was primarily a vehicle for the Council to enhance its influence. Enhanced commitments within rule of law through Commission instruments would probably have been a more rational approach if one only considers the practical aspects on the ground. As a consequence it is concluded that the mission sought to boost the influence of the Council [M1].

A.5.8 Summary

Table A.5 summarises the outcome of the independent variables related to EUJUST Themis.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X			X		X	X				X	X

TABLE A.5: EUJUST Themis: Summary of Outcome

This mission entails a balance of Realism and Idealism when reflecting on the outcome of the independent variables.

A.6 EUFOR Althea: The EU Military Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina

A.6.1 Context

Above the development in Bosnia-Herzegovina following the disintegration of Yugoslavia has been reviewed. The EUPM, the first CSDP intervention, in support of wider EU efforts, was fielded in 2003. Nevertheless, NATO provided the most tangible and robust contribution with its Stabilisation Force (SFOR). Initially, in December 1995 a 60,000-strong NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) deployed to implement the Dayton Peace Agreement and at the same time replacing the UN force (UNPROFOR) that had a significantly weaker mandate and force. A year later the mission was relabelled as

SFOR. The SFOR mission was continued until December 2004, when it was succeeded by the EU-led Operation EUFOR Althea.²⁴

The EU was already deeply engaged and committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina prior to the military engagement. By February 2004, when the planning of EUFOR Althea intensified, the EUPM had been operational for more than a year and some €2.5 billion of Community funds had been committed since 1991, addressing conflict and post-conflict development, focusing on refugee return programmes and reconstruction. Starting in 2001 focus shifted towards institutional capacity-building and economic development in line with the goals of the Stabilisation and Association Process (Council of the EU, 2004p, p.7).

In tandem with the considerations on a military engagement a more profound deliberation was taking place in Brussels. During 2004 a key decision point was to determine whether negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement could start. In November 2003, the Commission presented a report on the preparedness of Bosnia-Herzegovina to negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU (European Commission, 2003g). It was concluded that Bosnia-Herzegovina had made important progress. One of the objectives where progress was identified involved the consolidation of international and regional peace and stability. However, progress in several other areas, including fighting organised crime, was needed before the Commission could recommend proceeding towards negotiation on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement. The Commission assessed that it would be possible to move forward with a recommendation by the end of 2004. The European Council welcomed the report and supported its conclusion (European Council, 2003c, p.12). In June 2004, shortly before the EUFOR Althea mission was decided, the EU adopted the first European Partnership for Bosnia-Herzegovina to identify priorities for action in moving closer to the EU (European Commission, 2004a). The Stabilisation and Association Agreement negotiations between the EU and Bosnia-Herzegovina were officially launched in November 2005.

A.6.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

Already at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, the European Council indicated its willingness to explore the possibility of taking over the military mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (European Council, 2002c, p.8). It did so against the backdrop of the agreement on Berlin Plus arrangements that were concluded at the same meeting. In 2003, at the Thessaloniki Summit, the EU was overly enthusiastic and optimistic about the progress in the Western Balkans and the prospects of integrating the region closer

²⁴ NATO continued to conduct operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the handover, albeit on a limited scale.

to the EU (European Council, 2003f, p.12). The rationale for the EU to field EUFOR Althea was, to a large extent, driven by the idea of a greater and more comprehensive role for the EU as well as an increased European integration of the country. In December 2003 the European Council confirmed the readiness of the EU to launch a military CSDP-mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with recourse to NATO assets based on the agreed Berlin Plus arrangements (European Council, 2003c, p.22). The initial public master messages that were prepared shortly thereafter articulated a two-fold aim for the mission: to continue the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to support the Stabilisation and Association Process (Council of the EU, 2004p). The EU saw some potential in adding the military component to the EU toolbox. However, no clear ambition was articulated in terms of what this synergy could add. More clear was the overall interest and where the operation fitted in the political landscape.

The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) is the framework for the European course of the Western Balkans countries. The EU is determined to do its utmost to support the efforts of the countries of the region in moving closer to the Union. Available instruments will be geared towards this objective. (Council of the EU, 2004p, p.6).

Already in April 2004 the Council approved a general concept for the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Council of the EU, 2004j). At the NATO summit in Istanbul in June 2004 the Alliance announced that the successful mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, SFOR, would be succeeded by an EU-led peacekeeping force. Solana participated in the summit and made remarks on the transition. He emphasised that the agenda for implementing the peace agreement was gradually being replaced by that of European integration. Clearly, European integration was at the core of any decision on this mission. This is further underscored by the political long term objective for the mission: “A stable, viable, peaceful and multiethnic [Bosnia-Herzegovina], cooperating peacefully with its neighbours and irreversibly on track towards EU membership” (Council of the EU, 2004e, p.3). From this discussion it is clear that EUFOR Althea provided a way to integrate the country into Europe for the benefit of the Union. It, therefore, falls within the category of missions that are to safeguard the fundamental interests of the Union [II].

A.6.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

Neither the UN Security Council Resolution nor the Joint Action, defining the mandate, provides a clear picture of the threat. Instead the General Framework Agreement for

Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina serves as a key input regarding the former warring factions. Consequently the military planning put significant emphasis on the need to prevent a return of major violence (Council of the EU, 2004e). To ensure a seamless transition from SFOR, their so called Deterrence Presence Profile was emulated by EUFOR Althea. The force was tailored to deter military forces from resuming hostile activities. In the military planning to continue the implementation of the agreement it was concluded that a key task was deterrence of armed recidivist elements (Council of the EU, 2004e, p.6). Hence, it is inferred that the threat was military actions by the factions and that the threat addressed is categorised as a state failure [T2].

A.6.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

The EUFOR Althea is the largest military operation in terms of troops that the EU has embarked upon to date. Prior to deciding on the mission an international mandate was established by the adoption of a tailored UN Security Resolution on 9 July 2004 (UN Security Council, 2004b). The resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and thus categorised as a Peace Enforcement mission in UN vernacular. The subsequent Joint Action to decide on the mission was mandated to provide deterrence, continued compliance with the responsibility to fulfil the role specified in the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to contribute the safe and secure environment (Council of the EU, 2004j). Based on the robust mandate of this mission, including the UN mandate, it is concluded that EUFOR Althea mission relates to peacemaking [R1].

A.6.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

At the time of deliberation on this mission, the European Council argued that: “The future of the Western Balkans lies within the European Union” (European Council, 2003c, p.12). More importantly its justification was based on further European integration. The European Council has repeatedly stated that the EU was strongly committed to the European perspective of Bosnia-Herzegovina (European Council, 2000a, 2003f). Moreover, the country falls within the category of prospects for EU integration as it was set on a clear track towards negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement. The geopolitical aspects of the mission are influenced by a desire to integrate the country to become part of the EU and the EUFOR Althea is therefore categorised as an accession candidate [A1] mission.

A.6.6 Conflict Cycle: When is action needed?

It is already established that the mission sought to continue to implement the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As such, the mission qualifies as a post-conflict mission [C3].

A.6.7 Multilateralism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

The transition of responsibility from NATO to EU for the military component of the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina was driven by political agendas in the framework of a Euro-Atlantic security calculus and not by the situation on the ground. This conclusion is underpinned by several arguments. Firstly, EUFOR Althea did not enhance military capabilities available to address the conflict. At the transition, EUFOR Althea was maintaining the same force level as SFOR, around 7,000 soldiers.²⁵ Many deployed troops just switched organisations at the time of transition. Some 80 per cent of the SFOR troops were European (Council of the EU, 2004p). Indeed, the transition meant little more than a change in political structures. Secondly, EUFOR Althea was dependent on NATO assets and capabilities. NATO was providing planning, logistic and command support for the EU-led operation. Within the framework of the Berlin Plus arrangements between the organisations, the EU military command structure was based on critical contributions by NATO. The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO was appointed the Operation Commander for the CSDP mission, with the EU Operation Headquarters located at the SHAPE (NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) (Council of the EU, 2004q). The EU Force HQ was located together with the NATO HQ at their compound in Sarajevo. As an extra layer in the command structure an EU Command Element was stood up at NATO Joint Force Command Headquarters in Naples (Council of the EU, 2004r). Moreover the EU relied to some extent on NATO troops for employment of reserve forces (Council of the EU, 2004e). Thirdly, despite its termination of SFOR, NATO maintained a military posture in the country to conduct specific tasks. These included advising the country's authorities on defence reform, as well as working on counter-terrorism and apprehending war-crime suspects (North Atlantic Council, 2004). From this examination it is concluded that EUFOR Althea was driven by a desire to add more political weight to EU and boost the influence of the EU [M1].

²⁵ See for instance NATO press release in conjunction with the transition, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_20645.htm?selectedLocale=en. The website was accessed on 28 December 2009.

A.6.8 Summary

Table A.6 summarises the output of the independent variables for EUFOR Althea.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X		X		X		X			X	X	

TABLE A.6: EUFOR Althea: Summary of Outcome

This mission was dominated by realist justifications. As depicted in the table below five of the six independent variables have outcomes in the realist domain.

A.7 EUPOL Kinshasa: The EU Police Mission in Kinshasa

A.7.1 Context

Operation Artemis, in mid 2003, was primarily addressing the conflict in the northern eastern region of DR Congo and involving Uganda, following the peace agreement in Luanda in September 2002. Another peace settlement was made in Pretoria in July 2002 with Rwanda regarding the conflict in the eastern parts of the DR Congo (UN Secretary General, 2002a). The provisions included withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DR Congo and the dismantling of the former Rwandan Armed Forces and Interahamwe forces, a Hutu paramilitary organisation, in the country. Following this progress the internal peace process settlement culminated in December 2002 when key stakeholders, including civil society representatives, signed the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement (Furley and May, 2006, p.108). The Agreement stipulated a comprehensive plan to transition the country from civil war to peace. The end of the transition phase would be marked by presidential elections (UN Secretary General, 2003). It was envisaged that this process would include a security sector reform. The agreement also called for an integrated police unit to be organised.²⁶ In July 2003, a Transitional Government was inaugurated, as outlined in the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement. However, due to conflict that erupted in Bunia at the time, in which EU played a role with Operation Artemis, the implementation was put in hold. In October 2004 the UN

²⁶ Annex V para 2 a of the agreement states that “[a]n integrated police force shall be responsible for ensuring the safety of the government and the population.” The Global and All Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, signed in Pretoria 16 December 2002 is available at [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2004.nsf/FilesByRWDocUNIDFileName/MHII-65G8B8-gov-cod-16dec-02.pdf/\\$File/gov-cod-16dec-02.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2004.nsf/FilesByRWDocUNIDFileName/MHII-65G8B8-gov-cod-16dec-02.pdf/$File/gov-cod-16dec-02.pdf). The website was accessed on 30 December 2009.

Security Council adopted a resolution to increase the strength of MONUC, including up to 341 civilian police personnel (UN Security Council, 2004e). The resolution also empowered the MONUC with further responsibilities to support the implementation of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement, pertaining security sector reform as well as training and mentoring of the police. Notably, an earlier resolution gave MONUC a mandate in this area, albeit less comprehensive (UN Security Council, 2003a). As an interim solution MONUC was tasked to provide an Integrated Police Unit for Kinshasa.

[T]o contribute to arrangements taken for the security of the institutions and the protection of officials of the Transition in Kinshasa until the integrated police unit for Kinshasa is ready to take on this responsibility and assist the Congolese authorities in the maintenance of order in other strategic areas. (UN Security Council, 2004e, para 5a).

This paved the way for a more robust effort to bolster the Congolese police force.

A.7.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

Following the Operation Artemis the EU emphasised that their commitment towards DR Congo remained. The successful undertaking to assist the UN with a bridging operation brought the two organisations closer together in the field of crisis management. A high profile joint EU-UN declaration in September 2003 took stock of the practical cooperation in DR Congo and the Balkans with the intent to institutionalise the cooperation. The declaration made reference to the EU aspirations to assist in contributing to an integrated Police Unit in Kinshasa. The ground work for this declaration was made by the Council Secretariat and agreed by GAERC on 21 July 2003 (Council of the EU, 2003t). The declaration asked the High Representative and the Commission to consider support for setting up an integrated police unit to guarantee the security of the provisional institutions in Kinshasa and, possibly, other measures in the police sector (Council of the EU, 2003b, p.17). Moreover, the Council expressed its intention to support the electoral process, leading to presidential elections. In conjunction with the EU-UN Declaration, DR Congo authorities produced an official request to the EU to assist with the build-up of the Integrated Police Unit. In December 2003 the Council agreed on a three pronged support: the rehabilitation and refurbishment of a training centre and the provision of basic equipment; the training of the Integrated Police Unit; and the follow-up, monitoring and mentoring of the concrete implementation of Integrated Police Unit's mandate after the initial training phase (Council of the EU, 2004k, preamble).

In May 2004, a Joint Action was adopted for supporting the Integrated Police Unit, albeit not with a CSDP mission (Council of the EU, 2004h). Instead the Council called upon the Commission, and to some extent also Member States, to provide the support. The Commission was to refurbish a training centre and provide equipment to the Integrated Police Unit. Funding was available through the European Development Fund (EDF). Also, the Commission was directed to provide technical assistance. The Joint Action also indicated that a CSDP mission was contemplated to provide monitoring and mentoring of the Integrated Police Unit's build up.

The Council may decide that the EDF project and the provision of law enforcement equipment, arms and ammunition to the [Integrated Police Unit] as appropriate be followed by an European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) component for monitoring, mentoring and advising. (Council of the EU, 2004h, preamble)

On 16 November 2004, the PSC agreed to the concept of a CSDP mission, and subsequently the Joint Action to establish a CSDP mission was agreed on 9 December 2004 (Council of the EU, 2004k, preamble). The Joint Action does not offer any explicit justifications for the mission. However, from the discussion above it is clear that the EU was committed from the onset to assist during the transition phase, to set conditions for an election, which would ideally be closely linked with a sustainable peace. In conjunction with the fielding of EUPOL Kinshasa, a Council press release argued that the rationale of the mission was “ensuring the protection of the state institutions and reinforce[sic] the internal security apparatus.” (Council of the EU, 2004n, p.2). Solana elaborated further on this topic in his inauguration speech for the mission:

We would like to provide all support to the transition process and to contribute to the establishment of a strong, efficient and professional integrated police force that . . . [could] take on more responsibilities in protecting their own institutions in order to ensure the success of the Transition Process and the proper conduct of elections. (Solana, 2004d, p.2)

In conclusion, this mission, as one of several EU instruments, was driven by a desire to actively contribute to a successful transition process that would set conditions for successful elections. Clearly, this aspiration is first and foremost linked to developing and consolidating democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [16].

A.7.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

The Joint Action setting up the EUPOL Kinshasa does not provide an explicit definition of the threat. However, it emphasises that the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) is intended to strengthen the ‘internal security apparatus’ (Council of the EU, 2004k, preamble). Hence, it is concluded that the key threat is primarily related to state failure [T2].

A.7.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

In the EU master messages issued in January 2005, it was anticipated that the Integrated Police Unit would be fully operational by March 2005 (Council of the EU, 2005w). However, the mission, involving some 30 personnel, was officially launched on 12 April. The initial focus seemed to have been to set up the IPU with some 1,000 Congolese police. The Integrated Police Unit’s objective was to replace the neutral force currently made available by MONUC. The mandate of EUPOL Kinshasa stipulates that the mission was to conduct a police mission in Kinshasa including monitoring, mentoring, and advising the establishment and initial operations of the IPU (Council of the EU, 2004k, article 3). As the EUPOL Kinshasa focused on police matters the mission should be categorised as a police mission [R8].

A.7.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

The operation is taking place in Sub-Saharan Africa. It has already been established that the DR Congo is a part of the ACP cooperative framework. It is therefore inferred that the mission takes place with a developing partner as the host nation [A3].

A.7.6 Conflict Cycle: When is action needed?

The mission took place against the backdrop of the peace agreement signed in December 2002 and as such it is defined as a post-conflict mission [C3].

A.7.7 Multilateralism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

The account above suggests that the UN had an overarching responsibility for Congolese police training as well as an organised Integrated Police Unit. MONUC’s civil police contingent was more than ten times as large as EUPOL Kinshasa. Furthermore, the Commission supported the UN assistance to the IPU. The account above also suggests

that capabilities provided by the CSDP mission could have been integrated in the Commission technical assistance or into the MONUC. Indeed, both of these missions had a substantial body national experts (civil police) provided by the Member States. Had the resources for the mission been allocated to augment the Commission efforts instead, the effects on the ground would have been more substantial. The mission was an end in itself. Possibly, the evolving EU-UN relationship could have contributed to these aspirations. The British-Franco declaration in 2003 argues that the CSDP mission was intended to strengthening the role of the EU.

In respect of the ongoing discussions in the EU about the appropriate response to the request from the UN to take on a role in the training of the Integrated Police Unit in Kinshasa, the UK and France consider that a police training mission would demonstrate the EU’s continued commitment to the [DR Congo].²⁷

From this examination it is concluded that the mission was set up with the aim of boosting the EU [M1], in particular the Council.

A.7.8 Summary

In Table A.7 the findings of the discussion relating to the EUPOL Kinshasa are summarised.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
	X	X			X		X		X		X

TABLE A.7: EUPOL Kinshasa: Summary of Outcome

While the decision-making process for Artemis was exceptionally swift, this continued CSDP effort proved much more cumbersome to agree on. EUPOL Kinshasa was dominated by idealistic influences.

²⁷ Declaration from the Franco-British Summit in London, 24 November 2003, *Strengthening European Cooperation In Security And Defence* available at the website of the British The Foreign and Commonwealth Office http://www.fc.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf5/beu_ukfr_nov03_defence. Accessed on 27 December 2009.

A.8 EUJUST Lex: The EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq

A.8.1 Context

The study of EUJUST Lex is bound to originate with the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Both the intention to pre-empt an Iraqi threat and the desire to provide a UN mandate for the operation caused a major split amongst Member States. The UK, Italy and Spain, sided with the USA, while other nations, such as France and Germany, were adamant in their respective views on the lack of legality and the need for continued UN inspections (Corn and Gyllensporre, 2010, pp.528-36). Still, the need to give the UN inspectors more time was unilaterally agreed upon by the European Council at an extraordinary meeting (European Council, 2003b). By the time of the EUJUST Lex deliberations, the US-led coalition had seized control of the country and was pursuing nation building, albeit with a deteriorating security situation. A new phase of the conflict was entered with the Ashura massacre, in Baghdad and Karbala, in March 2004. Some 140 Shia Muslims were killed and another 400 injured while commemorating the Day of Ashura. (BBC, 2004). The massacre occurred in conjunction with the signing of the Transitional Administrative Law by the Interim Governing Council of Iraq.

A.8.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

At the same time as the commencement of the US-led military operation, on 20 March 2003, the European Council convened and managed to forge a common view on the future of Iraq. It expressed a desire for the EU to contribute to improving the situation including enhancing freedom, dignity and prosperity under a representative government. The Commission and the High Representative were invited to explore the means by which the EU might become involved in pursuing these objectives (European Council, 2003e, p.32). Later, at the European Council Summit in October 2003, the Commission and the High Representative were invited to present a medium term strategy for the EU's relations with Iraq (European Council, 2003d). The European Council also confirmed the EU support to the UN Security Council Resolution that was adopted to authorise the Coalition Provisional Authority as well as the US-led multinational force under international law (UN Security Council, 1995c).

In November 2004, following a discussion with Prime Minister Allawi, the European Council issued a comprehensive declaration on the EU relations to Iraq (European Council, 2004b). It articulated, *inter alia*, an aspiration for the EU to contribute to

the reconstruction and the emergence of a stable, secure and democratic Iraq through an integrated police, rule of law and civilian administration mission. More specifically, the European Council welcomed a Joint Fact Finding Mission for a possible integrated police and rule of law operation. In a follow-up decision the Council organised and dispatched an Expert Team in November 2004 (Council of the EU, 2004l, art. 1). In response to the request in October 2003 by the European Council, the Commission identified ‘substantial’ EU interests in rebuilding political and legal institutions (European Commission, 2004c, p.3). The rationale for bolstering the legal framework was not only driven by humanitarian aspects but to create conducive conditions for investments, including the energy sector (European Commission, 2004c, p.3). The strategy, welcomed by the Council (Council of the EU, 2004b), provided three objectives: A secure, stable and democratic Iraq; an open, sustainable and diversified Iraqi market economy; and an Iraq at peace with its neighbours and integrated into the international community. In follow-up recommendations in 2006 by the Commission, it proposed to maintain the medium-term strategy while focusing on five concrete objectives of which one was linked with the ongoing EUJUST Lex mission. This objective focussed on contributing to consolidation of security by underpinning the system of rule of law and promoting a culture of respect for human rights (European Commission, 2006a, p.3).²⁸ The advancement of this objectives called upon the Commission, in close cooperation the EUJUST Lex, to work towards establishing a culture of respect for human rights, including capacity building to monitor human rights compliance.

In conclusion, the deliberation for this mission was very much driven by the European Council. It formed a piece of the strategic puzzle to, on the one hand, find and show EU unity following the initial political rift. On the other hand, it was important to be seen as a relevant global actor contributing to this important endeavour. Clearly, there were some strategic EU interests to be served. However, they could not be served by the scope of this mission. It is therefore concluded that the mission was devised to safeguard the common values of the Union [12] in that it demonstrated unity and commitment.

²⁸ The objectives included:

- Endorse and support a model of democratic government that overcomes divisions;
- Contribute to a consolidation of security by underpinning the system of rule of law and promoting a culture of respect for human rights;
- Support national and regional authorities in improving the delivery of basic services and in promoting a conducive environment for job creation;
- Support mechanisms to pave the way for Iraq’s economic recovery and prosperity;and
- Promote the development of an effective and transparent administrative framework.

A.8.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

The Joint Action that establishes the EUJUST Lex stresses that the EU is committed to a secure, stable, unified, prosperous and democratic Iraq that will contribute to the stability of the region (Council of the EU, 2005j). It further defines that the situation in the country poses a threat to law and order, the security and safety of individuals and ultimately to the general stability of Iraq. While these statements cut across several pre-identified outcomes the public master messages focus on the stability of the country to contribute to regional stability (General Secretariat of the Council, 2005d). A similar message was delivered by Solana on his visit in Baghdad in June 2005.

Our presence today underlines that the European Union (EU) is fully committed to a secure, stable, unified and democratic Iraq that will make a positive contribution to the stability of the region. (Solana, 2004b, p.1).

From the discussion it is evident the major concern of the Council revolved around the stability of the country, with the potential ripple effect for the region, therefore it is concluded that the mission is primarily related to state failure [T2].

A.8.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

Ever since the European Council welcomed a Joint Fact Finding Mission on 5 November 2004 the deliberations revolved around an integrated mission comprising police, rule of law and civilian administration. Accordingly, the mission has been labelled by the EU as the first integrated rule of law mission. The mission is mandated to address the urgent needs in the Iraqi criminal justice system through providing training for high and mid level officials in senior management and criminal investigation (Council of the EU, 2005j). At the same time it is supposed to cater for closer collaboration between the different actors across the Iraqi criminal justice system and strengthen the management capacity of senior and high potential officials primarily from the police, judiciary and penitentiary and improve skills and procedures in criminal investigation in full respect for the rule of law and human rights. Whilst police matters are addressed, the mission does not have any executive powers. Therefore, this mission is labelled as a civilian mission [R10].

A.8.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

The conflict takes place in the Middle East and as such it is in the vicinity of EU territory. However, Iraq is not included in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

Nevertheless, the country is a former colony as it was occupied by the UK during World War I and later under UK administration. Iraq attained independence in 1932. When the king was overthrown by a coup d'état in 1958 and Iraq established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, relations with the UK were maintained at a minimum level. This was further compounded by the Gulf War in 1990 and the continued US and UK operations to enforce no-fly zones over Iraq 1992-2003. As the mission was set up, training activities were scheduled in the EU, with a liaison office in Baghdad. According to the Joint Action, training activities in Iraq are conditioned by improved security conditions and availability of appropriate infrastructure. Given the actual location of training Europe, the mission area in a non-ENP country in the Middle East it is assessed that the mission should be classified as taking place in 'other parts of the world' [A4].

A.8.6 Conflict Cycle: When is CSDP action needed?

The mission was conducted well after the coalition partners declared, on 15 April 2003, the war effectively over. However as noted above, the conflict took a new turn in March 2004 with the attacks in Baghdad and Karbala. Later, insurgent attacks increased significantly and subsequent sectarian violence grew to a level regarded as a civil war. Clearly, this is not a post-conflict situation. As discussed above, the EU threat assessment and the conduct of training activities in the EU bear witness of an on-going conflict. Therefore and the conflict phase is labelled as conflict resolution [C2].

A.8.7 Multilateralism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

In comparison with other EU measures and partner activities the EUJUST Lex provides modest contributions. According to the High Representative the mission was focused on training of 770 Iraqi officials from the police, judiciary and penitentiary sectors (Solana, 2004b). More specifically, the objective was to train some 520 judges, investigating magistrates, senior police and penitentiary officers in 13 senior management courses and of some 250 investigating magistrates and senior police in seven management of investigation courses, over a period of a year. At that time the police force alone consisted of some 58,000 personnel.²⁹ The budget was limited. The first year of operation was financed with a budget of €10 million, including salaries, running costs for the office in Baghdad co-located with the UK Embassy amounting €2,3 million and travel costs to bring the students to Europe (Council of the EU, 2005j, article 11). In comparison the

²⁹ Data issued by the Council on Foreign Relations, available at their website <http://www.cfr.org/publication/7633/iraq.html{#}19>. The website was accessed on 30 December 2009.

Commission allocated €200 million in 2005 for support to the Iraqi administration (General Secretariat of the Council, 2005d).³⁰ Another actor involved in training was NATO (i.e. the NATO Training Mission-Iraq). At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, allies committed to a training and assisting mission addressing military leadership and the development of the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and the Iraqi Security Forces (North Atlantic Council, 2004). Few references are made in official EU documents regarding cooperation and coordination with NATO and the USA. Conversely, the EUJUST Lex received minimum attention in the USA.³¹ At a joint press event in June 2005, in conjunction with the US-EU Conference in Brussels to build a renewed international partnership with Iraq, the Deputy Prime Minister of Luxembourg, then the EU Presidency representative, Jean Asselborn, reaffirmed the EU commitment: “The EU stands ready to take up these challenges shoulder to shoulder with Iraq in a spirit of partnership” (Rice, 2005). Although this media event was conducted in conjunction with the launch of EUJUST Lex, the mission received minimum attention.³² The 2006 USA-EU Summit Progress Report on Political and Security Issues proclaims that “The [EUJust Lex] is a crucial complement to other international efforts in the area of rule of law in Iraq”, even though the attention this mission receives in the report was minimal (Council of the EU, 2006h). In a similar vein, the subsequent Summit Progress Report states that the EU is “conducting a successful Rule of Law training program called [EUJust Lex] for Iraqi officials.” (Council of the EU, 2007p).

To sum up, the EUJUST Lex is modest in ambition, compared to other EU efforts and engagements by other key actors. As a consequence, the mission received minimum attention at the time of inception. EUJUST Lex was deployed to boost the influence [M1] of the EU, in particular the Council.

A.8.8 Summary

Table A.8 captures the findings of EUJUST Lex. The mission provided an equal mix of Realism and Idealism influences.

³⁰ The funding included programmes for restoration of public services, employment, strengthening institutions, and support for the political process, civil society and human rights. In addition the Commission provided some €320 million to humanitarian aid, reconstruction and preparation for the elections on 30 January 2005.

³¹ For instance, no information, press release or statement was issued by the State Department in relation to the inauguration of the mission.

³² Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn made a specific reference to the mission. Secretary of State Rice made reference to the need for technical assistance in rule of law. Neither Iraqi or UN officials nor the Press expressed any interest in the mission.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X	X			X		X		X		X	

TABLE A.8: EUJUST Lex: Summary of Outcome

A.9 EUSEC RD Congo: The EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

A.9.1 Context

In section 7 above, the security situation and EU engagements in DR Congo were reviewed in relation to EUPOL Kinshasa. As EUSEC RD Congo was contemplated during the same time-frame, most of the relevant parts of the context have already been addressed. In addition, the UN Security Council adopted another resolution that urged the transitional government to conduct security sector reform.

[T]hrough the expeditious integration of the Armed Forces and of the National Police of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in particular by ensuring adequate payment and logistical support for their personnel, and stresses the need in this regard to implement without delay the national disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion programme for Congolese combatants (UN Security Council, 2005b, p.2).

Moreover, it urged MONUC to assist within its mandate and capabilities and requested the donor community to continue to assist the integration, training and equipping of the Armed Forces and of the National Police.

A.9.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

The Council argued that the transition process had reached a decisive phase and that there were considerable challenges still to be met. The demobilisation of the combatants and reform of the security sector were identified as crucial components to the success of the transition and to the post-crisis strategy in the DR Congo (Council of the EU, 2005c, p.14). From this, it is clear that the justification of the mission was designed to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6].

A.9.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

The Joint Action setting up the mission does not explicitly address the threat. In order to understand the nature of the threat it is necessary to consult earlier deliberations of the Council and its emphasis on the critical transition process. Security sector reform was one avenue of approach towards preventing a failed transition.

The demobilisation of the combatants and reform of the security sector are crucial to the success of the transition and to the post-crisis strategy in the [DR Congo]. (Council of the EU, 2005c, p.14).

It is reasonable to conclude that the main threat to be addressed was state failure [T2].

A.9.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

According to the Joint Action establishing the mission, the EUSEC RD Congo should provide advice and assistance for security sector reform with the aim of contributing to a successful integration of the army (Council of the EU, 2005l). Consequently, the scope of the mission is consistent with the definition of security sector reform missions [R6] as outlined in Chapter 5.

A.9.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

In accordance with earlier elaborations on the DR Congo, it is concluded that the mission took place with a developing partner [A3] as the host nation.

A.9.6 Conflict Cycle: When is action needed?

The mission took place against the backdrop of the peace agreement signed in December 2002 and as such, it is defined as a post-conflict mission [C3].

A.9.7 Multilateralism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

While the MONUC is responsible for the overall support of security sector reform, EUSEC RD Congo provides a valuable complement that aims for tangible outcomes, beyond the scope of the UN mission, including budgetary and financial control and management, public procurement, accountancy and financial monitoring (Council of the EU, 2005l). Therefore it is concluded that EUSEC RD Congo is focused on complementing other actors [M2].

A.9.8 Summary

Table A.9 summarises the outcome from the independent variables.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
	X	X			X		X		X		X

TABLE A.9: EUSEC RD Congo: Summary of Outcome

Apart from the state-centric aspect of the mission, the EUSEC RD Congo was underpinned by idealist influences.

A.10 EU AMIS: The EU support to the African Union Mission in Darfur

A.10.1 Context

Sudan has a long history of civil war. The violence related to the Darfur crisis can be traced back to February 2003, when attacks were initiated against government targets in the western part of the country. These attacks drove the government to respond with proxy militias against the separatist movement, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M). These semi-autonomous militias were trained, armed, funded and mobilised by the leadership in Khartoum to attack civilian bases in the Darfur region that provided support for the rebel insurgency (Brunk, 2008). There were reports of government aircraft bombing villages, and militias that would slaughter, rape and steal. Reportedly more than 2 million people fled their homes (BBC, 2006). Following a humanitarian cease-fire signed in N’Djamena, Chad, in April 2004 the African Union deployed a monitor mission to Darfur, AMIS, to observe compliance with the agreement (Council of the EU, 2005m, preamble). A string of UN Security Council resolutions lent support to the Ceasefire Agreement and the gradually expanding AU deployment, but also to aimed to energise further support from the international community, including logistical, financial and materiel support (UN Security Council, 2004a,c,d,f).

A.10.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

The EU was involved in brokering the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and supporting the AU deployment. Since January 2004, the EU and its Member States were providing

a wide range of support to the African Union's efforts to help stabilise the situation in Darfur (General Secretariat of the Council, 2005b).³³ In June 2004 the European Council expressed its deep concern at the continued humanitarian crisis and large-scale human rights violations in Darfur. At the same time it confirmed the EU's involvement in, and financial support to, this mission (European Council, 2004b). In 2004 the African Peace Facility was set up under the Ninth European Development Fund as a €250 million development instrument in support of African peace support operations and capacity building in the area of peace and security, (European Commission, 2007c). In June 2004 the High Representative sent a letter to the President of the African Union Commission, Oumar Konaré, declaring the intention of the EU to provide observers at the disposal of the African Union in support of AMIS, one of them being the Vice-President of the Ceasefire Commission. In conjunction with this event the High Representative reflected on the EU justification for becoming involved in the mission: "The consolidation of the cease fire is crucial to prevent a real humanitarian crisis in Darfur. This is the reason why the Member States have quickly decided to take part in the cease-fire monitoring mechanism" (Solana, 2004c, p.1). In a similar vein, the European Council argued that the support was made with the aim of alleviating human suffering (European Council, 2004b, 2005b). However, the Joint Action for fielding a CSDP mission did not materialise until after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed to end the civil war in Sudan and a Transitional Government of Sudan was installed in June 2005. Still it is relevant to relate the justification of this mission to respect for human rights. The critical situation of this humanitarian crisis, by some assessed as genocide, resonates with the core beliefs and universal human rights that is a bedrock in the EU values and principles. Arguably the justification of the mission relates to the development of and respect for human rights [I6]. However, the graveness of the situation, as it was understood by the EU, begs for a more profound value-based justification. It is therefore deemed appropriated to classify the mission as an effort to safeguard the common values of the Union [I2].

A.10.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

The threat to regional stability was acknowledged from the onset and articulated by Solana in May 2005 (Solana, 2005a, p.1). As will become apparent in section 21 of this Appendix, the conflict would spread and destabilise neighbouring Chad and the Central African Republic, triggering another CSDP mission. It is therefore concluded that the threat is Regional Conflicts [T1].

³³ The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, sometimes referred to as the Naivasha Agreement, is available at the UN website: <http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-en.pdf>. The website was last accessed on 10 February 2010.

A.10.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

The EU sent observers to support the African Union well in advance of the mission. Following the agreement on the implementation of the ceasefire, in June 2004, Solana announced the decision of the EU to provide observers at the disposal of the African Union, one of them being the Vice-President of the Ceasefire Commission (Solana, 2004c). The Joint Action is not specific on the mandate of the mission. It outlines support to be provided by a civilian and a military component (Council of the EU, 2005m). The master messages shed some more light on this. The military component included planning and technical assistance to all levels of command of AMIS II, the enhanced AU mission, military observers, training, equipment and assets as well as strategic and tactical transportation. On the civilian side the support included assistance to the AMIS CIVPOL chain of command; support for the training of CIVPOL personnel and EU support to the development of a police unit within the secretariat of the African Union (General Secretariat of the Council, 2005b). Clearly this mission had a wide scope comprising military and civilian instruments as well as several of the pre-identified outcomes, including security sector reform, police missions and monitoring mission. The EU logic of labelling this mission as a monitoring mission is that it is supporting the African Union efforts to monitor the ceasefire, AMIS II. As the EU mission included provision of the Vice-Chairman of the Ceasefire Commission and 11 monitors throughout Darfur it is interpreted that this is the critical element of the mission. Hence the outcome is defined as monitoring mission [R9].

A.10.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

The mission was taking place in Sudan, an ACP country. The EU AMIS is therefore is categorised as hosted by a developing partner [A3].

A.10.6 Conflict Cycle: When is CSDP action needed?

Despite the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in January 2005 between the Government of Sudan and Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the situation in Darfur did not improve. In late March 2005 the UN Security Council argued for the need to put an end to the violence.

[T]o take immediate steps to achieve a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Darfur and to take all necessary action to prevent further violations of human

rights and international humanitarian law and to put an end to impunity, including in the Darfur region. (UN Security Council, 2005a, pp.1-2).

The European Council echoed the UN appeal in June 2005 and stated that the EU pursued its commitment to restoring peace and development through its support for AMIS (European Council, 2005b). It is clear that this crisis was seen in the context of Conflict Resolution [C2].

A.10.7 Multilateralism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

From a mission perspective the interaction with other actors, in addition to the support provided to the AU, specifically included the UN and NATO (Council of the EU, 2005m). It is clear that the EU was a key player in making the AU operation possible, providing most of the funding. Also, the CSDP mission ensured access to critical enabling capabilities for the AU. The consolidated supporting package included, amongst other things, substantial capability contributions, both military and civilian (General Secretariat of the Council, 2005b). Moreover, EU AMIS set conditions for the follow-on AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) (Solana, 2007b; UN Security Council, 2007a). To this end the practical support on the ground provided a valuable complement and prerequisite for the effective use of the funding allocated through the Commission and the African Peace Facility and it is inferred that the EU sought to complement other actors [M2].

A.10.8 Summary

Table A.10 summarises the findings of EU AMIS.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who		
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	
		X	X			X	X			X		X

TABLE A.10: EU AMIS: Summary of Outcome

Following the discussion above it is concluded that this mission comprised a balanced approach of realist and idealist influences.

A.11 AMM: Aceh Monitoring Mission

A.11.1 Context

Aceh is situated on the northern tip of the island of Sumatra (Indonesia). It is believed that the diffusion of Islam in the region emanated from Aceh. A small Islamic kingdom was established during the 15th Century. Ever since, Aceh has fought for independence from Portuguese, Dutch, and Japanese invaders as well as centrist rulers in Jakarta. While these historical conflicts have links to religion and the Acehnese identity, the conflict of interest, emerging in the 1970s has a different context. Aceh has significant natural resources, including oil and gas. Some estimates put Aceh gas reserves as being the largest in the world. In 1972 international oil and gas companies began exploiting the natural resources in Aceh. The alleged uneven distribution of revenues between the central government and the native people of Aceh created tensions. Aceh proclaimed Independence in 1976 and created the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). Although unsuccessful, the insurgency maintained its goal and operated in waves during the next 30 years (Barter, 2008).³⁴

In 2004 a newly elected administration in Indonesia took on the challenge to devise a peace plan for Aceh. The former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari became engaged (Braud and Grevi, 2005). The Tsunami in December 2004 was devastating for Aceh, as the region was already impoverished. As a consequence, the political landscape changed radically. Domestic political cohesion set conditions for delivery of humanitarian relief. It also re-energised peace talks facilitated by Ahtisaari (Braud and Grevi, 2005). During negotiations, the parties identified a need for a suitable monitoring body. The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was to be established by the European Union and five ASEAN contributing countries with a mandate to monitor the implementation of both parties' commitments (Feith, 2007). The negotiations culminated in signing of a MoU on 15 August 2005, which included a mandate and a key role for AMM.

The EU was involved in the peace process by providing financial support to the negotiator Ahtisaari and his team as well as assisting the disaster relief financially through the Commission's Rapid Reaction Mechanism (Solana, 2005e).

A.11.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

The Commission regional strategy from 2001 emphasises that Asia is a crucial economic and political partner for Europe, and outlines an overall strategic framework for relations

³⁴ The paragraph is based on (Barter, 2008).

with Asia with a 10-year outlook based on the key objective of: “strengthening the EU’s political and economic presence across the region, and raising this to a level commensurate with the growing global weight of an enlarged EU” (European Commission, 2001c). Within this context, contributions to peace and security in the region were envisaged as a consequence of the enhanced engagement in the region. Eight sources of conflict in the region are identified, among them Aceh. Other policy areas of focus include trade and investment flows, promoting development and mitigation of poverty, protection of human rights and to the spreading of democracy, good governance and the rule of law. The Commission Strategy Paper on Indonesia (2002-2006) focuses on assistance in two sectors: good governance and the preservation and sustainable management of natural resources (European Communities, 2001). These objectives are further broken down, including the rule of law. The paper briefly covered the unrest in Aceh and claimed that implementation of regional autonomy legislation for Aceh would be a key indicator of progress. However no specific Community measures were identified to address this issue. Before negotiations in early 2005 the EU did not attempt to specifically address the conflict in Aceh. Still, the conflict was addressed as a part of a general effort of good governance. The Tsunami disaster changed the EU posture and attention significantly. The EU and its Member States constituted a key donor for the victims. Some €630 million were allocated for the humanitarian response in Indonesia, in addition to the annual support of €240 million (Solana, 2005e).

In June 2005 the European Council indicated that a CSDP mission was considered, however no justification was provided (Council of the EU, 2005y, p.7). In the subsequent GAERC meeting in July the High Representative gave an update from the EU fact-finding mission and the MoU negotiations (Council of the EU, 2005d). Again, no rationale for engaging in the conflict settlement was provided. In his inauguration speech for the mission on 15 September, the High Representative elaborated on the desire support Indonesia in enhancing security and the need to support in the Tsunami stricken Aceh.

The EU wants to support Indonesia and the people of Aceh on the path to peace, security and prosperity. It wants in particular to help the Aceh region, which has been devastated both by conflict and by the consequences of the tsunami. (Solana, 2005e, p.1).

Only after the completion of the mission was a more articulate explanation provided. It was argued that the objective of the AMM was to “contribute to a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict in Aceh” against the backdrop of the Tsunami disaster (General Secretariat of the Council, 2006a, p.1). There are no signs

that suggest that the mission was driven by vital EU interests. Instead the Tsunami in combination with the window of opportunity that the peace talks brought forward seem to have been the driving factors. Accordingly the mission aimed to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6].

A.11.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

The Crisis Management Concept for the mission foresaw the EU involvement as support to resolve a threat to Indonesia's territorial integrity and regional stability within the country (Council of the EU, 2007l).³⁵ As a positive second order effect the involvement intended to strengthen the longer-term democratic reform process which will ultimately provide a sustainable political resolution to the conflict (Council of the EU, 2007l). From this it can be concluded that the main threat was resumption of hostilities by the signatories of the MoU and thus associated with state failure [T2].

A.11.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

According to the Joint Action establishing the mission, the key mandate of the AMM was to monitor the implementation of the commitments undertaken by the Government of Indonesia and the GAM pursuant to the MoU (Council of the EU, 2005n). The AMM mission was conducted with non-uniformed EU personnel through a civilian chain of command. The MoU, as well as the Joint Action further specified tasks, focusing on the monitoring of demobilisation, re-integration of GAM and its members as well as monitoring of the human rights situation. The Crisis Management Concept of the AMM specifically states that the mission "would not perform any functions that might be considered to be peacekeeping" (Council of the EU, 2007l, p.5). It is inferred that the mandate is first and foremost linked to a monitor mission [R9].

A.11.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

The mission takes place in Aceh, Indonesia. During the occupation, wars were fought in the Aceh region. Indonesia gained independence from the Netherlands in 1945. In accordance with the definition in Chapter 5, the mission takes place in 'other parts of the world' [A4]. The AMM was the first CSDP mission in Asia.

³⁵ Based on the language in the Commission Country Strategy Paper (CSP) it is concluded that regional stability refers to internal stability in the country. In the CSP, 'regional unrest' is used to describe internal hot spot without any reference to inter-country stability. Furthermore the CSP claims that "The international community has been explicit about its continued support to Indonesia's territorial integrity" (European Communities, 2001, p.12).

A.11.6 Conflict Cycle: When is action needed?

The mission was deployed in conjunction with and in support of the signing of the MoU between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement support of its implementation. Indeed, the timing was critical for success and the initial deployment had to coincide with the signing of the MoU (Council of the EU, 2007m). The mission qualifies as a post-conflict management [C3] mission.

A.11.7 Multilaterism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

In accordance with the MoU the mission was to be executed by EU and ASEAN. The EU confidently claimed its dominant role by setting conditions for peace and stability.

The AMM was the first EU-led mission in Asia and the first co-operation with ASEAN member states of this kind, illustrating the EU's growing cooperation with this key region. By establishing the AMM, and fully assuming its role as a global actor, the EU underlined its commitment to the peace process in Aceh, as well as to peace and stability in the region as a whole. The EU showed its capability to reach out to regional partners, carving out the conditions for lasting peace, security and justice. (General Secretariat of the Council, 2006a).

The EU with its Member States provided the preponderance of the monitoring personnel and the Head of Mission was a Council Secretariat *fonctionnaire*. As the mission commenced the EU announced that it included some 226 international unarmed personnel, comprising 130 from Member States as well as Norway and Switzerland, and 96 from the five participating ASEAN countries (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) (Solana, 2005e, enclosure).³⁶ The mission chain of command went through the High Representative (Council of the EU, 2005n). Clearly, the EU had a key role. In addition, the Commission supported the mission through flanking measures including support for the re-integration of former GAM combatants into civil society and democratic political life (Solana, 2005e, p.1). Another aspect of the partner interaction is the EU emphasis on promoting its own institutions. The master messages articulated the role of the EU as a global actor and its capability to reach out to regional partners and more specifically a vehicle to enhance relations with East Asian countries (General Secretariat of the Council, 2005e). In a paper issued by the EU Institute for Strategic

³⁶ The Initial Monitoring Presence, deployed on 15 August 2005, comprised 80 monitors from EU and ASEAN countries. The mission was formally deployed on 15 September 2005.

Studies the authors suggested that the mission was related to the EU as an institution. It served the purpose of advancing the newly established Civ-Mil Cell in the Secretariat (Braud and Grevi, 2005). In addition, it demonstrated action despite the setback with the Constitutional Treaty. Finally, the authors argued that the mission demonstrated that the EU was a global player in the security arena.

In summary, the mission demonstrated commitment and leadership shown in launching the operation. Notwithstanding the observations made by the EU Institute for Strategic Studies it is assessed that effective multilateralism was the key rationale. The deployment of AMM seeks to add concrete capabilities and complement other actors [M2].

A.11.8 Summary

Table A.11 summarises the outcome of the independent variables related to AMM. The result confirms a dominance of idealist drivers.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
	X	X			X		X		X		X

TABLE A.11: AMM: Summary of Outcome

The table below summarises the outcome and confirms the idealist dominance.

A.12 EUBAM Moldova: The EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine

A.12.1 Context

The Transnistrian region stretches along the border region between Moldova and Ukraine. At the heart of the problem justifying a CSDP mission was a struggle for independence. This is the only Moldavian region where ethnic Moldovans were outnumbered by a Slavic majority of Russians and Ukrainians (Vahl and Emerson, 2004, pp.4-5). The Transnistria conflict started in 1990 with minor armed clashes between Transnistrian Republican Guard and Cossack units, supported by the Russian army, and Moldovan policemen (Vahl and Emerson, 2004, p.6). In conjunction with the Moldavan independence and its accession into the UN, intensified fighting erupted in March 1992 (Johansson, 2006, p.509). A ceasefire was reached shortly thereafter. The fragile ceasefire was challenged at times by increased tensions between the parties but no outbreak of

violence has occurred. A European crisis management mission to Moldova to address the latent Transnistria conflict was contemplated in 2003 (Rácz, 2005, p.2). The Dutch OSCE Presidency started to negotiate both with the EU and NATO regarding a crisis management mission. At that time the force proposal included some 1,000 soldiers, and foresaw cooperation with Russian peacekeepers. However, the Dutch initiative was rejected by the Russian settlement plan, the so-called Kozak-memorandum (Rácz, 2005, p.2).³⁷ The proactive Russian posture triggered an increased EU interest in the conflict. At the same time the EU-Russia dialogue on security issues evolved. An objective of the dialogue was to: “strengthen EU-Russia dialogue on matters of practical co-operation on crisis management in order to prepare the ground for joint initiatives . . . in the settlement of regional conflicts, inter alia in regions adjacent to EU and Russian borders” (Council of the EU, 2005b, p.38). The Orange Revolution that started in late 2004 and subsequent changes in Ukrainian policy set conducive conditions for a more active EU approach to conflict resolution. These developments in combination with lack of attention by other key actors, such as the USA, NATO, and the OSCE, made the EU the conduit for change (Popescu, 2006).

A.12.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

The EU objectives towards Moldova were initially formulated in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1998, and re-iterated in various Council conclusions (European Commission, 2003e). The objectives seek to project EU values of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, and market economy to Moldova. However, another motivation was that Moldova aspired to an enhanced of association with the EU, leading to future EU membership. Moldova was a member of the Stability Pact for South East Europe, and had declared its interest in becoming a member of Stabilisation and Association Process (European Commission, 2004d). Moreover the paper states that the EU objectives seek to extend the area of peace and stability in the EU neighbourhood. The latter is specifically related to supporting the process of settling the conflict with the separatist region of Transnistria, in full coordination with the OSCE. To this end, various measures were contemplated regarding, border and customs issues. The Commission conducted meetings with Moldova and Ukraine during 2003-2004 on the introduction of joint border controls between two countries, including along the Transnistria section of the border (European Commission, 2004d). In March 2005, the Council appointed an EU Special Representative for Moldova to,

³⁷ Putin’s special envoy, Dmitri Kozak, prepared an unilateral settlement plan in November 2003, the Kozak-memorandum. The Kozak-memorandum was finally refused by Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin. This would have opened the way to a Russian military presence until 2020 and Transnistria’s de facto domination of the whole of Moldova.

amongst other things, strengthen the EU contribution to the resolution of the Transnistria. The mandate articulated an intention by the EU to contribute actively to the settlement by launching a mission (Council of the EU, 2005k, para 1b). The rationale for the mission was well embedded in the ENP. With specific reference to the conflict, it argues that the EU must have a more active role in conflict settlements and demonstrate its willingness to assume a greater share of the burden of conflict resolution in the neighbouring countries: “A shared neighbourhood implies burden-sharing and joint responsibility for addressing the threats to stability created by conflict and insecurity” (European Commission, 2003e, p.12). From this discussion it is concluded that a motivating factor behind the mission was the EU aim to build security in its neighbourhood [I7].

A.12.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

The Commission Country Strategy paper on Moldova argues that fighting organised crime and trafficking, widespread corruption and money laundering are key objectives of the EU action in support of Moldova (European Commission, 2004d). On 30 November 2005, when the mission was launched by the High Representative, Javier Solana, and Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the Presidency issued a declaration that shed some more light on the nature of the threat, putting organised crime at the forefront and regional stability as a second order effect.

The deployment of the EU Border Mission marks an important step in the development of cooperation between the EU and the Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities in the fight against weapons trafficking, smuggling, organised crime and corruption . . . The Mission is also part of the EU’s ongoing commitment to helping to improve security and stability in the region. (Council of the EU, 2005x, p.1).

The documentation and statement bear witness of a focus on organised crime [T5].

A.12.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

On 20 September 2005, prior to the adoption of the Joint Action establishing the mission, the PSC agreed on the establishment of an EU Border Mission for Moldova-Ukraine including through the reinforcement of the team of the EU Special Representative for Moldova. This Joint Action, adopted on 7 November 2005, mandates the support team to ensure overview of the political activities related to the Moldovan-Ukraine state border

(Council of the EU, 2005o). Initially the team included around 70 border professionals from EU Member States (EUBAM Moldova, 2006). The official joint request from Moldova and Ukraine sought assistance in the creation of an “international customs control arrangement and an effective border monitoring mechanism on the Transnistrian segment of the Moldova-Ukraine State border” (General Secretariat of the Council, 2007b, p.1). The EUBAM is an advisory mission without executive powers. This mission falls within the remit of a monitor mission [R9].

A.12.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

Earlier discussions have established the proximity to the EU and the geopolitical interest the Union was paying to the conflict, including the specific reference to the Transnistrian Conflict in the ENP. Clearly, the conflict takes place in the EU neighbourhood [A2].

A.12.6 Conflict Cycle: When is CSDP action needed?

While the mission sought to establish preconditions for a settlement to the Transnistrian conflict, the conflict was of a latent nature, without overt hostilities since 1992. Given the long period of non-violence it is assessed that the mission is deployed as a preventive engagement. The EUBAM Moldova is viewed as a measure of conflict prevention without deterrence [C4].

A.12.7 Multilateralism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

The EUBAM Moldova has a very complex relationship with the Commission and was from the onset dependent on Community financing. The initial six month phase of the mission was funded under the Commission’s Rapid Reaction Mechanism, and not the CFSP budget. The following 18 months were funded under the TACIS programme, also within the first pillar budget of the Commission (EUBAM Moldova, 2006). Moreover, EUBAM Moldova carried out its mandate by providing on-the-job training and advice, formal training and assisting via another Commission funded project, BOMMOLUK (Improvement of Border Controls at the Moldova-Ukraine Border) (EUBAM Moldova, 2006). The legal mandate of EUBAM Moldova is not a Joint Action launching a new mission, but an amendment of the mandate of the EU Special Representative to augment the support team. In short, the mission was managed by the Commission but the head of mission reported to the Council through the EU Special Representative and the PSC. As a reflection of the ambiguity of the institutional arrangements the official photo from the inauguration depicts both the High Representative and the Commissioner cutting the

ribbon simultaneously (EUBAM Moldova, 2008, p.3). It is argued that the involvement of the Council in the field activities provided limited added value. These activities could possibly have been executed exclusively through a Commission chain of command. This situation testifies that the CSDP element of the EU effort was initiated to boost the Council [M1].

A.12.8 Summary

Table A.12 summarises the outcome of the independent variables related to EUBAM Moldova.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X			X	X		X			X	X	

TABLE A.12: EUBAM Moldova: Summary of Outcome

In summary, the mission reveals a balanced idealist-realist outcome.

A.13 EUPOL COPPS: The EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories

A.13.1 Context

In 1975 the Commission signed the first Co-operation Agreement with Israel. This agreement was replaced by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (or Barcelona Process) that came into force in 2000 and added a legal foundation to the relationship (European Commission, 2000b). The co-operation agreement with Israel outlines a framework for political dialogue. One of its aims is related to promoting peace and security, based on the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as other obligations under international law. Hence there is a strong link to the idealistic aspirations of article 11 of the TEU. The partnership also addresses economic issues. The EU is Israel’s most important trading partner. Moreover the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe (European Council, 2003a). In 2005, at the Barcelona Summit of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, participants agreed to continue to “work together to reach a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict” (Council of the EU, 2005a, p.2). The ENP complements and reinforces the Barcelona Process on a bilateral basis. It is done through mutually agreed action plans. Within the ENP framework the EU and Israel agreed on an Action Plan

in December 2004, outlining strategic objectives for their relations. The plan called for both parties to be “committed to join efforts to combat common security threats, to promote peace and stability in the Middle East, to support the work of international multilateral frameworks and co-operate in these fora” (European Commission, 2004e).

Within the same ENP framework, the EU has also been engaged with the Palestinian Authority (European Commission, 1997). A bilateral Action Plan emphasised intensified efforts to facilitate the peace process for Arab-Israeli conflict and bring about the implementation of the Quartet Roadmap to a permanent two-state solution to the conflict (European Commission, 2004f). Moreover, it emphasised the need for establishing an effective enforcement of legislation and strengthening the rule of law as well as strengthening institutions and reinforcing administrative capacity.

A.13.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

It is recalled that the EU has devoted strategic priority to addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict and setting conditions for a two-state solution. The ESS also gives a good insight as to the interests of the EU: “Problems . . . impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East” (European Council, 2003a, p.4). In June 2004 the European Council urged the Palestinian Authority to consolidate all Palestinian security services and expressed its willingness to assist in improving its civil police and law enforcement capacity. To that end, it also announced intentions to provide practical support (European Council, 2004a, p.25). In April 2005, the EU Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS) was established within the office of the EU Special Representative. EU COPPS office, including four EU Police experts, was set up without legal instrument to coordinate Member States and to provide support for both immediate operational priorities, and longer term transformational change. The initiative was also justified by the envisaged Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and parts of the West Bank from mid-August 2005 and the corresponding need for the Palestinian Authority to fill the legal void. The EU COPPS office was established in the building of the Palestinian Interior Ministry in Ramallah with a detachment in Gaza City (General Secretariat of the Council, 2005f). Following its progress and in conjunction with the Israeli withdrawal, in July 2005, the GAERC agreed that the EU COPPS should be enhanced and established as a CSDP mission, EUPOL COPPS (Council of the EU, 2005d). Clearly, this was an effort that should be seen as a practical and immediate effort to assist in the critical phase of Israeli withdrawal. Hence, despite the strategic priority of the Middle East it is assessed that it was the evolving situation on the ground and the urgent need for security that triggered this mission. Amongst the value interests identified in Chapter 5 that apply to this conflict,

the aspiration to promote international cooperation and the ambition to develop and consolidate the rule of law stands out. However, at this critical juncture in the peace process it seems that the focus was first and foremost on international security. In July 2005, the GAERC commented on the urgency of the matter.

The Council commended the political courage shown by the leaders of the two sides with regard to the withdrawal from Gaza and certain parts of the northern West Bank. The Council stressed the importance of a successful disengagement and noted that only one month remains until it is scheduled to start. (Council of the EU, 2005d, p.16).

The CONOPS also argued along the lines of the EU facilitating the Palestinian Authority in complying with its Roadmap-obligations (Council of the EU, 2005t). From this elaboration it is inferred that this mission was launched to preserve peace and strengthen international security [I4].

A.13.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

In July 2005 the Council articulated serious unease about the security situation in the Occupied Territories, in particular related to recent terrorist attacks (Council of the EU, 2005d). However, the mission was not designed to address this type of threat. The Joint Action establishing the EUPOL COPPS defines the operational environment and concludes that it “poses a threat to law and order, the security and safety of individuals, and to the stability of the area” (Council of the EU, 2005p). An examination of the Draft CONOPS reveals that assistance to enforce law and order was key.

[T]he support of the EU to the [Palestinian Civil Police] aims at increasing the ‘safety and security’ of the Palestinian population and at serving the domestic agenda of the Palestinian Authority in reinforcing the rule of law. (Council of the EU, 2005t).

Mindful of that fact that the Palestinian Authority is not a state as such the characteristics relevant for this research still apply and it is concluded that EUPOL COPPS is primarily addressing state failure [T2].

A.13.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

The mandate of the mission, as laid out in the Joint Action establishing the mission, is to contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements

under Palestinian ownership (Council of the EU, 2005p). It is primarily concerned with advising and mentoring the Palestinian Civil Police in implementing the Police Development Programme. Accordingly, the mission is categorised as a police mission [R8].

A.13.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

Both Israel and the Palestinian Authority are partners in the ENP. Consequently, the mission takes place in the EU neighbourhood [A1].

A.13.6 Conflict Cycle: When is action needed?

When it comes to the Middle East Conflict it is particularly challenging to identify the phase of the conflict cycle. In a sense this conflict emerged before the creation of the Israeli state. However, a more narrow perspective on the conflict is adopted. The issue at stake at this point was fear of renewed violence and security deterioration in conjunction with the Israeli withdrawal. As this has been the underpinning rationale for the discussion above it is assessed that this mission was in the realm of conflict prevention without deterrence [C4].

A.13.7 Multilateralism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

In 2002 the Palestinian Authority, with support from its partners,³⁸ set up an ambitious reform program. The Task Force on Palestinian Reform (TFPR) was set up to monitor and support implementation of Palestinian civil reforms.³⁹ The reform agenda included several domains linked to rule of law, such as elections, judiciary, financial accountability and reform of public administration and the civil service. However, security sector reform was beyond the scope of the TFPR. In tandem with the progress of this institution building project, the Commission pursued an ambitious judiciary programme (Council of the EU, 2005t).⁴⁰ The 2005 Commission programme included a €7 million budget for a three year project providing short term technical assistance to developing of the Judicial System (Council of the EU, 2005t). Hence, the CSDP mission was reinforcing the priorities set by the Commission. Moreover, it was complementary in that it provided

³⁸ Representatives of the Quartet (USA, the EU, Russia and the UN), Norway, Japan, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.

³⁹ The information is obtained at the EU website, see http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_1581_en.htm{#}top. The website was last accessed on 7 January 2010.

⁴⁰ The programme included the following three components; 1) institutional; 2) professional, with training activities for the members of the Judicial System; 3) provision of equipment required to carry out the tasks of the Judicial System.

practical assistance on the ground. Neither of the other Quartet members was in the position of fielding a police related mission in the region.⁴¹ The picture that emerges is a complementary one, as the mission is adding value to the process at a critical time and it is established that EU sought to complement other actors [M2].

A.13.8 Summary

Table A.13 summarises the outcome of the independent variables related to EUPOL COPPS.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
	X		X		X	X	X			X	X

TABLE A.13: EUPOL COPPS: Summary of Outcome

The EUPOL COPPS was focused on the emerging security situation in conjunction with the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Occupied Territories. As such it emphasised time critical contributions rather than serving EU vital interests.

A.14 EUPAT: The EU Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

A.14.1 Context

The narrative on Proxima in section 4 of this chapter provides the context for The EUPAT.

A.14.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

On 1 April 2004 the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Macedonia came into effect (Council of the EU, 2004g). Subsequently, in December 2005, Macedonia was granted candidate status by the European Council (European Council, 2005a, p.7). In tandem with this positive political development, the future of EU police support was considered. The Joint Action establishing the mission adopted most of the language from the legal basis of EUPOL Proxima (Council of the EU, 2005r).

⁴¹ Still the Council emphasised the importance of coordinating the mission with US Security Coordinator General Ward, see Council of the EU (2005d).

A Council press release, in conjunction with the adoption of this Joint Action, conveyed a notion of continuation of the EUPOL Proxima mission, albeit with an adjusted focus.

The objective of EUPAT is to further support the development of an efficient and professional police service based on European standards of policing: a priority reform area for further progress towards the EU. (Council of the EU, 2005i, p.1).

Whilst the Joint Action reflects the continued positive progress, including in the field of rule of law, it still argues for embedded EU political and practical measures (Council of the EU, 2005r, preamble). Hence, it is inferred that the justification for this mission is the same as for EUPOL Proxima, to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6].

A.14.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

In line with the legal basis for EUPOL Proxima, the Joint Action makes references to the need for the EU to: “further contribute to a stable secure environment to allow the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia government to implement the Ohrid Framework Agreement” (Council of the EU, 2005r, preamble). Moreover it alludes to the implications for international security and the need for continued EU commitment to further “embed stability in the country as well as in the region” (Council of the EU, 2005r, preamble). However, the mandate in the Joint Action specifically directs the mission to fight against corruption and organised crime. Accordingly, the threat is categorised as organised crime [T5].

A.14.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

In many ways the mission built on the structures established by its predecessor, EUPOL Proxima. However, the change of name suggests a new scope. While Proxima, including some 140 international police officers, had a broad scope ranging from the police reform policies at the Ministry of Interior to local police confidence building, EUPAT, with some 30 EU experts, would focus more on mentoring and implementation on the local level. Indeed, it was the focus on the local level that the High Representative emphasised during his closing speech for EUPOL Proxima (Solana, 2005c). The Joint Action specifically directs EUPAT to focus on overall implementation of police reform in the field, police-judiciary cooperation, and professional standards/internal control (Council of the EU, 2005r, art.2). The tasks fall within the definition of a police mission [R8].

A.14.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

This operation took place in South East Europe, close to the borders of the EU. A review of the plausible outcomes reveals that this mission should be classified as linked to an accession candidate [A1].

A.14.6 Conflict Cycle: When is CSDP action needed?

Mindful that EUPOL Proxima was defined as a post-conflict mission, this mission qualifies in that category on the same merits and is accordingly labelled as post-conflict management [C3] mission.

A.14.7 Multilateralism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

Based on its previous advisory missions under CARDS⁴² and following a request of the Macedonian government, the Commission launched in October 2005, a two-year police reform project, including deployed personnel affiliated with the Ministry of Interior (European Commission, 2007b). The aim with this advisory mission was to establish and consolidate an effective and publicly accountable police service. However, a gap of six months was identified between the termination of EUPOL Proxima and the initiation of the field oriented part of the Commission run advisory missions. The need to bridge these efforts was apparent. The bridging effort was a key rationale for launching the mission.

To ensure a smooth transition between the end of EUPOL PROXIMA and the start of the European Commission project in the field of police reform, the EU decided to establish a team of EU police advisors to provide further support to the development of an efficient and professional police service based on European standards of policing from 15 December 2005 for a period of 6 months. (Council of the EU, 2006j, p.4).

This mission provided an essential link between EUPOL Proxima and the Commission programmes and it is concluded that the Council seeks to complement other actors [M2] with EUPAT.

⁴² E.g. the Commission's Justice and Home Affairs Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

A.14.8 Summary

The following picture emerges as the outcomes are summarised, see Table A.14.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X			X		X	X				X	X

TABLE A.14: EUPAT: Summary of Outcome

In difference to what has been concluded regarding the previous operations in Macedonia, i.e. Concordia and EUPOL Proxima, it seems that the underpinning rationale for this mission was driven by the desire to ensure an effective and seamless contribution without reflecting too much about the role and standing of the EU and the CSDP. However, this does not explain why it was gradually downsized and refocused, as was the case when it was extended. While the official documents fail to give an answer on this subject it is reasonable to conclude that it was linked to the progress towards EU accession.

A.15 EUBAM Rafah: The EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories

A.15.1 Context

The context for this mission is provided in Chapter 5 and in section 13 of this chapter.

A.15.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

When the UK Presidency was initiated on 1 July 2005 the UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, made a Joint Statement with the EU Commissioner for External Relations and the European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner. During this event Straw claimed that: “There will be no higher priority in the next six months than working for peace in the Middle East” (Straw, 2005, p.1). Indeed, it would turn out to be a critical period for the Middle East Peace Process. One month later, the Israelis withdrew from the Gaza Strip. Prior to this significant event, the Quartet’s Special Envoy for disengagement, James Wolfensohn, presented six points, or joint issues, for the Israelis and the Palestinians to address in order to set the conditions for ensuring the success of the disengagement plan and future engagement of the international donor community.⁴³

⁴³ One of the points pertained to border crossings and trade corridors.

Improved border crossings and trade corridors constituted one of the issues. This plan did not include border crossing at Rafah, as preferred by the Palestinians. Instead the Israelis favoured movement through other passages. Despite the effort to launch the six joint issues, the plan was never materialised. In October 2005 the Commission issued a policy paper on EU-Palestinian cooperation after disengagement, building on the Quartet Roadmap and the six joint issues. The paper set out priorities for EU support (European Commission, 2005c). Two priorities, improving security and strengthening the rule of law, made reference to the important work being conducted under the EU Special Representative in the field of police support, EU COPPS. While these measures were in the political sphere some economic priorities were also identified. These included building up customs administration with the possibility of offering a third party presence. The Palestinian Authority had requested further assistance, including third party presence, and the Commission articulated the intent to examine this issue with Member States, possibly drawing on the EU experience of improving border management in Central and Eastern Europe. A CSDP mission was considered. Facilitated by the USA, the EU and the Special Envoy to the Quartet, Israel and the Palestinian Authority agreed on 15 November 2005 an "Agreement on Movement and Access", including established principles for the Rafah crossing in Gaza. In letters of invitation on 20 November 2005 and on 23 November 2005 respectively, the Palestinian Authority and the Government of Israel invited the EU to establish the mission. On 21 November, the Council welcomed the Agreement and decided that the EU should undertake the third party role proposed (Council of the EU, 2005e). The operational phase of the mission commenced on 25 November, as envisaged in the agreement. Notably, the Joint Action establishing the mission, was adopted after the deployment, on 12 December 2005 (Council of the EU, 2005s). The mission was launched just before the 10th Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit on 27 November.

From this account it can be concluded that the mission was a logical and important step to advance the overall process of a Palestinian State and regional stability. Accordingly, the Joint Action points out that the Rafah Crossing Point has economic, security and

Border Crossings and Trade Corridors – a three phase approach to "back – to – back" for all crossings but Rafah. Phase I would see improvements in the current process, and in particular an increase from 4 to 8 or ten lines, more x-ray machines etc, with the expectation of decreasing the waiting time. Phase II would introduce methods which would move the process towards "door – to – door". For example, the cab would be released, the trailer scanned and a new cab used once the trailer had passed the scanning. Phase III would see the Special Envoy chair a committee to determine an agreed definition of "door – to – door" and define methods of implementation. The Palestinians have indicated a preference to maintain Rafah for both people and goods while the Israelis have suggested movement of people through the current terminal and movement of goods through Nitzana.

The information is included in the Office of The Special Envoy for Disengagement Periodic Report, 15 July 2005 available at the UN website, see <http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/59c118f065c4465b852572a500625fea/8d577d850d97681e8525705e00509aa7!OpenDocument>. The website was accessed on 17 Oct 2008.

humanitarian implications (Council of the EU, 2005s, preamble). Comparing the EU actions in this case with those in the Balkans suggests that this process was driven by the situation on the ground as opposed to the political landscape in Brussels and the EU agenda. Hence, it is inferred that this mission has been justified from an idealistic perspective, more specifically to preserve peace and strengthen international security [14].

A.15.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

The Joint Action is not distinct in its treatment of the threat. It argues that the mission will operate in the context of a situation which poses a threat to law and order, the security and safety of individuals, and to the stability in the region (Council of the EU, 2005s). Furthermore, it states that the opening of the Rafah Crossing Point has economic, security and humanitarian implications. The emphasis on law and order and economic aspects indicates a focus on organised crime. The Commission also defined rule of law as one of the EU priorities (European Commission, 2005c). However, the mission mandate is focused on the third party role to build up confidence between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. It seems that that this was seen as the key issue as the Joint Action was finalised. On 15 November, at the occasion of the agreement on movement and access at the border crossing points with Gaza, Solana stated that the contribution was ultimately about making the disengagement possible and implicitly framing it in a regional conflict context.

I think this is a very, very important agreement ... [T]he European Union will assume the "third-party role" on that very important and complicated border ... It's not an easy task, but I'm sure it will be successful and it will contribute for the first time to the Palestinians having a border that is open and controlled by them with a third party present so that they can go to Egypt and the outside world ... We assume that responsibility as a very important contribution to the finalisation of the Gaza disengagement. (Solana, 2005d, p.1)

Solana elaborated further on this at his inauguration of the mission (Solana, 2005b). At the core of the disengagement was an aspiration of regional stability and implicit in the third party role was the aim to facilitate harmonious relations and thus mitigate regional conflicts [T1].

A.15.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

According to the Joint Action, EUBAM Rafah actively monitors, verifies and evaluates the performance of the Palestinian border control, security and customs officials working at the Rafah Terminal in accordance with the Framework, Security and Customs Agreements (Council of the EU, 2005s, art.2). These tasks are consistent with a monitoring mission [R9].

A.15.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

Both Israel and the Palestinian Authority are partners in the ENP. The mission takes place in the EU neighbourhood [A1].

A.15.6 Conflict Cycle: When is action needed?

Based on the same arguments presented for the concurrent EUPOL COPPS, it is assessed that this mission was also in the realm of conflict prevention without deterrence [C4].

A.15.7 Multilateralism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

As described above, the mission was crafted by the Quartet, in particular the USA. From this point view the mission was drawing on the unique role and status that the EU enjoyed in the Quartet as the only realistic provider of on-the-ground support through a mission. During the 18 months the EUBAM Rafah monitors were present at the terminal, a total of 443,975 passengers crossed through Rafah Crossing Point (General Secretariat of the Council, 2008b). During the State of Emergency that followed Hamas taking over the Gaza Strip in June 2007, the EUBAM Head of Mission declared a temporary suspension of operations at the Rafah Crossing Point in June 2007 (EUBAM Rafah, 2007). Despite this major setback for EUBAM Rafah, the mission represented an important step forward, as it is the first time that Israel allowed the EU to assume practical security responsibility. More importantly the mission, according to the High Representative, provided a turning point for the development: “For the first time, Palestinians assume the responsibility to manage external borders. It is one important step towards eventual statehood” (Solana, 2005b, p.1). The aim of the mission was to ensure effective multilateralism. The discussion testifies that the EU sought to complement other actors [M2].

A.15.8 Summary

Table A.15 summarises the outcome of the independent variables related to EUBAM Rafah.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
	X		X		X	X			X		X

TABLE A.15: EUBAM Rafah: Summary of Outcome

Although different outcomes, this mission reveals the same pattern of idealist and realist outcomes as EUPOL COPPS. This seems rational bearing in mind that the missions were decided on during the same period of time.

A.16 EUFOR RD Congo: EU Military Operation in support of the UN Mission in DR Congo

A.16.1 Context

The general context in which this mission is taking place has been reflected in previous sections on missions in DR Congo, i.e. section 3, 7 and 9. These missions have been launched against the backdrop of the peace accord and associated transition process that followed that civil war. The culminating event of this process was the first ever free election, initially scheduled for 18 June 2006. During the decision-making process for EUFOR RD Congo the Independent Electoral Commission postponed the election to 30 July 2006 (Council of the EU, 2006f, para.4). Financially, the EU was the main sponsor for the election.⁴⁴

A.16.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

In a letter dated 27 December 2005 from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the UK, then holding the EU Presidency, the UN requested support to the MONUC with a ‘deterrent force’ during the electoral process (UN Secretary General, 2006a, annex 1).

⁴⁴ According to Solana the EU provided some 80% of the budget. The article *Pourquoi une nouvelle operation de l’Europe en RDC?* was published in *Le Phare* on 20 July 2006, see Council website at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/FR/articles/90618.pdf. The website was accessed on 7 January 2010.

The request was specified as in the context of strengthening the cooperation between the two organisations in the area of international peace and security. A response came from the Austrian Presidency three months later (UN Secretary General, 2006a, annex 2).

At the GAERC meeting in February 2006 the Council noted the UN request and was considering how best to provide support. In this context it was concluded that this endeavour is first and foremost the responsibility of the transition government, supported by MONUC (Council of the EU, 2006b). While cautious remarks may signify hesitation to commit, a presentation by Solana following his visit to Kinshasa, at the subsequent GAERC in March, gained some support and the Presidency noted that there was “general agreement on the principle of giving a positive answer to the UN’s request” (Council of the EU, 2006c, p.15). Shortly thereafter, on 23 March, the Council approved an option paper for possible EU assistance to MONUC (Council of the EU, 2006f, para.5). On 28 March the EU, through the Presidency, responded positively to the UN request (UN Secretary General, 2006a, annex 2). The response letter made clear that it would be a four-month mission (June-October). Furthermore it emphasised the need for a UN mandate and the autonomy of the EU to decide on the use of force. Still it was underscored that the EU force should neither replace MONUC nor national forces, but act as support element. In addition, the EU saw that the force could provide assistance in securing the Kinshasa airport, and support to MONUC as needed in stabilising a situation.

Whilst the Joint Action does not shed more light on the justifications for a high profile military mission, the master messages, as a part of the information strategy are more illuminating. As expected, most of the themes are related to the importance of a successful transition process and the ability to assist the UN. However, when reviewing the master messages in more detail, it becomes clear that the rationale for the mission is grounded in vital interests of the EU. The first theme in the master messages elaborated on EU interests.

The importance of Africa for Europe: importance of stabilising the continent, because if not, we will pay the consequences - e.g. migrations, human trafficking, terrorism, diseases. (General Secretariat of the Council, 2006c, p.3).

It is argued that the mission aimed at strengthen the security of the Union in all ways [I3].

A.16.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

The Joint Action does not elaborate on the nature of the threat of this mission. In December 2005 the Council reaffirmed its commitment to a peaceful, and democratic DR Congo, as part of a stable Great Lakes region and noted that the successful completion of the transition process is not only essential for the peaceful, long-term, democratic development of the DR Congo but also for fostering peace and stability throughout the Great Lakes region (Council of the EU, 2005f). In two similar articles, published by the High Representative following the launch of the operation, he emphasised the importance of RD Congo for regional and continental stability.⁴⁵

Just as earlier missions in DR Congo have focused on state failure, this assessment suggests a state-centric perception of the threat. Furthermore in a post-mission report to the UN, the Secretariat argued that it understood MONUC's role as providing reassurance to the population of the country by the deterrence of potential 'spoilers' to the election process and the EU force was to reinforce MONUC in that context (General Secretariat of the Council, 2007c). Notably, the reference above to terrorism should be regarded as a second order consequence and a not an immediate threat. The major threat linked to the elections was state failure [T2] which could also threaten regional security.

A.16.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

The response concept revolved around providing a mobile force that could be deployed in support of MONUC, wherever needed. The UN mandate outlined five tasks for the force (UN Security Council, 2006c, p.3); to support MONUC to stabilise the situation, in case MONUC is challenged in fulfilling its mandate; to contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat; to contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa; to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel as well as the protection of the installations of EUFOR RD Congo; and to execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger. According to the High Representative, some 500 soldiers were deployed in country while the major force component, comprising some 1,100 soldiers, was stationed in adjacent Libreville, Gabon.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the mission

⁴⁵ See 'Pourquoi une nouvelle operation de l'Europe en RDC?' published in *Le Phare* on 20 July 2006. The article is available at the Council website, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/FR/articles/90618.pdf. See also 'Pourquoi des Soldates d'Europe au Congo Kinshasa?', published in *Ouest France* on 26 July 2006. The article is also retrieved from the EU website http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/FR/articles/90682.pdf. Both websites were accessed on 7 January 2010.

⁴⁶ See *La mission européenne en RD Congo, un exemple pour le futur*. published in *Newswire Media Monitoring* on 7 June 2006. Retrieved at the EU website <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EUFORCongo.pdf>. Accessed on 7 January 2010.

was based on a UN Chapter VII mandate, including peace enforcement and thus making this a peacemaking [R1] mission when considering the aforementioned tasks.

A.16.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

Consistent with earlier missions in DR Congo, EUFOR RD Congo is categorised as a mission conducted with a developing partner [A3] as the host nation.

A.16.6 Conflict Cycle: When is action needed?

Given the context of supporting a peace process originating in a peace accord from 2002, it could be argued that this mission was being conducted in a post-conflict environment. Indeed, this assessment has been made for the security sector reform missions in the country. However, the nature of this mission is conditioned by two additional but critical factors. The force was deployed for a critical event, the election. Furthermore it was intended to deter violence. From this it is deduced that the mission profile was foremost related to conflict prevention with deterrence [C1].

A.16.7 Multilateralism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

In comparison to MONUC, which comprised some 18,000 personnel, the EU was relatively small, around 3,000 personnel in total. However, the force was a very effective one. Its mobility and additional capabilities were valuable for the mission. Indeed, the EU support was consistent with the UN request that the EU initially approached with caution. Moreover, the value added also lay on the political level, further emphasising the international community's commitment (General Secretariat of the Council, 2007c). The mission provided a valuable complement for the UN and a stabilising factor on the ground. It is inferred that the EU sought to complement other actors [M2].

A.16.8 Summary

Table A.16 summarises the outcome of the independent variables related to EUFOR RD Congo.

From this discussion it is concluded that EUFOR RD Congo was dominated by realist influences.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X		X		X		X		X			X

TABLE A.16: EUFOR RD Congo: Summary of Outcome

A.17 EUPOL Afghanistan: The EU Police Mission in Afghanistan

A.17.1 Context

In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, American forces and the Northern Alliance pursued a successful military operation in Afghanistan that, in effect, removed the Taliban regime. In December 2001, influential Afghans met under UN patronage in Bonn to carve out a plan for the future of the country. Amongst other things, the Bonn Agreement gave birth to the Afghan Interim Authority and set foundations for a legal system.⁴⁷ It also foresaw support by an international security force. Following the Bonn Agreement, the London Conference on Afghanistan took place in January 2006 with a broad representation from the international community, including the EU (Council of the EU, 2006a, p.10). Partners renewed their commitments to Afghan reconstruction and support for the Afghanistan Compact, The latter provided a framework for enhancing security, advancing rule of law, governance and human rights, and economic and social development.

Ever since NATO assumed responsibility in Afghanistan by taking command over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003, the security situation has deteriorated.⁴⁸ The geographic expansion of ISAF from Kabul to all of Afghanistan was not matched by forces required. At the NATO Summit at Riga in November 2006 the Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, once more made a case for more military capabilities. As the challenges mounted the realisation of the need for a comprehensive approach, working in concert with international organisations, grew. He then called for the UN, the EU and the World Bank, to step up their efforts. He also revealed that he had asked the EU to contribute to practical measures for enhancing the security:

NATO is a necessary but not sufficient condition of success. That is why I have called on the EU in particular to contribute its expertise in police

⁴⁷ The Bonn Agreement is available at the official website of the Government of Afghanistan, see <http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm>. The website was last accessed on 11 March 2009.

⁴⁸ This correlation does not intend to suggest that ISAF has a negative impact on the situation. An elaboration of the driving factors for the deterioration security situation is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

training and I am happy that a mission to this end will visit Afghanistan soon. (Hoop Scheffer, 2006).

It is difficult to assess the extent of the impact this request had. However, as more than 20 Member States of the EU were committed to ISAF it is reasonable that the request in some way, influenced decision making in the Justus Lipsius building (headquarters of the Council), regarding alleviating committed troops.

A.17.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

In November 2005, the EU and Afghanistan adopted an ambitious Joint Declaration setting out a new partnership (Council of the EU, 2005u). This Joint Declaration outlines increased co-operation, based on Afghan ownership, in a broad range of areas, including development of police forces. The EU and its Member States committed themselves to support with funds and expert assistance. Along the same lines the Commission Country Strategy Paper for Afghanistan 2007-2010 allocated €610 million for Multiannual Indicative Programmes, primarily against the priorities in Rural development, Governance, and Health. While Governance included justice and public administration reform, there was no particular emphasis on police. In addition, continued minor contributions were made towards facilitating restructuring of the national police service (European Commission, 2006f).

In June 2006, in conjunction with the initiation of the EUPOL Afghanistan deliberation, the EU met with the USA for an annual summit. The progress report on Afghanistan claimed that the country had reached a critical point in its stabilisation. It stated that twenty-three Member States participated in the process, and the European Union had contributed over €3.3 billion to Afghan reconstruction and development since 2002. Since 2001, the USA had committed over \$10.3 billion (Council of the EU, 2006h). On 18 July 2006, the PSC endorsed a joint exploratory mission to prepare an assessment of the rule of law in Afghanistan. The Mission report recommended, *inter alia*, further considerations on a police mission (Council of the EU, 2007i). Having assessed the mission report the PSC initiated deployment of another fact-finding mission. With planning activities in Brussels a Crisis Management Concept could be put forward to the Council in February 2007 (Council of the EU, 2007g).⁴⁹ The Council envisioned that the mission should address issues of police reform at central, regional and provincial level. It also addressed the need to pay attention to ensuring complementarity and mutual reinforcement with actions of the Commission, especially its proposed engagement with reform

⁴⁹ The document is classified and therefore not accessible. The information has been retrieved from the document name and date that are released for official use.

of the justice sector (Council of the EU, 2007a). In tandem with the deliberation of the EUPOL Afghanistan, the Commission reviewed its Asia Strategy. The new strategy covered programming for 2007-2013 and did not change the course already set. No new initiatives or changed ambitions for Afghanistan were included. Shortly thereafter, the UN Security Council adopted a Resolution, which welcomed the decision to launch the EU police mission.

[The Security Council welcomes] the decision by the European Union to establish a mission in the field of policing with linkages to the wider rule of law and counter narcotics, to assist and enhance current efforts in the area of police reform at central and provincial levels, and looks forward to the early launch of the mission (UN Security Council, 2007c, p.3).

Despite a lengthy account on the political context, the rationale for embarking on this mission has not been evident in the EU documents. The Joint Action establishing EUPOL Afghanistan outlines contributions toward sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements as the objective (Council of the EU, 2007i, art.3). At the official start, on 15 June 2007, this message was echoed and the announcement stated that the mission

aims at contributing to the establishment of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements that will ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system under Afghan ownership and in accordance with international standards. (Council of the EU, 2007o, p.1).

From this discussion it can be concluded that the ambitions to augment the rule of law sector was consistent with the trajectory set by the Council as well as the Commission. However, there was no earlier indication in the policy processes that provided the rationale for this measure at this point. The timing of the mission is discussed further below. To sum up, the justification for the mission is centered around a desire to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6].

A.17.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

There is no clear assessment of threat in relation to the mission. Despite the armed Taliban insurgency with terrorist affiliation, the EU put emphasis on other parts of the security challenge, such as organised crime. Perhaps this is explained by the non-military engagement. The Commission Country Strategy for 2007-2013 asserts that the narcotics trade is a primary threat to stable political development (European Commission, 2006d,

p.7). Moreover, the external actions of the third pillar stress the EU support in combating drug production in and trafficking from Afghanistan (Council of the EU, 2006l). The Joint Action establishing the mission calls for cooperation with NATO in a number of areas including security support. Regular in-theatre security training is also recommended (Council of the EU, 2007i). At his GAERC address on 14 May 2007, Solana emphasised the considerable challenges regarding the state of policing arrangements and the security situation. He called for patience and determination (Solana, 2007c).

The threat includes state-centric as well as human security/transnational threats. At one extreme it concerns state failure and risks of regional instability. While these primarily are addressed by the military forces, terrorism and organised crime are issues for the police to deal with. In this context, it is therefore prudent to link the threat to organised crime [T5].

A.17.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

Despite the name of the mission it also emphasises activities in the domain of security sector reform. According to the Joint Action, the mission is a non-executive engagement to promote effective civilian policing arrangements but also address interaction with the wider criminal justice system. The Joint Action also called upon the mission to support the reform process within the police (Council of the EU, 2007i). As the Council outlined the practical support to the police to include the provisional level, in addition to the national level (Council of the EU, 2007o, p.1), it is reasonable that the mission should be classified as a police mission [R8].

A.17.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

The mission is taking place in Asia. Despite British interventions in Afghanistan during the three Anglo-Afghan wars, their influence never did measure with colonial control. In accordance with the definition in Chapter 5, the mission should be classified as taking place in 'other parts of the world' [A4].

A.17.6 Conflict Cycle: When is CSDP action needed?

Although the process started with the Bonn Agreement and the fall of the Taliban regime, the internal security challenges as outlined above are extraordinary. Indeed, the on-going NATO mission is in a state of war, in particular in the south and east, and the war situation is frequently reported in the media. As a consequence, the police force is

being built up during an ongoing conflict where some units are engaged in large scale and high intensity operations. It is inferred that the mission takes place in a conflict resolution [C2] phase.

A.17.7 Multilaterism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

Annex I of the Bonn agreement called upon the international community to assist in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces. The training responsibility was soon divided among partners. The USA, UK and France were supporting military training while Germany was responsible for the Afghan National Police and established the German Police Project Office in Kabul. The police training has been subject to some harsh criticism. Late funding delayed training efforts significantly. The training effort was under-resourced and failed to help the ordinary police who did the patrolling. Instead focus was on higher ranks and geographically limited to Kabul. By introducing a substantial in-country training organisation from 2005, the USA became the de facto lead agent for police training (Solana, 2007c), in partnership with ISAF and several national initiatives. The EU claims that EUPOL Afghanistan, led by a German Police Commissioner, builds on the German mission (Council of the EU, 2007o).

While the ambition of the mission is welcomed the resources provided did not measure up to the requirements nor to other partner contributions. From an EU perspective the mission was an opportunity to boost its own influence. On the other hand, other Afghan partners saw merit in a deepened EU commitment. Mindful of the demanding tasks of transforming the geographically dispersed Afghan Police including some 75,000 personnel, EUPOL Afghanistan was limited in scale. At the start of the mission it consisted only of some 160 police, law enforcement and justice experts deployed at central (Kabul), regional (the 5 regional police commands) and provincial levels (deployment in provinces, through Provincial Reconstruction Teams) The mission was also dwarfed by the USA and NATO contributions for Afghan National Police (ANP) support. Under the control of United States Central Command the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan was deployed in Afghanistan with some 7,000 military and civilian personnel to train and equip the Afghanistan National Security Forces, including the police.⁵⁰ It is concluded that the mission was a vehicle for the EU to boost its influence [M1].

⁵⁰ Information obtained at the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan website <http://www.cstc-a.com/mission/CSTC-AFactSheet.html>. The website was last accessed on 24 November 2008.

A.17.8 Summary

Table A.17 summarises the outcome of the independent variables related to EUPOL Afghanistan.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
	X	X			X		X		X		X

TABLE A.17: EUPOL Afghanistan: Summary of Outcome

The mission is shows a preponderance of idealistic drivers.

A.18 EUPOL RD Congo: The EU Police Mission in DR Congo

A.18.1 Context

A review of the context for this mission is provided in section 7 (EUPOL Kinshasa) and in section 17 (EUFOR RD Congo). In May 2007, following the election process, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution to extend the mandate of MONUC to strengthen its role, in close cooperation with other international partners including the EU, regarding further efforts by the government in the field of security sector reform (UN Security Council, 2007b).

A.18.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

Originally EUPOL Kinshasa, officially launched in April 2005, was intended to run for a year. However, due to the continuation of the critical transition phase, a series of decisions extended and broadened the mandate of the mission (Council of the EU, 2005q, 2006g). The expanded mandate included strengthening the advisory capacity to the Congolese police with a view to facilitating the security sector reform process in the DR Congo together with EUSEC RD Congo and a temporary reinforcement to support the electoral process in the DR Congo. On 14 May 2007 the Council acknowledged that following the installation of the newly elected government in February 2007, the EUSEC RD Congo had continued to provide important advice and assistance to the DR Congo authorities in carrying out the integration of combatants from former factions, and in reforming the Congolese armed forces (Council of the EU, 2007b). Also, the Council noted preparations for the further reinforcement and expansion of the mission’s mandate

and welcomed agreement on a new civilian mission in the field of police reform, EUPOL RD Congo. The Council also approved a concept for EUPOL RD Congo, emphasising that there should be no break in continuity when the activities of EUPOL Kinshasa cease and those of EUPOL RD Congo commence (Council of the EU, 2007j, para8). The Joint Action establishing EUPOL RD Congo states that the aim of the mission is to contribute to Congolese efforts to reform and restructure the National Congolese Police (PNC) and its interaction with the judicial system (Council of the EU, 2007j, art.1). Clearly, this aspiration is the primary link to the EU objective to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6]. This is further underscored by the Council's emphasis that EUPOL RD Congo is a continuation of EUPOL Kinshasa.

A.18.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

On 14 May 2007, GAERC reaffirmed that progress in security sector reform remains a key issue to the consolidation of the security and stability in the DR Congo (Council of the EU, 2007b). Hence, in line with other civilian EU missions in RD Congo, the key threat addressed by the EUPOL RD Congo is state failure [T2].

A.18.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

The Joint Action establishing the EUPOL RD Congo outlines the mission to include providing advice and assistance for security sector reform. The mission is mandated to support security sector reform in the field of policing and its interface with the justice system, by means of monitoring, mentoring and advisory action with emphasis on the strategic dimension (Council of the EU, 2007j, art.1-2). A closer examination of its tasks reveals that engagement with the police is related to setting up forces as opposed to mentoring and assisting police forces during operations. This testifies that the mission should be categorised as a security sector reform [R6] mission in the field of police.

A.18.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

Consistent with earlier missions in DR Congo, EUPOL RD Congo is categorised as a mission conducted with a developing partner [A3] as the host nation.

A.18.6 Conflict Cycle: When is action needed?

The mission is taking place against the backdrop of the peace agreement signed in December 2002 and as such it qualifies as a post-conflict management [C3] mission.

A.18.7 Multilateralism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

Whilst EUSEC RD Congo is focused on security sector reform for army units, EUPOL RD Congo is assisting security sector reform for the police. Consequently, the missions are complementary. Still the Joint Action establishing the mission articulates a desire to merge the two missions, following a review in 2008 (Council of the EU, 2007j, art.15). Notably, the mandate for EUSEC RD Congo was renewed on same day (12 June 2007) as the adoption of the Joint Action for this mission. This suggests that, from the onset of EUPOL RD Congo, there was an attempt to combine them but, for some reason it did not come to fruition. Clearly, maintaining two separate security sector reform missions with 40 international experts each is inefficient. Moreover, bearing in mind that the country is larger than Western Europe, these small size missions have limited ability to accomplish change outside the capital. Indeed, the Joint Action defines the ‘deployment zone’ as Kinshasa. However, it also states that movement of experts and their presence in the provinces could prove necessary (Council of the EU, 2007j, art.3). This limited ambition together with the inefficiency of maintaining two parallel security sector reform missions indicate that the mission as a stand-alone structure is foremost justified by internal EU motives and not necessarily benefitting the security situation on the ground. There appears to be no compelling argument for having these Security Sector Reform efforts in a separate mission in DR Congo. Hence it is inferred that the EU sought to boost its influence [M1].

A.18.8 Summary

In Table A.18 summarises the outcome of the independent variables related to EUPOL RD Congo.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
	X	X			X		X		X	X	

TABLE A.18: EUPOL RD Congo: Summary of Outcome

This mission was dominated by idealist influences.

A.19 EUFOR Tchad/RCA: The EU Military Operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic

A.19.1 Context

Chad and neighbouring Central African Republic received full independence from France in 1960. Three decades of unrest and hardship followed for both countries. Whilst Chad was challenged by civil war and invaded by Libya, the Central African Republic suffered from misrule, mostly by military governments. An insurgence movement has been active in northern Chad since 1998. In 2005, President Idriss Deby, with the help of a referendum, successfully removed constitutional term limits and won another controversial election in 2006. In 2005, rebellions started to penetrate Chad from western Sudan as a spill over from the Darfur region. Despite signing peace agreements in December 2006 and October 2007 the rebel activities continued. The capital experienced a significant rebel threat in early 2008. In the Central African Republic a civilian rule was established in 1993 only to be ousted in a military coup in 2003 by General Francois Bozize, who managed to hold on to power during the elections in 2005. The government has limited control in the countryside. The border region in the north, towards Chad and Sudan, is an area of lawlessness beyond the control of the government. Hence unrest in these neighbouring nations affects the stability in the Central African Republic. The major trading partners for Chad and the Central African Republic in the EU include France, Belgium and Germany.⁵¹

Indeed, as the Sudan crisis unfolded the UN Security Council had repeatedly expressed concerns of escalation in Chad and the Central African Republic and pointed out that regional security aspects must be addressed to achieve long lasting peace in Darfur (UN Security Council, 2006b). To this end, EU AMIS was mandated to monitor the transborder activities of armed groups along the Sudanese borders with Chad and the Central African Republic. Also, a multifunctional presence was endorsed in key locations in Chad, including in camps for internally displaced persons and refugees, and if necessary, in the Central African Republic (UN Security Council, 2006a). In addition, the UN Secretary General proposed a UN multidimensional presence in Chad and the Central African Republic separate, but in close coordination, with the AU Mission in

⁵¹ Facts in this paragraph are retrieved at from the CIA World Fact Book, available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>. The website was last accessed on 7 January 2010.

the Sudan (AMIS)/UNMIS and other UN operations (UN Secretary General, 2006b).⁵² In a follow-up report in February 2007, based on a technical assessment mission, detailed proposals for the size, structure and mandate of a UN multidimensional presence in the two countries was provided (UN Secretary General, 2007b). Later, in July 2007, the UN Security Council expressed willingness to consider a possible multidimensional UN presence in Eastern Chad and North-Eastern Central African Republic with a view to improving the security of civilians in these regions (UN Security Council, 2007a). In response, the UN Secretary General provided a revised concept that amongst other things foresaw the EU providing the military component of the mission (UN Secretary General, 2007c).

A.19.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

The looming crisis officially came to the attention of the Council as the awareness in the UN was raised. In May 2006, GAERC expressed grave concerns about the developments in Chad (Council of the EU, 2006d). In December 2006, the European Council viewed the destabilising effects of the Darfur conflict for Chad and Central African Republic with great concern (European Council, 2006). The official statements do not disclose the context in which the EU considerations started. On 11 July 2007 Solana talked with President Sarkozy on the possibility to provide a bridging force for the UN to protect refugee camps.⁵³

Later that month the Council articulated a desire to field a CSDP operation in support of the multidimensional UN presence in Eastern Chad and North-Eastern Central African Republic, with a view to improving security in those areas (Council of the EU, 2007c). In October 2007, following the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution that mandated an EU force, the Council elaborated on the justification of the mission.

The deployment of EUFOR TCHAD/RCA is a concrete expression of the EU's commitment to actively work for the improvement of the security situation in Eastern Chad and North-Eastern Central African Republic, by contributing to the protection of refugees and IDPs, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance, helping to create the conditions for displaced

⁵² The report considered two principal options for a multidimensional presence. Option A- Monitoring mission: the mandate of a monitoring mission would be to observe the situation in the border areas. It would liaise with the parties, provide early warning and confidence-building measures; Option B- Monitoring and protection mission: in addition to the above, a larger monitoring and protection mission would contribute to improving security in the border region by also providing protection, within its capabilities, to civilians under imminent threat.

⁵³ See for instance interview with Solana in *La Croix* published on 12 July 2007 available at <http://www.la-croix.com/article/index.jsp?docId=2308823&rubId=4077>. The website was accessed on 7 January 2010.

people to return to their places of origin voluntarily, as well as contributing to ensure MINURCAT's security and freedom to operate. (Council of the EU, 2007d, p.10).

From this account it is concluded that the mission was first and foremost launched to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights [I6].

A.19.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

As described above, the mission grew out of a spreading unrest from the Darfur crisis. From the onset, regional stability was at the core of the problem. In October 2007 the Council urged all states in the region, in particular Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic, to work to promote regional stability and ensure security along their common borders (Council of the EU, 2007d). Thus, the major threat for the success of this mission was regional conflicts [T1].

A.19.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

The EUFOR Tchad/RCA was a bridging operation. In its resolution, the UN Security Council approved the establishment of a UN Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT) as a follow-on force and authorised the EU to deploy an initial force in these countries for a period of 12 months from the declaration of Initial Operational Capability. The mandate, extended under chapter VII of the UN Charter, included protection of civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons; facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian aid and protecting United Nations personnel (UN Security Council, 2007d). The Joint Action establishing the mission does not offer any information as to the design of the response (Council of the EU, 2007k, article 1). Instead, a press release on the occasion of agreeing the Joint Action for EUFOR Tchad/RCA provides information on the tasks. It outlines three tasks: contribute to the protection of civilians in danger; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid; and contribute to the protection of UN personnel (Council of the EU, 2008k). Although the force was provided with a peace enforcement mandate, its focus was on humanitarian tasks [R4].

A.19.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

The mission is conducted in Africa in former French colonies. Both countries are ACP partners. EUFOR Tchad/RCA is categorised as a mission conducted with a developing partners [A3] as host nations.

A.19.6 Conflict Cycle: When is action needed?

The urgency and deteriorating situation with spill over effects from Darfur indicates that mission takes place in an unfolding conflict situation. EUFOR Tchad/RCA is categorised as a conflict resolution [C2] mission.

A.19.7 Multilateralism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

As a bridging operation the CSDP mission filled a security void in Chad and the Central African Republic. Moreover the aspirations and ambitious programmes of the Commission in Chad and the Central African Republic were dependent on regional peace and stability. In conjunction with this mission the Commission showed resilience by adapting their programmes to ensure a comprehensive approach. During 2001-2007 (Ninth European Development Fund) the Commission assistance amounted €121 million in the Central African Republic and focused on institutional support, macro-economic support and good governance. Reconstruction of the army was identified as an objective within the framework of bolstering economic and social development in the Central African Republic (European Commission, 2000c). Since 2004, €23.4 million had been allocated through the African Peace Facility (APF) in support of FOMUC⁵⁴ to bolster national stability and security and facilitate restructuring of the armed forces.⁵⁵ The Commission has defined the Central African Republic as a “post conflict fragile state”.⁵⁶ In Chad the Commission assistance for the period 2001-2007 amounted €202 million and focused on three sectors: water supply; transport/infrastructure; and macroeconomic measures. A minor financial envelope was identified for peace and security (European Commission, 2000c). For the period 2008-2013 (Tenth European Development Fund) the assistance, amounting €317 million, aims to support good management of public services and national security in order to encourage a cycle of sustainable economic growth and a reduction of poverty. In conjunction with launching EUFOR Chad/RCA the

⁵⁴ The multinational African force in Central Africa. The acronym is based on the France name of the force, *La Force multinationale africaine en Centrafrique*

⁵⁵ An additional €10 million in EU support was allocated in 2008.

⁵⁶ See for instance the Commission (Directorate General for Development) website at http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/regionscountries/countries/country_profile.cfm?cid=cf&type=long&lng=en. The website was accessed on 7 January 2010.

Commission allocated a €3 million, of the €137 million budget, for a development and rehabilitation programme in north-eastern Central African Republic to ensure synergies with the efforts of the the Council.⁵⁷ In Chad, the Commission also contributed to the establishment of the subsequent UN Police force with the intention train and equip Chadian police officers as well as deploy them in the refugee and internally displaced persons camps (Council of the EU, 2007d). From this discussion it is clear that the mission added unique capabilities to the region in concert with the Commission and it should be concluded that the Council sought to complement other actors [M2].

A.19.8 Summary

In Table A.19 summarises the outcome of the independent variables related to EUFOR Tchad/RCA.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
	X	X			X		X	X			X

TABLE A.19: EUFOR Tchad/RCA: Summary of Outcome

Based on the analysis, the EUFOR Tchad/RCA constituted a balanced approach of idealist and realist drivers.

A.20 EULEX Kosovo: The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

A.20.1 Context

Kosovo has been elaborated in previous sections and chapters. Amongst other things, the conflict in 1999 was a catalyst for developing the CSDP. The chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the American Congress, Elmar Brok, argued that the NATO air campaign in Kosovo (operation Allied Force) was instrumental in shaping the EU.

The way NATO took military action in and around Kosovo to protect a whole population from ethnic cleansing was one of its greatest achievements.

At the same time, this war, fought on behalf of common democratic values, acted as a catalyst for Europe's consciousness because it became clear to

⁵⁷ See for instance the Commission (Directorate General for Development) website at http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/regionscountries/countries/country_profile.cfm?cid=cf&type=long&lng=en. Accessed on 7 January 2010.

the Europeans that no diplomatic action could ever be successful if it could not be sustained, if necessary, by military action. The Kosovo War will be considered in the future as a milestone in the history of the EU, because it was the key factor, which led to the declaration adopted on 4 June 1999 in Cologne by the EU's 15 heads of state and government. (Brok, 1999, p.6).

Furthermore, as CSDP missions in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were examined, the regional destabilising effects of the conflict in these countries were considered. The conflict in Kosovo surfaced in a late stage of Yugoslavia's disintegration. Disregarding many of its complexities and historical roots, unification with Albania or its recognition as an independent state had been a long time aspiration for many Kosovar Albanians. The emergence of the conflict in 1998 was due to Kosovar Albanian militancy embodied in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and atrocious responses by the Yugoslav army and the Serbian Interior Ministry (Webber, 2009). Following NATO's 78 days air campaign Milosevic gave in and capitulated. The UN Security Council then agreed on a resolution that has shaped the post-conflict period until this day, UNSCR 1244 (UN Security Council, 1999a). It mandated the deployment of a military NATO-led international Kosovo Force (KFOR) to promote security. KFOR is still operating in Kosovo, albeit far from its initial troop strength around 50,000 soldiers. On the civilian side of UNSCR 1244, an unprecedentedly broad mandate was given to the UN (UN Security Council, 1999a). Under these auspices an interim governance was installed and reconstruction was conducted within the framework of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The UN was assuming significant responsibilities in the field of governance. At its peak UNMIK employed more than 6,000 staff, and the running costs from 1999 to 2006 are estimated to be around €2.6 billion (Canas, 2008, p.2). The civilian efforts were pursued in four strands and involved the OSCE as well as the EU. The UN was responsible for two strands; police and justice and civil administration. The OSCE was in the lead for the strand regarding job of democratization and institution-building and the EU provided leadership for the strand on reconstruction and economic development. However, the fundamental issue of the status of Kosovo was left unresolved in UNSCR 1244 (Mertus, 2009). Instead it mandated UNMIK to facilitate "a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status" (UN Security Council, 1999a, p.4). The process to determine the status of Kosovo commenced in 2005 and by 2007 a plan was crafted by the UN Special Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari. While the plan gave Kosovo everything it would need for statehood it did not define the status. Instead supervised independence was envisaged. The plan faced resistance from Russia and the UN Security Council was not able to endorse it. With support from the USA and most of, but not all, Member States of the EU, the Kosovo government declared independence

in February 2008. However, the international recognition of Kosovo remained contested (Weller, 2008).

A.20.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

Since the conflict erupted it has been on the political agenda of the EU. On 24 March 1999, when NATO initiated its military air operation to enforce its non-negotiable conditions and terminate the humanitarian catastrophe, the European Council stressed the ‘moral obligation’ of the EU to respond to the humanitarian catastrophe in the ‘middle of Europe’ (European Council, 1999a, part III). In June 2003, the European Council declared the intention to integrate countries in the Balkans into the EU, the Thessaloniki Declaration (European Council, 2003f). Later, in 2005 the Commission acknowledged that this aspiration also applied to Kosovo. The Commission argued that Kosovo needed “to overcome its isolation and participate in the region’s progress towards Europe” (European Commission, 2005a, p.1). More importantly, it argued for a CSDP mission. The EU applied similar tools to Kosovo as it did to other areas Western Balkans, albeit more cautiously. A Stabilisation and Association Agreement, which is a contractual relation towards integration into the EU, was not signed until 2008. However various other instruments were applied early on, including the European Partnership for Kosovo and the Stabilisation and Association process Tracking Mechanism (European Commission, 2005a). At the European Council summit in June 2005 a comprehensive declaration on Kosovo was issued. The declaration also articulated EU aspirations of assuming greater influence in the process to determine the status of Kosovo.

Kosovo will, in the medium term, continue to need a civilian and military international presence to ensure security and in particular protection for minorities, to help with the continuing implementation of standards and to exercise appropriate supervision of compliance with the provisions contained in the status agreement. In this respect, the European Council stressed the EU’s willingness to play a full part, in close cooperation with the relevant partners and international organisations. (European Council, 2005b, p.35).

The High Representative and the Commission suggested in December 2005 a framework for the future EU role. It argued for the need to prepare for a CSDP mission in, *inter alia*, the areas of rule of law and police. In April 2006 the Council established a Planning Team (Council of the EU, 2006e). On 14 December 2007, following the Troika mediation, the European Council declared its readiness to launch a CSDP mission (European Council, 2007a, p.20). On 16 February 2008, the day before independence was declared, the

Council decided to launch the EULEX Kosovo. In a discussion in October 2008 the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, established a firm link between EULEX Kosovo and European integration.

Kosovo will remain a focal point ... A successful deployment of our ESDP mission EULEX Kosovo is essential. The EU is committed to help secure peace and stability in Kosovo and support its economic development, as well as its progress towards the EU as part of the Western Balkans. Kosovo on its part needs to ensure its commitment to a democratic and multi-ethnic society. (Rehn, 2008, p.3).

From this, it can be inferred that the decision to launch EULEX Kosovo was driven by the vital interest to safeguard the fundamental interests of the Union [I1].

A.20.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

The Joint Action establishing the EULEX Kosovo mandated the mission to monitor, mentor and advise the Kosovo institutions in all areas related to the wider rule of law. These efforts are seen in the context of regional security and a review of the specified task reveals a focus on addressing organised crime and corruption (Council of the EU, 2008b, art.3). Still other important areas include inter-ethnic crimes, property issues, war crimes, terrorism, and fostering of inter-ethnic institutions. The Concept of Operations of the mission designates support to Kosovo institutions as a key element of the EU political objectives. To this end, the mission statement emphasises the importance of enhancing judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies (Council of the EU, 2008h, p.26). This brief discussion suggests that the major threat against mission success was deterioration of the Kosovo judicial capacity. Mindful of the ambiguity over the status of Kosovo, it is inferred that the key threat was primarily linked to state failure [T2].

A.20.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

The Mission Statement argues that EULEX Kosovo will implement its mandate through monitoring, mentoring, and advising, while retaining certain executive responsibilities (Council of the EU, 2008h). Hence, the mission has features related to security sector reform, police missions, monitor mission as well as other civilian missions (rule of law, civil protection, and civil administration). As the mission has an executive component, security sector reform is a too narrow description. Likewise, police missions and monitor missions do not capture the scope of the mission. Instead it is asserted that EULEX Kosovo should be categorised as a civilian mission [R10].

A.20.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

The mission takes place in Western Balkans, and as discussed above, the EU regarded this as ‘in the middle of Europe’. EULEX Kosovo is classified as linked to an accession candidate [A1]. The geopolitical aspects are influenced by the desire to integrate the country into the EU.

A.20.6 Conflict Cycle: When is action needed?

The discussion above related to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 establishes EULEX Kosovo as a post-conflict management [C3] mission.

A.20.7 Multilaterism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

Despite initial challenges with launching the mission, due to the delicate political impasse on the status of Kosovo, the prolonged preparations by the planning team resulted in a well synchronised mission with regards to other efforts of the international community. The Concept of Operations for the mission provides a detailed account of the division of labour between the international organisations. KFOR was to cater for a safe and secure environment (Council of the EU, 2008h, p.22). The OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK) was mandated to assist in democratisation and promoting good governance through proactive monitoring of and assistance to municipal and central institutions, election organisation and supervision, media affairs, human rights monitoring, as well as protecting and promoting human rights. The plan called also for a transition of authority from UNMIK (Council of the EU, 2008b). However the impasse in the UN Security Council prevented it from releasing UNMIK from its duties. Finally all sides accepted that the UNMIK would remain, as an umbrella organisation, which the CSDP mission could operate under. In reality most of UNMIK’s responsibilities would migrate to EULEX Kosovo (Weller, 2008). From the EU side it was emphasised that EULEX Kosovo was different from that of UNMIK, in particularly with regards to the reduced executive powers.

The EU presence will be different in nature from that of UNMIK: there will be no direct administration over Kosovo, but rather a specific mandate focused on the implementation of the status and strengthening of the rule of law, with clearly defined and limited executive/corrective efforts devoted to key factors of insecurity in the region: organized crime, corruption, property issues, war crimes, terrorism, ethnically motivated crimes and financial and economic crimes. (General Secretariat of the Council, 2008a, p.11).

In this case a reduced mandate should be regarded as a positive step as the government authorities were empowered. On the coordination with the Commission, there was considerable attention given to the subject in the Concept of Operation (Council of the EU, 2008h). Moreover, on 18 February the Council agreed on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the European Partnership with Serbia including Kosovo, as defined by the UN Security Council Resolution 1244. The decision sets conditions for the Commission to act in close coordination with the EULEX Kosovo that was agreed by the Council two weeks previously (European Commission, 2000a). The UN favoured a shift of responsibilities from the UN to the EU as the Union was seen to be instrumental for the process. In 2005, the UN Special Envoy, ambassador Kai Eide, submitted a report to the UN Security Council via the UN Secretary General. In the report he concluded that putting the EU in the lead for Kosovo would provide the impetus needed for the process.

The international community will need strength to carry the future status process forward. The United Nations has done a credible and impressive job in fulfilling its mandate in difficult circumstances. But its leverage in Kosovo is diminishing. Kosovo is located in Europe, where strong regional organizations exist. In the future, they - and in particular the European Union (EU) - will have to play the most prominent role in Kosovo. They will have the leverage required and will be able to offer prospects in the framework of the European integration process (UN Secretary General, 2005, p.5).

From this discussion it is concluded that the EU sought to complement other actors [M2].

A.20.8 Summary

Table A.20 summarises the outcome of the independent variables related to EULEX Kosovo.

TABLE A.20: EULEX Kosovo: Summary of Outcome

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X			X	X	X				X		X

In summary, this mission had a complex political context. The rationale for launching EULEX Kosovo had a even mix of realist and idealist drivers.

A.21 EUSSR Guinea-Bissau: The EU Mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau

A.21.1 Context

Guinea-Bissau, a small country in Western Africa, received independence from Portugal in 1974. Ever since, the country has faced political and military turmoil. Following a military *coup d'état* in 1980, the authoritarian dictator, Joao Bernardo 'Nino' Vieira, came into power. He remained in power after the first free elections in 1994. However, military mutiny in 1998 that led to a civil war also removed Vieira from power. He was overthrown in another military *coup d'état* in 2003. In 2005, Vieira was re-elected.

Key trading partners in Europe include Portugal and France.⁵⁸ In 2005 the UK Security Sector Advisory Team (SSDAT) assisted in preparing the security sector reform Strategy Document for the country. The finalised document was circulated to international partners in November 2006 to attract external funding for SRR projects (UN Peacebuilding Commission, 2008). In 2006 an international contact group was established to support the government.⁵⁹ Despite some commitments by the international community the progress on security sector reform projects stalled because of political instability. Another fundamental challenge for Guinea-Bissau and the security sector reform was the problem of drug-trafficking (Observatoire d'Afrique, 2008; UN Secretary General, 2007a). Nevertheless, donors and the Government agreed on an security sector reform Action Plan, still with the earlier strategy document as a guideline (UN Peacebuilding Commission, 2008). A substantial portion of the budgeted \$ 184 million was provided by the Commission, through the European Development Fund (Observatoire d'Afrique, 2008, p.5). Also, Guinea-Bissau was put on the agenda of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in December 2007 (UN Peacebuilding Commission, 2007). In September 2007, the UN Secretary-General issued a report that, whilst commending the Government for the positive measures to implement security sector reform, also emphasised the country's inability to combat drug trafficking by itself. The UN Secretary General called for support, technical as well as financial, from regional and international partners (UN Secretary General, 2007a).

⁵⁸ Facts in this paragraph are retrieved at from the CIA World Fact Book, available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>. The website was last accessed on 7 January 2010.

⁵⁹ The International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau was composed of France, Spain, Portugal, Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea, ECOWAS, the Executive Secretariat of the Economic Community of West African States, and the Executive Secretariat of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries.

A.21.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

Following an initial joint Council-Commission information gathering mission in May 2007 to Guinea-Bissau, the Council considered in November 2007 that a CSDP action in the field of security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau would be appropriate (Council of the EU, 2007e). On 10 December 2007, the Council approved a concept for a potential CSDP action in support of the security sector reform efforts in Guinea-Bissau. The Council emphasised the need for coherence with and complementarity to activities financed from the European Development Fund and other Community activities. Through the Commission, the Tenth European Development Fund covering the period 2008-2013 provides a total of €100 million focused on prevention of conflict, water and energy projects. The conflict prevention project, amounting to some €27 million, focuses on the oversized security forces and administration, the inefficiency of the legal system and corruption. Moreover, the Commission Country Strategy Paper focuses on the importance of bolstering economic development and addressing poverty (European Commission, 2007e).⁶⁰ Within this context the Joint Action establishing the EUSSR Guinea-Bissau emphasises that the security sector reform efforts are needed for stability and sustainable development (Council of the EU, 2008a). Also, the commitment to Guinea-Bissau can be viewed against the backdrop of the EU commitment towards Africa in the realm of peace and stability, as discussed in Chapter 5.7.1. Notably, the deliberation of this mission was taking place in parallel with the second ever EU-Africa Summit, held in Lisbon in December 2007 and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy that was adopted at the Summit. The master messages for EUSSR Guinea-Bissau provide more insight to the justification of the mission. They outline the EU objective to revolve around assistance in establishing conditions for a stable and sustainable security sector capable of responding to society's security needs, including the fight against organised crime and drugs trafficking (Council of the EU, 2008g, p.4). Furthermore the master messages conclude that a secure and stable Guinea-Bissau is key for ensuring peace and stability in the West Africa sub-region, and it would minimise the effect of organised crime networks extending into Europe. Under the Portuguese Presidency an international conference on drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau was convened in Lisbon on 19 December 2007. Notably, one of the priorities of the Portuguese Presidency was cooperation with West Africa, specifically tackling the cocaine flow into Europe from that region. The conference sought to attract financing to implement an 'Operational plan to support the government of Guinea-Bissau in the fight against drugs', set up with

⁶⁰ Earlier Guinea-Bissau has benefited from some security sector reform programmes under the eighth and ninth European Development Fund. Within the 9th European Development Fund, assistance was focused on justice reform programmes, technical assistance and the training of magistrates.

the technical support of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).⁶¹ The justification for this mission was primarily related to ensuring quality of life for EU citizens and therefore classified as strengthening of security of the Union [I3].

A.21.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

The master messages for the EUSSR Guinea-Bissau argue that the mission mitigates threats related to state failure by addressing organised crime (Council of the EU, 2008g, p.4). It is claimed that the EUSSR Guinea-Bissau contributes towards building capabilities required for Guinea-Bissau to respond to its security needs. The elaboration on the nature of these threats is centered around organised crime. The threats identified include drug trafficking, illegal migration, and human-trafficking. Still state failure appears to be the main concern. The master messages articulates this view: “The political and security situation in Guinea Bissau remains stable, yet fragile. The EU wants to make a contribution to the stability of Guinea Bissau and the wider region” (Council of the EU, 2008g, p.6). This perception is further substantiated by the events that unfolded soon after the mission was launched. Following the elections in November 2008 the presidential palace was attacked (Solana, 2008d). When Solana made a statement after the assassination of President Joao Bernardo Vieira and the Army Chief of Staff in March 2009, he called on the need for stability in the country (Solana, 2009). The press release also included references to the EUSSR Guinea-Bissau. In summary, it is concluded that the main threat addressed is state failure [T2].

A.21.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

The Joint Action establishing the EUSSR Guinea-Bissau states that the mission shall provide local authorities with advice and assistance on security sector reform to contribute to creating conducive conditions for implementation of the National security sector reform Strategy (Council of the EU, 2008a). The particular objectives of the mission include operationalisation of the National Security Sector Reform Strategy by assisting in the planning for downsizing/restructuring the armed forces and security forces, and assistance to capacity building needs, including training and equipment. The information strategy for the mission concluded that this is the first CSDP mission in the field of security sector reform bringing together three sectors (defence, justice and police). For the purpose of this research it can be concluded that EUSSR Guinea-Bissau is a security sector reform [R6] mission.

⁶¹ The information is obtained from the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction at their website <http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/html.cfm/index48989EN.html>. The website was last accessed on 7 January 2010.

A.21.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

The mission is taking place in sub-Saharan Africa in a former Portuguese colony that is a ACP partner and supported by the European Development Fund. Thus, EUSSR Guinea-Bissau is categorised as a mission conducted with a developing partner [A3] as the host nation.

A.21.6 Conflict Cycle: When is CSDP action needed?

Whilst the Commission engagements, through the European Development Fund, assisted security sector reform programmes under the heading Conflict Prevention, the CSDP mission should be understood as a post-conflict mission. The structures and challenges addressed are all results of the country's period conflicts and instability. In particular, the way the army has evolved as an institution and the way it has influenced the political development needed to be rectified.⁶² Hence it is inferred that EUSSR Guinea-Bissau is a post-conflict management [C3] mission.

A.21.7 Multilateralism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

Before the launch of this operation the UN and the Commission were well established actors in the security sector reform arena. Within Guinea-Bissau's investment plan for security sector reform it is also benefiting from assistance by other international bilateral and multilateral partners. Still the EUSSR Guinea-Bissau was regarded as a unique and valuable contribution: "Significant EU assistance is . . . being provided under the Instrument for Stability and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) launched recently" (UN Peacebuilding Commission, 2008, p.4). It is inferred that the EUSSR Guinea-Bissau was launched to ensure effective multilateralism and that EU sought to complement other actors [M2].

A.21.8 Summary

In Table A.21 the outcome for EU SSR Guinea-Bissau is summarised.

⁶² A UN Development Programme funded Census of the armed forces indicated that there was a total of 4,493 military personnel in active service, of which 1,869 are officers (41.9 %); 604 under-officers (13.5%); 1,108 sergeants (24.9%); and 867 foot soldiers (19.7%). The census concluded that that Guinea-Bissau's Armed Forces has an inverted hierarchical pyramid, and has a ratio of 2.73 military personnel per 1,000 inhabitants, compared to the sub-region's average of 1.23 military personnel per 1,000 inhabitants (UN Peacebuilding Commission, 2008).

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X		X		X		X		X		X	

TABLE A.21: EUSSR Guinea Bissau: Summary of Outcome

The mission had a clear interest in safeguarding EU from narcotics trade and mitigating state failure. However the overall outcome points towards dominance of idealist factors.

A.22 EUMM Georgia: The European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia

A.22.1 Context

Background information for this mission is provided in section 5 (EUJUST Themis) of this chapter. In conjunction with Georgia's independence from Soviet Union a war was waged in 1991-1992 in South Ossetia, a region northwest of Tbilisi, between Georgians and Ossetians, the latter affiliated with the Russians. As a consequence, South Ossetia was controlled by a Russian-sponsored regional government without international recognition. In 2004 Georgia made a failed attempt to regain South Ossetia. In July 2008 the security situation in South Ossetia deteriorated when its de-facto government detained four Georgian soldiers. They were only released after an intervention by the Georgian President. In response, Russian military aircraft showed force over Georgian territory in an open warning to Tbilisi. After skirmishes between Georgian and Ossetian forces in and around the region's capital in early August Georgia had called a unilateral ceasefire. However, as the Ossetians continued to shell Georgian villages a Georgian military official announced on 7 August that it would restore 'constitutional order' in South Ossetia. On 8 August, the Georgian Army launched a large-scale attack against the town of Tskhinvali. Russian troops had been deployed in the region as peacekeepers, with Georgia's consent, following the first Ossetian war. As Georgian forces launched their attack Russian soldiers were killed. Within hours Russian tank columns crossed the border into Georgia and fighting between Georgian and Russian forces unfolded for five days. On 26 August Russia formally recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states (International Crisis Group, 2008; King, 2008).⁶³

⁶³ This section is based on King (2008) and International Crisis Group (2008).

A.22.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

In a first EU response on 11 August, the Presidency expressed grave concerns over the violence in South Ossetia (Council of the EU, 2008f). It gave support to the OSCE and their mission in Georgia. The EU Presidency played an important role in drafting a ceasefire plan. An extraordinary GAERC meeting was held on 13 August, which welcomed the Six Point Plan between the parties that was closed on 12 August and supplemented on 8 September (Council of the EU, 2008j).⁶⁴ The Council underlined the need for rapid reinforcement of the OSCE's observer capabilities on the ground. It also considered that the EU must be prepared to commit itself, including on the ground, to support every effort of the international community to establish a peaceful situation in Georgia. In addition, the statement stressed the need to respect Georgian sovereignty as well as the humanitarian emergency. On 1 September, the European Council reiterated GAERC's concerns regarding the deteriorating security situation as well as the readiness of the EU to commit, including by deploying a mission (European Council, 2008). More importantly, it confronted Russia with power politics by calling Russia's recognition of independence for Abkhazia and South Ossetia as 'unacceptable' and called upon the Commission to examine the practical consequences to be drawn. The European Council also saw the event as a threat against security of energy supplies to the EU. The justification for the CSDP mission must be considered against the backdrop of the strong language applied towards Russia and the perceived threat against EU interests. As an extension of this rhetoric the European Council decided to appoint a EU Special Representative and dispatch a CSDP fact-finding mission (European Council, 2008). It is reasonable to assert that the European Council would have settled with reinforcing the OSCE mission in a less hostile situation. From this discussion it is concluded that the mission was launched to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways [I3].

A.22.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

The EU was concerned by the violation of Georgia's sovereignty, Russia's recognition of independence for Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as the threat of further escalations. In its extraordinary meeting on 1 September the European Council noted with concern "the impact which the current crisis is having on the whole of the region" (European

⁶⁴ The principles to which the parties subscribed to included (1) Not to resort to force; (2) To end hostilities definitively; (3) To provide free access for humanitarian aid; (4) Georgian military forces will have to withdraw to their usual bases; (5) Russian military forces will have to withdraw to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Pending an international mechanism, Russian peace-keeping forces will implement additional security measures; (6) Opening of international talks on the security and stability arrangements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Council, 2008, p.3). It is inferred that the major threat for the EU and the CSDP mission was regional conflict [T1].

A.22.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

The Joint Action establishing EUMM Georgia mandated the mission to monitor, analyse and report on the situation pertaining to the stabilisation process centred on full compliance with the Six Point Plan as well as the normalisation process of civil governance, focusing on rule of law (Council of the EU, 2008c). The EUMM Georgia is an autonomous, civilian and unarmed mission without executive powers, comprising some 200 monitors (Solana, 2008a). Despite the perceived mandate to operate throughout Georgia there is a limit as to what they could monitor. The de-facto governments in South Ossetia and Abkhazia initially denied EUMM Georgia access to their regions. On 4 November the EUMM Georgia was granted access to enter Abkhazia for the first time (EUMM Georgia, 2008c). The Head of Mission, Ambassador Haber, argued that the mission was dependent on the cooperation of the parties;

EUMM is a civilian and unarmed mission. We cannot and we do not want to force our way. We can only go where there is cooperation. It is the task of our monitors to knock on the doors and request access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Therefore, our patrols approach the Russian, Abkhaz and South Ossetian checkpoints along the administrative boundary line. We approach the staff of the checkpoints in a friendly manner, try to establish contacts and explain our mandate. We will continue this confidence-building work. (EUMM Georgia, 2008c, p.1).

The mission was set up as and continued to be a monitoring mission [R9].

A.22.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

The mission took place close to EU borders. The European Council argued for the need to energising regional cooperation and stepping up relations with its eastern neighbours, in particular through the ENP and the development of the Black Sea Synergy initiative (European Council, 2008, p.3). It is concluded that the mission is conducted in the EU neighbourhood [A2].

A.22.6 Conflict Cycle: When is CSDP action needed?

Clearly this was a rapid reaction mission, responding within weeks of the outbreak of hostilities. The six-point Agreement that was made between the parties on 12 August suggests that it was a post-conflict mission, to ensure compliance with the agreement. Indeed, the Joint Action defining the mandate had that approach. However, the situation on the ground may not have been as stable and secure as is expected in a post-conflict mission. The fact-finding mission was dispatched on 2 September, less than a month after the war erupted. The EUMM Georgia was launched on 1 October some six weeks after the Six Point Plan was signed. Notably, the agreement was only a ceasefire measure and in itself fragile. Recalling the mandate, the first element included tasks related to stabilisation. The situation remained unstable in Georgia. Violent incidents were reported (EUMM Georgia, 2008a,b). Based on the fragile and unstable situation at the time of deployment it is concluded that EUMM Georgia was a conflict resolution [C2] mission.

A.22.7 Multilateralism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

Prior to the decision to launch a CSDP mission the Council as well as the European Council urged for EU support of the existing OSCE mission in Georgia. The Joint Action establishing EUMM Georgia calls for close coordination with the OSCE mission as well as UN activities (Council of the EU, 2008c). A closer examination of the existing OSCE mission reveals that it lacked capabilities and to some extent the mandate necessary to address the situation.⁶⁵ Another important factor is that Russia and its closest partners are members of the OSCE and thus in the position of influencing the organisation's decisionmaking. When the mandate of the mission expired, at the end of 2008, the OSCE Permanent Council failed to reach consensus on its renewal, due to the conflict.⁶⁶ The OSCE mission in Georgia was established in 1992, in conjunction with the first Georgian-Ossetian conflict. The original mandate was to promote negotiations towards a peaceful political settlement. Support to the Government of Georgia was provided in the fields of, conflict settlement, democratisation, human rights and the rule of law. In 1994 it was expanded to include the monitoring of the deployed peacekeeping forces and to become involved in the reconvened Joint Control Commission. During 2000-2004 the Mission's Border Monitoring Operation was mandated to monitor movements across parts of the border between Georgia and Russia. As of 1 February 2008, the Mission

⁶⁵ The objective of the OSCE mission was to promote negotiations between the conflicting parties, see <http://www.osce.org/georgia/13203.html>. The website was last accessed on 20 December 2009.

⁶⁶ Some twenty unarmed military monitoring officers were to remain deployed under a mandate that expired on 30 June 2009, see <http://www.osce.org/georgia/13203.html>. Accessed on 20 December 2009.

had a total of 142 staff, including 29 seconded international staff.⁶⁷ To reconfigure this mission to accommodate EU aspirations, the number of monitors would have to be ten times as big and the mandate redrawn to accommodate the implementation of the Six Point Plan. The endeavour to conduct such a major change in the mission and involve another international actor appears to have been less helpful. Given its rapid deployment, EUMM Georgia added unique capabilities on the ground. It is concluded that the mission was fielded as to ensure effective multilateralism and that the EU sought to complement other actors [M2].

A.22.8 Summary

Table A.22 summarises the findings from the analysis of EUMM Georgia.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X		X			X	X			X	X	

TABLE A.22: EUMM Georgia: Summary of Outcome

The EU and its Member States were taken by surprise by the rapid and unexpected emergence of the Russia-Georgia war. The response was strong in rhetoric and in timing so as to show that the Russian invasion was unacceptable. This posture was supported the active involvement by the EU Presidency and President Sarkozy in person. However, the mission did not match the EU's aims. A small unarmed team of civilian monitors appears to be an asymmetric response that fell short of substantiating the EU strong political stance. Whether a military option was contemplated or even possible due to other commitments is not reflected in the official EU documents and statements. Still, this civilian mission is dominated by realist drivers.

A.23 EUNAVFOR Somalia: The EU Counter-piracy Naval Operation off the Coast of Somalia

A.23.1 Context

Somalia became an independent state in 1960. General Mohamed Siad Barre created a military regime in 1969. After the 1977-1978 war with Ethiopia, a failed *coup d'état* triggered a long period of intermittent civil war. As Somalia disintegrated in internal

⁶⁷ The fact in this section are extracted from the official OSCE website available at <http://www.osce.org/georgia/>. Accessed on 24 May 2009.

conflict in late 1990, President Siad Barre fled to exile, and the fragile Somali state collapsed (Elmi and Barise, 2006). Several international efforts to broker peace failed. Three consecutive UN missions were launched with a degree of success. However when 18 USA Rangers were killed and 75 wounded in a fight with a warlord's, Farah Aideded, units in Mogadishu on 3 October 1993, forces were redeployed and the international community's commitment to address the conflict faded (Gyllensporre, 2001). By 1995 even the International Red Cross and the UN had left Somalia due to the insecurity (Sörenson, 2008). At the same time the dynamics of the internal conflict changed. The emphasis shifted from inclusive clan identities to sub-clan identities and adding more tension to the conflicts. Clan identity became an instrument for mobilisation (Elmi and Barise, 2006). Since 1991, Somalia has not had a functional, central government. The launch of the Transitional National Government in 2000 aimed at re-establishing a central state without success. Somalia is at the top of the comprehensive index of state weakness in the developing world (Rice and Patrick, 2008). Following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, attention was once more given to the Horn of Africa. The collapse of state structures in Africa's Horn, in particular in Somalia, opened up opportunities for rebels and criminals to generate cash by piracy. Piracy in this region, including Gulf of Aden and East coast of Somalia, is rampant. Prior to the launch of the mission, in 2008, it ranked as the number one piracy hot spot in the world, accounting for almost a third of the overall reported attacks.⁶⁸ From the international community's perspective there are two facets to this problem. The Gulf of Aden is a strategic chokepoint for global merchant shipping and the piracy has serious consequences for global trade. According to the International Maritime Bureau Director, Captain Pottengal Mukundan;

Piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia are unprecedented. It is clear that pirates in the Gulf of Aden believe that they can operate with impunity in attacking vessels - some of which have included tankers and large bulk carriers. The cost to owners whose vessels are hijacked is significant. What is required is robust action against the pirates' mother ships before they succeed in hijacking vessels. The locations and descriptions of these mother ships are known. We therefore call upon all governments to direct their navies to disrupt the activities of the pirates and their mother ships. This is vital to protect this major world seaway.⁶⁹

The other facet of piracy is a humanitarian one. Some 3.2 million people in Somalia are dependent on humanitarian assistance (UN Security Council, 2008d). The World Food

⁶⁸ Information obtained at International Chamber of Commerce Commercial Crime Services website http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=306:unprecedented-rise-in-piratical-attacks&catid=60:news&temid=51. Accessed at 7 January 2010.

⁶⁹ Statement issued on 23 October 2008. <http://www.cargosecurityinternational.com/print.asp?id=9949>.

Programme (WFP) is the most active agency to address this problem. Since some 90% of their deliveries are supplied by sea communications the humanitarian impact is great, amounting to 40,000 metric tons of WFP food every month.⁷⁰ However, the urgency of enhancing the WFP was not immediate. In a press release on the same day as the EU commented on the launching of the EU NAVFOR mission it was stated that “Since the naval escort system began in November 2007, no pirate attacks have been launched against ships loaded with WFP food despite 2008 being the worst year ever for piracy off Somalia” (World Food Program, 2008). These escort missions were conducted by France, Denmark, the Netherlands and Canada.

The UN Security Council has adopted three resolutions that provide a mandate for countering piracy off the Somali coast. The first resolution is focusing on political process in Somalia. It stresses the importance of unhampered passage of humanitarian goods to the country (UN Security Council, 2008e). The second resolution takes as a point of departure the reporting on piracy by the International Maritime Organization. With reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter the resolution calls upon states and organisations to coordinate and render assistance to vessels threatened by or under attack from pirates or armed robbers (UN Security Council, 2008f). The third resolution makes specific reference to the emerging EU NAVCO initiative. More importantly, it urges states to: “take part actively in the fight against piracy on the high seas of the coast of Somalia” (UN Security Council, 2008e). Notably the mandate is not confined to do humanitarian shipments.

A.23.2 Interests: Why is CSDP action justified?

Following the UN Security Council Resolution 1814 the Council acknowledged the problem with piracy, stressing the implications on international maritime traffic as well as the humanitarian efforts (Council of the EU, 2005g). In June 2008 the Council, without providing any additional justification, requested the Secretariat and the Commission study possible options for how best to contribute to the implementation of the second UN Security Council Resolution (1816) (Council of the EU, 2008d, para.3). Subsequently, the Council agreed a concept on 5 August and on 19 September 2008, a Joint Action was agreed to set up a military coordination unit (EU NAVCO) in Brussels to support the activities of Member States deploying military assets in theatre, with a view to facilitating the availability and operational action of those assets (Council of the EU, 2008d). In a EU Military Staff presentation on EU initiatives in support of implementation of

⁷⁰ Information obtained at NATO website http://www.afsouth.nato.int/organization/CC_MAR_Naples/operations/allied_provider/background.html. The website was last accessed on 10 January 2010.

UN Security Council Resolution 1816 it is stated that Piracy off the coasts of Somalia is:⁷¹

today a threat growing and likely to badly disturb *[sic]* security of sea lanes and three main tasks to facilitate with EU NAVCO

- To protect WFP shipping essentially between Mombasa and Mogadishu, but also between Djibouti and Bossaso on the North coasts of Somalia;
- To protect interest of EU shipowners in the gulf of Aden;
- To protect EU fishers whose working area is around Seychelles Islands and that are threatened by Somalian pirates,

Clearly, the justification for this mission is two fold. Due to the explicit references to EU interests we will conclude that these take precedent and provide the overarching rationale for the mission. Thus it is concluded that mission is devised to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways [I3].

A.23.3 Threats: What is the nature of the threat?

In an implementation policy to the Africa Strategy, the Commission introduced a regional partnership for the Horn of Africa in 2006. The analysis in the document lays out a serious threat to the EU.

[A]n uncontrolled, politically neglected, economically marginalised and environmentally damaged Horn has the potential to undermine the region's and the EU's broad stability and development policy objectives and to pose a threat to European Union security. (European Commission, 2006h, p.5)

The Joint Action as well as the UN Security Council Resolution identified the threat as acts of piracy and armed robbery (Council of the EU, 2008e; UN Security Council, 2008f). The threat is transnational and according to the discussion in Chapter 5.5 primarily related to organised crime [T5].

⁷¹ Accessed at the Council website on 23 May 2009 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1521&lang=en>

A.23.4 Response: How should a CSDP response be tailored?

The Joint Action defines the military mission to include deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast (Council of the EU, 2008e, art.1). The mission is designed to enforce compliance with the UN Security Council Resolution, if necessary using force. Therefore, the mission is categorised as a peacemaking [R1] mission.

A.23.5 Arena: Where is the conflict taking place?

The mission is conducted in international waters in the proximity of Somalia, a country in Eastern Africa. Somalia has no significant colonial links remaining. However, it is participating in the ACP programme and therefore it is concluded that the mission takes place with a developing partner [A3] as the host nation.

A.23.6 Conflict Cycle: When is action needed?

This mission is conducted as the conflict is on-going and EUNAVFOR Somalia is defined as a conflict resolution [C2] mission.

A.23.7 Multilaterism: Who is engaged in resolving the conflict?

The Commission has for a long time supported the establishment of a peaceful and secure environment in Somalia. Their assistance aims to restore the rule of law through support of Somali-owned governance and security sector initiatives. To this end it has supported the AU Mission in Somalia, AMISOM with some €15 million, through the African Peace Facility, and some additional €5 million were considered at the time of launching of the EUNAVFOR Somalia (European Commission, 2008). Within the framework of the support to AMISOM the Council assisted with planners for the set-up of the mission (Council of the EU, 2007h).

Following a request by the UN Secretary-General in September 2008 NATO was providing naval escorts under Operation Allied Provider, pending a commitment by the EU.⁷² During the course of the operation, WFP escort ships are provided with close protection, while NATO ships providing a deterrent presence patrol various routes most susceptible to criminal acts against merchant vessels. The extensive area of operation

⁷² Information obtained at NATO website, available at http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Operations/allied_provider/background.html

suggests that the total number of anti-piracy vessels, including EU, NATO and other national operations, operating in the area are not sufficient. The EU actions must be seen as an effort to ensure effective multilateralism. It is concluded that the EU seeks to complement other actors [M2].

A.23.8 Summary

Table A.23 summarises the outcome of the independent variables related to EUNAVFOR Somalia.

Why		What		How		Where		When		Who	
R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I
X			X	X			X	X			X

TABLE A.23: EUNAVFOR Somalia: Summary of Outcome

The mission has a balanced mix of realist and idealist drivers.

Part VI

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Information**

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Samenvatting

Dit proefschrift geldt als beleidsanalyse van het gemeenschappelijk veiligheids- en defensiebeleid (GVDB) om de acties van de Europese Unie (EU) uit te leggen als zijnde een internationale crisismanagementacteur. Binnen dit beleidsveld, portretteert de EU zichzelf als een altruïstische en onbaatzuchtige 'kracht ten goede'. Dit zelfbeeld wordt gedeeld door andere westerse landen en organisaties en de uniciteit ervan wordt bepaald door de sterke correlatie die bestaat tussen het zelfbeeld en de vertegenwoordiging van het GVDB door de onderzoeksgemeenschap, waarbij de EU de meerderheid van de GVDB wetenschappers gecharterd heeft.

Dit onderzoek wordt omlijst door de overkoepelende vraag hoe het besluit van de Raad om deel te nemen aan crisisbeheersingmissies dient te worden uitgelegd en is verdeeld in twee fasen. De primaire doelstelling is bij te dragen tot een meer gedetailleerd beeld van de drijfveren achter EU-crisisbeheersingmissies. Het onderwerp is de verklarende kracht van respectievelijk Realisme en Idealisme, bij kritisch onderzoek door middel van empirische analyse. Bijgevolg draait het onderzoek om twee rudimentaire vragen:

- Hoe effectief zijn respectievelijk Realisme en Idealisme bij de beoordeling van de motivatie van de EU als een crisismanagementacteur?
- Wat is de verklarende kracht van de verschillende scholen binnen het Realisme in de beoordeling van de motivatie van de EU als een crisismanagementacteur?

Een synthese van de bevindingen stelt dat de EU crisismanagement nastreeft op basis van een evenwichtige mix van realistische en idealistische invloeden. GVDB-missies behelzen net zoveel het bevredigen van vitaal eigenbelang als het vooruitstreven van universele waardebelangen. Antwoorden zijn gebaseerd op realistische perceptie van de veiligheidssituatie en aangepast om staatcentrische bedreigingen in de buurt van de EU of in de voormalige kolonin van de lidstaten aan te pakken. Deze acties worden geleid door idealistische uitgangspunten, vaak gepaard gaand met niet-dwingende maatregelen. Antwoorden hebben de neiging om eerder bijstand te leveren via civiele instrumenten in plaats van middels militaire kracht. Werkgelegenheidsberaadslagingen gaan ook gepaard met de consideratie ten opzichte van de versterking van het politieke gewicht van de EU en de Raad, naast het streven een effectief multilateralisme te waarborgen.

Bovendien geeft de EU de voorkeur aan tussenkomst in postconflictsituaties of preventieve verbintenissen zonder af te schrikken. Het is moeilijk te beweren dat de EU een zachte kracht is, terwijl aan de andere kant, de verklarende kracht van het Realisme zacht is. De EU ontwikkelt het GVDB niet om de Amerikaanse dominantie in internationale veiligheid uit te dagen. Integendeel, zij geeft de voorkeur aan het leveren van aanvullende inspanningen. Desalniettemin is de EU beïnvloed door een verlangen om haar afhankelijkheid van de VS op het gebied van veiligheid te verminderen. Sturend realisme voor de EU is voornamelijk gegenereerd door de lidstaten. De motivatie voor de inzet van GVDB-missies wordt beïnvloed door nationale belangen, in het bijzonder die van Frankrijk, evenals de wens om de EU-grenzen te beveiligen, terwijl de EU-bureaucratie ook bijdraagt aan de vormgeving van het EU-gedrag op basis van realisme. Dit omwille van prestige, een verlangen om het GVDB te promoten en om het vermogen van de EU om te handelen aan te tonen. Geen van deze ambities van de EU-bureaucratie hebben een sterke invloed op het EU-gedrag, maar gecombineerd vormen zij een stuwkracht voor Realisme. Aangezien empirisch onderzoek onvoldoende overtuigende correlatie tussen het analytisch kader en de onderzochte criteria van de realist aantoonde, mag men hieruit afleiden dat de verklarende kracht om sturing voor Realisme te verklaren, zacht is, om maar een voor het GVDB vaak gebruikt bijvoeglijk naamwoord te lenen. Samenvattend, de EU denkt als een realist, maar handelt als een idealist. Het is een zachte macht met een harde kern. De Raad is vooringesteld om te handelen op basis van de idealistische principes bij het afstemmen van de missie van het mandaat en de timing van de interventie, maar de overwegingen zijn nog steeds ondersteund door een realistische berekeningswijze. Hij reageert op staatscentrische bedreigingen en stelt geopolitieke prioriteiten in de omgeving.

Curriculum Vitae

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Dennis Gyllensporre was born 1964 in Skellefteå, Sweden. He has served in the Swedish Army since 1983. In 1987 he became a commissioned officer and was promoted to the rank of colonel in 2005. He is married to Helena and has three children (ages 19, 17 and 13 years). He speaks fluent English and basic French and German.

Recent Assignments

- Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, Armed Forces Headquarters, Stockholm, November 2008 - present.
- Chief of Staff, Regional Command North Headquarters, ISAF, Mazar-E-Sharif, Afghanistan, March - November 2008.
- Chief of Doctrine and Concepts Branch, Policy & Plans Division, European Union Military Staff, Brussels, Belgium, July 2005- March 2008.
- Chief of Staff, Swedish Joint Forces Command, Uppsala, Sweden, 2005.
- Military Advisor, Department for International and Security Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Stockholm, 2002-2004 (excluding a period for overseas deployment).
- Chief Operations Officer, Joint Military Mission, Nuba Mountains, Sudan, 2002-2003.
- Battalion Commander, Headquarters Battalion, 19th Infantry Regiment, Boden, Sweden, 2001- 2002.
- Desk Officer for National and NATO/PfP Defence Planning, J 5, Armed Forces Headquarters, Stockholm, 1998-2000.
- Nordic-Polish Brigade Liaison Officer to the USA Division Headquarters (SFOR), Tuzla, Bosnia Herzegovina, 1997-1998.

Academic Record

- Joint Combined Warfighting School (JCWS), US Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University, Norfolk VA, USA, 2005.
- Master of Military Arts and Science, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS, USA, 2000-2001.
- Master of Business Administration in Corporate Strategy, Warwick University, Coventry, United Kingdom, 1994-1997 .
- National Defence College, Stockholm, Sweden, 1993-1994 and 1995-1997.
- Master of Science in Computer Science, Royal National Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden, 1985-1991.

Publications in English and French

- International Legality, the Use of Military Force, and Burdens of Persuasion: Self-Defense, the Initiation of Hostilities, and the Impact of the Choice Between Two Evils on the Perception of International Legitimacy, (co-author with Corn, G.), *Pace Law Review*, 2010, 30 (2), 484-543.
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- *Adding Nonlinear Tools to the Strategists Toolbox*, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2001.

Awards and Honorary Assignments

- Recipient of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Award in 2001 for academic achievements at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
- Recipient of *die Einsatzmedaille der Bundeswehr in Bronze* in 2009 for leadership achievements in Afghanistan while serving with the German ISAF contingent.
- Member of the Swedish Delegation for Research in Military History.

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